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Summary: By its nature, international air transport exposes carriers and their customers 
to risks that arise from crossing jurisdictional borders. For these reasons, treaties, such 
as the Montreal Convention 1999 (MC99), lay down provisions on jurisdiction aimed at 
securing uniformity while assuring an equitable balance of interests between 
stakeholders. However, these provisions have caused controversy and fuelled wasteful 
litigation over the matter of choice of forum in passenger claims. In this context, the 
common law doctrine of forum non conveniens (FNC) has been employed by defendants 
to defeat claimant passenger’s choice of forum. This thesis critically examines whether 
FNC is consistent with MC99 and/or its policies. In so doing, the broader question of how 
to regulate choice of forum in international aviation litigation is analysed. It is argued that 
MC99, as the successor to the Warsaw Convention 1929, is predicated on an 
anachronistic understanding of itself as a discrete system grounded on the two-party 
paradigm of claimant passenger versus defendant carrier. It is demonstrated that this 
does not correspond to the reality of modern international aviation litigation where third-
parties play a critical role. Claimant passengers now have access to alternative remedies 
and with it, additional choices as to forum. In turn, the liability relationships between 
carriers and third parties (such as aircraft manufacturers) have evolved and bound them 
together, often in opposition to the claimant passenger. Behind the carrier and third 
parties stands the aviation insurer, calling the shots and pulling the strings. MC99 is 
merely a component of a bigger aviation accident passenger compensation system, the 
interdependency of which means that evaluating choice of forum under MC99 requires 
understanding this system’s organization and operation. This thesis puts forward a 
proposal for reform which takes account of this bigger picture and will regulate choice of 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
1.1  The Crash of West Caribbean Airways Flight 708 
On 16 August 2005, West Caribbean Airways Flight 708 took off from Tocumen International 
Airport in Panama set for Aimé Césaire International Airport in Fort-de-France, the capital city of 
the French overseas region of Martinique. A little over an hour later, it crashed near Machiques, 
Venezuela, killing everyone on board.1 In addition to the 8 Colombian crew members, Flight 708 
was carrying 152 passengers, mostly civil servants from Martinique and their families who had 
been vacationing in Panama. The charter flight was operated by the Colombian airline, West 
Caribbean Airways (WCW) which was established in 1998 and ceased operations following the 
crash. The aircraft, a McDonnell-Douglas MD82, manufactured in 1986, was owned by a US 
leasing corporation in Nevada called MK Aviation and had been delivered to WCW on 10 January 
2005.2 
The report3 of the Venezuelan accident investigation authority concluded that the aircraft had 
been airworthy at the time. It had passed a complete inspection by Colombian authorities the 
same week as the accident and had also been subjected to two recent inspections by French 
authorities in Martinique.4 Flight 708 was WCW’s second fatal accident of 2005. The earlier crash 
had occurred on 26 March 2005 in Colombia and resulted in the deaths of 6 passengers and 2 
crew.5 Three months prior, the airline had been fined by the Civil Aviation Authority of Colombia 
for 14 violations of airline regulations, including failures to provide required pilot training.6 The 
financial situation of the airline was dire and the report concluded that this had contributed to the 
accident by generating an atmosphere of uncertainty and stress for its employees. The pilots had 
not been paid in several months and the report even noted that the captain had been moonlighting 
during his off hours by running a bar. These and various other psycho-emotional factors were 
identified as contributing negatively to the pilots’ performance.  
The cause of the accident was ultimately determined to be human factors. The disaster had 
resulted from the flight crew operating the aircraft at conditions beyond its capability due to the 
inappropriate configuration of the flight settings and the use of the de-icing system. In simple 
terms, the aircraft was flown too high. Due to a lack of situational awareness, a failure to utilize 
                                                       
1 ‘Grim Find at Venezuela Crash Site’ BBC News (17 August 2005) <http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-
/2/hi/americas/4158126.stm> accessed 28 February 2019. 
2 Complaint for Damages (Doc 1) at [28]-[30], [38], In re West Caribbean Airways SA 616 F Supp 2d 
1299 (SD Fla 2007) (No 06-CV-22748).  
3 See ‘English Translation of the Main Text of Venezuelan Accident Report JIAAC-9-058-2005’ 
<www.skybrary.aero/bookshelf/books/1930.pdf> accessed 22 February 2019.  
4 ‘Grim Find at Venezuela Crash Site’ (n 1). 
5 F Fiorino ‘West Caribbean Crash Probe’ (2005) 163(8) Aviation Week & Space Technology 50. 
6 E Ellsworth and J Forero ‘160 Die in Crash of Airliner in Venezuela’ New York Times (17 August 2005) 
<www.nytimes.com/2005/08/17/world/americas/160-die-in-crash-of-airliner-in-venezuela.html?_r=0> 
accessed 22 February 2019.  
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crew resource management and the absence of effective communication, the flight crew failed to 
take the correct remedial measures to recover. In fact, the captain’s interventions had only 
contributed to worsening the situation.  
In the wake of an aviation accident, such as that of WCW-708, although compensation is rarely 
the immediate concern of the representatives of the victims, the issue will inevitably arise at an 
early stage. Law firms specialising in aviation litigation are quick to respond, sending agents to 
offer their services to the families and representatives of the deceased and/or injured victims. The 
competition to sign-up clients is fierce amongst these law firms, mostly of US origin but also from 
the UK and other jurisdictions. One hears shocking stories (albeit from defence lawyers) of all 
forms of skulduggery and unethical behaviour. Not all victims are alike, a seriously burned victim 
is worth more than a dead one since a jury’s sympathies are more easily aroused by the disfigured 
visage of a living victim on the stand than the idea of one in the grave. This is not to say that the 
law firms representing the airlines and other interested parties do not participate in the post-
accident free-for-all. Claimant lawyers also point the finger at defence lawyers, recounting similar 
stories of questionable practices, such as greasing the wheels for quick settlement by offering 
televisions and other inducements to victims from poor and unsophisticated backgrounds.  
In speaking to aviation lawyers from both sides, it becomes immediately apparent that there 
is little love lost between the claimant and defence sides. The question as to what extent these 
anecdotal horror stories have been exaggerated is not a question that this research will address. 
However, it does demonstrate the emotive and morally charged backdrop against which the 
matter of aviation litigation unfolds. It is always important to remember that these cases involve 
terrible events in which lives have been lost in violent and often terrifying circumstances. These 
is loss and suffering on all sides, not only for the families and friends of those injured or killed, but 
also for the carrier involved, for whom the accident will likely be the worst moment in its history 
and in which it too has suffered tragic human losses. Conscious and respectful of this context, 
this work explores jurisdictional aspects of the legal regime by which those suffering loss arising 
from passenger death or injury during international carriage by air seek compensation.  
 
1.2  Jurisdiction and West Caribbean Airways 
Under the Montreal Convention 1999 (MC99),7 the applicable instrument governing the liability of 
the carrier for passenger death or injury arising during most international carriage by air, there 
exists a presumption of fault on the carrier in the event of an accident. The burden of proof rests, 
not on the claimant to prove fault, but on the carrier to prove the absence of fault. Where a carrier 
can make out this defence, it is entitled to limit the maximum extent of its liability. Otherwise, as 
in WCW-708, the carrier faces unlimited liability. On the facts of WCW-708, the negligence of the 
carrier was incontestable and thus the question of liability was not truly at issue. In a case like 
this, indeed in most aviation litigation—especially under MC99—the real crux of the matter is the 
question of damages. Claimant lawyers consider themselves duty bound to secure for their clients 
the largest award possible. Since the ultimate quantum recoverable is often dictated by the forum 
                                                       
7 Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules for International Carriage by Air (signed 28 May 1999, 
entered into force 04 November 2003) 2242 UNTS 309 (MC99). 
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in which one sues, it is not surprising that choice of forum is the key factor in international aviation 
litigation. The quantum recoverable varies substantially from one forum to another. For instance, 
one jurisdiction might allow for the determination of damages by a jury rather than a judge and/or 
the recoverable heads of damage may be broader in one forum than in the other.  
Under MC99, a claimant does not have complete freedom of choice when it comes to deciding 
where to bring an action. In all cases, the claimant is constrained to bringing his claim before the 
courts of one of a limited number of specified forums. Under Article 33 of MC99, there are five 
grounds provided for jurisdiction, which on application to a given case will generally yield a choice 
between the courts of two or three different States. In the case of WCW, the choice of forums 
available to the majority of the claimants would have been between Colombia, Martinique (i.e. 
France), and the USA. Unsurprisingly, claimant lawyers chose to sue in a US federal court, 
specifically the District Court for the Southern District of Florida. 
Given that WCW-708 was a flight between Panama and Martinique, operated by a Colombian 
airline, which had crashed in Venezuela, with only French and Columbian nationals on board, it 
might seem perplexing that any resulting litigation would find its way before a court in the US. 
Plaintiff counsel listed multiple defendants to the actions, including WCW, its insurer, Asegurados 
Colseguros SA (an Allianz corporation), a Martinique travel agent called Globe Trotters de Riviere 
Salee Travel (hereinafter “Globe Trotters”), as well as the owners/lessors of the aircraft, MK 
Aviation.8 In addition, Newvac Corp and Go 2 Galaxy Inc, both Florida based, were listed as 
defendants. The two corporations, along with another defendant, Jacques Cimetier, a French 
national resident in Florida who owned and controlled both corporations, were, for the purposes 
of the case, treated as one and referred to in common as Newvac. It was through Newvac’s 
connections to Florida that the claimants were able to ground jurisdiction within the US. In simple 
terms, although WCW was the operating carrier, Newvac was the contractual carrier and being 
both incorporated and having its principal place of business in the US, MC99 permitted the action 
to be brought against Newvac in US. 
Whilst the claimants had overcome the initial hurdle of establishing jurisdiction in the US under 
MC99, the defendant had an ace up its sleeve in the form a common law doctrine known as forum 
non conveniens (FNC). Under this doctrine, a court may, on the request of the defendant and at 
the discretion of the court, decline to exercise jurisdiction over a dispute, not for lack of 
competence, but because an alternative forum is considered to be the more appropriate one for 
resolving the dispute. Although a feature of the legal systems of many common law States (see 
Chapter 2), the doctrine is virtually absent from civilian legal systems who generally view it with 
contempt (civilian attitudes to FNC are addressed in Chapter 3).  
The defendant’s motion for FNC dismissal emphasized the preponderance of connecting 
factors between the case and Martinique while noting the relative poverty of the links to the US.9 
The only link to the US that the defendants acknowledged was the incorporation of Newvac in 
Florida. The plaintiffs and decedent passengers were residents of Martinique, evidence and 
witnesses as to damages was primarily located there and the substantive legal issues would be 
                                                       
8 Complaint for Damages (Doc 1) at [16], [22], West Caribbean Airways (n 2). Ultimately, MK Aviation 
and Globe Trotters were removed from the proceedings. 
9 Defendant’s Refiled Motion to Dismiss on Grounds of Forum Non Conveniens (Doc 164) at 3-4, ibid. 
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governed by its law. The defendants argued that they would be prejudiced by trial in the US since 
the court would be unable to compel the appearance of certain witnesses and some evidence 
would be unobtainable. In light of these considerations, the defendants argued that the balance 
of private and public interest factors overwhelmingly indicated that the courts of Martinique should 
be preferred. Martinique, they argued, was the more convenient forum for resolution of the 
dispute. Defendants were willing to make the following concessions, they agreed to submit to the 
jurisdiction of the Martinique courts, to concede liability, to waive any statute of limitations, and 
not to invoke any defence under Article 21(2) of MC99.10 This is a tactic frequently employed by 
defendants in aviation litigation. By giving these and other commitments they effectively limit the 
scope of litigation to the matter of damages, in so doing the FNC analysis is reframed and the 
likelihood of dismissal is greatly increased.  
The plaintiffs resisted dismissal. If dismissal were granted then they would be forced to pursue 
their claims against a US domiciled defendant in one of the other jurisdictions permitted under 
MC99 (most likely Martinique). They argued that Article 33 of MC99 gives the plaintiff an 
unqualified right to choose which of the available forums to bring an action in. Having exercised 
that choice, it should be inviolable, i.e. the defendant should not be able to undermine it by means 
of FNC. Plaintiffs challenged the legitimacy of the doctrine of FNC within the MC99 regime, 
arguing that not only is it nowhere referenced in the Convention, it is patently inconsistent with 
the regime’s goal of uniformity and its emphasis on consumer protection.  
Claimants relied heavily on the decision of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Hosaka 
v United Airlines Inc.11 The Hosaka decision had held that under the Warsaw Convention12 (the 
predecessor to MC99) a court has mandatory jurisdiction over a dispute properly brought before 
it and is precluded from declining jurisdiction on grounds of FNC. However, in West Caribbean 
Airways, the judge (Ungaro J) determined that the Hosaka decision was of ‘limited precedential 
value’,13 because in that case the Ninth Circuit had specifically stated that it was not expressing 
an opinion on the availability of FNC under MC99, an entirely new treaty with its own drafting 
history. For these reasons, although the text of Article 33 of MC99 was very similar to that of 
Article 28 of the Warsaw Convention, Ungaro J decided that she was faced with resolving the 
availability of FNC under MC99, ‘apparently as a matter of first impression’.14   
Judge Ungaro found the text of Article 33 to be ‘unambiguous and dispositive’15 in providing 
that questions of procedure shall be governed by the law of the forum. Although not containing 
any express mention of FNC, the court resolved that because FNC was so firmly entrenched in 
the procedural law of the US at the time at which MC99 was drafted that the text clearly permitted 
it. Furthermore, Ungaro J found that the availability of FNC was consistent with the purpose of 
MC99 and its drafting history.16 
With the question of the applicability of FNC under MC99 resolved, the court next had to apply 
                                                       
10 Defendant’s Refiled Motion to Dismiss on Grounds of Forum Non Conveniens (Doc 164) 2-3, ibid. 
11 305 F 3d 989 (9th Cir 2002) cert denied 537 US 1227 (2003). See Chapter 5 for further analysis. 
12 Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Carriage by Air (signed 12 
October 1929, entered into force 13 February 1933) 137 LNTS 11 (Warsaw Convention). 
13 West Caribbean Airways (n 2) 1309. 
14 ibid. 
15 ibid 1310. 
16 ibid 1328. 
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the doctrine to the case at hand. Although the doctrine varies between jurisdictions—sometimes 
substantially—and the manner of its application is highly specific to facts and circumstances of 
each case, it is worthwhile giving a high-level summary of how it was applied in the West 
Caribbean Airways case. Not only will this give an indicative impression of how the FNC is applied 
generally (specific doctrines will be examined in detail in Chapter 2) it will enrich the context for 
consideration of the issues raised in West Caribbean Airways, issues to be tackled throughout 
this thesis. 
 Given the facts involved, it was not surprising that Ungaro J took the prima facie view that 
there was obviously a strong case for FNC dismissal.17 To begin with, Ungaro J was satisfied that 
the courts of Martinique were available, insofar as they had jurisdiction over the dispute in 
question, and that there was no reason to doubt their adequacy.18 The plaintiffs had sought to 
challenge the adequacy of the courts on grounds, inter alia, that the judicial system in Martinique 
consisted only of a single four-chamber court and that the proceedings would therefore be highly 
inefficient due to delay. Ungaro J was unpersuaded.19 In considering FNC dismissals, courts do 
not require that the alternative forum be perfect or offer a superior service or remedy. 
Next, Ungaro J noted that none of plaintiffs or decedent passengers were US citizens and all 
were (or had been) resident in Martinique. The various sources of proof likely to be required in 
the litigation, e.g. damages evidence, were localized in Martinique, not the US, so it would 
undoubtedly be more convenient for the parties that the collection of such evidence be through 
the local Martinique court.20 A very practical consideration was the issue of translation costs. If 
the litigation were to be held in the US, much of the evidence would have to be translated from 
French into English; such cost would be avoided if the litigation took place in Martinique.21 This 
neatly demonstrates how practical the perspective of courts can be in applying FNC. 
A group of factors taken into consideration in FNC dismissals by US courts are those pertaining 
to the convenience/appropriateness of trial from the perspective of the court itself and of the 
general public in the locality. As we shall see in Chapter 2, these “public interest factors” are not 
an express factor under the English doctrine of FNC. In West Caribbean Airways, Ungaro J was 
convinced that the public interest was much greater in Martinique (for many of the same reasons 
as discussed above). Generally speaking, there is an interest in having local disputes resolved in 
the local forum.22 The burden on a US court and taxpayer of hearing what it regarded as a foreign 
dispute was unjustifiable in the circumstances. The live testimony of more than a hundred 
witnesses may have been required, for which translation services would be necessary in a US 
court.23 Lastly there was the question of the application of French law to some of the issues 
involved. It is generally regarded as more appropriate for a French court (e.g. Martinique) to apply 
French law than a US court. However, Ungaro J did accept that some issues would be governed 
by US law for which it would be more appropriate for a US court to apply.24 On balance, the factor 
                                                       
17 Order Granting FNC Dismissal (Doc 184) at 4, West Caribbean Airways (n 2). 
18 Order Granting FNC Dismissal (Doc 184) at 6-7, ibid. 
19 Order Granting FNC Dismissal (Doc 184) 7-8, ibid. 
20 Order Granting FNC Dismissal (Doc 184) at 8-9, ibid. 
21 Order Granting FNC Dismissal (Doc 184) at 11-12, ibid. 
22 Order Granting FNC Dismissal (Doc 184) at 13, ibid. 
23 Order Granting FNC Dismissal (Doc 184) at 14, ibid. 
24 Order Granting FNC Dismissal (Doc 184) at 14, ibid. 
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of the application of foreign law was not decisive. It is not uncommon that some of the factors in 
the FNC analysis will be evenly balanced. However, it is to the overall balance of factors that the 
court will look to make its final determination. In West Caribbean Airways, Ungaro J decided that 
the balance laid in favour of dismissal to Martinique.25 
In 2009, the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed Ungaro J’s decisions and then, 
in 2010, a petition for a writ of certiorari was denied by the US Supreme Court.26 Surprisingly, the 
story did not end there. There was to be a twist in the tale which would see the plaintiffs back 
before Ungaro J in 2012, seeking to have the 2007 FNC dismissal vacated.  
Immediately after the 2007 FNC order, the plaintiffs had commenced proceedings in 
Martinique against Newvac. Unexpectedly, the Newvac action was not commenced with a view 
to resolving their claims for damages. Instead, the plaintiffs had petitioned the Tribunal de Grande 
Instance (TGI) in Fort-de-France, Martinique, to declare itself without jurisdiction to hear such a 
claim. The plaintiffs maintained that they had not chosen Martinique as their forum and only 
appeared before it because they were forced to do so on account of the FNC dismissal from the 
US district court. It was their view, per Article 33(1) MC99, that jurisdiction could only vest in a 
court by act of the plaintiff’s choice and, regardless of Article 33(4), this choice of forum cannot 
be nullified and substituted by a rule of internal procedural law, such as FNC. The plaintiff’s 
maintained that the choice of the US district court effectively preempted and precluded the 
Martinique TGI from hearing the dispute.  
The TGI rejected the claimant’s petition and ordered them to submit proof of damages to the 
court. At this point in time, WCW and its insurer had conceded liability and surrendered €450 
million to provide for full compensation in accordance with French law.27 Over 400 claims had 
been submitted to the court in Martinique, of which more than 100 had been settled.28 Despite the 
ready availability of full compensation, the claimants sought to appeal the decision of the TGI to 
the Cour d’Appel de Fort-de-France which duly affirmed the TGI’s decision.29 As a last throw of 
the dice, the claimants sought review of the decision by the Cour de Cassation in Paris, France. 
On 7 December 2011, the Cour de Cassation found in favour of the claimants and quashed 
the decision of the Cour d’Appel.30 The Cour de Cassation concluded that it is the exclusive right 
of the claimant to choose their forum from those available under MC99 and that an internal rule 
of procedure, such as FNC, cannot be invoked to disturb that choice. For the Cour de Cassation, 
this interpretation was necessary to meet MC99’s objectives of predictability, certainty and 
uniformity.31 In consequence, jurisdiction of the chosen forum is mandatory under MC99. Once 
the chosen forum is seised of the case, the courts of any other State identified by Article 33 lose 
their jurisdiction over the dispute. The Cour de Cassation held that by assuming jurisdiction, the 
                                                       
25 Order Granting FNC Dismissal (Doc 184) at 15, ibid. 
26 Pierre-Louis v Newvac Corp 584 F 3d 1052 (11th Cir 2009) cert denied sub nom Bapte v West 
Caribbean Airways 560 US 952 (2010).  
27 Order on Motion to Vacate (Doc 301) at 10, West Caribbean Airways (n 2). 
28 ibid. 
29 Certified English Translation of Cour d’Appel Decision 10/239 (Doc 289.4) at 9, West Caribbean 
Airways (n 2). 
30 Cass Civ (1ère) Arrêt n 1201 du 7 décembre 2011, Antoine X c Newvac, n 10-30919. For an English 
translation, see Certified English Translation of Cour de Cassation Judgment (Doc 289.8), West Caribbean 
Airways (n 2). 
31 Antoine X (n 30). The Court’s ruling is considered further in Chapter Five of this work (see Chapter 
5.5.3). 
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court of Martinique had, in the circumstances, acted contrary to the terms of MC99.   
Seemingly vindicated by the Cour de Cassation, the plaintiffs returned to Florida seeking to 
have the FNC order vacated. Judge Ungaro took an unsurprisingly dim view of what she 
described as ‘the latest offensive in Plaintiffs' four-year campaign to subvert the forum non 
conveniens dismissal.’32 Unfazed, Ungaro J voiced her disagreement with the conclusion reached 
by the Cour de Cassation, noting that a US court was not bound by the analysis of the French 
Court33 and need not blindly abide by it.34 With a warning of possible sanctions should they launch 
yet another assault on the FNC order,35 Ungaro J denied the motion to vacate, stating: 
[T]he Court can only marvel at [Plaintiffs’] relentless four-year campaign to subvert this Court's 
order dismissing their case pursuant to forum non conveniens. Although none are United 
States citizens, what they hope to gain apparently is a more financially generous forum. The 
[Plaintiffs] are not content with receiving 100 percent of their Montreal Convention damages 
from a French court—they would rather play their hand here. But, their transparent avarice 
hardly suffices as a fair, just or equitable reason to vacate the earlier FNC Order. … [T]o undo 
the forum non conveniens dismissal would sanction Plaintiffs’ disrespect for the lawful order 
of this United States court and encourage other litigants to engage in similar conduct.36 
In its 2011 annual report, the Cour de Cassation made the following statement in respect of its 
decision in the case, it said, ‘by adopting [its] position, the Supreme Court of France brings into 
the international legal order the “dialogue of judges” required by the absence of an international 
jurisdiction capable of securing a uniform interpretation of said Convention (between all State 
Parties).’37 The French Court’s statement is open to interpretation. It could be taken as an 
example of French judicial chauvinism, a thinly veiled cliché aimed at implying that, unlike US 
courts, the French courts understand the value of judicial cooperation. On the other hand, rather 
than just shield itself behind an unequivocal statement as to the veracity of its decision, the Court 
may have been earnestly leaving the door open for further dialogue. To date, the US courts have 
not picked up the baton and responded to this invitation to parley. Instead, they have continued 
to apply the doctrine of FNC to dismiss cases under MC99.38 The views from the courts of other 
jurisdictions, common law and civilian, are eagerly anticipated but the opportunity has not yet 
arisen for such consideration. How will future claimants, in similar circumstances to those in West 
Caribbean Airways, be perceived by these courts? As avaricious forum shoppers, or as deserving 
victims seeking the fullest vindication of their rights? 
It is clearly a worrying and undesirable state of affairs that so essential a matter as jurisdiction 
under an international treaty aimed at achieving uniformity of law is the subject of such radically 
opposed interpretations by two of its most influential State parties. Nonetheless, the matter 
remains in a juridical limbo while the deadlock persists.  
1.3  Overview 
This catalyst for this research was the compelling doctrinal conundrum posed by the controversy 
                                                       
32 Order on Motion to Vacate (Doc 301) at 3, West Caribbean Airways (n 2). 
33 Order on Motion to Vacate (Doc 301) at 16, ibid citing Osorio v Dole Food Co 665 F Supp 2d 1307, 
1325–1326 (SD Fla 2009). 
34 Order on Motion to Vacate (Doc 301) at 16, West Caribbean Airways (n 2). 
35 Order on Motion to Vacate (Doc 301) at 25, ibid. 
36 Order on Motion to Vacate (Doc 301) at 24-25, ibid. 
37 Cour de Cassation, ‘Annual Report 2011’ (2011) 514, quoted in S Adeline ‘The Forum Non Conveniens 
Doctrine Put to the Test of Uniform Private International Law in Relation to Air Carriers’ Liability: Lack of 
Harmony between US and French Decisional Outcomes’ (2013) 18 Unif L Rev 313, 327. 
38 See Chapter 5. 
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surrounding the West Caribbean Airways case. The immediate question was whether the doctrine 
of FNC was available under MC99 to begin with. Starting with the text of MC99 and looking at in 
light of its context and purpose of the treaty as a whole, a host of questions presented themselves: 
Is it fair to deny the claimant his/her choice of forum under MC99? Conversely, is it fair to the 
defendant carrier to subject it to litigation in an inappropriate forum? Is the doctrine consistent 
with, and conducive to, the furtherance of, MC99’s policy objectives? Should the jurisdictional 
provisions of MC99 make it possible for claimant passengers to secure windfall recoveries in 
foreign forums? The exploration of these questions raised various issues pertaining to the 
jurisdictional scheme of MC99 but they ultimately boiled down to the confrontation of the 
competing interests of the parties to the litigation of MC99 passenger claims. Interests which drive 
both parties’ choice of forum. Whilst it is the claimant who has the initiative in choosing his forum 
under MC99, the defendant can, through the use of FNC, turn the choice of forum into a dialectical 
process. In so doing, the jurisdictional question of forum becomes a litigational battleground. 
In the field of MC99 passenger claims litigation, both the claimant lawyers and defendant 
lawyers devote much time and effort to jurisdictional strategizing. Because the US is currently the 
focal point for such litigation, a core pillar of that strategy is FNC (whether as a question of 
securing dismissal or resisting it). The determination of the jurisdictional question is, in many 
cases, the most important because it is often outcome determinative. In other words, once the 
issue of forum has been decided, the parties will frequently settle the action. For this reason, both 
sides will employ tactics that range from the ingenious to the utterly disingenuous—often both—
all in order to secure, through the selection of a particular forum, a jurisdictional advantage that 
can ultimately be translated into a pecuniary gain. The resulting litigation on the matter of 
jurisdiction is both time-consuming and expensive. 
That FNC motions are outcome determinative means that the parties essentially agree on, or 
at least do not sufficiently dispute, other matters, most notably the question of liability. The irony 
is obvious. What this also demonstrates is that by and large MC99 has been successful in 
lessening the amount of litigation on the essential matter of liability. Much less litigation over 
liability is seen under MC99 that under its predecessor regime, the Warsaw Convention System 
(WCS).39 The changes made to the liability provisions have undoubtedly benefitted the claimant 
passenger and greatly reduced the amount of litigation. Lawyers for both sides jokingly complain 
that MC99 has deprived them of the steady stream of business that they enjoyed under WCS. 
However, it is the preponderance of litigation over the question of jurisdiction, particularly the 
recurring incidence of FNC motions, that sets the alarm bells ringing and strongly suggests that 
all is not well with MC99.  
If only this jurisdictional predicament could be overcome then MC99 would surely become an 
even greater success. The answer may seem as simple as jettisoning FNC altogether from MC99. 
However this may be achieved, the express exclusion of the possibility for a court to decline to 
exercise jurisdiction properly vested in it by MC99 is certainly an option to consider. FNC is, after 
all, only a common law doctrine and so many of the world’s legal systems appear to do just fine 
without it. Attractive though this solution might be, it fails to consider at least one crucial factor. At 
                                                       
39 The Warsaw Convention System (WCS) consists of the Warsaw Convention of 1929 and the various 
amending protocols, a supplementary Convention and a number of inter-carrier agreements.  
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this particular point in time, it is the common law courts (specifically those of the US) which are 
the primary locations for aviation litigation. That being so, FNC plays an important role in keeping 
down the cost of aviation accidents. This is clearly advantageous to the aviation industry, the 
benefit of which is ultimately felt by the fare-paying public, albeit at the expense of the claimant. 
However, does the claimant really suffer by having his compensation assessed by the court with 
the closest connection to, and greatest interest in, the accident and its litigation? In the case of 
West Caribbean Airways, was it not more equitable for all concerned that the courts of the 
plaintiffs’ domicile (i.e. Martinique) assess the level of damages rather than a foreign court with 
little or no connection to the dispute? Resolving this jurisdictional dilemma is clearly much more 
than a cold doctrinal exercise, it entails grappling with deeply divisive ethical considerations. 
Overcoming the stalemate reached in the West Caribbean Airways case entails understanding 
the place of FNC within the jurisdictional scheme of MC99. At its simplest, FNC is ultimately just 
a doctrinal mechanism for resolving a dispute between the litigants regarding choice of forum. It 
presupposes the existence of concurrent jurisdiction. Where only a single forum is available then 
FNC has no part to play. However, once there is a choice between available forums, then the 
space is created for conflict between the interests of the litigants. Where the interests of the 
defendant are better served by trial in a foreign forum, then the doctrine provides an avenue by 
which the defendant can petition the court to show preference for its choice of forum. FNC is thus 
a stage upon which is played out the drama arising from the conflicting interests of claimant and 
defendant with respect to choice of forum. Taking FNC as the prism through which to examine 
choice of forum grants insight into the interests driving the claimant’s initial choice, as well as 
those manifested in the defendant’s opposition. It is at the level of this interests analysis that a 
bigger picture is revealed, one which takes us beyond MC99. 
This bigger picture consists of two inter-related aspects. First, the availability of alternative 
remedies for passenger claims, that is, alternatives to a claim against the carrier under MC99.40 
Second, the influence of other stakeholders, specifically third parties to the passenger-carrier 
relationship. Let us look at each aspect in turn.41 
The typical claimant in the event of an aviation accident is not limited to solely pursuing the 
carrier through MC99. In fact, this is just one option from amongst many. Due to the nature of 
aviation accidents—which typically involve a multitude of contributing factors—the aviation 
claimant will usually have several options to choose from. There will often exist the possibility of 
bringing a claim against a number of alternative defendants, typically aircraft or component 
manufacturers, or, as has become fashionable of late, an aircraft lessor. These actions are not 
based on the cause of action governed by MC99 but arise independently, usually under national 
law. Whilst an MC99 action represents a highly attractive option to a claimant, what American 
claimant lawyers colloquially refer to as a “slam-dunk”, the reality is that there has been a 
proliferation in aviation litigation outside MC99. Why? The answer comes down to choice of forum.  
The claimant’s choice of defendant is frequently driven by the choice of forum in which to 
litigate. This is because the forums available to a claimant depend on and often differ between 
the various potential defendants. For example, the claimant passenger might only have the option 
                                                       
40 The topic of Chapter 6. 
41 These will be explored in detail in Chapters 7 and 8. 
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of suing the carrier under MC99 in either Cyprus or Greece, whereas, if the claimant decides to 
sue the manufacturer then the action could be taken in the US.42 The decision of which defendant 
to sue is often driven by interests of forum selection. In simple terms, an action against the carrier 
under MC99 may not provide as advantageous a forum for the plaintiff as an action against the 
manufacturer or some other defendant. 
There are many factors that make trial in the US desirable. The availability of contingency fees 
is a major advantage, without the possibility of which suing a rich corporate defendant would be 
beyond the means of many claimants. Likewise, the absence of the loser pays principles when it 
comes to legal costs makes US litigation less risky for the claimant. The broad general jurisdiction 
of US courts is attractive to claimant lawyers because it permits for unified litigation against 
multiple defendants in a single forum. The robustness of US judicial process, with its liberal and 
far-reaching pre-trial discovery rules, is the envy of many foreign litigators and also acts to 
augment the appeal of the US as a forum. In addition, a potential claimant can rely on the 
existence of (and competition between) highly qualified law firms with a wealth of experience and 
expertise in aviation litigation. These are among the most compelling factors which make trial of 
passenger aviation accident litigation in the US desirable, but, once we get down to the crux of 
the matter, the decisive factor behind the choice of a US forum is quantum of damages. 
The potential recovery in a US forum is likely to be far greater than in the claimant’s home 
forum because of the right to trial by jury and the broad heads of damages available.43 Even when 
the choice of law rules likely to be applied by those courts will call for the application of foreign 
law for the determination of damages, a jury award in the US will still nearly always be higher than 
if the foreign court were to make the determination. Provided a jury is given the task of determining 
damages of a general nature, then there is a good likelihood that they will award an amount far 
in excess than would have been granted by a judge in the claimant’s home forum. For these 
reasons, the US is spoken of as the El Dorado for injured plaintiffs, the promised land in which 
they can expect an award akin in value to winning their national lottery.44 
That a claimant will elect to forego a tailor-made remedy against a carrier under MC99 in 
favour of an alternative general remedy provokes searching questions about the efficacy of MC99 
as a system for compensating passengers. As will be shown, this a reflection of the very different 
legal landscape within which MC99 exists, comparative to that which existed at the time of the 
Warsaw Convention’s drafting. One has to ask if MC99 (as successor to WCS) has failed to 
appreciate its place in the bigger picture of modern international aviation litigation. The existence 
of alternative remedies has also played a part in the emergence of the second aspect of the bigger 
picture, i.e. the involvement of third parties. 
Turning to this second aspect. The natural tendency is to look upon MC99 litigation as being 
only two-party in form. However, an analysis of the interests actually involved brings to light a 
complex web of devices by which third parties can affect the litigation. The truth is that disputes 
                                                       
42 See e.g., Clerides v Boeing Co 534 F 3d 623 (7th Cir 2008). The plaintiff sued the US manufacturer of 
the aircraft in Illinois in relation to the death of a passenger in an air crash in Greece of a flight by the Cypriot 
airline Helios Airways between Larnaca, Cyprus, and Athens, Greece.  
43 W Freedman Product Liability Actions by Foreign Plaintiffs in the United States (Kluwer Law 1988) 13. 
44 MW Gordon ‘Forum Non Conveniens Misconstrued: A Response to Henry Saint Dahl’ (2006) 38 U 
Miami Inter-Am L Rev 141, 145. 
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between the nominal parties to MC99 litigation, i.e. the claimant passenger and the defendant 
carrier, represent only the tip of the iceberg. Beneath the surface is to be found the surreptitious 
involvement of third parties, linked to the carrier (qua nominal defendant) by numerous devices 
for risk allocation and loss spreading. These devices take many forms, either arising by force of 
law or by contractual agreement, but through each of which a third party gains considerable 
interest in and influence over the litigation. The most direct manifestation of which is something 
so patently obvious that it is staggering that it so frequently goes uncommented upon, that is, the 
fact that in the majority of cases the substantive and operative interests are those of the carrier’s 
insurer. The truth is that it is not the defendant carrier who is calling the shots but its insurer. 
Through subrogation or contractual assignment, the insurer holds claims control in the vast 
majority of cases where airlines are being sued by passengers.  
Furthermore, linked to the defendant carrier are various third-party defendants who may bear 
concurrent liability and against whom the carrier’s insurer has a subrogated claim to contribution 
or indemnity. The true picture is that the claimant passenger is not simply faced with litigating 
against the carrier—a formidable foe in its own right—but must also contend with other parties, 
often possessing extraordinary resources and power. The ugly truth is that the insurer, acting in 
the name of the carrier, often cooperates with potential third-party defendants and/or their insurers 
(not unfrequently the same insurer as the carrier) to secure a jurisdictional advantage that will 
translate into lesser net liability. The cheaper the award against the carrier, the cheaper the third-
party’s contribution or indemnity payment. In many cases, the potential defendants will have 
already reached (well in advance of any litigation) a sharing agreement with respect to liability for 
a given accident and will coordinate their efforts to secure the outcome that best serves their 
common interest. 
 Common to both aspects is the tendency to focus on the two-party paradigm of passenger 
versus carrier. Although the court docket presents a simple picture, the reality is that on account 
of these risk allocation and loss spreading devices, the true litigation relationship does not 
conform to the two-party paradigm. Whilst the courts may be constrained to dealing with the 
parties appearing before them, the same constraint does not limit the policymaker, and yet, these 
third-party interests have not been given the consideration in the context of MC99 that they 
demand. The result has been the myopic exclusion of vital factors which contribute to making up 
the bigger picture within which MC99 is only a part. In consequence, MC99 is premised on a 
skewed appreciation of the interests actually involved. It has failed to keep pace with the 
developments of aviation litigation and in so doing has sown the seeds of its own eventual demise. 
The time is nigh for an evaluation of MC99 as an aviation accident passenger compensation 
system, considering its fairness, efficacy and social cost, in light of its systemic shortcomings with 
respect to choice of forum.  
It is argued in this work that MC99, as the successor to WCS, is predicated on an anachronistic 
understanding of itself as a discrete system grounded on the two-party paradigm of claimant 
passenger versus defendant carrier. It is argued that this does not correspond to the reality in 
which MC99 is merely a component of a bigger, interdependent, aviation accident passenger 
compensation system. The interdependency between MC99 and this bigger system means that 
evaluating the fairness and efficacy of choice of forum under MC99 requires us to understand 
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how this system is organized and how it operates. This is achieved by identifying the third-party 
stakeholders, i.e. those beyond the claimant passenger and defendant carrier, and by elucidating 
the nature of their relationships and interests. In so doing, a fuller appreciation can be achieved 
of the wider issues involved. From this it will be concluded that the regulation of choice of forum 
under MC99 is fundamentally unfair to the claimant passenger and that it frustrates the policy 
objectives of MC99. In conclusion, a solution shall be proposed which will: (1) take account of the 
existence of alternative remedies and the influence of third parties; (2) regulate choice of forum 
in a manner which is fair to all parties, and; (3) promote the policy objectives of MC99 and that of 
the industry generally. 
 
1.4  Structure 
This work is divided into five parts and consists of nine chapters. This introductory chapter, 
amounting to the first part of this work, is followed by a second part containing two chapters 
addressing essential matters relating to jurisdiction and the doctrine of FNC. The third part 
focuses on the jurisdictional schemes of the Warsaw Convention and MC99 and the place of FNC 
therein. Part Four, which consists of three chapters, expands the scope of research by exploring 
the role of third-party interests and how they affect issues of choice of forum. The final part of the 
work will consist of a concluding chapter in which a summation of conclusions from the preceding 
chapters will inform a proposal for reform. 
Chapter 2 commences by providing some core context by describing the origins, development 
and operation of FNC within key common law jurisdictions. Aside from doctrinal illumination, this 
chapter will inform subsequent chapters by exposing the lack of uniformity that exists with respect 
to the doctrine within the common law world. Chapter 3 examines the general approach adopted 
by civil law systems with respect to judicial competence and explores civilian attitudes to the 
doctrine of FNC.  
Chapters 4 and 5 turn the attention to an examination of WCS and MC99 and the functioning 
of FNC therein. MC99 was preceded by almost ninety years’ worth of jurisprudence built up 
surrounding WCS, so it is apt to firstly address what role FNC played under that system and to 
what extent its availability was challenged. Detailed consideration of WCS is also justified for the 
purpose of establishing and appreciating the policy objectives involved. This approach will 
establish a foundation upon which to conduct a similar analysis of MC99 in Chapter 5, where the 
issue of the availability and consistency of FNC within that system will be directly addressed.  
The second and third parts of this work shall give ample evidence as to the existence of wider 
considerations affecting—to a very substantial degree—the resolution of matters relating to 
jurisdiction under MC99. A bigger picture will have emerged, one that will require us to venture 
beyond the two-party paradigm within which aviation litigation is traditionally framed. The 
influence of third parties on aviation litigation and choice of forum, exercised through devices such 
as subrogation and contractual indemnity, will be the focus of Part Four. A critical step in the 
analysis will be to establish how, and to what extent, this bigger picture impacts on MC99. A 
common theme throughout Part Four is an elucidation of the extent to which MC99 is embedded 
within a complex web of arrangements for risk allocation and loss spreading which undermine the 
balance of interests achieved by MC99 and may even provide for its circumvention. 
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Part Four will reveal the bigger picture of international aviation litigation by illuminating the 
complex interplay of liability relations between claimant passengers, defendant carriers and third 
parties. Chapter 6 examines the emergence of alternative litigation options for claimants seeking 
compensation for passenger death or injury. Chapter 7 develops on the preceding chapter by 
looking at the multi-party nature of aviation litigation and the impact of third-party actions for 
contribution or indemnification based legal principles of joint or concurrent liability. Chapter 8 shifts 
attention to devices of risk management and how they provide a further avenue for third party 
influence. This will be done firstly by examining the contractual indemnities agreed between 
commercial stakeholders to international air transport whereby they allocate the risk amongst 
themselves. And, secondly, by revealing the reality of aviation insurance which allows for risk to 
be spread and on account of which the insurer assumes the controlling interest in aviation 
litigation. 
The fifth and final part of this work applies the lessons learned and conclusions reached in the 
preceding chapters and the argument will be made that reform of the aviation accident 
compensation system for passengers is both desirable and necessary. 
 
1.5  Scope and Terminology 
The scope of this work is liability for passenger death or injury during international carriage by air. 
Although private air law is not limited purely to liability for passenger death and injury, this work 
does not attend to liability for damage or loss to cargo or baggage, nor is it concerned with 
passenger losses arising from delay or other flight disruption. Since the focus is on passenger 
liability, liability to third parties on the ground necessarily falls outside the scope of this work.  
It goes without saying that a work concerned with international aviation litigation inevitably 
implicates the involvement of multiple legal systems and jurisdictions, which,  for obvious reasons 
of time and space, a comprehensive study of which is not possible. Therefore, the emphasis will 
be on the common law. This is not simply a result of the fact that the author hails from a common 
law jurisdiction, it is the product of the reality that aviation litigation is presently centred in common 
law States, most notably the US. The emphasis on the common law is also warranted by the 
special interest that the UK has in the area on account of London being the centre for much of 
the aviation insurance market. As will be shown, the role played by the insurer in the world of 
international aviation litigation cannot be underestimated and thus this work will be of particular 
interest to that section of the industry. Likewise, with its emphasis on the doctrine of FNC, this 
work will touch on areas and the ongoing controversy between the UK and the EU on the role of 
the doctrine within the Brussels I Regime. Its prospects seemed moribund but, with the imminent 
prospect of Brexit, there may be hope yet for FNC’s future in Europe. Nevertheless, conscious of 
the international nature of the legal regime involved, careful attention has been paid to 
accommodating the civilian law perspective throughout. In addition, reference to international 






FORUM CONVENIENS OR NON CONVENIENS? 
 
Chapter 2: History and Doctrine 
 
2.1  Introduction 
This chapter consists of a journey through a selection of the various manifestations of the doctrine 
of FNC, both historical and contemporary. The journey commences in Scotland and has its 
principal ports of call in England and the United States with brief stops to be made in a handful of 
other jurisdictions, such as Australia and Canada. The primary goal of this chapter is to inform. It 
seeks to both acquaint the reader with the doctrinal substance of FNC and to familiarise them 
with the underlying policies and principles that account for its presence within the common law 
systems. In addition, this chapter aims to provide the international context and understanding of 
the doctrine necessary for its analysis within the specific field of international aviation litigation. 
Together with Chapter 3, which looks to civilian law attitudes to FNC, it is hoped that a sufficiently 
broad picture will have been painted to provide the necessary backdrop for the remaining chapters 
of this work and its conclusion.  
This chapter dedicates a substantial part of its attention to the doctrine of FNC within the United 
States. Such emphasis is warranted on account of the fact that so much aviation litigation takes 
place there and FNC motions are routinely raised. Indeed, the majority of the cases to be analysed 
throughout this work hail from the US. However, a note of warning must here be issued. To speak 
of a singular US doctrine is a fallacy and it is a key objective of chapter to dispel any such notion 
and to demonstrate that the US is a jurisdiction of many doctrines of FNC.  
 
2.2  Scotland  
Prior to the union of the parliaments of England and Scotland in 1707, Scots law was 
predominantly influenced by the civil law tradition and a particularly strong affinity exists with 
Roman-Dutch law. Since 1707, Scots law has merged with English law to the extent that the 
modern Scottish legal system is regarded as a mixed system of civil law and common law. It 
remains a distinct legal system, but one over which English law has exerted influence. Modern 
Scots law thus owes its origins to a number of different historical sources.  
 
2.2.1  Early Instances of a Judicial Discretion to Decline Jurisdiction 
Two 17th century cases are frequently cited as the first instances of the FNC doctrine at work,1 
                                                       
1 See EL Barrett ‘The Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens’ (1947) 35 Cal L Rev 380, 387 n 45. See also 
RA Brand and SR Jablonski Forum Non Conveniens: History, Global Practice and Future Under the Hague 
Convention on Choice of Court Agreements (OUP 2007) 7 n 2; J Bies ‘Conditioning Forum Non Conveniens’ 
(2000) 67 U Chi L Rev 489, 493 n 20. 
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Vernor v Elvies2 (1610) and Col Brog’s Heir3 (1639). However, it is submitted that the stronger 
view is that these two cases were not instances of the judicial exercise of a discretionary power 
to decline jurisdiction, but were instead cases in which the courts regarded themselves as lacking 
civil jurisdiction to begin with. The same doubt arises with respect to some later cases also cited 
as early evidence of a doctrine identifiable with FNC. In Brown’s Trustrees v Palmer (1830) and 
MacMaster v McMaster (1833) the Scottish Court of Session considered cases involving claims 
against executors of foreign estates.4 The language employed by the Court of Session in Palmer 
and MacMaster is suggestive that it viewed the matter as one of competence and not of 
discretion.5 In each case, the court decided that, in the circumstances, arrestment was insufficient 
to establish the jurisdiction of the court over the defender. Therefore, it was for lack of competence 
and not as a matter of discretion that the courts did not exercise their jurisdiction. 
Whatever the status of the court’s jurisdiction in these early cases, by 1846, in Tulloch v 
Williams, the court clearly accepted that it not only had jurisdiction, but that it also had the 
discretionary power to decline to exercise it.6 The case concerned a dispute relating to the 
mismanagement by the defender of the pursuer’s affairs in Jamaica. The court stated that the 
Scottish forum was ‘not an incompetent but an inconvenient forum’,7 the Lord President opining 
that it was ‘a question of convenience whether we should sist (the Scots law equivalent of “stay”) 
process so as to let an accounting go on in Jamaica, or proceed with the action ourselves.’8 The 
issues of jurisdiction and forum competens (understood in the sense of convenience) were treated 
separately, the defender had initially challenged the jurisdiction of the courts of Scotland but 
abandoned that line of argument in favour of forum competens, arguing against the 
appropriateness of the forum. Reversing the decision of the lower court, the Court of Session 
elected to sist the proceedings so they could be taken in Jamaica. That the court was prepared 
to sist the action in itself demonstrates that unlike the dismissals in the earlier authorities, the 
court considered itself competent. This represented a clear shift from the question of competence 
to one of appropriateness. Thus, only with Tulloch v Williams (1846) can we reliably speak of a 
doctrine with the same essential characteristics as what would later come to be known as FNC.9  
Longworth v Hope10 (1854) concerned a Scottish resident who sued the publishers of a well-
known London newspaper for libel resulting from an article published in London but which had 
also been distributed in Scotland. The defenders requested that the court exercise its discretion 
to decline jurisdiction and leave the pursuer to bring her claim in England. In unanimously rejecting 
the plea of forum non competens, the court stated that, ‘the plea thus expressed does not mean 
                                                       
2 [1610] Mor 4788 (Sess) (Scot). 
3 [1639] Mor 4816 (Sess) (Scot).  
4 Brown’s Trustees v Palmer (1830) 9 S 224 (Sess IH) (Scot); MacMaster v MacMaster (1833) 11 S 685 
(Sess IH) (Scot). 
5 The view also reached by R Braucher ‘The Inconvenient Federal Forum’ (1947) 60 Harv L Rev 908, 
909. 
6 (1846) 8 D 657, 658 n 1 (Sess IH) (Scot). 
7 ibid 658. 
8 ibid. 
9 See Braucher (n 5) 909; see also RT Abbott ‘The Emerging Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens: A 
Comparison of the Scottish, English and United States Applications’ (1985) 18 Vanderbilt J Transnat’l L 111, 
114.  
10 (1865) 3 M 1044 (Sess IH) (Scot). 
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that the forum is one in which it is wholly incompetent to deal with the question’,11 but that the true 
issue was about the, ‘consideration of the appropriate forum’.12 Lord President Jervis-Woode 
opined that precedent showed that even in those cases where the jurisdiction of the court was 
beyond doubt, the courts had nonetheless declined jurisdiction.13 Lord Ardmillan expressly 
recognized the inaccuracy of the word “competens”14 and Lord Deas confirmed this when he 
stated that, ‘the plea is really not that one forum is incompetent, but that the other forum ought to 
be preferred.’15  
When it came to the determination of appropriateness, this was to be divined from a 
consideration of the interests of justice, such that refusing the plea would amount to, ‘a hardship, 
and almost an injustice.’16 Lord Deas made it clear that the onus was on the party raising the plea 
to prove that they would suffer an “unfair disadvantage” and that it was not enough to show that 
the party had a better chance of success in the other forum. “Unfair disadvantage” was to be 
understood as a state of affairs where, ‘justice is not likely to be done.’17 Of the various 
considerations to be taken into account, the court noted two, the location of evidence/witnesses 
and the applicable law.18 
The defender in Clements v Mcaulay19 had successfully pleaded forum non competens before 
the court of first instance, but on appeal to the Court of Session, a fundamental flaw in the 
defender’s plea was exposed. His proposed alternative forum did not in fact have jurisdiction. 
Lord Justice Clerk Inglis explained that it was a prerequisite that an alternative forum be available 
before the plea could succeed.20 As the defender had not proposed an available alternative forum, 
the Scottish Court was not at liberty to send the parties away. This represents one of the key 
ingredients of FNC without which there is no scope for the application of the doctrine. 
In the 1868 case of Thomson v North British & Mercantile Insurance Co, Lord Benholme 
explained that the plea was not a question of the court’s competence but really one of the relative 
convenience of competent courts,21 suggesting that the plea of forum non competens ought 
instead to be termed forum non conveniens.22 This was followed in 1873 by the case of Macadam 
v Macadam, where the court referred to the plea as forum conveniens.23 The first reported case 
in which the Court actually considered a plea under the full name of forum non conveniens came 
in 1883 with Brown v Cartwright.24 The court repelled the plea in that case but it was sustained in 
different case the following year in Williamson v North-Eastern Railway Co.25 
From the early origins of FNC in Scots law it can be concluded that the doctrine emerged not 
from considerations pertaining to competence of the chosen forum but from questions of 
                                                       
11 ibid 1053.  
12 ibid. 
13 ibid.  
14 ibid 1059.  
15 ibid 1058. 
16 ibid 1053. 
17 ibid 1057. 
18 ibid 1053, 1057. 
19 (1866) 4 M 583 (Sess IH) (Scot). 
20 ibid 592. 
21 (1868) 6 M 310, 312, 315 (Sess IH) (Scot). 
22 ibid 315. 
23 (1873) 11 M 860, 862 (Sess IH) (Scot). 
24 (1883) 10 R 1235 (Sess IH) (Scot).  
25 (1884) 11 R 596, 598 (Sess IH) (Scot). 
 18 
comparative convenience. Its operation was predicated on the existence of concurrent jurisdiction 
and its purpose was to ensure that the ends of justice were best secured. By 1883, the doctrine 
had been christened under its modern label of forum non conveniens. But, the essential 
ingredients of a doctrine for the discretionary declining of jurisdiction were already in place since 
1846. The threshold for sustaining the plea was high, a hardship, or unfair disadvantage, 
amounting almost to an injustice was required and, as such, its successful pleading was to be 
exceptional.  
 
2.2.2  The Settled Doctrine of FNC in Scots Law 
What is regarded by some as the standard formulation of the doctrine in Scots law26 was to be 
provided by the Court of Session in the 1892 case of Sim v Robinow.27 A joint venture between 
Scottish businessmen concerning mines in Kimberley, South Africa, was at the heart of the 
dispute. At first instance, the Lord Ordinary had repelled the plea, not finding the considerations 
of convenience to be sufficiently strong.28 The defender reclaimed, arguing that the plea of FNC 
ought to be granted where the balance of convenience lay in favour of the foreign forum. Lord 
Kinnear did not agree, stating that ‘something more is required than mere practical inconvenience 
in order to sustain the plea of forum non conveniens.’29 On a review of the authorities, the court 
laid down the classic articulation of the doctrine, and in so doing gave one of the most concise 
distillations of the spirit of the doctrine in the common law world: 
In all these cases there was one indispensable element present when the Court gave 
effect to the plea of forum non conveniens, namely, that the Court was satisfied that 
there was another Court in which the action ought to be tried as being more 
convenient for all the parties, and more suitable for the ends of justice.30 
The court was not of the view that this indispensable element existed in the case before it. That 
it would cause the defender inconvenience and considerable expense was not sufficient 
justification to sustain the plea.31 Inherent to which was the recognition that the plea was only to 
be granted in exceptional circumstances and that, on balance, the pursuer’s choice of forum 
should stand, consistent with the judge’s duty not to abdicate completely his own judgment (as 
expressed by the Latin maxim of judex tenetur impertiri judicium suum). 
The sinking of a ship carrying a consignment of coal from Dunston in the North of England to 
Rouen in France was the controversy at the centre of the litigation in La Société du Gaz de Paris 
v La Société Anonyme de Navigation ‘Les Armateurs Français’ (No 2).32 The pursuers, a Parisian 
gas company, sought to recover for the loss of their cargo, which they argued was due to its 
incorrect loading aboard the French defender’s vessel. On the face of it, the centre of gravity of 
the dispute was firmly located in France. While some connection existed to England, there was 
next to nothing connecting the case to Scotland, except that the jurisdiction of the Scottish Court 
had been founded by way of arrestment of one of the defender’s vessels there. At first instance, 
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the plea of FNC had been repelled but was sustained on appeal. When it came before the House 
of Lords, the Lord Chancellor remarked, ‘[f]rom the beginning to the end of the case there is not 
a breath of Scottish atmosphere,’33 a state of affairs which made it hard for him to conceive of a 
stronger case for dismissal. Unsurprisingly, the House of Lords upheld the decision of the Inner 
House of the Court of Session to dismiss the action on the grounds of FNC. Citing Sim v Robinow 
and Clements v Mcaulay, the Lord Chancellor defined the Scottish plea of FNC as follows: 
[I]f in any case it appeared to the Court, after giving consideration to the interests of 
both parties and to the requirements of justice, that the case could not be suitably 
tried in the Court in which it was instituted and full justice could not be done there to 
the parties, but could be done in another Court, then the former Court might give 
effect to the plea by declining jurisdiction and permitting the issues to be fought out 
in the more appropriate Court.34 
The pursuer’s motivation for bringing their action to Scotland was contemplated by Lord Sumner, 
he inclined to the view that they had done so purely to gain a tactical advantage.35 Trial in Scotland 
would allow them to avoid a limit of liability which existed under French law. Not only does this 
demonstrate, by way of an early example, the strategic value of FNC, but it also provided Lord 
Sumner with the foundation for a salient point. Although he concurred in the outcome, he differed 
from the majority on the grounds for the judgment, opining that it was not profitable to give 
consideration to weighing up the interests of the parties, since what was advantageous to one 
would be disadvantageous to the other and vice versa. In Lord Sumner’s view, the object of FNC 
‘is to find that forum which is the more suitable for the ends of justice, and is preferable because 
pursuit of the litigation in that forum is more likely to secure those ends.’36 The majority’s 
formulation in La Sociéte du Gaz came to represent the ruling authority in Scotland and is cited 
by many commentators as the principal articulation of the doctrine in Scots Law.37  
 
2.2.3  Concluding Remarks 
By the mid 19th Century the doctrine of FNC was established in Scots law, not as a question of 
competence or convenience, as its various names might have suggested, but as a question of 
appropriateness of forum. Indeed, in La Société du Gaz, Lord Dunedin remarked that, in his ‘view, 
“competent” is just as bad a translation for “competens” as “convenient” is for “conveniens”. The 
proper translation for these Latin words, so far as this plea is concerned, is “appropriate”.’38  
In the case of Crédit Chimique v James Scott Engineering Group Ltd (reported in 1982) the 
Outer House of the Court of Session summarized four general principles of law applicable to the 
plea of FNC as laid down in Clements v Macaulay, Sim v Robinow and La Sociéte du Gaz.39 First, 
that the burden of satisfying the Court rests upon the defender raising the plea; second, this 
burden demands weighty reasons why jurisdiction should not be exercised, mere balance of 
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convenience being insufficient; third, that there exists another available court of competent 
jurisdiction; fourth, consideration of the reasons leads to ‘the conclusion that the interests of the 
parties can more appropriately be served and the ends of justice can more appropriately be 
secured in that other court.’40 
 
2.3 England  
FNC is a relatively new doctrine within English law, only gaining full acceptance in 1983. However, 
while the English courts were both resistant to incorporating a doctrine they regarded as an oddity 
of Scots law and disinclined to deter claims being brought before their courts, there did exist a 
comparable doctrine in English law whereby jurisdiction could be declined. This highly-restrictive 
doctrine, best known as the St Pierre rule, allowed for a stay of proceedings to be granted where 
a claimant sought to invoke the jurisdiction of the court in circumstances amounting to an abuse 
of process. The scheme of this section will be to chart the emergence of FNC in England, 
beginning with an examination of the St Pierre rule and then moving to show its progressive 
metamorphosis by the courts into the doctrine of FNC. The greater part of this section will focus 
on the current ruling authority for FNC in England, i.e. Spiliada Maritime Corp v Cansulex Ltd,41 
in which the House of Lords restated the doctrine and liberalized its application. Spiliada also 
carries the extra significance of being the guiding authority for the application of FNC in many 
other common law jurisdictions. 
 
2.3.1  The Vexatious and Oppressive Test 
The English courts have long maintained themselves as open to hearing actions concerning 
foreigners (provided the defendant had been properly served) and little doubt was entertained as 
to their competence or suitability in such matters. Unlike Scots law, the traditional position of the 
English courts was not to grant a stay of proceedings on the basis of appropriateness but instead 
required a higher standard, one of vexation and oppression amounting to injustice.42 In 1906, in 
Logan v Bank of Scotland (No 2), the Court of Appeal affirmed the power of the English courts to 
stay vexatious proceedings but warned that it ‘should be exercised with great care’,43 since the 
courts of England are freely open to foreigners and such freedom ought not to be disturbed except 
in the case of abuse of process.44 
The strictness of the English doctrine was reinforced in 1936 by the Court of Appeal in St 
Pierre v South American Stores (Gath & Chaves) Ltd.45 The requirements for a stay were neatly 
summarized by Scott LJ. Firstly, he stated that ‘a mere balance of convenience is not a sufficient 
ground for depriving a plaintiff of the advantages of prosecuting his action in an English Court if it 
is otherwise properly brought.’46 Secondly, to justify a stay, the defendant must satisfy the court 
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that not granting the stay would ‘work an injustice because it would be oppressive or vexatious to 
him or would be an abuse of the process of the Court in some other way’,47 and that granting the 
stay ‘must not cause an injustice to the plaintiff.’48 The St Pierre standard was thus a highly 
onerous burden, one which the defendant in that case was unable to overcome despite the 
overwhelming balance of convenience favouring the foreign forum. Based on the appropriate 
forum test described by the Scottish Court in La Société du Gaz, the difference between it and 
the St Pierre standard is clear to see.49 The English courts apparent hostility to adopting FNC is 
explained by their openness to receiving foreign claimants, who, in the majority of cases, were 
commercial parties for whose business the English courts were partial.50 
 
2.3.2  The Metamorphosis of St Pierre 
The shift away from the St Pierre vexatious and oppressive test began in 1974 with The Atlantic 
Star v Bona Spes51 and was continued by MacShannon v Rockware Glass Ltd52 in 1978 and then 
by The Abidin Daver53 in 1984. In this trio of cases, the House of Lords metamorphosed the 
burdensome and restrictive rule of St Pierre into a more flexible and liberal doctrine of forum non 
conveniens. The motivation for liberalising the St Pierre test was firstly to address the 
phenomenon of forum shopping by reducing the burden on the defendant to secure a stay. The 
second motivation was to make allowance for a change in judicial attitudes. In this trio of cases, 
the courts of England had given recognition to the fact that comity demanded greater deference 
be accorded the interests of foreign jurisdictions in resolving disputes over which they had a 
greater claim.   
The Atlantic Star presented a case in which it was obvious that the dispute had almost no 
connection to England, that jurisdiction of the English court was entirely fortuitous, that the foreign 
forum was clearly more appropriate, and it was also plain to see that the claimant was forum 
shopping. Despite all of this, the trial court and the Court of Appeal thought the St Pierre rule 
precluded the possibility of a stay because the inconvenience involved did not amount to an 
injustice.54 On further appeal to the House of Lords, the starkness of the case provided 
encouragement for their Lordships to dispense with the St Pierre rule and adopt the doctrine of 
FNC in its place. However, the majority were not prepared to take that step but they did endorse 
adopting a more liberal application of the existing rule.55 Although sharing a common spirit, the 
Law Lords descriptions of the how the rule ought to be applied in its more liberal sense differed, 
both in terms of emphasis and terminology. Nevertheless, on application to the case at hand, their 
Lordships reached a common conclusion that the claimant’s choice of England as the forum was 
indeed oppressive and vexatious (in the new liberal sense).56 In so finding, the House managed 
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to pay lip service to the vocabulary of St Pierre while simultaneously opening the semantic back 
door to a broader and more liberal doctrine approaching that of FNC.  
The liberalising steps taken in The Atlantic Star were built a few years later in MacShannon.57 
Again, the foreign forum was clearly the more appropriate for resolution of the dispute but the 
courts had been unsure as to whether a stay was permitted. The House of Lords decision 
represented a key juncture in the emergence of FNC in English law and is particularly notable for 
discarding, once and for all, the St Pierre terms “vexatious and oppressive”.58 In their place, it 
attempted to define a doctrine tailored to address the ills posed by forum shopping. Unfortunately, 
the House strained itself to avoid expressly adopting FNC. Instead, it insisted on the necessity 
and prudence of developing an English doctrine for staying proceedings on the foundation of the 
rule from St Pierre. MacShannon had liberalized the test and brought it closer to the Scottish 
doctrine of FNC. However, subsequent case law showed that in practice the doctrine remained 
more favourable to the plaintiff with the consequence that stays were refused in circumstances 
where the foreign forum was clearly more appropriate.59  
An additional problem with MacShannon was that there were differences between the 
approach described by Lord Diplock and that of Lord Salmon and Lord Keith, the two Lords’ 
opinions were capable of yielding two seemingly irreconcilable approaches.60 This contributed to 
subsequent uncertainty among the lower courts about how to apply the doctrine.61 Indeed, taken 
together, The Atlantic Star and MacShannon, cases which yielded 10 speeches from the Law 
Lords, so it is unsurprising that they failed to deliver a fully coherent doctrine.  
The third case in the trilogy, i.e. The Abidin Daver,62 plays a prominent role in the history of 
FNC in England, largely because it was the case in which the House of Lords explicitly recognized 
the doctrine in English law under its Latin moniker and declared it to be indistinguishable from the 
Scottish doctrine. However, the case is also of relevance because it further liberalized the 
doctrine. It achieved this by expanding, beyond convenience and expense, the considerations to 
be taken into account and overtly paid greater regard to judicial comity.63 Where foreign 
proceedings co-existed over the same subject matter there emerged a risk of conflicting decisions 
between the courts of those States. Lord Diplock thought such a situation anathema and opined 
that comity demanded that it not be permitted to arise.64 This explicit invocation of comity (a term 
not used in The Atlantic Star nor in MacShannon) is representative of the further movement away 
from the traditional insular orientation of the English courts. Lord Diplock captured the zeitgeist 
when he stated: 
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My Lords, the essential change in the attitude of the English courts to pending or 
prospective litigation in foreign jurisdictions … is that judicial chauvinism has now 
been replaced by judicial comity to an extent which I think the time is now right to 
acknowledge frankly is, in the field of law with which this appeal is concerned, 
indistinguishable from the Scottish doctrine of forum non conveniens.65  
 
2.3.3  The Spiliada Test 
The modern authority for FNC in English law comes from the 1986 decision of the House of Lords 
in Spiliada,66 in which Lord Goff undertook a thorough re-examination of the doctrine and re-stated 
it in terms which have brought it such stability and gravitas that it has become the guiding authority 
for many common law jurisdictions.  
With FNC now let out of the closet by Lord Diplock in The Abidin Daver, Lord Goff (giving the 
leading opinion in Spiliada) felt justified in having regard to the Scottish authorities and 
commenced his speech by endorsing Lord Kinnear’s statement in Sim v Robinow as being the 
expression of the fundamental principle involved: 
[T]he plea can never be sustained unless the court is satisfied that there is some 
other tribunal, having competent jurisdiction, in which the case may be tried more 
suitably for the interests of all the parties and for the ends of justice.67 
In Lord Goff’s view, this was the principle applicable both in Scotland and England. Echoing the 
views of Lord Dunedin in La Société du Gaz, Lord Goff doubted the aptness of the term 
“conveniens” since the question involved was not one of convenience, but of suitability or 
appropriateness; Lord Goff stating: ‘I feel bound to say that I doubt whether the Latin tag forum 
non conveniens is apt to describe this principle. For the question is not one of convenience, but 
of the suitability or appropriateness of the relevant jurisdiction.’68 However, given how well 
established the doctrine was under that name in Scotland and the US it seemed the prudent 
course to retain the name in England. However, he suggested that when applying the doctrine in 
practice it was advisable to employ the term “appropriateness” instead of “convenience”.69 
Lord Goff did not think Lord Diplock’s statement of principle from MacShannon was intended 
as ‘an immutable statement of the law but rather as a tentative statement at an early stage of a 
period of development’.70 Presumably, therefore, Lord Goff perceived himself as having the go-
ahead to tweak and reformulate. In giving his own summary of the law, he began with a new 
version of the basic principle expressed by Lord Kinnear in Sim v Robinow, stating: 
The basic principle is that a stay will only be granted on the ground of forum non 
conveniens where the court is satisfied that there is some other available forum, 
having competent jurisdiction, which is the appropriate forum for the trial of the 
action, i.e. in which the case may be tried more suitably for the interests of all the 
parties and the ends of justice.71 
This formulation of the basic principle differs only slightly from its predecessor. It expressly 
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provides that the foreign forum must be available72 (no doubt implicit Lord Kinnear’s wording) and 
it emphasizes the question as one of appropriateness (deftly avoiding use of the word 
convenience). These differences are not material alterations. Lord Goff was rewording the 
principle in a form consistent with the Scottish doctrine. Taking Lord Diplock’s articulation from 
MacShannon, Lord Goff then translated this basic principle into a two-stage test.  
 
2.3.3.1  Stage One: Availability and Appropriateness 
In an application for a stay of proceedings on grounds of FNC, the burden of proof, in the first 
instance, rests on the defendant. As we shall see, under the second stage the burden may shift 
to the claimant. At stage one of the test, the burden on the defendant is not just to show that 
England is not the natural or appropriate forum but that there exists another available forum which 
is ‘clearly or distinctly more appropriate’.73 A mere balance of convenience will not be sufficient to 
warrant a stay of proceedings. Therefore, in circumstances where no forum (including England) 
is clearly more appropriate, then a stay ought not to be granted.  
In order to establish appropriateness, a court should look at the factors pointing toward the 
other forum as the natural forum for the action.74 Lord Goff endorsed the meaning ascribed to the 
term “natural forum” by Lord Keith in The Abidin Daver as ‘that with which the action had the most 
real and substantial connection’.75 The particular connecting factors to be looked for were 
identified by Lord Goff as those having a bearing on inconvenience and expense, as referred to 
by Lord Diplock in MacShannon.76 However, consideration was not limited solely to these, but 
may include, inter alia, the governing law of the relevant transaction, the place of residence or 
business of the parties, etc. The range of possible connecting factors which could be considered 
by a court were thus left open. Indeed, Lord Templeman, stated that that factors which a court is 
entitled to take into account with regards to appropriateness are ‘legion’. 77 This is not to say that 
no constraint was intended, Lord Goff clearly intended that the range of considerations under the 
first stage would be narrower than that under the second.  
If at this first stage of consideration the court is not persuaded that there is another available 
forum which is clearly more appropriate for trial, then a stay of proceedings will normally be 
refused. However, where a defendant has satisfied the court that an alternative and available 
forum is clearly the more appropriate forum then the FNC enquiry moves to the second stage.  
 
2.3.3.2  Stage Two: The Interests of Justice 
Under the second stage of the Spiliada test, the onus shifts to the plaintiff ‘to show that there are 
special circumstances by reason of which justice requires that the trial should nevertheless take 
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place in this country.’78 In assessing the second stage, a court will consider a broader range of 
factors than are available under the first stage. Lord Goff stated that the Court will consider ‘all 
the circumstances of the case, including circumstances which go beyond those taken into account 
when considering connecting factors with other jurisdictions.’79 The second stage of the Spiliada 
test seeks to ascertain whether the requirements of justice demand that a stay should not be 
granted where the other forum is clearly the more appropriate. Broadly speaking, the case law 
suggests that two categories of cases exist; those in which the granting of a stay would result in 
the denial of justice and, more commonly, cases where the claimant would lose a legitimate 
personal or juridical advantage.80 
Lord Goff returned to the topic of FNC in Connelly v RTZ Corporation81 and, giving the majority 
judgment spoke directly on the matter of when a stay might be refused on the grounds that not 
doing so would result in a denial of justice. He reiterated that, in general, a claimant must take the 
clearly more appropriate forum as he finds it, a court will only refuse a stay where the claimant 
‘can establish that substantial justice cannot be done in the appropriate forum’.82 The House of 
Lords reached the same view in the case of Lubbe v Cape plc.83 However, these two cases 
involved exceptional circumstances and thus, in most cases, there is only a small likelihood of 
invoking denial of justice as grounds for resisting a stay where the natural forum lies abroad. 
Where the foreign forum is the clearly more appropriate forum, resisting a dismissal is much more 
likely to be secured on the grounds of the potential loss of a personal or juridical advantage. 
When it came to the question of how to treat legitimate personal or juridical advantages, Lord 
Goff stressed that the mere existence of such an advantage should not be taken as decisive.84 
He took the view that, as a general rule, a court should not be deterred from granting a stay of 
proceedings merely on the basis that it entailed the loss of such an advantage for the claimant. 
The interests of both parties had to be taken into account. However, since what is 
disadvantageous to one party will be advantageous to the other (and vice versa) focusing solely 
on the relative positions of the parties will usually end in stalemate. The solution to such an 
impasse could be found by asking whether substantial justice could be done in the appropriate 
forum.85 In other words—relying on the fundamental principle of FNC—one must ask if the 
deprivation of a legitimate personal or juridical advantage would prejudice the opportunity for 
substantial justice, where it would not, then the parties must take the natural forum as they find it.  
The prime examples of legitimate personal or juridical advantages, as discussed by Lord Goff 
in Spiliada, concern rules for discovery, power to award interest, scale of damages and limitation 
periods.86 Whilst differences between the systems governing these factors may differ quite 
substantially in some cases, the mere fact that granting a FNC stay would force the claimant into 
a less advantageous system will not suffice to resist its granting. The court must be satisfied that 
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the loss of a personal or juridical advantage would mean that substantial justice will not, or may 
not, be done.87 Even where the loss of an advantage could prejudice the securing of substantial 
justice, it can often be overcome by way of a conditional grant of stay, whereby the situation is 
effectively remedied by the defendant undertaking certain binding commitments, e.g. to waive a 
foreign time limitation.88 
The purpose behind Spiliada was to establish a more even-handed approach toward the 
interests of both parties by defining a doctrine that would be more objective.89 As a result, the 
substantial weight that was generally afforded a legitimate personal or juridical advantage of trial 
in England was reduced, thereby increasing the likelihood of dismissal. This approach was also 
justified by the desire of the English courts to avoid entering into the task of comparing the quality 
of justice between English courts and those of foreign jurisdictions. As observed in Cheshire, 
North & Fawcett, ‘[t]he emphasis in the House of Lords is now very much on chauvinism being 
replaced by judicial comity.’90  
The liberal nature of Spiliada test, insofar as a stay on grounds of FNC is now more easily 
secured, is reinforced by the deferential stance taken by appellate courts towards a trial judge’s 
determination. In Spiliada, Lord Templeman explained that when it comes to the weighting of the 
factors under consideration, clear guidance could not be provided and instead it must be left to 
the discretion of the trial judge.91 As such, he opined that ‘appeal should be rare and the appellate 
court should be slow to interfere.’92 Once a stay is granted the chances for overturning the 
decision on appeal are slim. 
  
2.3.4  Concluding Remarks 
Given how intimately related the doctrine of FNC is with the common law, it is surprising that its 
appearance in England only occurred so late in the day. Prior to this, the English courts had 
consistently shown themselves reluctant to decline to exercise their jurisdiction, only doing so on 
the basis of a highly restrictive doctrine which required a showing of vexation or oppression. 
Claimants could rely on their choice of an English forum in all but the rarest of circumstances. 
This began to change in the 1970s when judicial attitudes shifted. The recognition of the need for 
greater international judicial comity, twinned with the perceived rise in forum shopping precipitated 
the metamorphosis of the restrictive St Pierre rule into the more liberal doctrine of FNC.  
 
2.4  Other Jurisdictions 
Although this chapter focuses on FNC in the United Kingdom and the United States, these are 
not the only States within whose legal systems the doctrine of FNC is to be found. FNC is not 
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unique to the US, nor indeed to the UK, it has a presence in many jurisdictions throughout the 
world. This is a reality that has important implications for this work. Not only is it wise to understand 
the doctrinal diversity that exists, it is important to appreciate the extent of international support 
for FNC in general. Admittedly, the support for FNC within the specific context of aviation 
passenger actions should not be assumed from its wider acceptance, but it is certainly a factor to 
be taken into consideration when it comes to evaluating choice of forum within an international 
regime such as MC99.  Proposals for reform should be made in light of the interests of the various 
States involved and this chapter, as well as the following chapter which looks at civilian attitudes 
to jurisdiction and FNC, aim to give a representative picture of these interests. Whilst it is beyond 
the scope of this work to provide an exhaustive cataloguing of the various versions of FNC or 
cognate doctrines, some brief notes and observations are appropriate.  
 
2.4.1  Spiliada Jurisdictions and Others 
Firstly, a large number of common law jurisdictions have endorsed and apply the House of Lords 
test and can thus be regarded as Spiliada jurisdictions, for example: Canada,93 New Zealand,94 
Hong Kong,95 Ireland,96 Cyprus,97 Malaysia,98 Singapore,99 and Brunei.100 In the case of Canada, 
special mention should be made of Québec. As a jurisdiction with a heavy civil law component 
one might expect it to be hostile to the doctrine of FNC but, surprisingly, Article 3135 of the 
Québec Civil Code101 provides a discretionary authority to decline jurisdiction, albeit only in 
exceptional circumstances.102 
While Spiliada has become a stable ruling authority for a significant portion of the common law 
world, there are jurisdictions which have elected to chart a different path. Other versions of the 
doctrine may be found, for example, in India103 and the Philippines.104 In South Africa, the Dutch 
law influence appears to have won out over the English common law, where, aside from some 
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statutory exceptions, the doctrine has no place in its law.105 This was recently affirmed by the 
Supreme Court of South Africa in Agri Wire (Pty) Ltd v Commissioner of the Competition 
Commission, where it stated that ‘our law does not recognize the doctrine of forum non 
conveniens, and our courts are not entitled to decline to hear cases properly brought before them 
in the exercise of their jurisdiction.’106 However, the Supreme Court of South Africa has 
recognized that it does have the inherent power, in exceptional circumstances, to decline 
jurisdiction to prevent an abuse of process and thus some general scope for declining jurisdiction 
exists.107 
Israeli courts, taking their lead from the English common law, initially followed a liberalized 
version of the St Pierre standard for FNC.108 However, there was a shift in attitude in the 1980s 
which saw the courts adopt a flexible US standard of FNC.109 Since then, the pendulum has swung 
back toward a more restrictive approach.110  
The Australian doctrine of FNC is especially interesting because it offers an intriguing 
opportunity to explore a common law jurisdiction which is bucking the trend of liberalization of 
FNC and which has been outspoken and pragmatic in its criticisms of the more liberal approach 
to granting dismissals. 
 
2.4.2  Australia 
Despite its Latin tag, forum non conveniens is far from a dry, legalistic issue. Indeed 
it is fair to say that a highly emotional debate has raged on this topic in recent years, 
with accusations of “parochialism”, “naked and open chauvinism” and even outright 
racism on one side, and “chaotic transnational jurisprudence” and lack of clear 
guidance on the other.111 
As the above quotation indicates, the recent history of FNC in Australia has been a heated one, 
full of controversy. Prior to this, there is evidence that the Australian courts, much like the English 
courts pre-Atlantic Star, adhered to a vexatious and oppressive standard for granting stays.112 
However, in 1988, the Australian High Court gave in-depth consideration to its position, post-
Spiliada, in Oceanic Sun Line Special Shipping Co Inc v Fay.113 One of the fundamental questions 
facing the court was whether to follow the trend of liberalization represented by Spiliada.  
Three different approaches can be identified in Oceanic. Brennan J held fast to the existing 
standard of vexation and oppression, a benefit of which was that it did not call for the invidious 
task of comparing the quality of justice between the local and foreign forums, something he 
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viewed as inevitable under the Spiliada approach.114 The other four judges were split, Wilson and 
Toohey JJ would have adopted Spiliada and argued that the “vexatious and oppressive” test of 
St Pierre was an anachronism, ill-suited to the modern world.115 Deane and Gaudron JJ were 
both in favour of liberalizing the vexatious and oppressive test and suggested applying a “clearly 
inappropriate forum” standard.116 Unsurprisingly, given the divergence of approach, uncertainty 
reigned following Oceanic and it was not long before the High Court was once against faced with 
clarifying its stance. This came with the case of Voth v Manildra Flour Mills Pty Ltd,117 wherein 
the court elected to buck the trend of liberalization and adopt a highly restrictive approach to FNC. 
The Voth case involved two Australian companies who brought an action in New South Wales 
against a Missouri tax advisor for professional negligence which had resulted in financial loss in 
the USA and Australia. The court accepted that the high burden imposed by St Pierre test could 
lead to injustice so it considered the approaches of Spiliada and Oceanic. However, it was not 
prepared to follow the liberal approach of Spiliada and instead adopted the “clearly inappropriate 
forum” test of Deane and Gaudron JJ from Oceanic, which it described as a test which ‘focuses 
on the advantages and disadvantages arising from a continuation of the proceedings in the 
selected forum rather than on the need to make a comparative judgment between the two 
forums.’118  
The fundamental difference between the “clearly inappropriate forum” test and that of Spiliada, 
as well as other versions of the doctrine, is that it refuses to consider the appropriateness of the 
foreign forum and instead focuses itself solely on the appropriateness of the domestic forum. This 
approach means dismissal will be refused unless the Australian forum is clearly inappropriate, it 
matters not that the balance of convenience favours the foreign forum, or even that the foreign 
forum is clearly the more appropriate one.119 
Any doubts that the Australian court was rejecting a liberal approach to FNC was clarified by 
the court statement that, the jurisdiction to grant a stay or dismiss the action is to be exercised 
“with great care” or “extreme caution”.’120 The restrictiveness of the approach has been 
demonstrated by subsequent cases, wherein stays have been granted in only a small minority. 
Indeed, some commentators have described Australia as the most difficult common law 
jurisdiction in which to attain a stay on the grounds of FNC.121   
The strength of the Australian doctrine is that it takes account of the appropriateness of the 
plaintiff’s choice of forum whilst simultaneously requiring a high—perhaps excessively high—
burden for declining jurisdiction, such that provides a greater degree of certainty and predictability. 
As will be discussed in due course, the civil law systems generally place emphasis on the value 
accorded parties by legal certainty and predictability with respect to jurisdiction. This would 
certainly make it more attractive to civilian tastes than the liberal Spiliada doctrine of FNC or 
indeed that of the United States, to which we now turn our attention. 
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2.5  United States of America 
Seen by many as the forum of choice for civil litigation due to the habitual generosity of its juries, 
its far-reaching rules of discovery and much more besides, it should come as little surprise that 
recourse to the doctrine of FNC is widespread in US courts and, therefore, that there exists an 
abundance of case law and commentary to explore. This section will, first and foremost, provide 
a general description of the US doctrine’s key features and principles, as well as reveal its 
underlying policies and principles. However, this section also pursues two critical secondary 
objectives; first, to expose an inconsistency that lies at the heart of accepted interpretation of the 
Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on FNC and secondly, to dispel the notion that there exists a 
single doctrine of FNC within the US. To fully appreciate the special status of FNC within the US, 
one must accept the reality that the US is home to a large variety of divergent doctrines of FNC, 
both at state and federal levels.   
 
2.5.1  Historical Origins 
Whilst the modern doctrine of FNC began with two US Supreme Court cases decided on the same 
day in 1947,122 there exists a long history leading up to that moment at both state and federal 
level, consideration of which provides a valuable frame of reference for emergence of the modern 
doctrine. While the US courts and commentators agree on the Scottish origins of the doctrine,123 
there is little evidence to support its direct importation from Scotland. The term forum non 
competens does not feature at all in US jurisprudence and forum non conveniens only begins to 
appear from early in the 20th century. Instead, it seems the doctrine developed in the US in a 
‘somewhat parallel, but separate and independent manner’124 to Scotland, merging itself with the 
limited instances of the exercise of judicial discretion to decline jurisdiction by federal courts and 
some state courts.   
From the beginning, a constitutional law question created a hurdle to the emergence of FNC, 
this was whether it was constitutionally possible for US courts to decline jurisdiction at all. Chief 
Justice Marshall stated, in the 1821 case of Cohens v Virginia: ‘We have no more right to decline 
the exercise of jurisdiction which is given, than to usurp that which is not given’, further opining 
that, ‘[t]he one or the other would be treason to the Constitution.’125 However, it seems clear, at 
least within admiralty, that federal courts had the power to decline jurisdiction.126 The strength of 
opinion was of the view that any discretion to decline jurisdiction was unique to admiralty cases 
involving foreigners and that otherwise these courts were duty-bound to exercise jurisdiction. On 
the other hand, there were sufficient exceptions evidenced within the case law to support the 
argument for the possibility of a more general discretionary power of federal courts.127 Uncertainty 
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thus reigned over the issue of the power to decline jurisdiction. Firstly, the nature and extent of 
that power was obscure. Second, even within admiralty, the exercise of the discretion to decline 
jurisdiction eluded formalization.128 For these reasons, it is impossible to discern from these early 
federal manifestations much more than the sense of a nascent concept resembling FNC in some 
of its fundamental features, but falling short of a formal doctrine. 
Turning to state level jurisprudence, ample evidence exists of some state courts declining to 
exercise jurisdiction in non-admiralty cases, so much so that some commentators identify state 
courts as the origin of FNC in the US.129 Not only do these state law cases show courts declining 
jurisdiction outside admiralty, some of the familiar features of FNC were present in the courts’ 
decisions, i.e. discretion, availability of an alternative forum and considerations of convenience.130 
The invocation of docket congestion as a justification for declining jurisdiction must also be 
noted.131 Although such overt consideration of issues of public policy are not characteristic of FNC 
in the Scottish or English experience, they would come to play a central role in the US doctrine.  
In contrast to the federal courts, state courts provide evidence of a broader discretion to decline 
jurisdiction that admitted for greater formalization as a doctrine than its federal manifestation. 
However, much of the state law precedent for a doctrine approximating FNC came from a single 
source, i.e. the New York courts, who frequently declined jurisdiction in tort claims.132 While, at 
least where foreigners were involved, case law can found for the same proposition from other 
courts, such as those of Michigan,133 Wisconsin134 and Texas,135 it must be acknowledged that, 
in the main, only a small number of states actually adopted something akin to FNC, whereas 
many states had either not considered the matter or had expressly rejected it.136  
Thus, at the beginning of the 20th century, the status of FNC within the US was far from clear. 
Some kindred notion existed in a vague form at federal level, and in a handful of states a more 
formal doctrine had found a foothold. Against this backdrop, in 1929, a Wall Street lawyer by the 
name of Paxton Blair published a law review article which would go on to have a considerable 
influence on the development of the doctrine of FNC in the US. Blair’s article is credited with firmly 
attaching the Latin term, i.e. forum non conveniens, to the doctrine and it was his thesis that the 
US courts had been applying it for years without realizing. Blair declared: 
Upon an examination of the American decisions illustrative of the doctrine of forum 
non conveniens, it becomes apparent that the courts of this country have been for 
years applying the doctrine with such little consciousness of what they were doing 
as to remind one of Molière’s M. Jourdain, who found he had been speaking prose 
all his life without knowing it.137 
Blair’s thesis arrived at an opportune moment when solutions were being sought to address the 
growing problem of docket congestion in large centres of population in the US, particularly New 
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York. Blair’s article represented an invitation to formally adopt FNC but it also provided a 
convenient hook upon which to hang it. The need for new legislation could be avoided since it 
was allegedly already part of the ‘inherent powers possessed by every court of justice.’138  
At that time, the federal courts still considered themselves duty bound to exercise jurisdiction 
(except in admiralty) and this impeded the development of a general federal doctrine.139 It is 
commonly accepted that the main reason behind the non-adoption of the doctrine at state level 
was largely down to doubts regarding its compatibility with the privileges and immunities clause 
of the US Constitution.140 Blair’s thesis provided powerful encouragement and support for those 
who wished to formally adopt FNC. However, it would not be until the federal matter was resolved 
that the path would be fully cleared. This began with a shift in the US Supreme Court’s attitude 
toward accepting the doctrine beyond admiralty. First, in the 1932 case of Canada Malting Co Ltd 
v Paterson Steamship Ltd141 and then developed further in subsequent judgments.142 These 
cases edged the US Supreme Court closer and closer to the express recognition of a general 
federal doctrine of FNC which eventually came in 1947 with Gulf Oil Corp v Gilbert and Koster v 
(American) Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Co.143 
This brief sojourn through the pre-history of FNC in the US courts demonstrates the obscurity 
of the doctrine’s origins in that jurisdiction. While there was evidence for the exercise of a 
discretionary power to decline jurisdiction, exhibiting some of the key features of FNC, there was 
a manifest absence of doctrinal substance. Thus, when it came time for the US Supreme Court 
to address the status of FNC at federal level (from which the state courts would take their lead) it 
was not starting from a blank canvas, it had a vague proof of concept but had to find the criteria 
necessary to establish a general doctrine with practical utility. 
 
2.5.2  A Federal Doctrine 
In Gilbert, a Virginia resident brought an action in New York alleging negligence against a 
Pennsylvania oil company for the destruction of Gilbert’s warehouse in Virginia. Koster, a 
companion case to Gilbert decided the same day, concerned a derivative action brought in New 
York against the defendant insurance company relating to the alleged breach of fiduciary duties 
by officers of the company. Koster (a New York resident) brought the action as a member and 
policyholder of Lumbermens Mutual Casualty (an Illinois insurance company) in the right of the 
company and on behalf of all the members and policyholders of the company. In both cases, the 
district courts had granted FNC dismissals, in Gilbert, the court of appeals had reversed, whereas 
in Koster, it had upheld the dismissal. The subsequent appeals gave the US Supreme Court the 
opportunity to have its say. 
The first question, in ways the most essential, to be addressed in Gilbert was whether federal 
courts had the inherent power to decline jurisdiction. Giving the opinion for the majority, Jackson 
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J stated that the Court, ‘in one form of words or another, has repeatedly recognized the existence 
of the power to decline jurisdiction in exceptional circumstances.’144 Insofar as competence was 
concerned, the Supreme Court formally affirmed the intrinsic power of federal courts, whether in 
admiralty, law or equity, to decline jurisdiction. 
Justice Jackson then identified the fundamental elements of the doctrine. He began by stating 
that FNC ‘presupposes at least two forums in which the defendant is amenable to process; the 
doctrine furnishes criteria for choice between them.’145 In his view, ‘[t]he principle of forum non 
conveniens is simply that a court may resist imposition upon its jurisdiction even when jurisdiction 
is authorized.’146 These are certainly vital elements to the core proposition of FNC and agree with 
the fundamental features shown by the earlier federal and state cases discussed above, but, they 
are essentially silent on the practical doctrinal content of FNC. In other words, what are the criteria 
for choice and against what standard are they assessed?  
Jackson J considered it unwise to attempt to catalogue all the various circumstances in which 
dismissal would be warranted, opining that it was ultimately a discretionary matter for the court. 
While a precise itinerary of considerations or formula for their combination was beyond reach, the 
factors to be considered were broadly defined by the Supreme Court under the headings of private 
and public interest factors.147 These were to provide the hitherto absent criteria necessary to guide 
a federal court in the exercise of its discretion when applying the doctrine of FNC. 
 
2.5.2.1  Private Interest Factors 
In its private interest factor analysis in Gilbert, the Supreme Court noted, in respect of the New 
York forum, that the plaintiff was not a resident of New York, that no event connected to the 
dispute occurred there and that no witnesses, except perhaps for experts, resided there either. In 
so doing, the Court was emphasizing the lack of connecting factors between the dispute and the 
forum insofar as it could indicate convenience for the plaintiff for trial in that forum. In fact, the 
only factor that explained the plaintiff’s choice of trial in New York was the fact that a New York 
jury might be more comfortable with awarding the high damages sought-after than a jury in 
Lynchburg, Virginia. The district court had rejected this justification and the Supreme Court was 
similarly dismissive; from which it can be concluded that the private interest must be viewed as 
legitimate. In the end, therefore, the plaintiff had been unable to satisfactorily indicate any 
justifiable reason for his choice of forum; his legitimate private interest in trial in the New York 
forum, compared to that in Virginia, was weak. On the other side, the defendant was able to point 
to several factors connecting the case to Lynchburg; notably, the fact that the plaintiff and every 
other person who participated in the allegedly negligent acts, as well as most witnesses, resided 
in or around Lynchburg. The private interest factors thus pointed strongly toward the convenience 
of trial in Virginia.  
By private interest factors, the court was referring specifically to the interests of the parties to 
the litigation and defined these as, ‘practical problems that make trial of a case easy, expeditious 
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and inexpensive’.148 The Supreme Court provided a list of six important considerations, which 
have subsequently been adopted by courts as a guide for conducting the private interest 
analysis.149 Those considerations are as follows. (1) Relative ease of access to sources of proof. 
In an aviation context, this encompasses access to documentation such as crew training or safety 
records.150 (2) Availability of compulsory process for attendance of unwilling witnesses.151 (3) The 
cost of obtaining the attendance of willing witnesses.152 (4) Where appropriate, the possibility of 
viewing premises. In the specific case of aviation litigation, this usually encompasses accessibility 
to the crash site and wreckage.153 (5) Questions as to the enforceability of a judgment.154 (6) All 
other practical problems that make trial of a case easy, expeditious and inexpensive. Cleary, this 
final category of considerations is something of a catch-all under which a wide range of factors 
might be considered. For example, the relative costliness of litigation has been considered under 
this category in a number of aviation cases.155 The ability to implead third parties (a topic 
addressed in Chapter 8 of this work) has also been identified under this category in aviation 
litigation.156 
 
2.5.2.2  Public Interest Factors 
Categories of public interest factors were not specifically defined in Gilbert. Instead, Jackson J 
elected to present indicative examples.157 He referred to administrative difficulties arising from 
court congestion and the burden of imposing jury duty upon a community without a connection to 
the controversy involved. He remarked that some cases may be of wider interest to the community 
in which the cause of action arose and that there would thus be a local interest in having the case 
litigated in the locality. As noted in the Introduction, this was a factor in favour of FNC dismissal 
in West Caribbean Airways and is a frequent factor in aviation litigation given the international 
nature of the activity. In a diversity action, such as Gilbert, there was an interest in having the 
case heard by a forum familiar with the state law that would be applied rather than a forum to 
which the law may be foreign. Avoidance of complex conflict of laws questions was also regarded 
as a public interest factor. These latter two examples do not immediately conjure up the public 
interest, being questions of trial convenience for the court; however, the public interest involved 
here can be seen to be that of the public’s interest in the efficient use of judicial resources. While 
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not attracting the same degree of attention, the public interest factors were also weighted in favour 
of dismissal in Gilbert and in Koster.158 
The emphasis in Gilbert and Koster was on the private interest factors and as a result the 
exposition of the public interest factors was brief and lacking in detail. However, in the later 
Supreme Court judgment in Piper Aircraft Co v Reyno,159 the Court would speak of public interest 
factors as those affecting ‘the convenience of the forum’ by impacting on ‘the court’s own 
administrative or legal problems’.160 Distilling Gilbert, the Court in Reyno listed the following (non-
exhaustive) factors.161 (1) Administrative difficulties flowing from court congestion.162 (2) Local 
interest in having localized controversies decided at home. This can be a compelling factor in 
aviation litigation cases as the courts will defer to the forum with which the accident has the closest 
connection, e.g. because of the location of the accident or the nationality of the victims.163 Indeed, 
it is not uncommon in multi-party litigation for the defendant to settle with US plaintiffs in order to 
facilitate FNC dismissal against the foreign plaintiffs.164 (3) Interest in having the trial in a forum 
familiar with the governing law. However, US courts have sometimes only regarded this as 
carrying minor weight for dismissal given the experience of their courts with international 
litigiation.165 (4) Avoidance of unnecessary problems of conflict of laws or in the application of 
foreign law.166 For example, in a case involving 100 claims arising from a Spanish aviation 
accident, the Central District of California held that the difficulties involved in applying Spanish 
law to the great majority of the claims involved favoured dismissal.167 (5) Unfairness of burdening 
local citizens in an unrelated forum with jury duty. To give an aviation example, the lack of local 
interest in a controversy relating to the crash occurring in Greece, to a Cypriot carrier, where all 
the decedents were non-US citizens were some of the factors justifying the court’s conclusion 
that it would be unfair to press local jurors into service for the case.168 
 
2.5.2.3  Balance of Convenience 
Identifying the factors to be considered is only part of the FNC process, a process whose entire 
purpose, it should be remembered, is to facilitate a choice of forum in the event of concurrent 
jurisdiction. In order to arrive at a choice on the basis of considering these factors, some method 
of assessment is required. It was clear that Gilbert intended a balancing test to apply, but in order 
to balance interests they must be weighed against some common scale. What criterion/standard 
was to be applied? Was it the same for private interest factors as for public interest factors? Were 
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the two sets of factors alternative grounds for dismissal or should they be measured cumulatively 
against a common standard? These and other questions bearing on the applicable standard and 
the practical application of the balancing test were not adequately addressed by the Supreme 
Court in Gilbert and Koster and this lead to confusion and division among the lower federal courts. 
When it came to private interests, Jackson J had defined these as ‘practical problems that 
make trial of a case easy, expeditious and inexpensive’,169 in so doing, the suggestive criterion 
was one of trial convenience for the parties. One would thus expect that the forum conveniens 
would be the one in which, from the perspective of the private interests, trial would be easiest, 
cheapest and most efficient. However, Jackson J did not leave the matter here, a mere balance 
of convenience was not sufficient, something more was necessary. Immediately after referring to 
trial convenience, he stated that ‘[t]he court will weigh relative advantages and obstacles to fair 
trial.’170 Much hinges on what he meant by fair trial. It is submitted that Jackson J meant to identify 
the threshold or standard of inconvenience required before a dismissal will be granted. The point 
he was attempting to emphasize was that a mere balance of convenience would not suffice to 
warrant dismissal, the degree of inconvenience must cause unfairness to the defendant. 
While it has the obvious advantage of giving flexibility to the doctrine, the notion of fairness, 
without more, is a vague and unhelpful criterion for choice. The guidance to be found in Gilbert 
and Koster as to the meaning of fairness is far from unequivocal. Jackson J certainly considered 
that dismissal on grounds of FNC should be exceptional171 and as something to be granted only 
in rare cases.172 Indeed, Jackson J stated that ‘unless the balance is strongly in favour of the 
defendant, the plaintiff’s choice of forum should rarely be disturbed.’173 However, in Koster, he 
also referred to the extreme standard of vexation and oppression.174 The presence of two distinct 
standards, i.e. “vexation/oppression” and “strongly in favour”, left the tipping point for dismissal ill-
defined and led to judicial and academic uncertainty175 that continues to generate doctrinal 
inconsistency to this day.   
When it came to the balancing of public interest factors, Gilbert and Koster are far from 
illuminating. This is likely a result that dismissal in both cases was overwhelmingly supported by 
the balance of private interest factors and, perhaps for this reason, the two cases attended less 
to the matter of the aforementioned public interest factors. The resulting difficulty was that it was 
unclear what weight was to be given to public interest factors and what place their consideration 
was to be given in the overall FNC analysis.176 Were private and public interest factors to be 
balanced together or separately? In other words, was dismissal dependent on the cumulative 
balance of these factors, or, did the two sets of factors provide alternative grounds for dismissal? 
Again, ambiguity reigned as support for each interpretation could be found in the Supreme Court 
judgments. The stronger interpretation, and the one ultimately affirmed by the Supreme Court in 
1981 in Reyno, was that a court must, in exercising its discretion under the doctrine of FNC, give 
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reasonable consideration to both private interest factors and public interest factors in the 
balancing of interests.177 This accords with the view expressed in Koster of FNC as amounting to 
an ‘ultimate inquiry [of] where trial will best serve the convenience of the parties and the ends of 
justice’.178  
 
2.5.2.4  Concluding Remarks on Gilbert/Koster 
The majority decision of the US Supreme Court in Gilbert and Koster established the federal 
criteria for FNC.179 The decisions confirmed that the federal courts have an inherent power to 
decline jurisdiction and identifying FNC as the doctrine which furnishes criteria for making a choice 
between forums. Although ultimately a question of discretion, such discretion was to be guided 
by consideration of factors which could be broadly identified under the headings of private interest 
and public interest factors. However, Gilbert and Koster were at times vague, leaving a number 
of issues in a state of uncertainty. There were two particularly troublesome issues.  First, the 
precise standard(s) of inconvenience required to justify dismissal. Taking Gilbert and Koster 
together, it is not surprising that commentators and courts alike have read them as at times 
supporting an abuse of process version of FNC (a standard of vexatious and oppressive) and at 
other times as requiring a most appropriate forum version (a standard of strongly favors).180 
Second, the question of the deference due the plaintiff’s choice of forum and to what extent, the 
FNC analysis ought to take account of the citizenship and residence of the plaintiff, most 
specifically the case of the foreign (i.e. non-U.S.) plaintiff. 
When it comes to exploring the legacy of Gilbert and Koster and describing how the doctrine 
has come to be applied by the US courts, two issues are of primary relevance within the context 
of this work. First, the resolution of the ambiguity surrounding the precise standard of 
inconvenience required to justify dismissal. Secondly, an issue which relates to the first, is the 
question of whether, and to what extent, the FNC analysis ought to take account of the nationality 
of the plaintiff, most specifically the case of the foreign (i.e. non-US) plaintiff. Should the foreign 
plaintiff be subject to a different standard? This is, of course, especially relevant in the case of 
aviation litigation since such cases are frequently transnational in nature. Therefore, it is no 
surprise that the next most significant Supreme Court case in the history of FNC in the US should 
be an aviation disaster case, i.e. Piper Aircraft Co v Reyno.  
 
2.5.3  Codification: Section 1404(a) 
Gilbert and Koster both concerned the application of FNC by federal courts to competing US 
federal forums, in other words, they were inter-state cases, rather than international. This national 
scope of the doctrine was effectively removed from the ambit of the federal doctrine of FNC by 
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legislative action taken by Congress in 1948 which resulted in the enactment of Section 1404(a) 
of Title 28 of the US Code. Section 1404(a) provides a rule for the transfer of civil actions between 
federal district courts, it provides: ‘For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of 
justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other district or division where it might 
have been brought or to any district or division to which all parties have consented.’181 Dismissals 
in cases falling within the scope of § 1404(a) are thus decided on this statutory basis and not 
under the inherent power of the court to dismiss under FNC.  
It has been claimed that § 1404(a) codified Gilbert.182 Indeed, this finds some support in the 
Reviser’s Note to § 1404(a) which stated that it had been drafted in accordance with FNC. 
However, the text of § 1404(a) was proposed and adopted in 1945, prior to Gilbert and, further 
still, the Congressional intent had been to make a revision of the doctrine and not merely a 
declaration of it.183 The object of the revision was to make transfer more common by lowering the 
burden and this has been borne out by its more liberal application by the courts (comparative to 
FNC).184 The courts may have applied the Gilbert approach to transfers under § 1404(a) but they 
required a much lesser showing of inconvenience than that necessary for dismissal under FNC.185 
As a result of § 1404(a), the incidence of FNC motions in federal courts was greatly reduced. 
The statutory version pre-empted the majority of actions and effectively curtailed the availability 
of the federal common law doctrine to cases involving a foreign (i.e. non-US) forum,186 or cases 
where the alternative forum was a state court (as opposed to another federal court).187  
The introduction of § 1404(a) partially accounts for the low incidence of Supreme Court cases 
involving FNC after Gilbert and Koster which in turn helps to explain why there was a 30-year gap 
between them and the next substantial Supreme Court case, i.e. Reyno. This long hiatus is also 
accounted for by the fact that FNC dismissals were rare on account of the fact that many courts 
interpreted Gilbert/Koster as demanding a very high standard for dismissal. Indeed, it was only 
after a number of federal courts began to liberalize their approach to FNC in the 1970s that room 
was made for a case like Reyno and the Supreme Court was granted an opportunity to address 
some of the uncertainties left over from Gilbert/Koster.  
  
2.5.4  Reyno: Refinement of the Federal Doctrine? 
The litigation in Reyno concerned an action brought on behalf of the relatives of foreign decedents 
who perished in a 1976 aircraft accident in Scotland. Wrongful death suits in the Superior Court 
of California against the defendant manufacturers, Piper Aircraft and Hartzell Propeller 
(Pennsylvania and Ohio corporations respectively). The case was removed from state court to 
federal court. Removal is a common tactic in aviation litigation cases, often motivated by the 
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perception that federal courts are more likely to grant a FNC dismissal than state courts. In Reyno, 
the case was removed to the District Court for the Southern District of California and from there 
it was transferred, under § 1404(a), to the District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania. 
At this point, the defendants sought dismissal on the grounds of FNC. 
 
2.5.4.1  Deference Due the Plaintiff’s Choice of Forum 
The district court judge (Herman J) had applied the Gilbert criteria, beginning with the question of 
whether an alternative available forum existed. He determined that the Scottish courts satisfied 
this requirement, noting that the defendants had agreed to submit to the jurisdiction of those 
courts and to waive any statute of limitations.188 The next step identified by the court was the 
plaintiff’s choice of forum. The court began with the statement of Jackson J in Gilbert that, ‘unless 
the balance is strongly in favour of the defendant, the plaintiff’s choice of forum should rarely be 
disturbed.’189 The plaintiff had expected the court to defer to its choice of forum but the court was 
quick to point out that plaintiffs were not US citizens, but foreigners, and this changed the 
complexion of things. Herman J stated:  
Generally, the courts have been less solicitous when the plaintiff is not an American 
citizen or resident and, particularly when the foreign citizen seeks to benefit from the 
more liberal tort rules provided for the protection of citizens and residents of the 
United States.190  
Whilst he acknowledged that there is ordinarily a strong presumption in favour of a plaintiff’s 
choice of forum, he decided that this presumption applied with less force when the plaintiff was 
foreign.191 A foreign plaintiffs’ choice of forum was ‘entitled to little weight’.192 On this basis, 
Herman J concluded that a necessary step in the FNC analysis was to determine the degree of 
deference owed the plaintiff’s choice of forum, the result depending on whether he was foreign or 
not. From where did he get this notion? Its provenance is unclear. It was certainly not the 
brainchild of Herman J although he zealously adopted it. He provided no doctrinal rationale for 
his decision, instead he relied on weak or irrelevant authorities, taking his cue from other courts 
which had espoused similar trains of thought.193 Examination of these authorities reveals a further 
poverty of judicial reasoning on the matter and only the flimsiest of rationales. What is to be found 
in these authorities is a stark example of false inductive reasoning. These courts concluded from 
the fact there were very few cases involving FNC dismissal of a US plaintiff, when compared to 
the dismissal of foreign plaintiffs, that a differential approach was inherent to the doctrine.  
This erroneous conclusion was aided by the ambiguity in Gilbert and Koster with respect to 
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the applicable standard for dismissal. There is nothing in Gilbert to suggest that doctrinal 
adaptation was necessary in the case of a plaintiff bringing suit in a foreign forum. Indeed, 
Jackson J paid little attention to the foreign status of the plaintiff (i.e. that Gilbert was a Virginian 
suing in New York). However, Koster can be taken—erroneously—as supporting greater 
deference for a plaintiff that sues in his home forum. The key to understanding the emergence of 
the presumption that a higher degree of deference is owed a plaintiff suing in his home forum 
relies on reading Koster as establishing a different standard for dismissal in such cases. In other 
words, that Koster is to be distinguished from Gilbert. In simple terms, the view taken by some 
was that Koster intended a heavier burden (i.e. oppression and vexation) be placed on the 
defendant to secure dismissal where the plaintiff has sued in his home forum, as opposed to the 
lower burden of Gilbert (i.e. strongly favours) which was to apply only where the plaintiff is foreign 
to the forum. The existence of two distinct standards provided proof to some that a different level 
of deference was due the foreign plaintiff. Under this theory, the strength of the presumption in 
favor of a plaintiff’s choice of forum (i.e. deference) was to be expressed by the standard required 
for dismissal. 
This argument hinges on what Jackson J understood by referring to the “home forum” in 
Koster. For those who supported a differential standard, “home forum” was understood as 
referring to citizenship. However, the stronger line of argument is that Jackson J understood it as 
referring to residence and that he was only making a practical observation that where a plaintiff 
who sues in a forum located at his place of residence then that forum is likely to be more 
convenient than it would be to a foreign plaintiff. Ipso facto, a defendant will have to show a greater 
degree of inconvenience to warrant a dismissal. That a person has sued in their home forum is 
not conclusive proof of a defined and immutable degree of convenience from which one can infer 
a fixed standard to apply. Jackson J was merely making a practical observation of how the 
balance of convenience would normally operate in the context of a case where the plaintiff had 
sued in his home forum; he was not establishing a principle upon which a different standard ought 
to be applied.  
It is submitted that the true basis for Herman J’s determination, and for those of the authorities 
cited by him directly and indirectly, are considerations of policy, not legal principle. Up until the 
1970s, FNC dismissal did not worry US plaintiffs. In the years following Gilbert and Koster, the 
general tendency of courts was to grant FNC dismissals only in extreme circumstances amounting 
to an abuse of process.194 On account of § 1404(a), FNC motions were effectively limited to 
international cases which were far less numerous then than they are nowadays. The net result of 
all of this was that there were few FNC motions and even fewer dismissals. This changed in the 
1970s when international cases became much more common (aided in part by the jet aircraft 
transport revolution) and federal judges complained of being overworked due to docket 
congestion.195 Against this backdrop, judicial tendencies moved toward a more liberal attitude 
toward the dismissal of claims. Whilst this suited the US defendant it was not in the interests of 
the US plaintiff. On the one hand, the courts wanted to liberalize FNC, while on the other hand, 
they were reluctant to send US plaintiffs abroad. The solution was to limit the “liberalization” of 
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FNC by ring-fencing the US plaintiff through bestowing a greater level of deference on their choice 
of forum. Justification for this was based on the fact that in the cases involving FNC, i.e. 
international cases, dismissals were predominantly granted where the plaintiff was foreign. From 
this small selection of cases, the courts inferred the false conclusion that lesser deference was 
granted the foreign plaintiff and thus greater deference ought to be shown toward the foreign 
plaintiff. It is true that US plaintiffs are less likely to be dismissed from a US court on grounds of 
FNC, but this is not proof of a differential approach. All it proves is that, on average, a US plaintiff 
suing in a US forum is more likely to have sued in the forum conveniens. Nevertheless, this was 
the false logic upon which the decision of Herman J and the authorities cited by him were implicitly 
based. There were, of course, authorities (see below) which did not accord with this line of thought 
and refused to apply differing levels of deference. 
Reyno was decided by the district court in 1979. In 1978, the Second Circuit had disapproved 
of the proposition that a foreign claimant’s choice of a US forum is entitled to less weight than a 
US citizen in Farmanfarmaian v Gulf Oil Corp196 and cited the opinion of the Ninth Circuit in 
Mizokami Bros of Arizona Inc v Baychem Corp197 for support. What is striking about Herman J’s 
opinion in Reyno is the fact that he made no mention of these authorities. In the interim between 
the district court’s and the Supreme Court’s judgments in Reyno, the Second Circuit had added 
further fuel to the fire. In Alcoa Steamship Co v M/V Nordic Regent, when addressing the correct 
standard to be applied to a US plaintiff in an FNC analysis, the Second Circuit endorsed its 
approach in Farmanfarmaian, stating that, ‘American citizenship is not an impenetrable shield 
against dismissal on the ground of forum non conveniens’.198 The court even observed that the 
‘trend of both the common law generally and admiralty law in particular has been away from 
according a talismanic significance to the citizenship or residence of the parties.’199 The DC Circuit 
reached much the same view in Pain, concluding that citizenship was ‘largely irrelevant to the 
factors which Gilbert-Koster required courts to consider when making [FNC] determinations’ and 
opining that it regarded citizenship as serving as ‘an inadequate proxy for the American 
residence’200 of the plaintiff. The court specifically noted that residence was just one of the 
considerations to be taken into account in the FNC analysis of convenience, stating that US 
residence was not to be regarded as in any way dispositive.201 There was, therefore, a great deal 
of judicial divergence between the federal courts on the degree of deference owed a foreign 
plaintiff comparative to a US plaintiff. So, when the Third Circuit reversed the decision of the 
district court in Reyno, citing Alcoa Steamship approvingly in the process,202 the stage was finally 
set for the Supreme Court to have its say.   
 
2.5.4.2 Reyno in the Supreme Court 
The Supreme Court concluded that the district court had been fully justified in distinguishing 
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between US and foreign plaintiffs.203 It explained that while there is ordinarily a strong 
presumption in favour of a plaintiff’s choice of forum, this applies with less force when the plaintiff 
is foreign.204 The Court was thus authorising a differential stance be taken in the FNC analysis 
depending on whether the plaintiff was foreign, or not. The difference in treatment was to be 
expressed by the degree of deference owed the plaintiff’s choice of forum; a foreigner was entitled 
to less deference, the citizen or resident ‘deserved somewhat more deference’.205 Dismissal of a 
citizen or resident was possible, the Court stating that ‘[a]s always, if the balance of conveniences 
suggests that trial in the chosen forum would be unnecessarily burdensome for the defendant or 
the court, dismissal is proper.’206 The Court continued by stating: 
When the home forum has been chosen, it is reasonable to assume that this choice 
is convenient. When the plaintiff is foreign, however, this assumption is much less 
reasonable. Because the central purpose of any forum non conveniens inquiry is to 
ensure that the trial is convenient, a foreign plaintiff’s choice deserves less 
deference.207 
For the Court, ‘citizenship and residence are proxies for convenience’.208 One could infer from the 
foreign status of the plaintiff that his choice of a US forum was presumptively less convenient and 
therefore entitled to less deference. Precisely how much less deference a foreign plaintiff’s choice 
of a US forum is entitled to was not quantified by the Court, but, in the final paragraph of the 
majority’s judgment, it did furtively refer to a foreign plaintiff’s choice of forum as applying with 
‘less than maximum force’.209  
Rather than provide a cogent rationale for its position, the Court supported its position by 
reference to dicta from Koster210 which it reinforced by alluding to its acknowledgement in Swift & 
Co Packers v Compania Colombiana del Caribe SA, that very different considerations arise where 
a US plaintiff is involved.211 As discussed above, Koster does not provide the authority supposed 
by the Court, nor indeed does Swift. The Court also found support for its proposition in the typical 
practice of lower federal courts who accorded less weight to a foreign plaintiff’s choice of forum.212 
As authority should flow down from the Supreme Court to the lower courts, rather than the other 
way, this reliance on lower court practice without an evaluation of the reasoning contained therein 
is lazy and tantamount to letting the tail to wag the dog. What value is the practice of lower federal 
courts on the matter when it is based on a weak or non-existent rationale? In truth, the Supreme 
Court thus did little more than echo Herman J by relying on the same authorities.  
The Court was also very selective in its choice of authorities. Despite referencing Pain and 
Mizokami, it is quite amazing that the Court did not address itself to the rejection of a differential 
approach in those two cases. More bizarrely, the Court cited Pain,213 as well as a scholarly article 
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by Wolinsky,214 as support for the reasonableness of the thesis that the degree of deference due 
a plaintiff’s choice of forum can be inferred from his citizenship/residence.215 Yet this was not at 
all what the DC Circuit in Pain, or Wolinsky in his article, were asserting. In fact, quite the opposite, 
they specifically advised against taking citizenship and residence as proxies for convenience. 216 
When it came to clearing up the doubts surrounding the applicable standard for FNC dismissal, 
the Supreme Court affirmed that dismissal ‘will ordinarily be appropriate where trial in the plaintiff’s 
chosen forum imposes a heavy burden on the defendant or the court, and where the plaintiff is 
unable to offer any specific reasons of convenience supporting his choice.’217 Later, the Court 
declared that it was sufficient for dismissal that trial in the plaintiff’s chosen forum be burdensome, 
it need not be unfair.218 This was a pivotal statement in Reyno. It rejected any interpretation of the 
doctrine as requiring a standard approaching an abuse of process. Bearing in mind that the post-
Gilbert courts had, by-and-large, adhered to a very strict version of the doctrine, which if not an 
outright abuse of process version was certainly one that demanded such a degree of 
inconvenience as to amount to unfairness, the Court was now endorsing an alternative view that 
it was sufficient it be “burdensome”. In the context of its assessment of the public interest factors, 
the Court demonstrated that the burden of the choice of forum had to be balanced against the 
convenience of the forum for the plaintiff. Dismissal was warranted where there existed a heavy 
burden on the defendant or court which was unjustified by the plaintiff’s convenience, i.e. 
unnecessarily burdensome. This is closer in spirit to the standard actually intended by 
Gilbert/Koster, i.e. strongly favours, but it departs from it insofar as it substitutes the notion of a 
degree of inconvenience constituting unfairness to one of being merely unnecessarily 
burdensome. In so doing, Reyno liberalized the Gilbert/Koster doctrine. 
In the end, although the Court clarified that a lesser degree of deference was indeed owed to 
the foreign plaintiff than that owed to a US claimant, it did not provide any logical basis for that 
blanket proposition. Neither did it quantify what degree(s) of deference was due, nor provide any 
helpful criteria by which it might be determined. Doubts remained about whether deference was 
a product of residence or whether it could also be inferred from mere citizenship. Crucially, the 
matter of how this deference ought to be accommodated into the FNC analysis was not expressly 
addressed by the Court. This was made all the more confusing by its supposed endorsement of 
its “unnecessarily burdensome” standard. In so doing, the Court was indicating that a single 
standard for dismissal applied in all cases. If that were the case, then it would seem that applying 
a different standard for dismissal in the case of a foreigner was not an option. Indeed, figuring out 
how to incorporate different degrees of deference while at the same time following a single 
standard for dismissal proved very difficult for the lower courts and has led to significant division 
among the federal circuits. 
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2.5.4.3  Subsequent Supreme Court Judgments 
In the years since Reyno, the Supreme Court has addressed itself to substantive issues of FNC 
in a handful of cases, most notably in American Dredging Co v Miller and Sinochem Int’l Co Ltd 
v Malaysia Int’l Shipping Corp.219 However, these cases have added little more than a few 
snippets of information. In American Dredging, Justice Scalia (speaking with the majority) 
underlined that the doctrine’s modern development has been in response to the phenomenon of 
forum shopping and describing it as being, ‘at bottom, ... nothing more or less than a supervening 
venue provision, permitting displacement of the ordinary rules of venue when, in light of certain 
conditions, the trial court thinks that jurisdiction ought to be declined.’220 He also acknowledged 
that ‘[t]he discretionary nature of the doctrine, combined with the multifariousness of the factors 
relevant to its application ... make uniformity and predictability of outcome almost impossible.’221 
A concession likely to excite those civilian lawyers who oppose the doctrine. It may be tentatively 
suggested that Scalia J considered the merits of controlling forum shopping justified the lack of 
uniformity inherent in the US version of the doctrine, especially in light of the fact that it is a rule 
of procedure rather than of substance.222 
In American Dredging Justice Scalia made a number of comments on FNC, by way of 
summary he stated: 
Under the federal doctrine of forum non conveniens, ‘when an alternative forum has 
jurisdiction to hear [a] case, and when trial in the chosen forum would “establish ... 
oppressiveness and vexation to a defendant ... out of all proportion to plaintiff's 
convenience,” or when the “chosen forum [is] inappropriate because of 
considerations affecting the court's own administrative and legal problems,” the court 
may, in the exercise of its sound discretion, dismiss the case,’ even if jurisdiction and 
proper venue are established.223 
Justice Scalia’s choice of language in summing up the doctrine is very selective and potentially 
misleading, it could easily be read as endorsing an affirmation of the vexatious and oppressive 
standard for dismissal. Additionally, it returns to the language of either/or with respect to the 
grounds for dismissal. Simply put, he suggests that dismissal is granted where the balance of 
inconvenience to the defendant is out of all proportion to the inconvenience of the plaintiff, this 
being an assessment of private interest factors. Then, as an alternative proposition, he suggests 
that dismissal is appropriate where the court’s own inconvenience renders it inappropriate, this 
being an analysis of public interest factors.  
In Sinochem,224 Justice Ginsburg (delivering the unanimous opinion of the Court) quoted 
approvingly this statement by Scalia J. She also stated, in more general terms, that a court may 
dispose of an action by an FNC dismissal ‘when considerations of convenience, fairness and 
judicial economy so warrant.’225 If anything, American Dredging and Sinochem represent 
retrograde steps in the evolution of FNC, contributing to the confusion rather introducing some 
much-needed clarity 
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On the specific issue of the degree of deference, Ginsburg J touched on this Sinochem, stating 
that a defendant ordinarily bears a ‘heavy burden in opposing the plaintiff’s chosen forum’,226 and 
that when a plaintiff sues in a forum which is not his home forum, ‘the presumption in the plaintiff’s 
favour “applies with less force,” for the assumption that the chosen forum is appropriate is in such 
cases “less reasonable.”’227 It is submitted that Ginsburg J does no more here than merely echo 
the sentiments of Reyno. This is regrettable considering the divergence existing with the federal 
circuits on the question of the degree of deference due and its place within the FNC analysis.  
  
2.5.5  The Reyno Conundrum  
The title to the previous sub-section posed the question of whether the Supreme Court’s judgment 
in Reyno amounted to a refinement or a revision of the federal doctrine of FNC as laid down in 
Gilbert and Koster. The answer to this question depends on how one reads Gilbert/Koster. These 
classical statements of the federal doctrine left a number of matters sufficiently uncertain that the 
federal courts had subsequently reached divergent interpretations on some key issues, especially 
with regards to the applicable standard for dismissal and whether differing degrees of deference 
applied. The following is submitted as the correct reading of Gilbert and Koster.  
Dismissals on grounds of FNC were to be granted in exceptional cases, therefore, the 
plaintiff’s choice of forum was to be rarely disturbed. Upon consideration of the private interest 
factors and public interest factors, dismissal was warranted where the cumulative balance of 
convenience of those factors was strongly in favor of dismissal. Crucially, the standard for 
dismissal in all cases was that the balance of convenience strongly favors dismissal. That Jackson 
J referred to vexation and oppression in Koster was not affirmation that, a priori, a different 
standard for dismissal applied in the case of a plaintiff who sues in his home forum. It was merely 
a common-sense observation that a plaintiff who sues in his home forum is more likely to make a 
greater showing of convenience and that a defendant who, in order to tip the balance to the level 
of strongly favors, will likely need to make a very strong showing of inconvenience, i.e. something 
akin to vexation and oppression. A posteriori, the doctrine of FNC, by being based on 
considerations of convenience, is arranged in such a way that it will, more often than not, defer 
to the choice of a plaintiff who sues in his home forum. Such deference is passive, it is not actively 
achieved through some form of judicial determination, such as by assigning a differential standard 
for dismissal.  
On this reading, Reyno is not a refinement of the doctrine from Gilbert and Koster, it is a 
revision. The Court endorsed Herman J’s approach as having been fully justified and concluded 
that the strong presumption in favour of the plaintiff’s choice of forum applies with less force when 
the plaintiff is foreign. In so doing, it confirmed the proposition that the degree of deference due a 
plaintiff’s choice of forum varied depending on his/her categorization as a US citizen/resident or 
as a foreigner. Yet, on the other hand, it appeared to reject the notion that Gilbert/Koster 
established alternative standards for dismissal and instead affirmed the proposition of a single 
standard. These two propositions are very difficult, if not impossible, to reconcile.  
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If at the outset one makes the determination that a particular plaintiff’s choice of forum is 
entitled to lesser deference than that due another plaintiff, and if that determination is intended to 
play an active role in the FNC analysis, then you are inevitably applying different standards for 
dismissal. In practical terms, the standard corresponds to the burden that is upon the defendant 
to show the requisite level of inconvenience. If you lower that burden for one category of case 
(i.e. foreign plaintiffs) then you have adjusted the standard required for dismissal. You can call 
the standard by the same name in both cases but that only masks the fact that two different 
standards actually apply. What is really happening is that in one case the plaintiff is being 
handicapped. What is the basis for this handicap? It is based on the presumption (deemed 
reasonable by the Court) that where a foreign plaintiff sues in a US court his choice is less 
convenient. However, as shown above, this is not a reasonable presumption at all, especially 
where it is based on mere citizenship. It should unthinkable that a doctrine whose raison d’être is 
the determination of convenience, should rely on such blunt suppositions about convenience at a 
preliminary stage of its analysis. If, as the Court insisted, convenience is the central focus of FNC, 
then the court should allow the analysis to do its job and trust that it will inherently favour the 
domestic plaintiff. 
With Reyno, the Supreme Court clearly intended to liberalize the doctrine and stated that it 
was not necessary for dismissal that the balance of convenience amount to unfairness, it was 
sufficient that it was unnecessarily burdensome. This is irreconcilable with the standard of 
dismissal laid down in Gilbert and Koster which required such inconvenience as to amount to 
unfairness, such that dismissal would be rare and exceptional. It is submitted that the standard in 
Reyno is more liberal and thus more likely to result in dismissal. That is a more substantial 
alteration than a mere refinement.  
Reyno thus posed two inter-related revisions. Firstly, the deference due a plaintiff’s choice of 
forum. Second, the applicable standard for dismissal. The dilemma this posed for the lower 
federal courts was one of accommodating two propositions that were essentially inconsistent. If 
a single standard for dismissal applies, how do you accommodate a differential stance with 
respect to deference? As we shall see federal courts have struggled to do just that and, as a 
result, have ended up producing differing versions of the doctrine of FNC. 
 
2.5.6  Post-Reyno: Lower Federal Courts 
The US federal court system consists of the Supreme Court, 13 courts of appeals and 94 district 
courts (organized into 12 circuits). Whilst the Supreme Court version of FNC is obviously binding 
on the lower federal courts, the doctrinal uncertainties inherent to it, combined with its inherently 
discretionary nature, has translated into a substantial degree of divergence between the courts 
of appeals which has filtered down to the lower district courts. Clearly, it is beyond the scope of 
this work to conduct a thorough examination of the various incarnations of the doctrine in the US 
federal circuits, but it is essential to demonstrate some of the divergence that exists.  
The standard for dismissal continues to vary between the circuits in the wake of Reyno. This 
is not surprising given the facts that the standard was defined with the vague terms “unnecessarily 
burdensome” and the relationship between it and the standard proposed by Gilbert/Koster left 
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undefined. Consequently, some circuits apply a standard which is closer to the liberal one 
intended by Reyno. For example, in the Fifth Circuit, dismissal will be granted where the balance 
of convenience is in the defendant’s favour.228 However, other districts have kept more steadfastly 
to the Gilbert/Koster standard. For example, the Seventh Circuit looks for ‘strong reasons’.229  
Differences in the applicable standard are not the only source of divergence. Whilst the 
Supreme Court in Reyno was clear that both private and public interest factors had to be 
considered in the FNC analysis (a position adopted by most circuits) the Fifth Circuit continues to 
maintain the position that public interest factors do not need to be considered unless the private 
interest factors weigh in favour of dismissal.230  
However, by far the biggest problem facing the circuit courts when interpreting the Supreme 
Court authorities is the question of how to accommodate the notion of deference to the US 
citizen/resident’s choice of forum. By briefly looking at the case law from the Eleventh Circuit, the 
First Circuit and the Second Circuit, it will be possible to show how the controlling authorities of 
three circuit courts of appeals have interpreted the same Supreme Court authorities in different 
ways. The difference may appear subtle but it is nonetheless substantial since the net result is 
that a plaintiff’s chances of successfully resisting an FNC dismissal is massively dependent on 
which circuit the district court is located and the version of FNC it follows. 
Deference to the US plaintiff’s choice of a US forum is accommodated in the Eleventh Circuit’s 
doctrine of FNC by applying an alternative standard for dismissal. In SME Racks Inc v Sistemas 
Mecanicos Para Electronica SA,231 it addressed the question of the degree of deference, stating 
that the ‘presumption in favour of the plaintiff’s initial forum choice in balancing the private 
interests is at its strongest when the plaintiffs are citizens, residents or corporations of this 
country.’232 The applicable standard for dismissal of a case involving such a plaintiff requires 
‘evidence of unusually extreme circumstances’ and that the court ‘be thoroughly convinced that 
material injustice is manifest’.233 Where the plaintiff is not a US citizen or resident then the 
standard required by the Eleventh Circuit is that the balance of private and public interest factors 
‘weigh in favor of dismissal’.234 The Eleventh Circuit thus accords great significance to the US 
citizenship of the plaintiff, according them exceptionally high deference and thereby placing the 
foreign plaintiff in a disadvantageous position.  
This can be discriminatory.235 For example, if a non-resident US citizen residing in France is 
accorded such an exceptionally high degree of deference when he sues in a district within the 
Eleventh Circuit, whereas his French neighbour is afforded so much less deference, then it is 
difficult to see how the extent of the difference in treatment is justified on the grounds of 
convenience. What objective justification is there for this? Although it is conceded that mere US 
citizenship of a plaintiff does imbue a US forum with some convenience for that plaintiff, even if 
non-resident, the difference in treatment is utterly disproportionate and therefore discriminatory. 
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It is clearly designed to protect US citizens from dismissal without a reasonable assessment of 
actual (in)convenience involved.  
The Second Circuit, a frequent forum for international aviation litigation given the inclusion of 
New York within its jurisdiction, has adopted its own solution to accommodating Reyno’s call for 
deference while seemingly applying a singular standard for dismissal. It achieved this by 
articulating a new step to the FNC analysis in Iragorri v United Technologies Corp.236 Taking a 
collection of propositions regarding FNC from Gilbert, Koster and Reyno and throwing them into 
the cocktail shaker, the Iragorri court surmised the broad principle that the deference due the 
plaintiff’s choice of forum varies with the circumstances. The degree of deference owed a 
plaintiff’s choice of forum ‘moves on a sliding scale depending on several relevant 
considerations.’237 This, the court insisted, was the spirit of the Supreme Court’s instructions.  
Taking that viewpoint, the court could define its own vision of the Supreme Court’s 
jurisprudence for determining deference. Essentially, the deference due a plaintiff is a reflection 
of their motivations for their choice of forum, the degree to which the lawsuit is genuinely 
connected to the US and to the forum, and the degree to which convenience supports that 
choice.238 In other words, the goal is to divine the plaintiff’s likely motivations for his choice of 
forum as inferred from several factors indicative of convenience.239 Simply put, the more the court 
suspects that the plaintiff is forum shopping, the less deference will be accorded his choice of 
forum. Once evaluated, the degree of deference accorded to the plaintiff’s choice of forum will 
determine the showing of inconvenience required by the defendant to secure dismissal.240 The 
Iragorri test thus consists of a three-step FNC analysis. First, determination of the degree of 
deference owed the plaintiff’s choice of forum; second, consideration of whether an adequate 
alternative forum exists; third, a balancing of private and public interest factors with a view to 
making a decision on dismissal. 241 
It is abundantly clear that the defendant’s burden will be made either easier or harder 
depending on the deference afforded the plaintiff’s choice of forum in the first step. The Eastern 
District of New York spoke of the first step in the Iragorri test as setting the bar which the defendant 
must hurdle.242 Taking a selection of district court cases which have applied the test, the 
terminology employed varies, with determinations such as, ‘little deference’,243 ‘very little 
deference’,244 ‘significant deference’,245 ‘substantially reduced deference’,246 ‘lesser degree of 
deference’,247 ‘diminished [deference]’248 and ‘limited deference’.249 What meaning are these 
determinations supposed to convey? More importantly, how do they influence the judge’s decision 
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whether to grant FNC dismissal? The district court judgments provide no elucidation on this crucial 
component of the decision-making process. The reality seems to be that the courts will simply 
rely on some vague impression or gut feeling to guide their decision, something not appreciable 
by the parties themselves. 
This approach is open to various lines of criticism, the full consideration of which is not possible 
with the scope of this work.250 It suffices to note that the degree of deference due the plaintiff’s 
choice of forum is essentially a determination regarding the perceived legitimacy of that choice. 
The reality is that the first step is not about convenience at all, its true object is to read the mind 
of the plaintiff so as to evaluate the legitimacy of his motivations for choosing a US forum and 
thereby assign a corresponding degree of deference or non-deference. In so doing, the Iragorri 
approach deflects the central focus of FNC away from what is largely an objective consideration 
of convenience toward a subjective evaluation of legitimacy. Indeed, it gives priority to legitimacy 
since the determination made under the first step of Iragorri skews the remainder of the analysis. 
This is an utterly unacceptable basis upon which to conduct an FNC analysis, it forfeits objectivity 
for supposition and suspicion. This is made all the more egregious by the inconsistency in 
treatment of the defendant’s likely motivations in seeking dismissal, i.e. reverse forum-shopping, 
these are not treated with anywhere near the same severity as the plaintiff’s. The strong 
impression is that the doctrine is custom-made to prejudice the interests of foreign plaintiffs whose 
status as such is thus inherently more likely to arose the suspicions of the judiciary. At the same 
time, it strongly favours US defendants sued by foreign plaintiffs.  
The First Circuit adopts yet another approach to deference within its doctrine of FNC. It follows 
a two-step framework for FNC. The first stage of the investigation is to establish if there exists an 
adequate alternative forum. The second stage requires a balancing of private and public interest 
factors. However, what makes it truly different is that it refuses to arbitrarily assign deference 
based on the foreign status of the plaintiff, e.g. by applying different standards for dismissal.251 In 
Iragorri v International Elevator Inc,252 in which a US citizen was suing in a US forum (albeit not 
her home district) the First Circuit did not show a higher degree of deference by applying a higher 
standard for dismissal. Indeed, it made no attempt to categorise the plaintiff, or her choice of 
forum, based on citizenship or residence. This is not to say that the First Circuit’s doctrine of FNC 
does not incorporate deference to the plaintiff suing in their home forum, as is required by 
Supreme Court precedent. The key distinction is that rather than explicitly do so by affixing a 
different standard, it does so passively by just allowing the doctrine to do its job; what the author 
refers to as “passive incorporation of deference”. 253 Although still the subject of some 
uncertainty,254 it is submitted that it is closest in spirit to Koster/Gilbert and can be interpreted 
consistently with Reyno.  
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2.5.7  State Courts 
Having considered the federal doctrine of FNC, it remains only to attend to the doctrine as it arises 
at state level in the US. Within the realm of international aviation litigation, the federal doctrine is 
the more relevant as many actions arising therein fall within the original jurisdiction of the federal 
courts, for reasons of being a federal question (i.e. the action arises under the constitution, treaty 
or federal statute).255 Claims under the WCS or MC99 (or indeed any treaty to which the US is a 
party) come within this category, the federal courts having exclusive jurisdiction (vis-à-vis US state 
courts). Where a claim is properly brought under state law and is not pre-empted by federal law, 
then the federal courts may nonetheless have original jurisdiction where the amount in dispute is 
more than $75,000 and there exists complete diversity amongst the parties, i.e. the parties are 
citizens of different states (or non-US citizens).256 Under this second category, i.e. diversity 
jurisdiction, the federal courts may have jurisdiction over state law claims in international aviation 
litigation which are not pre-empted by the WCS, MC99 or some other US treaty or federal statute. 
This commonly occurs in the context of products liability and will be addressed in Chapter 6.  
At state law level, the doctrine of FNC is recognized in most of the fifty states of the US. It 
applies as a matter of common law in many but has also been codified by statute in several, e.g. 
Louisiana,257 Florida,258 California,259 and New York.260 Although federal law does not govern the 
doctrine at state level,261 state courts, for the most part, follow the federal standard for FNC.262 A 
two-stage test is thus followed, i.e. a dismissal for FNC requires, first, the existence of an 
adequate alternative forum and second, that the balance of convenience of the private and public 
interest factors strongly favours the defendant. As to what “strongly favours” means, this varies 
from state to state. For instance, under the law of Oregon, “strongly favours” means ‘that the 
relevant private and public interest considerations weigh so heavily in favor of litigating in that 
alternative forum that it would be contrary to the ends of justice to allow the action to proceed in 
the plaintiff's chosen forum.’263 Other courts interpret it as requiring a more onerous burden on 
the defendant. For example, in the state of Delaware, the defendant must show ‘overwhelming 
hardship’264 before a dismissal will be granted. The Supreme Court of Nebraska also applies a 
heavy standard, holding that ‘a forum is seriously inconvenient only if one party would be 
effectively deprived of a meaningful day in court.’265 
When it comes to the deference due a plaintiff’s choice of his home forum, the majority of state 
courts give some recognition to this.266 The California courts, although they did not initially follow 
                                                       
255 US Constitution, Article III. 
256 28 USC § 1332. 
257 Louisiana Civil Code of Procedure art 123 (1999). 
258 Florida Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 1.061. 
259 Section 410.30(a) California Code of Civil Procedure. 
260 NY CPLR 327 (McKinney). 
261 American Dredging (n 186) 453. 
262 J Duval-Major ‘One-Way Ticket Home: The Federal Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens and the 
International Plaintiff’ (1992) 77 Cornell L Rev 650, 659; Brand and Jablonski (n 1) 71–72.  
263 Espinoza v Evergreen Helicopters Inc 359 Or 63, 102 (2015). 
264 Ison v DuPont de Nemours & Co Inc 729 A 2d 832, 842 (Del 1999).  
265 Christian v Smith 276 Neb 867, 876 (2008). 
266 See e.g., Ellis v AAR Parts Trading Inc 357 Ill App 3d 723, 742 (2005); Langenhorst v Norfolk Southern 
Railway Co 219 Ill 2d 430, 442–443 (2006). 
 51 
Reyno, adopted a position close to it in Stangvik v Shiley Inc,267 such that, ‘foreign plaintiffs 
receive no presumption of convenience in their choice of a California forum.’268 The courts of 
Minnesota and Florida apply the deference principle, affording greater deference to US citizens.269 
However, in the states of Washington and Oregon, their supreme courts have entirely rejected an 
approach that grants any deference to the plaintiff on the basis of his residence. In Myers v Boeing 
Co, the Supreme Court of Washington stated that deference raises concerns about xenophobia 
and described it as lacking any supportive analysis or reasoning.270 Recently, the Supreme Court 
of Oregon, in Espinoza v Evergreen Helicopters Inc, expressed its agreement with the 
Washington court’s view, stating that ‘that there is no principled reason to vary the degree of 
deference afforded to the plaintiff's choice of forum based on where the plaintiff, or real party in 
interest, resides.’271 The Second Circuit Iragorri approach to deference, i.e. a dedicated first step 
of the FNC analysis which determines the degree of deference owed, has not yet been influential 
in the state courts with only a handful of decisions even referring to it.272 Thus, while the lesser 
degree of deference owed a foreign plaintiff is a factor for many state doctrines, it is generally 
only taken into consideration as a factor in the balancing of convenience and not as a separate 
step in the analysis. 
The courts of Cook County, Illinois, have displayed a willingness to depart from the federal 
standard of FNC in a number of product liability cases, many with an aviation connection.273 In a 
number of cases involving a foreign plaintiff and where there was an adequate available forum 
abroad, the courts have nonetheless denied FNC dismissal. The predominant reasoning for doing 
so was that in those cases the evidence and witnesses were spread across a number of 
jurisdictions. In such circumstances, the court concluded that no one forum could be regarded as 
being any more convenient than another.274 Indeed, the Cook County courts have demonstrated 
a progressive tendency by reconsidering FNC in light of modern technological advances. In Vivas 
v Boeing Co, the court stated that the ‘the location of documents, records and photographs has 
become a less significant factor in forum non conveniens analysis in the modern age of email, 
internet, telefax, copying machines and world-wide delivery services, since they can now be easily 
copied and sent.’275 This approach has led the courts there to decline FNC dismissals in a number 
of cases involving Boeing,276 however, in cases successfully removed to federal court, FNC 
dismissal is generally granted.277 This neatly illustrates the divergence in approach to FNC 
between state courts and federal courts that is typical in the US, so much so that plaintiff lawyers 
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bemoan the routine outcome of FNC motions in the respective courts, that is, “win in state court, 
lose in federal court”.  
 
2.5.8  Concluding Remarks 
From modest beginnings in admiralty and in some state law jurisprudence, an inchoate doctrine 
gradually emerged in the US which exhibited some key features of what is recognisable today as 
FNC. The doctrine was not, as one might have expected, a direct importation from Scotland or 
England. Although they must share some common origin, the respective paths to their emergence 
as definable doctrines were parallel but distinct. It is not surprising, therefore, that the US version 
differs in some significant ways from its British counterpart. What is surprising, at least to an 
observer from outside the US, is the scale of divergence that exists within the US. Whilst we can 
refer to the federal doctrine of FNC as broadly representing the US doctrine of FNC, the reality is 
that the United States is a jurisdiction of many doctrines of FNC. In practice, depending on which 
version applies the outcome may be radically different. Some, particularly at state level, place a 
heavy burden on the defendant to secure dismissal, whereas others, are far more liberal. One’s 
chances of dismissal are far greater in a Florida district court than they are in a state court in Cook 
County, Illinois.  
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Chapter 3: Civilian Attitudes to Forum Non Conveniens 
 
3.1  Introduction 
Common law and civil law, never the twain shall meet. At the risk of offending adherents of both 
systems, it might—as a tentative generalization—be acceptable to say that a perceived difference 
between the two is that the civil law places greater emphasis on legal certainty and predictability 
whereas the common law is more inclined toward flexibility where necessary to tailor justice to a 
particular case. As Hartley opines:  
The difference is one of priorities: civil lawyers are more concerned with the structure 
of the law, common lawyers with its operation. … [Civil lawyers] often seem to regard 
fidelity to principle as more important than a just and satisfactory result in the case 
at hand. One could say that the civilian approach is theory-driven, while the common-
law approach is practice-driven.1  
Although certainly a common law lawyer’s assessment, it nevertheless captures the 
quintessential division between the two systems. Clearly, both systems are equally committed to 
doing justice, no one would challenge that. However, their respective approaches to securing this 
ultimate goal differ. The common law emphases flexibility whereas the civil law places greater 
value on certainty. Although broadly consistent, this difference in ethos does lead the two systems 
to deviate in some important respects. One such area is on the question of the declining 
jurisdiction, especially where it is a matter of discretion and even more so where there is the 
potential for concurrent jurisdiction between the two systems. Where these criteria are met then 
conflict tends to arise.  
The in personam jurisdiction of common law courts is very broad, even where the dispute 
involves a foreign element. It usually only requires that the defendant has been properly served 
with process either within or outside the territory of the forum. Civil law systems, however, are 
built on codes so the rules of jurisdiction tend to be more defined and specialised. Whereas FNC 
is a necessary mechanism for balancing the exercise of the common law’s broad jurisdiction in 
cases involving a foreign element, a civilian law court, once vested with jurisdiction, is presumed 
appropriate. Therefore, the issue of declining jurisdiction is generally redundant, whereas in a 
common law system it serves a useful function by acting as a check on its broad jurisdiction. The 
jurisdictional systems of civil law States are thus often characterized as “closed”, in contrast to 
the “open” systems of common law States.2 Under civil law codes, the competent court to hear a 
dispute is specified, the general rule being (in accordance with the Roman law maxim of “actor 
sequitur forum rei”) that the plaintiff must sue at the place of defendant’s domicile. The result of 
which is that a single court will effectively have exclusive jurisdiction. Indeed, civilian law systems 
closely follow the Roman law maxim of judex tenetur impertiri judicium suum, i.e. a judge with 
jurisdiction must exercise it.3  
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Viewed in this light, one can appreciate why a German civil law commentator states that, 
‘[l]egal certainty requires clear and foreseeable jurisdictional rules. Adopting the doctrine of forum 
non conveniens into the German system, which rests on statutorily standardized jurisdictional 
interests, would be paramount to breaking that system.’4 As will be shown in the case of the 
Brussels I Regime, the civil law is not completely averse to judicial discretion in matters of 
jurisdiction. There are many additional reasons why civil law systems have no such doctrine as 
FN.5 For instance, some State Constitutions indirectly prohibit it by guaranteeing their citizens a 
legally competent judge, the discretion to decline jurisdiction would be inconsistent with that 
guarantee.6  
It is fair to say that, generally speaking, FNC is perceived with hostility within the civil law 
system.7 The case of West Caribbean Airways,8 with which this work commenced, brought into 
stark relief, not only the divisiveness of FNC in respect of the choice of the forum between claimant 
and defendant, but also the antipathy over the matter that exists between the common law courts 
and the civil law courts. International aviation litigation within MC99 provided the context there but 
there have been precedents in other areas in which the same essential dispute has arisen. This 
chapter will examine two of these. First, the fascinating example of the responses adopted by 
some South American courts to FNC dismissals by US courts. Secondly, on the other side of the 
Atlantic, the battle over FNC within the European Union (EU) in the context of the Brussels I 
Regime.  
These confrontations between the two main legal systems over the question of FNC merits 
our attention as it will help to present the general civilian attitude toward the matter of a court’s 
discretionary power to decline jurisdiction and reveal the underlying doctrinal and policy 
justifications for that attitude. In addition, it will provide an opportunity to consider the civilian 
solutions for dealing with the matter of concurrent jurisdiction, both preventative and remedial. As 
the question of the choice of appropriate forum in international aviation litigation, whether it be 
within or outside MC99, will frequently implicate both common law and civil law States, any 
proposed reform in the area must contemplate and accommodate their respective positions and 
the underlying reasons therefor. Prior to this, it is important to introduce the doctrine of lis alibi 
pendens. 
  
3.2  Lis Alibi Pendens 
The issue of jurisdiction is a relatively straightforward issue for a civil law system because of the 
low likelihood of concurrent jurisdiction arising. However, it may nevertheless arise on a domestic 
level where the code identifies more than one competent forum. Concurrent jurisdiction involving 
a civil law forum is much more likely to be a feature of litigation with an international element when 
the jurisdictional systems of two or more countries concurrently assert some ground for jurisdiction 
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over the same dispute. Such a situation is known as lis alibi pendens, literally “dispute elsewhere 
pending”. Aside from the inefficiency and costliness of duplicate proceedings, the prospect of 
competing judgments strongly discourages allowing both courts to proceed to judgment, so some 
rule is necessary to determine priority.  
Of course, lis alibi pendens is not unique to the civil law. The common law has long recognized 
the power of its courts to stay or restrain proceedings in the event of parallel proceedings.9 
Although previously subject to differing principles, it has since become subsumed within FNC.10 
Where facing a situation of lis alibi pendens, the English courts will apply the doctrine of FNC 
(where still available) to determine whether to stay its own proceedings or restrain those in the 
foreign forum.11 The civil law adopts a different approach, it applies a very simple rule, the court 
first seised (in time) of the case has priority and any subsequently seised court must decline its 
jurisdiction over the proceedings.12  
The civil law rule is straightforward and mechanical. Unlike FNC, it does not entail the exercise 
of any discretion by the trial judge. However, it is not without its own problems. It is not always 
clear when two proceedings are to be considered as sufficiently similar to give rise to lis alibi 
pendens; for example, does the addition of an extra party to the litigation make an otherwise 
identical action distinguishable? Resolving such matters, as well as those of related proceedings, 
does in some cases require the civil law to grant discretion to the trial judge.13 A frequently voiced 
criticism of the civil law rule is that it encourages a race to court upon the merest suspicion of 
possible legal action in order to secure a jurisdictional advantage.14 As Hartley describes it, ‘[the 
rule] encourages well-advised, but unscrupulous, parties to win the race to the court house by 
commencing proceedings at the first hint of a dispute, often choosing a court precisely because 
it is inappropriate, though inappropriate in a way that advantages them.’15 
Whilst the common law and civilian law approaches are both driven by some of the same core 
policy objectives of preventing wasteful duplication of litigation and avoiding the risk of conflicting 
judgments, their respective rules for securing those objectives differ and reveal an essential 
division. The common law rule engenders flexibility and places greater value on the need for 
justice/fairness in the individual case, i.e. a posteriori, whereas the civil law’s mechanical rule 
serves the goal of justice/fairness by a priori ensuring certainty and predictability. This core 
philosophical belief divides the two systems, such that when a lis pendens situation arises 
between a civilian jurisdiction and a common law jurisdiction, one can expect the sparks to fly. 
This can be amply demonstrated by exploring the controversies surrounding FNC that emerged 
in the case of the Latin American response to FNC dismissals by US courts and in a European 
context by the case of the Brussels I Regime. 
 
                                                       
9 The Christiansborg (1885) 10 PD 141 (CA); McHenry v Lewis (1882) 22 Ch D 397 (CA). 
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3.3  Latin American Response to FNC 
A fascinating response by civil law States to the exercise of FNC by the US courts emerged in 
Latin America in the late 1990s in the form of FNC blocking statutes (as well as various other 
forms of judicial retaliation).16 The basic gist of these blocking statutes is that they provide a legal 
basis whereby the courts of the State concerned are closed to hearing actions that have already 
been initiated in a foreign jurisdiction; a kind of pre-emptive lis alibi pendens rule. The objective 
of these blocking statutes is, as the name suggests, to block the application of FNC by making 
the statute forum unavailable; It being a prerequisite for FNC that an available alternative forum 
exists.  
The background context to the introduction of this so-called retaliatory legislation is illustrated 
by cases such as Delgado v Shell Oil Co.17 In Delgado, nearly 26,000 plaintiffs from developing 
nations in Latin America brought personal injury claims arising from their exposure to a dangerous 
chemical that had been manufactured, designed, sold or used by the US defendants. The plaintiffs 
had sustained their injuries whilst working for the defendants on banana plantations in foreign 
countries (mostly Panama, Costa Rica and Nicaragua). The claims were brought before the courts 
of Texas where the defendant sought dismissal on the grounds of FNC. The Texan court 
concluded that alternative forums for resolution of the disputes existed and granted the dismissal. 
A practical result was that it resulted in massively fragmenting the litigation across multiple 
jurisdictions. As is so often the case, the dismissal was outcome determinative and the parties 
ended up settling for sums far less than would likely have been awarded had the case continued 
in the US.18 Generally having civil law systems and therefore already having a distaste for FNC, 
it was natural that legislators in some Latin American States affected by these decisions took a 
dim view of this and employed FNC blocking statutes as a form of legislative retaliation aimed at 
frustrating the attempts of US corporations to avoid having their liability determined by their own 
courts. 
Of particular interest is a model law proposed in 1998 by the Latin American Parliament 
(PARLATINO), an international organization made up of representatives from most Latin 
American and Caribbean States. Article 1 of this provides that, ‘[t]he petition that is validly filed, 
according to both legal systems, in the defendant's domiciliary court, extinguishes national 
jurisdiction’.19 In the late 1990s, Guatemala, Ecuador, Dominica, Nicaragua, Costa Rica and 
Panama either adopted or attempted to adopt legislation of this type. For example, the Civil Code 
of Procedure for Ecuador provides, ‘[i]f a suit were to be filed outside Ecuador, the national 
competence and jurisdiction of Ecuadorian courts shall be definitely extinguished.’20 In the case 
of Ecuador and Guatemala, their statutory provisions were subsequently held to be 
                                                       
16 See D Figueroa ‘Conflicts of Jurisdiction between the United States and Latin America in the Context 
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18 W Anderson ‘Forum Non Conveniens Checkmated? – The Emergence of Retaliatory Legislation’ 
(2001) 10 J Transnat’l L & Pol’y 183, 184. 
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unconstitutional as conflicting with the guarantee of a right of access to the courts. In other cases, 
the statutes were limited to specific causes of action, particularly product liability.21 
Brand and Jablonski discuss a number of US cases in which the existence of blocking statutes 
has arisen for consideration in the context of a motion for FNC dismissal.22 In some of the cases 
discussed, the courts, dubious as to the actual effect of these statutes, granted dismissal on the 
condition that if the foreign court did indeed hold itself without jurisdiction then the plaintiff could 
refile in the US.23 However, in others, the foreign plaintiffs managed to persuade the US courts 
that the foreign forum was not available and therefore resisted dismissal.24 It would seem that the 
blocking statutes have only met with modest success before the US courts.   
Modest though their success might have been, the mere existence of FNC blocking statutes 
aimed at frustrating attempts by US courts to dismiss cases against US defendants in favour of 
Latin American courts, is evidence of the deep dissatisfaction that exists within some of these civil 
law States toward the use of doctrine, generally within the sphere of international litigation relating 
to personal injury claims. To States whose general rule of jurisdiction is that the defendant ought 
to be sued at his place of domicile, it is particularly egregious for them to find themselves lumbered 
with deciding cases which were already brought before what they regard as the appropriate forum. 
Adding insult to injury, the motivation in such cases is usually the corporate defendant’s desire to 
avoid paying damages in accordance with the law of his home forum, i.e. reverse forum shopping, 
an endeavour the defendant’s home court appears to be endorsing, or at least facilitating. In such 
circumstances, the debate surrounding FNC goes beyond objections based on legal principle and 
enters into the sphere of morality. 
 
3.4  The Brussels I Regime 
In 1957, with the Treaty of Rome,25 six States created the European Economic Community (EEC). 
In time, the EEC grew in membership and would evolve to become the European Union (EU). 
These six founding Member States all have civil law systems and whilst this meant there was a 
large degree of uniformity between them, there were nonetheless points of divergence which 
could potentially result in the frustration of the enforcement of judgments within the EEC. As this 
was deemed to be adverse to the creation of the internal market, a commitment to establish 
judicial cooperation in civil matters with an intra-Community component was given under Article 
220 of the Treaty of Rome for the Member States to enter into negotiations with a view ‘to securing 
for the benefit of their nationals ... the simplification of formalities governing the reciprocal 
recognition and enforcement of judgements of courts or tribunals and of arbitration awards.’26  To 
provide legal certainty and predictability within the Community, the Member States agreed a 
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convention in 1968, the Brussels Convention.27 
Given that the Brussels Convention was agreed in 1968, at a point in time when the UK and 
Ireland (i.e. common law States) were not yet members of EEC, it should not come as a surprise 
that it has a decidedly civilian flavour which has been retained in its later manifestations. The 
Brussels Convention is largely irrelevant nowadays as it has been superseded, for the most part, 
by the Brussels I Regulation of 2001,28 which was itself repealed by a recast version of the 
Regulation in 2012 (which came into force on 10 January 2015).29 For simplicity’s sake, these 
instruments will be referred to collectively as the Brussels I Regime. With the accession of the UK 
and Ireland to the EEC in 1973, the legal landscape of the Community broadened to include its 
first common law Member States. This set the stage for potential conflict between the respective 
approaches of the common law and civil law States with respect to the then existing acquis 
communautaire and its future development. The focus here will be on the Brussels I Regime, 
which is of particular relevance to this work because it is, much like WCS and MC99, an 
international instrument aimed at the harmonization of rules of jurisdiction to which both common 
law and civil states subscribe. Furthermore, it is a regime within which the doctrine of FNC has 
proved controversial and its exploration is therefore germane. 
 
3.4.1  Jurisdiction under the Brussels I Regime 
Jurisdiction, in a simple sense, refers to the question of whether a court has the competence to 
hear and determine an issue upon which its decision is sought. The Brussels I Regime30 provides 
a set of rules for answering this question where the issue falls within its scope of application. Of 
special relevance to this work is the fact that the Brussels I Regime does not affect conventions 
to which Member States had already entered to the extent that any of those conventions regulate 
the question of jurisdiction or the recognition or enforcement of judgments.31 Thus, where a 
convention contains grounds for determining jurisdiction in a given area, as is the case with WCS 
and MC99 in respect of qualifying international carriage by air, the Brussels I Regime does not 
pre-empt the bases for jurisdiction provided thereunder.  
The general rule for jurisdiction adopted by the Brussels I Regime is that, subject to limited 
grounds of exclusive jurisdiction, ‘persons domiciled in a Member State shall, whatever their 
nationality, be sued in the courts of that Member State.’32 Of course, exceptions are provided 
under which a defendant may be sued in the courts of another Member State, i.e. special 
jurisdiction. For example, the courts of the place of performance of the obligation in matters 
relating to contract,33 or, in the case of matters relating to tort, in the courts of the place where the 
                                                       
27 1968 Brussels Convention on jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial 
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harmful event occurred.34 Therefore, the scheme of the Brussels I Regime provides for the 
possibility of concurrent jurisdiction of the courts of more than one Member State. In the interests 
of the harmonious administration of justice, and to minimize the possibility of concurrent 
proceedings, as well as avoid irreconcilable judgments, rules for dealing with situations of 
concurrent jurisdiction had to be defined. 
Again, given its civilian origins, it is not surprising that the rule adopted for dealing with 
concurrent jurisdiction is that of recognizing the priority of the court first seised. Article 29(1) 
provides: 
Without prejudice to Article 31(2), where proceedings involving the same cause of 
action and between the same parties are brought in the courts of different Member 
States, any court other than the court first seised shall of its own motion stay its 
proceedings until such time as the jurisdiction of the court first seised is 
established.35 
Where a situation of concurrent proceedings in the courts of different Member States arises, 
involving the same cause of action and being between the same parties, then the initial step to 
be taken is for any later seised court to stay its proceedings until such a time as the court first 
seised has ruled on its own jurisdiction.36 Where the court first seised establishes its jurisdiction 
then all other courts seised of the matter are obliged to decline jurisdiction in favour of the first 
court.37 This is not a matter of discretion, it is a mandatory rule. 
On first impression, therefore, it would seem that where the Brussels I Regime applies there 
is no room for the application of a discretionary doctrine (such as FNC) to decline jurisdiction 
granted under the Brussels I Regime. However, an important qualification must be noted with 
respect to the case of related actions where, surprisingly, the Regime provides a discretionary 
power to stay proceedings. This is explored in the next sub-section. Following that, attention will 
firstly turn to taking a closer look at defining the scope of the Brussels I Regime and assessing 
the consistency of FNC with that regime. This approach will provide an opportunity to consider 
the landmark case of European Court of Justice (as it then was) in Owusu v Jackson38 and will 
throw a light upon the divisiveness surrounding the doctrine of FNC between the common law 
and civil law States of the EU. 
 
3.4.2  Related Actions: Discretion under the Brussels I Regime 
Although the perception is that the exercise of judicial discretion with respect to jurisdiction is 
anathema to civil law courts, the reality is that, whilst it is certainly more tightly proscribed, it is 
nonetheless a feature of some civil law jurisdictional regimes. Such a discretion is also to be found 
in the Brussels I Regime which provides for the exercise of judicial discretion to stay proceedings 
or to decline jurisdiction in defined circumstances, i.e. in the case of related actions. This 
discretion was a feature of the Brussels Convention as originally adopted. This was at a point in 
time when it was an exclusively civil law affair and thus this discretion cannot be explained away 
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as a concession to the common law Contracting States. 
Unlike in the case of proceedings involving the same cause of action and the same parties, 
wherein staying or declination of jurisdiction by any court other than the court first seised is 
mandatory, in a case of related actions39 it is discretionary.40 For related actions, Article 30(1) of 
the Recast Brussels I Regulation (with similar provisions in the other Brussels I Regime 
instruments) states that a court, other than the one first seised, ‘may stay its proceedings’41 and 
Article 30(2) provides that it may, on application by one of the parties, decline jurisdiction.42 The 
wording is clearly permissive rather than mandatory. The first thing of note is that jurisdiction of 
the court first seised remains mandatory, it is granted no discretion to stay proceedings nor to 
decline jurisdiction. However, a court subsequently seised on related actions may stay 
proceedings or decline jurisdiction. Secondly, Article 30 is concerned with cases which fall outside 
of Article 29; in other words, Article 30 concerns related actions, not the same actions.43  
The doctrinal basis upon which such a court may exercise this discretion is unclear, except to 
the extent that Article 30(3) makes it clear that the object is to avoid the risk of irreconcilable 
judgments. There has been some debate as to whether this discretion allows a court to use of the 
doctrine of FNC or to at least consider matters of forum conveniens. Support for44 and against45 
this proposition is to be found in the case law. The stronger line of argument is against its 
identification with FNC. The Brussels I Regime discretionary rule for related actions is inherently 
distinct from FNC insofar as only a court other than the court first seised may exercise this 
discretion. Therefore, even where the first court is not the forum conveniens it is not at liberty to 
stay its proceedings or decline jurisdiction. This is a key indicator that the appropriateness of the 
forum (in the general sense of FNC) is not at issue, a very different proposition to FNC. Whilst it 
might not amount to a presumption in law, the scheme works to prefer the jurisdiction of the court 
first seised in the case of related cases. Where consolidation of proceedings is an option, such 
consolidation will occur within the court first seised. The Brussels I Regime’s discretion also differs 
from FNC insofar as there must be a risk of irreconcilable judgments. Although a consideration 
within FNC, it is not a requirement for the grant of a stay. This underlines that, rather than forum 
conveniens, the primary purpose of the Brussels I Regime’s discretion is to avoid irreconcilable 
or conflicting judgments.  
Therefore, it is submitted that the correct view, especially in light of the ECJ’s decision in 
Owusu (discussed below), is that while the discretion involved under the Brussels I Regime in 
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relation to related actions shares some considerations in common with FNC, it is not otherwise 
identifiable with the common law doctrine. Instead, the Brussels I Regime envisages a narrow 
doctrine whose exercise is limited, in the context of a given case, to considerations relating to the 
expediency of declining jurisdiction or staying proceedings in order to avoid the risk of 
irreconcilable judgments. This was emphasized by the Supreme Court in The Alexandros T, Lord 
Clarke (giving the leading opinion) stating that ‘the circumstances of each case are of particular 
importance but the aim ... is to avoid parallel proceedings and conflicting decisions.’46  
The mere fact that the Brussels I Regime contains a discretionary rule pertaining to a court’s 
power to stay or dismiss proceedings in the case of related actions demonstrates that the civil law 
is not inherently incompatible with the granting of discretion to its courts in matters of jurisdiction. 
However, this example of a civilian discretion also demonstrates the tendency to constrain it within 
boundaries much narrower than those which exist within the common law. In the appropriate 
circumstances, civil law States are prepared to concede some level of discretion, the Brussels I 
Regime being one such example.  
 
3.4.3  FNC and the Brussels I Regime  
It almost goes without saying that where a dispute does not fall within the scope of the Brussels I 
Regime, for instance, where it is not a civil or commercial matter, or where it comes within one of 
the exceptions, then its rules, including those on jurisdiction, do not apply. In these types of cases, 
the jurisdiction of the court will be determined in accordance with its own law. Accordingly, where 
part of the Member State’s national law, FNC would prima facie be available. Likewise, if a dispute 
is entirely domestic in nature then the Regime does not apply and FNC may be applicable, albeit 
only as a mechanism for determining venue within that State’s own territory. Where the defendant 
is not domiciled within a Member State but is sued therein, the Brussels I Regime directs the court 
to apply its own national law to determine the question of jurisdiction. If a Chinese national, 
domiciled in China, is sued in England then the Regime instructs the English courts to apply its 
own law, whereupon FNC may be employed to stay proceedings. However, where the alternative 
forum is located in a Member State to the Brussels I Regime then there remains a question as to 
whether FNC can be applied; current authority in England supports it application47 but it is 
recognized that reference to the CJEU is desirable.48 
Ordinarily, where a defendant is domiciled within the Community then the Brussels I Regime 
regulates the international jurisdiction of the Contracting States’ courts. The general rule is that a 
defendant shall be sued before the courts of his place of domicile. It is settled law at this point in 
time that where jurisdiction is established under the Regime and there are connecting factors 
between two or more Contacting State courts then FNC has no role to play.49 The doctrine would 
be clearly inconsistent with the legal framework of the Regime. However, where the defendant is 
domiciled in the Community and the only international element involved in the dispute is with a 
third State. For instance, if an English domiciled defendant is sued in England by an Argentinian 
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claimant in respect of a dispute entirely centred in Argentina. Should this concern the Brussels I 
Regime? Would it have intended to regulate the international jurisdiction of the English courts in 
such a case? These questions proved to be exceptionally controversial.  
The common law position, generally speaking, was that where there is no Community 
dimension involved then FNC remained an option because its use was not inconsistent with the 
Brussels I Regime.50 This perspective is predicated on the relative effect of treaties and on a 
narrow conception of the Regime’s object as being to establish a legal framework to provide for 
the free movement of Member State court judgments within the internal market. If there is no 
connection to the internal market then the Community has no vested interest and ought not to 
attempt to regulate the international jurisdiction of the Member State.  The countervailing point of 
view among civilian lawyers was that the general rule of the Brussels I Regime allocated 
jurisdiction to the court of the defendant’s domicile, such jurisdiction being mandatory, even where 
the alternative forum was in a third State.51 Surprisingly, the English High Court initially aligned 
itself with the latter perspective.52 However, the Court of Appeal, in the Re Harrods (Buenos Aires) 
Ltd,53 reversed course and adopted the view that the Brussels Convention is only concerned with 
regulating jurisdiction between Member States and not with a jurisdictional dispute between a 
Member State and a third State. In such a situation, the Court of Appeal concluded that applying 
FNC would not be inconsistent with the Brussels Convention and that English courts were 
therefore entitled to continue to apply it. 
The Court of Appeal’s in Harrods was appealed to the House of Lords, who referred the matter 
to the ECJ. But, the dispute was resolved before the ECJ had the chance to rule on the issues 
raised. Harrods was subsequently followed by the Court of Appeal in a number of cases.54 In 
2000, in Lubbe v Cape plc,55 the House of Lords received submissions from both parties on the 
availability of FNC within the context of the Brussels I Regime. Although the Court was not 
required to decide the issue, on account of the fact that a stay was refused in that case, Lord 
Bingham CJ did opine that the answer to the question was not clear and that a ruling from the 
ECJ would have been necessary.56 It was not until the 2005, with the case of Owusu v Jackson,57 
that the ECJ would finally get its chance to weigh-in on the matter. 
In Owusu, despite finding that Jamaica was the natural forum for the dispute, the English High 
Court had elected not to follow Harrods and refused to grant a stay on grounds of FNC. The Court 
of Appeal sought a preliminary ruling from the ECJ on the consistency of the discretionary power 
of a Contracting State court to stay proceedings, under its national law, where jurisdiction is 
founded under the Brussels Convention on the basis of the defendant’s domicile in the Community 
(i.e. Article 2) but where the jurisdiction of no other Contracting State is at issue, or, where the 
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proceedings have no connecting factors to any other Contracting State.58 The ECJ flatly rejected 
both propositions.59  
Curiously, the ECJ’s judgment began by addressing a question which was not actually referred 
to it. It asked whether Article 2 of the Brussels Convention applied at all. Clearly, the defendant 
was domiciled in the UK so the real issue here was whether the scope of Article 2 only applied 
where there was also an intra-Community element. If such an element was required, then the 
Convention would not apply at all. If a narrow view is taken of the purpose of the Brussels 
Convention then it is logical to conclude that it was only interested in regulating the international 
jurisdiction of Contracting States. And, only to the extent necessary to ensure the simplification 
of procedures relating to the recognition and enforcement of judgments between Contracting 
States and to promote the operation of the internal market. As Peel reminds us, the Brussels 
Convention ‘is a “judgments” convention in which rules on jurisdiction are included purely to 
facilitate the recognition and enforcement of judgments.’60 If an English court grants a stay and 
the dispute is determined by the courts of a third State then there is no issue since the judgment 
granted is not that of a Contracting State. In such a case, there is no real prejudice to the internal 
market.  
The ECJ did not agree, it held that it was never intended to be limited to intra-Community 
disputes. It held that the international element required did not have to be between Contracting 
States to the Brussels Convention. Instead, it could be a connection to any other State.61  The 
court found additional support for its holding in perceiving the purpose of the Brussels Convention 
in broader terms. The Convention was not simply about ensuring the free movement of judgments 
within the Community and promoting the internal market, it also sought to strengthen the 
protection accorded to persons established within the Community. This protection was achieved 
through eliminating disparities between national legislations by harmonizing rules of private 
international law.62 The free movement of judgments within the Community and the certainty 
granted with respect to where they might sue or be sued, not only benefitted those persons 
established within the Community, it also indirectly promoted the internal market. Having adopted 
this perspective, the writing was already on the wall for FNC. 
The ECJ made short shrift of the argument that FNC was not inconsistent with the Brussels I 
Regime, coming to the opposite conclusion based on the following considerations. As we shall 
see in the following chapter, these are arguments that arise in the context of FNC and the WCS 
and MC99. First, it noted that jurisdiction is mandatory under Article 2 of the Brussels Convention 
and may only be derogated from in situations expressly provided for by the Convention. Nothing 
in the Convention made provision for FNC. Secondly, an objective of the Brussels Convention is 
legal certainty and this could not be fully guaranteed if the court seised could apply the doctrine 
of FNC.63 As a doctrine which leaves a wide measure of discretion to the court to determine if 
another forum might be the more appropriate one for the resolution of the dispute, it is liable to 
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undermine the predictability of the rules and therefore undermine the principle of legal certainty.64 
Thirdly, the legal protection that the Brussels Convention seeks to ensure to persons established 
within the Community would be undermined by the doctrine of FNC. Fourthly, allowing for the 
operation of FNC in the context of the Brussels Convention would likely affect its uniform 
application as the doctrine is only a feature of a minority of Contracting States.65 This was contrary 
to the instrument’s purpose of providing for the harmonization of jurisdictional rules and would 
hinder, not promote, the functioning of the internal market. All of which justified the court’s decision 
to preclude the application of FNC. 
Leaving to one side the theoretical objections, the ECJ’s decision brought to the fore some 
practical consequences and difficulties inherent to the Brussels I Regime. Problems which had 
hitherto been resolvable with FNC. The UK court had posed a second question in the Owusu 
case which was tailored to challenge the ECJ to contemplate the consequences of its decision in 
the event that it held FNC to be inconsistent with Article 2 jurisdiction. The second question boiled 
down to whether the ban on FNC within the Brussels I Regime applied in all cases. The ECJ 
would not be drawn into responding to what it viewed as a hypothetical question.66 While it might 
not have been at issue on the facts of Owusu, it is regrettable that the ECJ did not deign to throw 
some light on it since its decision to bar FNC, if taken to its logical extreme, could raise substantial 
problems for the operation of the Brussels I Regime. 
 First of all, where a stay is not available, this may result in considerable hardship for a 
defendant in the position of Owusu. Of the several defendants in Owusu, only one was domiciled 
in the UK whilst the others were all Jamaican. As the dispute involved was undoubtedly more 
closely connected with Jamaica, it would place massive inconvenience on the parties to litigate 
in the UK. Not only would proceedings be much more expensive, the logistical problems involved 
in litigating so far from the geographical centre of the dispute would be substantial. Not to mention 
the difficulties involved in applying Jamaican law, the recovery of costs, the enforcement of an 
English judgment in Jamaica and so on. Another negative consequence of barring FNC (one not 
noted by the ECJ) was the likelihood that it might result in fragmentation of litigation. The 
Jamaican domiciled defendants had a strong case for FNC dismissal notwithstanding the fact that 
the English defendant was now obliged to proceed in the UK. This raises the spectre of conflicting 
and inconsistent judgments and is surely not consistent with the sound administration of justice. 
The ECJ acknowledged these potential hardships but was unperturbed. It appeared to regard 
these as natural consequences of a jurisdictional regime based on the mandatory domicile rule. 
In other words, this was the price to be paid for the certainty and predictability offered by the 
Brussels I Regime.67 On this precise point can be discerned the fundamental difference in ethos 
that exists between the common law and civil law systems; where flexibility is prized by the 
common law courts as providing a means of securing a just and fair result in the individual case, 
the more utilitarian perspective of civilian lawyers is to emphasize the greater good of legal 
certainty. 
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Secondly, a conundrum has long been recognized to exist with respect to Brussels I Regime’s 
provisions relating to cases of lis pendens and related actions, exclusive jurisdiction, and 
jurisdiction agreements. The gist of the dilemma involved here is that the Brussels I Regime, in 
each of these cases, provides for the priority of a particular Member State court, but it does not 
make any provision for non-Member State courts. This is best illustrated by way of an example. 
Let us imagine that proceedings are commenced in England against an English domiciled 
defendant but there is an exclusive jurisdiction agreement between the parties which has 
nominated the courts of a third State. Traditionally, the English courts would apply a bespoke 
version of FNC which applies in the case of breach of an exclusive jurisdiction clause.68 However, 
in this hypothetical scenario the jurisdiction of the English court is established under the general 
rule of the Brussels I Regime, i.e. the domicile of the defendant within the Community. The 
problem for the Brussels I Regime is that it nowhere confers the power to stay proceedings where 
they are brought in breach of an exclusive jurisdiction clause nominating a court in non-Member 
State; it only speaks of the courts of a Member States.69 Had the agreement nominated a court 
in another Member State then the Regime would have given priority to that court; problem solved. 
But, in the case of a non-Contracting State the Regime is silent. If Owusu means that FNC is 
barred, then the English court would be unable to rectify this situation. Yet, would this not involve 
disregarding the exclusive choice of forum clause agreed between the parties? Would this not 
actually subvert the legal certainty and predictability the parties intended to create? These 
questions are made all the more salient by the fact the Brussels I Regime has always championed 
respecting the autonomy of the parties to a contract70 and the sound administration of justice.71 
Surely it would be desirable for a court to apply its own national law to resolve such problems? 
Would FNC, or some similar doctrine, not provide a sensible solution to a most unsatisfactory and 
unworkable state of affairs whilst also safeguarding party autonomy and the sound administration 
of justice? The English court’s second question to the ECJ in Owusu targeted this kind of situation, 
asking whether the use of FNC might be acceptable in such circumstances.  
Some commentators have referred to the ruling of the ECJ (pre-Owusu) in Coreck Maritime 
GmbH v Handelsveen BV in which the court ambiguously said that in relation to exclusive 
jurisdiction clauses that designate the courts of third countries, ‘[a] court situated in a Contracting 
State must, if it is seised notwithstanding such a jurisdiction clause, assess the validity of the 
clause according to the applicable law, including conflict of laws rules, where it sits.’72 This might 
be read as authorising a Member State to apply its own private international law, including FNC.73 
At least one English case has done just that,74 albeit subject to criticism.75  
The refusal of the ECJ to address the English court’s second question in Owusu has given 
some solace to those who hold out hope that that FNC might make a comeback of sorts within 
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the Brussels I Regime. One commentator refers to them as ‘a chink of light ... [for] a residual right 
to stay proceedings in favour of the courts of Non-Contracting States’.76 However, a more 
pragmatic—perhaps cynical—observation is that the tide has well and truly turned against FNC 
and given the general civilian distaste for the doctrine it would be a great surprise to see the 
European courts throw it a life-line. There seems little doubt that the CJEU would take the same 
dim view as it did in Owusu and bar the use of FNC and cognate doctrines.77 The CJEU seems 
beyond conceding any utility to a doctrine so intimately associated with the English common law, 
especially where an alternative exists. This alternative is based on the notion of “reflexive effects”. 
In essence, this notion proposes to treat these situations involving non-Member States the same 
as if they involved a Member State. Therefore, in the example of an exclusive jurisdiction clause, 
the Member State court would yield to the nominated court (even though it is not manifestly 
empowered to do so by the Regime). This approach would certainly be more attractive to the 
CJEU since it would provide a solution from within the Brussels I Regime whilst also been more 
closely aligned to its civilian law sensibilities.  
With the Recast Brussels I Regulation, a partial solution has been established in the case of 
lis pendens and related actions.78 However, where a Member State court has jurisdiction under 
the Brussels I Regime and the dispute involves the courts of a third State, the lamentable situation 
persists in the case of proceedings brought in breach of jurisdiction agreements and where 
exclusive jurisdiction is granted under the Regime.  
Owusu’s impact has been to substantially narrow the already shrinking scope for the 
application of the doctrine of FNC by UK courts. Whilst Owusu was decided in relation to the 
Brussels Convention, there is no suggestion that the subsequent introduction of the Brussels I 
Regulation and now the Recast Brussels I Regulation have changed anything. Both instruments 
make it clear that continuity with the Brussels Convention was both desired and intended to be 
maintained.79 Indeed, the likelihood that a different conclusion might be reached in the case of 
the Regulations is made even more unlikely by the fact that both instruments’ recitals contain 
language consistent with the Owusu position.  
While the faintest glimmer of hope persists that FNC might have some relevance in some 
residual areas of the Regime, that seems unlikely, the trend within the EU is towards its eventual 
demise. This is especially so in light of Brexit. Once the UK has left the EU, then Ireland and 
Cyprus will be the only remaining common law jurisdictions applying the doctrine. Much will 
depend on the type of Brexit secured, where the UK follows through on its Article 50 withdrawal 
from the EU then it will cease to be bound by the Recast Brussels I Regulation. However, it might 
remain party to the Brussels I Regime, either by reversion to the Brussels Convention or, perhaps 
by becoming party to the Lugano Convention 2007 (which would require the UK to join the 
European Free Trade Area) or, by forming a bespoke bilateral agreement with the EU. The final 
option could conceivably open the door to the UK courts being re-empowered to employ FNC in 
areas where it is currently denied to them. Only time will tell.  
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3.5  Conclusions 
FNC seems most adept at stirring up the passions of common law and civil law lawyers alike. 
This is amply demonstrated by the experience of the Brussels I Regime, as well as the 
phenomenon of FNC-blocking statutes of some South American States. Indeed, the standoff 
between the French and US courts over West Caribbean Airways—the case at the heart of this 
work—exemplifies the dissension that exists between civil and common law systems with regard 
to FNC. It often goes beyond the purely doctrinal issues at hand and can engender suspicion and 
distrust. For instance, writing on Owusu, Hartley suggested that ‘[i]t seems that the continental 
judges on the European Court want to dismantle the common law as an objective in its own 
right.’80 From a common law perspective, it is hard not to sympathize with this perception since 
experience certainly seems to suggest that FNC is the persona non grata of the European legal 
landscape. Yet this lowly position is surely undeserved. On the one hand, one can appreciate 
civilian concerns about a doctrine which clashes with the civil law emphasis on legal certainty and 
predictability, as one commentator put it, ‘the doctrine of forum non conveniens produces too 
much legal uncertainty’.81 Yet, on the other hand, the vitriol and contempt with which it sometimes 
regarded by civilian lawyers is out of proportion to the offence actually posed. Why, for instance, 
did one French jurist choose to pejoratively entitle an article on the topic, “Le ‘forum non 
conveniens’ une menace por la convention de Bruxelles?”82  
One cannot escape the sense that some irrational fear exists behind the civilian law’s distrust 
of FNC, something more intimately bound up in the existential anxiety provoked by the separation 
of common law and civil law. Whatever the origins of this animus, the divisiveness that surrounds 
FNC is an inescapable reality. Irrational or not, it must be taken into account in the context of any 
international agreement in the field of private international law that wishes to unify or harmonize 
rules of jurisdiction between the common law and civil law systems. Foreshadowing the 
concluding chapter to this work, it is inevitable that any suggestions for reform made in this work 
must contemplate how to accommodate, or allow for, civilian attitudes toward FNC. This chapter 
has attempted to lay some of the groundwork for such by elucidating these attitudes and 
identifying some of the various principled objections made against FNC. 
This divisiveness that exists between the civil law and the common law systems over FNC will 
remerge in the next chapter in respect to WCS and MC99 and thus provide further opportunities 
for examination. This is especially so in the case of MC99, where FNC featured very prominently 
in the debate over the most controversial issue at the Montreal Conference in 1999.  
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Conclusion to Part Two 
Having traced the doctrine of FNC from its origins in Scotland to its current manifestations 
throughout the common law world, we are in a position to draw out the features which have a 
particular relevance for choice of forum in international aviation litigation. Firstly, there is no 
doctrine of FNC. There are only doctrines of FNC. At an international level, whilst consensus has 
built around the Spiliada doctrine of FNC, there remain States which apply divergent versions of 
the doctrine; most notably the US and Australia. In simple terms, this means there is a lack of 
doctrinal uniformity. At a domestic level, the lack of a unified doctrine within the US constitutes a 
very worrying issue for international aviation litigation; the US being the undisputed centre of 
gravity for such litigation at the present time. The dis-unified state of the doctrine in the US 
undermines the international credibility of the US as a jurisdiction for litigation of claims and has 
only exacerbated the jurisdictional lawfare engaged in by claimants and defendants. A topic which 
will be explored in greater detail in Chapters 6 and 7.  
Secondly, in this part the existential division that exists between the common law and the civil 
law has been identified and explored. The two systems adopt positions which diverge precisely 
on the matter of the discretion to decline jurisdiction. Civilian antipathy for FNC has been 
demonstrated and its alternative approach to jurisdiction described. As we shall see, the 
jurisdictional regime established by the Warsaw Convention (and in consequence by MC99) has 
a greater affinity to the civilian approach, it provides a limited number of potential forums which 
have been pre-selected precisely so as to ensure a strong connection to the defendant carrier. 
The question we now have to explore is precisely how compatible the doctrine of FNC is with the 
jurisdictional regime of the Warsaw Convention and MC99. It is to this that Part Three of this work 
is devoted. What can be singled-out at this point is the following question: if, as the title of the 
Warsaw Convention and MC99 suggest, the goal of those instruments is the unification of law, 
can a doctrine which inherently generates uncertainty have a place therein?  
Thirdly, although in its origins FNC was fixed firmly in convenience, there has been a shift in 
emphasis toward appropriateness of forum. The doctrine has evolved. It is undoubtedly employed 
nowadays primarily as a tool for policing forum shopping and only secondarily as preventing the 
unfair inconvenience of defendants. This shift, as well as other factors (e.g. comity), has seen a 
marked liberalization of the doctrine, with the consequence that dismissal is now far more likely 
whereas in the past it was exceptional. We must ask: Is it legitimate to speak of forum shopping 
in the context of a convention which grants the claimant passenger a limited choice of available 
forums? The shift toward liberal doctrines of FNC has favoured defendant carriers who wish to 
dispute the claimant’s choice of forum. Is this consistent with the balance of interests struck under 
the Warsaw Convention and now under MC99? Or, do we need to reassess that balance in light 
of the modern realities of FNC? Although it will only come into relief in Part Four, it is worthwhile 
noting at this point that the balance of interests is premised on a two-party conception of 
international aviation litigation. As we shall see, the truth is that third parties play a huge role and 
the weight of their influence is on the side of the defendant carrier, not the claimant passenger. It 
is a fundamental thesis of this work that the balance of interests struck in MC99 does not reflect 





WARSAW AND MONTREAL 
 
Chapter 4: Warsaw  
 
4.1  Introduction 
The availability of FNC within the jurisdictional scheme of WCS and MC99 is a critical question of 
this work. One which is ultimately a matter of treaty interpretation. While the Warsaw Convention 
and MC99 are conventions relating to private international law, they are nonetheless treaties and 
are therefore instruments governed by public international law. Therefore, it is to that body of law 
that we must look for the principles to be applied to their interpretation. Customary international 
law provides a body of interpretative rules to be applied to treaties, rules which have been codified 
in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (Vienna Convention).1 It is with the text of the 
particular provision in question that the interpretation of a treaty must begin, but this is done within 
its context and that of the treaty as a whole in light of its object and purpose. Treaty interpretation 
involves consideration of these and other authentic means of interpretation and, as is necessary 
in the case of FNC and the Warsaw Convention, supplementary means of interpretation.  
As codified by Article 32 of the Vienna Convention, customary international law permits access 
to supplementary means of interpretation, these include the travaux préparatoires of the treaty as 
well as its background circumstances and history.2 With this in mind, this section begins with the 
historical origins and context for the drafting of the Warsaw Convention and involves consideration 
of the existing legal regimes governing the liability of the carrier under common law, civil law, and 
existing international law regimes. Attention shall then turn to the drafting history of the Warsaw 
Convention in order to elucidate its purposes—a vital ingredient in the interpretative approach to 
treaties—and the specifics of its jurisdictional scheme. This chapter will then conclude with a 
critical evaluation of the case law treating the question of the availability of FNC within the Warsaw 
Convention and a final section in which a summation and conclusion on this critical issue will be 
presented. 
 
4.2 Purpose of the Warsaw Convention 
It is axiomatic that international air transport, by its nature, exposes carriers and their customers 
to the diversity of laws of multiple jurisdictions. From early on, aviation itself was awake to the 
issues of non-uniformity and it was accepted that uniformity of certain rules relating to international 
carriage by air was a necessity, especially regarding the liability of the carrier.3  
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Around this time, the liability of the carrier under le droit commun was actually quite favourable 
to passengers. Where difficulties emerged was, firstly, surrounding the applicability of existing 
legal regimes of carriage to the newly discovered carriage by air, and, secondly, the exploitation 
of exemption clauses by air carriers to restrict or exclude their liability. The English courts 
traditionally placed few restrictions on carriers using special contracts to exempt themselves from 
liability,4 even in the case of passengers.5 In similar vein, the French civil law generally permitted 
exemption clauses in the case of contractual liability but not to the extent of exempting dol or faute 
lourde (i.e. wilful misconduct or gross negligence).6  
These difficulties led many States to introduce specific legislation directed at carriage by air 
and regulating the liability of the carrier and the use of exemption clauses. These regimes differed 
substantially from one another with a resulting lack of international uniformity. For example, the 
French legislature introduced the Air Navigation Law of 19247 which essentially established a 
fault-based model of liability with no monetary limitation of liability; according to contemporary 
commentators, similar laws to the French Act were introduced in Chile (1925)8 and in Yugoslavia 
(1928),9 and Italy (1923).10 However, other civilian legal systems did not follow the fault-based 
model but adhered to a risk-based model with a monetary limitation of liability, e.g. Germany 
(1922)11 and Switzerland (1920).12 The resulting mish-mash of diverse national regimes being 
applied to an essentially international activity created an unacceptable level of non-uniformity. A 
unifying treaty was the solution adopted by the international community to address this non-
uniformity.  
The First International Conference on Private Aeronautical Law took place in October 1925, in 
Paris, France. The Conference considered a draft convention (prepared by France) and remitted 
it for further study to the newly created Comité International Technique d’Experts Juridiques 
Aériens (CITEJA). CITEJA was comprised of members from several States, nearly all of which 
had civil law legal systems. However, the UK was also member. A revised draft  was submitted 
to the Second International Conference on Private Aeronautical Law, held in Warsaw in 1929, 
from which would ultimately emerge the Warsaw Convention. As it shall prove highly significant 
at a later point, it must now be noted that the US did not officially participate in the First or Second 
International Conference on Private Aeronautical Law but it did send observers.13 It was not until 
1935 that the US would fully participate in CITEJA.14 
 
                                                       
Experts (CITEJA)’ (1932) 3 J Air L 27, 27; AN Sack ‘Unification of Private Law Rules on Air Transportation 
and the Warsaw Convention’ (1933) 4 Air L Rev 345, 346. 
4 See O Kahn-Freund The Law of Carriage by Inland Transport (4th edn, Stevens & Son 1965) 200–201. 
5 M Lobban ‘Personal Injuries’ in W Cornish and others (eds), The Oxford History of the Laws of England 
vol 12 (OUP 2010) 969. 
6 See S Whittaker ‘The Law of Obligations’ in J Bell, S Boyron and S Whittaker (eds), Principles of French 
Law (OUP 2008) 333, 356. 
7 Loi du 31 mai 1924 relative à la navigation aérienne. 
8 Sack (n 3) 360 n 65. 
9 ibid. 
10 D Goedhuis National Air Legislations and the Warsaw Convention (Springer 1937) 78. 
11 The text of the German law of 1922 is reproduced (in French) in (1923) 7 Revue Juridique 
Internationale de la Locomotion Aérienne 59. 
12 ‘Arrêté Du Conseil Fédéral Concernant La Réglementation de La Circulation Aérienne En Suisse Du 
27 Janvier 1920’ (1922) 6 Revue Juridique Internationale de la Locomotion Aérienne 141.  
13 S Latchford ‘The Warsaw Convention and the CITEJA’ (1935) 6 J Air L 79, 87.  
14 Ide (n 3) 40–44. 
 73 
4.2.1 The Resulting Regime 
The principal choice that faced the delegates was between the adoption of risk-based liability or 
fault-based liability.15 In simple terms, should the air carrier carry the entire risk of air 
transportation irrespective of fault, i.e. strict liability, or should its liability only arise in those 
circumstances where it could be shown that the air carrier failed to meet a specified standard of 
care? Those in support of risk-based liability argued that the air carrier should shoulder the burden 
for the entire risk of transportation by air. This point of view was supported on the basis that 
carriage by air was inherently risky and because it was deemed unreasonable to expect the 
claimant to prove negligence in the case of an air disaster. Fault-based liability was favoured by 
some because it emphasized the passenger’s assumption of risk, recognized the perils of the air, 
and was sympathetic to the view that it was unfair to expect carriers engaged in a new-born and 
experimental industry to bear strict liability. Instead, air carriers should be liable only where 
demonstrably at fault.16  
The Warsaw Convention adopted the fault doctrine with some modifications. A concession 
was made to the risk liability doctrine by shifting the burden of proof to the carrier, therefore 
making the carrier presumptively liable17 but allowing limited grounds for exoneration.18 What the 
choice of the theory of fault for the underlying doctrine for the carrier’s liability under the Warsaw 
Convention tells us is that it was largely dictated by the nascent state of aeronautics at that time. 
It was recognized that this would be beneficial to the carrier and detrimental to the claimant. Whilst 
it was accepted that it was in the shared interests of carriers and the public not to impose strict 
liability on the carrier, the need to make to concessions to claimant in order to adjust the balance 
was admitted.  
Having opted for a fault-based regime that thus favoured carriers, the drafters might have 
chosen to leave liability unlimited as a concession to the claimant. Instead, the Warsaw 
Convention reached a compromise solution. It established a monetary limit of liability19 while 
making allowance for its non-application in certain circumstances, i.e. potential unlimited liability.20 
There are many possible reasons for electing for a limitation of liability.21 The consensus of 
academic opinion has long supported the conclusion that the main rationale for the limitation of 
liability in the Warsaw Convention was to protect a nascent industry from the risk of catastrophic 
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losses that it was not yet able to bear.22 It is submitted that this is only part of the story and that 
stated alone it may give rise to the imprecise assumption that the Warsaw Convention’s limitation 
of liability served the sole purpose of protecting the carrier at the expense of the claimant. There 
is a better and fuller understanding to be found.  
Goedhuis identified two reasons for the limitation of liability, the need to prevent carriers from 
exempting themselves from liability through the contract of carriage, and, the necessity for carriers 
to know the extent of their risk for the purposes of insurance.23 Goedhuis’ explanation is the 
preferable starting point as it finds agreement in the minutes of the 1925 Conference.24 However, 
if we settled just for Goedhuis’ two reasons then we would be unable to adequately explain why 
the limits of liability were set at the level at which they were. Would higher limits not have served 
the same purposes?  
The setting of specific monetary limits of liability serves the Convention’s objective of assuring 
certainty and predictability for the interested parties because it provides the parties with a 
measure of the risk against which the air carrier and passenger/consignor may insure themselves. 
However, setting the limits at the particular levels that it did is not justified by the same objective, 
a higher limitation would have been just as certain and predictable. It is submitted that relatively 
low limits were were set for an economic policy reason, counterbalanced, to a lesser degree, by 
a moral consideration.  
The economic policy justification for low limits of liability was grounded in the public interest in 
the promotion of air transport.25 The stakeholders in air transport had an interest in seeing the 
costs kept down and this could be achieved by allocating a lower proportion of the risk to the 
carrier. The imposition of unlimited liability (or a high limit) would increase the insurance premiums 
of the carriers which would trickle down to the passenger and shipper in the form of higher fares 
and rates. It was in the general public interest to have a low limit of liability, it benefitted not just 
the carrier but also the public at large. The public interest in seeing this new means of 
transportation develop and mature demanded it be given the room to grow without the threat of 
massive liability claims which could wipe-out carriers and which would deter the capital investment 
the industry so desperately needed. The opposing moral consideration was the minimum level of 
protection to be afforded to victims of air accidents (specifically those without insurance).  
The result of these competing interests with respect to the Convention’s liability regime was 
that the scales were tipped against the victim of an air accident in favour of the carrier and the 
general public interest in the development of air transport. Too much has been made of the 
limitation of liability with the result that its assumed purpose, i.e. protecting the carrier, has come 
to eclipse the real principal purpose of the Convention, i.e. uniformity.  
Whilst uniformity of certain rules is the primary purpose of the Convention, a fact clearly 
evidenced in the rationale for the limitation of liability, consideration of the limitation of liability also 
leads us to appreciate another purpose of the Convention. By setting relatively low limits of liability 
it is clear that the delegates were also seeking to aid the development of air transport. This was 
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not, as is so often assumed, done solely for the benefit of the carrier but primarily in the interests 
of the general public. When one talks of the balance of interests in the context of the Warsaw 
Convention, it is not a simple opposition of carrier and passenger, it is actually a balance between 
the carrier and the general public on the one side and the claimant seeking compensation on the 
other side.  
Whilst it is convenient to speak of the Warsaw Convention as a pro-carrier instrument, it is 
more accurate to define it as an instrument whose paramount interest was that of the general 
public in the development of air transport. The regime was not intended to protect the carrier per 
se but only to the extent that it served the public interest. This conclusion necessitates reframing 
the understanding of the purposes of the Convention, especially as these are employed in its 
interpretation. We must recognize the inaccuracies inherent in the reductionist understanding of 
the Warsaw Convention as a pro-carrier instrument. 
 
4.2.2  Interpretation by the Courts 
Within common law jurisdictions, the courts have largely held to the view of the Warsaw 
Convention as having a dual purpose. However, some courts have chosen to give pre-eminence 
to one or other of those purposes. In particular, there has been a tendency to view the 
Convention’s purpose in the context of its monetary limitation. In the early US case of Kelley v 
Societe Anonyme Belge d’Explotation de la Navigation Aerienne (Sabena), a New York court 
spoke of the purposes of Article 22, i.e. the limitation of liability, as follows: ‘In order to protect this 
emerging industry, and to secure uniformity of recovery to passengers, the signatories framed 
Article 22’.26 In so doing, the Court identified a dual purpose, i.e. the protection of the industry and 
uniformity.  
A source which has been heavily relied on by the courts when speaking to the purpose of the 
Warsaw Convention is the 1967 law journal article by Lowenfeld and Mendelsohn.27 In this article, 
the authors also identified a dual purpose for the Warsaw Convention:  
First, since aviation was obviously going to link many lands with different languages, 
customs, and legal systems, it would be desirable to establish at the outset a certain 
degree of uniformity. … The second goal-clearly recognized to be the more important 
one was to limit the potential liability of the carrier in case of accidents.28  
Several decisions in which Lowenfeld and Mendelsohn’s article was cited have adopted this 
version of a dual purpose interpretation.29 Furthermore, some courts concurred that the limitation 
of liability was the ‘dominant’ purpose.30 As suggested earlier, this has skewed their interpretative 
analysis. For instance, in the Supreme Court case of Trans World Airlines Inc (TWA) v Franklin 
Mint Corp, the Court stated, ‘[t]he Convention's first and most obvious purpose was to set some 
limit on a carrier's liability for lost cargo. … The Convention's second objective was to set a stable, 
predictable, and internationally uniform limit that would encourage the growth of a fledgling 
                                                       
26 242 F Supp 129, 138 (EDNY 1965). 
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28 ibid 498–499.  
29 See, e.g., Block v Compagnie Nationale Air France 386 F 2d 323, 327 (5th Cir 1967); Saks v Air France 
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industry.’31 Here, the Court identified both purposes with the limitation of liability.  
The US Supreme Court took some corrective action in Zicherman v Korean Air Lines Co Ltd, 
opining that, ‘[u]ndoubtedly it was a primary function of the Warsaw Convention to foster 
uniformity in the law of international air travel’.32 However, in Floyd v Eastern Airlines Inc,33 the 
Supreme Court stated that ‘the primary purpose of the contracting parties to the Convention’ was 
‘limiting the liability of air carriers in order to foster the growth of the fledgling commercial aviation 
industry.’34 At other times the goal of achieving uniformity has been considered the dominant 
purpose. In Reed v Wiser, the Second Circuit defined, ‘providing a uniform system of liability and 
litigation rules for international air disasters’ as ‘the Convention’s most fundamental objective’.35  
In the most recent Supreme Court authority on the matter, Tseng v El Al Israel Airlines Ltd, 
the Court stated that, ‘[t]he cardinal purpose of the Warsaw Convention … is to “achiev[e] 
uniformity of rules governing claims arising from international air transportation.”’36 Tseng 
identified a ‘complementary purpose’ of the Convention as being, ‘to accommodate or balance 
the interests of passengers seeking recovery for personal injuries, and the interests of air carriers 
seeking to limit potential liability’.37 This complementary purpose served the goal of aiding the 
growth of the industry by accommodating the interests of the various parties.38 
The authorities in England and Wales are less numerous than the US. Nevertheless, there are 
dicta from the House of Lords and the Court of Appeal holding to the view that uniformity is the 
object of the Warsaw Convention. In Grein v Imperial Airways Ltd, Greene LJ stated that, ‘[t]he 
object of the Convention is stated to be "the unification of certain rules relating to international 
carriage by air"’,39 and he subsequently referred to it as one of the ‘main objects’.40 The House of 
Lords reached the same view in Fothergill v Monarch Airlines Ltd, Lord Scarman thinking it plain 
that, ‘uniformity is the purpose to be served by most international conventions, and we know that 
unification of the rules relating to international air carriage is the object of the Warsaw 
Convention.’41 The English authorities thus do not single out the limitation of liability as a distinct 
objective of the Convention, on the few occasions where the Convention’s purpose is dealt with, 
it is rather matter-of-factly stated to be uniformity.42 
The Tseng position regarding the purpose of the Warsaw Convention is best aligned with the 
drafting history and general scheme of the Convention itself and is reconcilable with the British 
authorities. As suggested by both the title to the Convention and its preamble, the cardinal 
purpose of the Warsaw Convention was to achieve uniformity of certain rules relating to 
international carriage by air, specifically relating to travel documentation and the liability of the 
carrier.  
Next to this cardinal purpose stands that of accommodating or balancing the interests of 
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passenger and carrier, what was characterized in Tseng as ‘a complementary purpose of the 
Convention’.43 Tseng spoke of this as seeking ‘to accommodate or balance the interests of 
passengers seeking recovery for personal injuries, and the interests of air carriers seeking to limit 
potential liability’.44 This is partially correct but it fails to clearly identify the interests of the general 
public as distinct from those of claimants. In that respect it stands in need of alteration. That said, 
Tseng provides the best foundation for a definition of the purpose of the Warsaw Convention. 
 
4.2.3  The Purpose of the Warsaw Convention 
What then is the purpose of the Warsaw Convention? The principal purpose of the Warsaw 
Convention is uniformity.  The historical background presented above showed that the patchwork 
of divergent national laws necessitated the conclusion of a treaty in order to avoid the conflicts of 
law that would otherwise be inherent in the uncoordinated regulation by individual countries of an 
international activity. However, uniformity was not pursued for its own ends but in order to provide 
a requisite level of certainty and predictability to the interested parties in carriage by air, namely 
the carrier, the passenger and the consignor. In other words, there was a limited scope to the 
goal of uniformity. It was not the stated goal of the Convention to unify “all rules” relating to 
carriage by air, but only “certain rules”. It is clear that these “certain rules” concerned travel 
documentation and liability of the air carrier; the latter being of primary importance.45 The 
preceding consideration of the drafting history of the Warsaw Convention has demonstrated that 
by addressing only “certain rules”, the delegates intended to limit the scope solely to matters 
strictly necessary for a convention on private air law. Indeed,  they repeatedly noted their desire 
to leave well alone questions of procedure and general matters of private international law.46  
The low limits of liability set in the Convention indicate the service of another purpose, i.e. the 
fostering of the development of international air transport. However, one must specify the interests 
pursued, lest one might conclude that the purpose of the Convention was only to protect the 
carrier. The drafters understood the regime as being in the general public interest. At that time, 
the public interest was aligned more closely with the interests of the carrier and thus the resulting 
regime had a de facto pro-carrier slant but it was not directly intended as such. The drafters were 
aware of this and made concessions to potential claimants in an effort to reach an equitable 
balance. However, the fact is that the public interests of air transport took precedence over those 
of the victim. 
In conclusion, the author proposes the purpose of the Warsaw Convention is twofold, 
consisting of a cardinal purpose and a supplementary purpose: 
1. Avoidance of conflict of laws through unification of certain rules relating to carriage 
documentation and air carrier liability. 
2. Furtherance of the public interest in the development of air transport whilst striking an 
equitable balance of interests between carriers, users and claimants. 
                                                       
43 Tseng (n 36) 170.  
44 ibid. 
45 Milde (n 22) 283. 
46 See RC Horner and D Legrez (trs) Second International Conference on Private Aeronautical Law, 
October 4-12, 1929 Warsaw: Minutes (Fred B Rothman 1975) 173–174. 
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4.3  Jurisdiction under the Warsaw Convention 
Jurisdiction under the Warsaw Convention and MC99 is laid down in Article 28 and Article 33 
respectively. The text of both Conventions is substantially the same with the exception of the fifth 
jurisdiction which was added with MC99. As the fifth jurisdiction was not initially provided for under 
the Warsaw Convention and because it bears special significance for the doctrine of FNC, it shall 
be explored in detail in Chapter 5. The focus of this section shall be on the first four jurisdictions. 
This section shall refer to the Warsaw Convention on the understanding, unless otherwise noted, 
that what follows applies equally to MC99.  
 
4.3.1  The Four Jurisdictions 
The 1925 Preliminary Draft Convention (Avant Projet) presented by France at the First 
International Conference on Private Air Law in Paris in 1925, had based jurisdiction on the place 
of departure or the place of arrival with the possibility—in the case of an accident—of jurisdiction 
at the stopping place of the aircraft en route.47 After deliberations, the draft produced at the 1925 
Conference provided for jurisdiction at the place of departure, the place of arrival, the place of the 
accident, or the place of the domicile of the defendant.48 Subsequent alterations were made by 
CITEJA, such that the draft submitted for consideration by the Diplomatic Conference in Warsaw 
provided for four jurisdictions: (1) the court of the principal place of business of the carrier (le 
siège principal de l’exploitation); (2) the place where the carrier has an establishment through 
which the contract was made; (3) the place of destination; and (4) in the case of non-arrival of the 
aircraft, the place of the accident.49  
The place of the accident had featured as basis for jurisdiction since the Avant Projet in 1925. 
Its removal had been proposed at the Second CIETJA Session in April, 1927,50 but it remained in 
the CITEJA Final Draft considered at Warsaw. The UK had submitted a proposal to the 
Conference calling for its removal, arguing that it bore no relationship to the contract of carriage, 
that it would not have been contemplated by the parties as the place for litigation of claims, and 
that it could not be presumed that the carrier would have a business presence there.51 The UK 
also perceived a risk of “blackmail”, whereby a claimant would elect for the place of accident in 
order to vex or harass the carrier into settling rather than face the difficulties and expense of 
answering a claim in a distant forum.52  
During the Conference, the Rapporteur explained that CITEJA had elected for the place of the 
accident because it would provide a convenient forum from the perspective of establishing the 
circumstances of the accident (such as access to evidence).53 The UK Delegate referred to the 
points raised in its submission and elaborated by pointing out the fortuitous nature of the location 
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of the accident, indicating that it could result in a case being heard before courts which were ‘not 
well organized’.54 The Polish and Greek delegates opposed the deletion. For them the place of 
accident was a natural choice of forum and they supposed that since the possible drawbacks of 
some forums would also be detrimental to the claimant that this would discourage them from 
pursuing litigation there in order to vex the carrier.55 Speaking in support of the UK proposal, the 
French Delegate opined that the place of the accident would be justifiable in the case of a third 
party but not where a contractual relationship existed between the parties. The Swiss Delegate 
was also in support of removing the place of the accident, pointing out that where one is dealing 
with an organized State then reliance could be placed on the local authorities to establish the 
circumstances of the accident, whereas if the State is disorganized then its forum would be 
objectionable in any case.56 The British proposal was adopted and the place of the accident was 
removed from the Convention. What is noteworthy in this interchange is the recognition by the 
other delegates that considerations of convenience and predictability were controlling. As to the 
possibility of forum shopping, this was not expressly rejected, nor accepted. The Polish and Greek 
delegates instead regarding it as not really being at issue. The main reason that the place of the 
accident was removed was because its raison d’être had been diminished by the observations of 
the Swiss delegate. This is striking given that the convenience posed by the location of evidence 
is so frequently cited in FNC motions in aviation litigation.57 Yet, in 1929, the delegates had not 
felt that such convenience was strong enough to guarantee jurisdiction at the place of the 
accident. 
Therefore, the result was that Article 28(1) of the Warsaw Convention provides four 
jurisdictions:58 (1) the place where the carrier is ordinarily resident; (2) the place where the carrier 
has its principal place of business; (3) the place through which the contract has been made; (4) 
the place of destination. In each case, the location must be within the territory of one of the 
Contracting Parties and where more than one forum is possible the choice rests with the claimant. 
The generally accepted view is that the jurisdiction of these forums under the Convention is 
mandatory and exclusive; the parties may not agree to waive jurisdiction and the claimant must 
ground jurisdiction on Article 28.59 Roskill LJ described Article 28, in Rothmans of Pall Mall 
(Overseas) Ltd v  Saudi Arabian Airlines Corp, as creating a ‘self-contained code within the limits 
of which a plaintiff must found his jurisdiction.’60 
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4.3.1.1  The Place where Carrier is Ordinarily Resident and Principal Place 
of Business 
For reasons which will become apparent, it is advisable to consider the first two grounds of 
jurisdiction under the Warsaw Convention simultaneously. In the French text of the Warsaw 
Convention (the only authentic language version) le domicile du transporteur is the first place 
whose courts have jurisdiction. The British translation of which is the place where the “carrier is 
ordinarily resident”, whereas the US translation refers to “the domicile of the carrier”. The second 
place whose courts are vested with jurisdiction under the Convention is the carrier’s principal 
place of business (le siège principal de son exploitation)—translated identically in both the British 
and US versions. In most circumstances, a carrier is domiciled/ordinarily resident in the same 
location as its principal place of business, so the question arises to why the Warsaw Convention 
provided two bases of jurisdiction which appear to point to the same location?  
The concept of domicile differs between common law and civilian law systems but what is 
common to the two is that it is more usual for it to be used to refer to natural persons. In the case 
of a corporation, it is generally understood as referring to its place of incorporation. For both 
systems, the proposition that a person or corporation can have only one domicile at a given point 
in time is widely accepted.61 While it is conceivable that a carrier may be incorporated within one 
State and have its principal place of business in another, this would certainly be exceptional, even 
today. The reason why the Warsaw Convention provided two bases of jurisdiction which overlap 
in the vast majority of cases is to be found in the travaux préparatoires. The comments submitted 
by Czechoslovakia on the CITEJA Final Draft had noted that le siège principal de l’exploitation 
and the place of the establishment through which the contract was made (i.e. the third jurisdiction) 
both presumed the existence of the carrier as a company/corporation. This would not cover those 
instances where a natural person provided carriage for hire.62 Only the term domicile of the carrier 
would cover this eventuality.  
It is clear that the drafters intended to ensure, as a prerequisite to a forum having jurisdiction 
under the Warsaw Convention, that there would exist a strong connecting factor between the 
carrier and the jurisdiction in question. This requirement was clearly satisfied by the first two 
jurisdictions, being places to which the carrier generally has its closest links. These would have 
provoked little controversy since they conform with the fundamental principle of jurisdiction, i.e. 
actor sequitur forum rei. 
 
4.3.1.2  Establishment Through Which the Contract Has Been Made 
A difference exists with respect to the wording of the third jurisdiction under the Warsaw 
Convention as translated in the UK and the US versions. Article 28(1) of the authentic French 
language version of the Warsaw Convention specifies that a claim may be brought before the 
courts of the place where the carrier has un établissement through which the contract has been 
made. Un établissement has been translated as “an establishment” (UK translation) and as “a 
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place of business” (US translation). The authentic English version of MC99 employs the US 
translation in Article 33(1). 
In most cases, identification of the forum under this base of jurisdiction is uncontroversial but 
difficulties emerge when the ticket has been purchased through an agency. Miller recounts the 
French case of Herfroy v Cie Artop.63 Here the passenger had purchased a ticket for a flight 
between Lisbon and Madeira through the carrier’s agent in Paris. The aircraft crashed, killing all 
on board. The claimant brought an action against the carrier in Paris, arguing that the sales 
agency office amounted to un établissement of the carrier. The court, however, explained that in 
order to be un établissement the premises would have to be directly owned by the carrier but that 
in the case at hand it was not. The French courts have thus adopted a strict interpretation of 
établissement which would not extend to the independent agent selling tickets on behalf of the 
carrier. The French interpretation is supported by reference to French authentic text of Article 
28(1) which states that the carrier possède un établissement, thus implying legal possession, a 
sense not carried by the verb “to have” in the English translations. 
Facilitated by its translation as “place of business”, US case law demonstrates that the US 
courts understanding of établissement is broader than that of the French. The US courts have 
held that an agency will suffice as a place of business for the purposes of the Convention where 
the agent issues tickets on behalf of the carrier,64 even where the agent is another carrier65 and 
especially where there is an interline agreement.66 As the authentic English version of MC99 
incorporates the term “place of business” it would seem that the French interpretation has been 
weakened, at least in respect of MC99, since it can no longer rely on the French being the only 
authentic language version. 
The third jurisdiction highlights some divergence between the views of the US and France with 
respect to the underlying policy considerations determining when jurisdiction is appropriate over 
a carrier. The US interpretation would suggest that minimal links are required whereas the French 
position demands a more substantial juridical link between the carrier and forum. However, 
although there proved to be disagreement among the courts as to the precise threshold involved, 
it is abundantly clear that consensus existed between the drafters that a significant business 
presence was required. A strong commercial link will exist in either case since the third jurisdiction 
was chosen precisely because it was the place through which the carrier’s undertaking to provide 
carriage to the passenger/shipper was given. Therefore, providing jurisdiction at the place of 
business through which the contract was formed would promote certainty and predictability 
because it presupposed a relationship to the contract of carriage and would thus likely have been 
contemplated by the parties. 
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4.3.1.3  Place of Destination 
One of the advantages of providing jurisdiction at the place of destination is that it guarantees a 
place of jurisdiction under the Warsaw Convention for international carriage by air because such 
carriage must, as defined by the Convention, possess its place of destination in the territory of a 
Contracting State. For the Convention to apply the carrier need not have its domicile, principal 
place of business, or establishment through which the contract was made, located in the territory 
of a Contracting State but, once the Convention applies, then there is, by definition, jurisdiction at 
the place of destination. A threshold requirement of the Warsaw Convention and MC99 is that the 
relevant contract be for international carriage with the Convention providing an autonomous 
concept for such. Article 1(2) of the Warsaw Convention defines international carriage as any 
carriage where, according to the contract made by the parties, the place of departure and the 
place of destination, regardless of any breaks in carriage, are located in the territories of two 
Contracting States.67 Therefore, where carriage is wholly domestic (regardless of transiting the 
airspace over the high seas or of a foreign State) it does not come under the Convention and thus 
jurisdiction under the Convention is not at issue.  
Given that return or roundtrip tickets are the mainstay of the airline business it would be a 
glaring oversight if the Convention did not apply to such carriage and indeed it does apply 
because Article 1(2) provides that international carriage also arises where the place of departure 
and the place of destination are located within the territory of the same Contracting Party provided 
there is an agreed stopping place within the territory of another State.  
The contract of carriage is controlling in identifying the place of destination. It is not the 
destination of the particular flight of an itinerary on which the injury arose that is the relevant place, 
it is the ultimate destination under the contract of carriage that is taken. Thus, where a contract 
of carriage is for a return trip, e.g. London-Paris-London, and the passenger is injured on the 
outbound flight, the place of destination for the purposes of jurisdiction is not Paris, it is London. 
In the English case of Grein v Imperial Airways Ltd,68 Greene LJ stated the it did not matter that 
there were breaks in the journey because for the purposes of the Convention ‘the contract is the 
unit, not the journey’69 and defined the place of destination as ‘“the place at which the contractual 
carriage ends”.’70 The courts will look to the full itinerary and it is the final destination of the entirety 
of the carriage under the contract that is the determinative place and not the destination of any of 
the intermediate flights.71 This remains the case even where one or more of the intermediate 
flights are wholly domestic,72 or where an agreed stopping place is in a non-Contracting State.73 
Modifications to an itinerary (even to add or remove sectors) or the substitution of a carrier, 
generally speaking, occur within the framework of the existing contract of carriage and the place 
of destination for the purpose of the Warsaw Convention remains that of ultimate destination.74 It 
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is the objective fact of the contractual itinerary that is controlling, not the passenger or shippers 
intention or purpose for travel.75 
By grounding this forum in the place of ultimate destination (per the contract of carriage) and 
thereby excluding accidental, fortuitous or intermediate destinations, the drafters ensured that the 
carrier would have a significant business presence there. Indeed, much of the reason for 
excluding the place of accident as a ground for jurisdiction was precisely because it did not 
presuppose a strong business connection to the carrier. Whilst the certainty of a limited number 
of forums was beneficial to both carrier and claimant, the fourth jurisdiction was predominantly 
granted with the interest of the latter in mind. The place of destination for the passenger would, 
in the majority of cases, be their home forum and in the case of goods, the place of destination 
was of special importance to the consignee. 
 
4.3.2  Purpose of the Jurisdictional Scheme 
The essential object being pursued via the jurisdictional scheme was the same as the 
Convention’s cardinal purpose, to avoid the conflict of laws though the unification of certain rules, 
in this case, the rules pertaining to jurisdiction. Rather than leaving the competence of a chosen 
tribunal to be evaluated in accordance with le droit commun, the drafters chose instead to 
establish harmonized rules of jurisdiction. The key features of the scheme are, the guarantee of 
a forum in a Contracting State, the centrality of the contract of carriage, the requirement that the 
forum have a substantial business connection to the carrier, and the limited number of possible 
forums. These key features reflected two core policy considerations. First, the need to ensure 
legal certainty and predictability. Secondly, the desire to accommodate the interests and 
convenience of the parties.  
Whilst certainty and predictability were of paramount importance, the drafters were keenly 
aware of the interests of the parties and this can be seen in the selection of the four jurisdictions. 
The choices made by the drafters demonstrate that much consideration was given to the interests 
and convenience of the carrier. Each forum bears a link to the contract and requires a significant 
business connection to the carrier. It has been said that the four jurisdictions are carrier-oriented 
and focus on the convenience of the carrier and not the claimant.76 It is submitted that this is 
inaccurate.  
The jurisdictional scheme demonstrates that a balanced approach was taken which weighed-
up the competing interests of both parties against the desire to secure the overriding goal of 
certainty and predictability. Both the interests of carriers and those of claimant 
passengers/shippers were taken into account. The rejection of the place of the accident and the 
definition of the four jurisdictions all demonstrate a clear desire to ensure a connection to the 
carrier; perhaps from this the conclusion has been reached that the scheme is carrier-oriented 
but this ignores a number of factors. One must firstly bear in mind that from the outset the general 
scheme itself inherently benefitted the claimant since it granted him the initiative in choosing his 
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forum (at least where a choice existed). Second, the third and fourth jurisdiction are concessions 
to the passenger/shipper since, in most cases, it would mean that the claimant would have the 
benefits of a home forum. This was not carrier-oriented since it meant the carrier would be faced 
with the likelihood of having to face litigation in a foreign forum.  
It is safe to conclude that convenience and fairness to the parties to litigation was an influential 
factor in the determination of the Warsaw Convention’s jurisdictional scheme. However, its 
significance should not be overstated. The third and fourth jurisdictions clearly contemplated 
exposing carriers to litigation in foreign forums which the drafters understood would entail some 
inconvenience to carriers. Secondly, while the drafters emphasized the need to reflect the 
expectations of the parties to the contract, the test employed to determine said expectations was 
objective in nature. It looked to the contract of carriage and not to the subjective intentions of the 
parties. This evidences a preference for legal certainty over the flexibility afforded by a subjective 
assessment. Thirdly, the number of potential forums was limited to a small number. A claimant 
might potentially have a choice of up to four fora or he may be limited to just one and have no 
choice at all. Realistically, a choice between two forums would be the most likely scenario in the 
vast majority of cases. More forums to choose from would have offered the claimant a greater 
chance of a convenient forum but here the drafters wisely opted instead for fewer. Nor was any 
rule for priority between the four jurisdictions defined, from which it can be inferred that relative 
convenience of the forums was not a consideration. More likely, the drafters would have regarded 
each as presumptively convenient and left prioritization to the claimant’s choice. Lastly, in 
removing the place of the accident as a ground for jurisdiction the drafters opted for predictability 
over convenience, specifically in the knowledge that such a forum would have offered some 
convenience to the parties given the location of evidence.  
Overall, the jurisdictional scheme of the Warsaw Convention displays a strong civilian 
sensibility to the nomination of forums. Primacy was given to legal certainty and predictability 
throughout, balanced against the secondary concern for the interests of the parties.  
 
4.3.3  Article 28(2): Rules of Procedure 
Article 28(2) of the Warsaw Convention provides (as does Article 33(4) of MC99) that: ‘Questions 
of procedure shall be governed by the law of the Court seised of the case.’77 That the forum which 
has been legitimately selected by the claimant (from those available per Article 28(1)) should 
apply its own rules of procedure to proceedings for a claim under the Convention would seem 
eminently uncontroversial. However, this seemingly innocuous provision has proved itself a 
source of controversy with respect to the availability of FNC under both the Warsaw Convention 
and MC99. The fundamental question asked has been whether the rules of procedure 
contemplated by Article 28(2) should be interpreted as including the doctrine of FNC or should 
the claimant’s choice of forum under Article 28(1) be pre-emptive and inviolable? 
There is no specific mention of FNC in the drafting history of the Warsaw Convention but there 
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is a very brief mention of the discretion to decline jurisdiction. In its comments on the CITEJA 
Final Draft, the UK had made a proposal to include an additional paragraph in what would become 
Article 28, part of which stated:  
None of the stipulations of this Article shall be deemed to bind any court whatsoever 
to hear a complaint which it would consider, according to principles of law and 
procedure in force in the country to which the said court belongs, as contrary to the 
rules of justice, or as irrelevant to be submitted to it.78  
That the UK had the discretionary power to decline jurisdiction in mind is clear from its 
commentary attached to this proposal. It explained, ‘[a] stipulation of this nature would avoid all 
interference in the discretionary power of courts, and would give them more latitude to repress 
vexatious litigation, as in the case where the “forum” of another country would be naturally 
indicated as being that where the debates should take place.’79 Had this proposal been adopted 
then there would be little doubt that it would cover the doctrine of FNC. However, it was not 
included in the final text of the Convention. All the Minutes tell us is that the British Delegate ‘did 
not insist’80 on the proposal, his reasons for doing so were not revealed. Whilst its non-inclusion 
may be taken as support for the argument that the drafter’s intended the claimant’s choice of 
forum to be final, the reality is that the record is so sparse that it is ultimately inconclusive either 
way. In the author’s opinion, the more plausible explanation for the British delegate’s non-
insistence is simply that with the removal of the place of the accident, the imperative for a 
discretionary power to decline jurisdiction was diminished to a degree insufficient to justify 
pressing the point. In the circumstances, where outnumbered by civilian lawyers, the British 
delegate’s non-insistence was more than likely acquiescence to inviolability of the claimant’s 
choice of forum.  
Full consideration of the significance of the matter will only be possible once the case law 
concerning FNC under the Warsaw Convention has been explored and reflected upon in light of 
the observations and conclusions made in the first sections of this chapter. For now, there are 
only questions: Should the reference in Article 28(2) to rules of procedure being a matter for the 
seised forum be understood as constrained by the provisions of Article 28(1)? In other words, do 
the rules of procedure of the forum apply only insofar as they are consistent with the choice of 
forum granted the plaintiff under the Convention? Or, should the Warsaw Convention be read in 
general—as the delegates repeatedly noted—as providing only for the unification of rules 
essential for a treaty on private aeronautical law whilst leaving general matters of private 
international law and matters of procedure outside its scope?  
 
4.4  The Availability of FNC within the Warsaw Convention  
Surprisingly, it was only in 1984 that the question of the availability of FNC under the Warsaw 
Convention first arose for consideration by the courts. In Irish National Insurance Co Ltd v Aer 
Lingus Teoranta81 the question had been asked whether a court was empowered to dismiss a 
case on FNC under the Warsaw Convention. On that occasion the court in question had not been 
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required to decide the matter.82 However, the US courts would later make determinations on the 
question on three occasions, in a 1989 decision in the case of Re Air Crash Disaster near New 
Orleans, Louisiana on July 9, 1982,83 then in a 1999 decision in the case of Re Air Crash off Long 
Island, New York, on July 17, 1996,84 and then in 2003 with Hosaka v United Airlines Inc.85 In 
England, the Court of Appeal would offer its perspective in 1996 with Milor v British Airways plc.86 
It is proposed to treat these cases by placing each of them into one of two categories which 
correspond to the nature of the approach to interpretation adopted, i.e. the literal approach or the 
comprehensive approach.  
 
4.4.1  The Literal Approach   
As noted in the introduction to this chapter, as an instrument of public international law, it is to 
that body of law we must turn to guide its interpretation. Articles 31 to 32 of the Vienna Convention 
are generally accepted as codifying the rules of treaty interpretation under customary international 
law.87 The interpretation of treaties under the Vienna Convention consists of a general rule (Article 
31) and supplementary means of interpretation (Article 32). 
Article 31(1) provides that ‘[a] treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the 
ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object 
and purpose.’88 When a court is faced with interpreting a provision of a treaty it must, first of all, 
start with the text, this is because, as the International Law Commission (ILC) stated, ‘the text 
must be presumed to be the authentic expression of the intentions of the parties’.89 In so doing, 
the court must endeavour to give to the text its natural and ordinary meaning within its context 
and in light of its object/purpose. 
Articles 31(2) and 31(3) fill out the broad approach defined by Article 31(1). The meaning of 
“context” is elucidated by Article 31(2) as not only including the text of the treaty (as a whole) but 
also includes its preamble and annexes. Article 31(3) specifies other authentic means of 
interpretation which must be considered together with the context, i.e. any subsequent agreement 
or practice in relation to the interpretation of the treaty, and, any relevant rules of international law 
applicable in the relations between the parties. Article 31(4) provides that a special meaning shall 
be given to a term if it is established that the parties so intended.90 
Although not expressly referred to in the Vienna Convention, the principle of effectiveness is 
implicit as part of the duty under Article 31(1) to interpret a treaty in good faith.91 The principle of 
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effectiveness requires that a treaty be interpreted so as to give effect to its purpose.92 Thus, where 
the text supports two possible interpretations, preference must be given to the one which will best 
give effect to the purpose of the treaty.93  
It is with this general rule of customary international law that courts ought to approach any 
interpretation of a treaty’s provisions. As will now be shown, when it came to the interpretation of 
Article 28 of the Warsaw Convention, the courts in Air Crash Disaster near New Orleans and Air 
Crash off Long Island began their analyses with the text of the Convention but never strayed too 
far from there, taking an overly literal approach which failed to adequately consider that text in its 
context and in light of the object and purpose of the Convention. 
The plaintiffs in Air Crash Disaster near New Orleans were the family of Uruguayan 
passengers killed when Pan Am Flight 759 crashed shortly after take-off from New Orleans. The 
plaintiffs sought to resist the defendant’s motion for FNC dismissal, arguing that the phrase in 
Article 28, “at the option of the plaintiff”, meant they were granted ‘the absolute and inalterable 
right to choose the national forum in which their claims will be litigated’.94 The question, therefore, 
turned on the interpretation to be given to that provision of the Warsaw Convention. 
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit made the following statement defining the intention 
behind the drafting of Article 28(1): 
Commentators are in general agreement that the delegates to the Convention were 
most concerned with limiting the locations in which an air carrier would have to 
defend an action, with ensuring that an injured party have an available forum in which 
to redress his injuries, and with allowing the suit to be heard in a forum that had 
some interest in the dispute.95 
The court was hereby relying on the views of commentators to discern the intention behind Article 
28(1). However, with respect to Article 28(2), the court was less concerned with the reasons for 
its inclusion, satisfied—without citing any authority—that it was included because the delegates 
understood that the provisions of the Warsaw Convention would be ‘applied and adopted to a 
variety of legal systems’.96 The court understood this to mean that Article 28(2) manifested the 
delegates’ intention not to interfere with the internal workings of the States’ legal systems on 
procedural matters. The interpretation of the text adopted by the court was that Article 28(1) grants 
the claimant a choice of forum, with Article 28(2) making that choice subject to the procedural 
rules of the chosen forum.97 In the courts view, FNC is a procedural rule of the legal system of 
the US, ergo it is available under the Convention. 98  The court might have left it there, but instead 
it stated: ‘We simply do not believe that the United States through adherence to the Convention 
has meant to forfeit such a valuable procedural tool as the doctrine of forum non conveniens.’99  
The significance attached by the court to US adherence is predicated on a number of 
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assumptions. Firstly, the court assumes that FNC was a valuable procedural tool in 1934. 
Secondly, that in adhering to the Convention the US had given consideration to, and had an 
understanding of, the status of FNC therein. Thirdly, even presupposing that the US understood 
that FNC would not be available, that explanations nonetheless justifying US adherence could 
not be found. As shown in Chapter 2, FNC was not the valuable procedural tool in 1934 that the 
court assumed it to be. In all likelihood the US had given no consideration to its availability when 
adhering to the Convention and, even if it had, there are many compelling reasons why it might 
have justified forfeiting it solely for Convention claims.  
Even if the court’s assumptions regarding US adherence were true, it would not materially alter 
the situation. Under international law, an accepted principle of treaty interpretation is that the 
intention of the parties at the time at which the treaty was concluded which is relevant, i.e. the 
principle of contemporaneity.100 The US did not actively participate in the drafting of the Warsaw 
Convention so, first and foremost, the meaning to be ascribed to its provisions would not be 
influenced by the US understanding. The only relevance that US adherence might have is as an 
example of subsequent State practice. Whilst this does constitute an authentic means of 
interpretation under the Vienna Convention,101 such practice is only relevant where it establishes 
the agreement of the parties with respect to the interpretation of the treaty. Whilst it need not be 
the practice of all State Parties, practice by one or some will suffice only where it is accepted by 
all. There is simply nothing to suggest that US adherence was understood by other State Parties 
as an acceptance of, or acquiescence to, the consistency of FNC with the jurisdictional scheme 
of the Warsaw Convention.  
The second ground for the court’s decision was that to accept the plaintiff’s interpretation of 
Article 28 would undermine the purpose of the Warsaw Convention’s provisions on jurisdiction by 
allowing cases to be heard in forums without an interest in the matter.102 The court had—based 
solely on the views of commentators—identified three goals to the Warsaw Convention’s 
jurisdictional regime: (i) to provide a limited number of forums; (ii) to ensure the claimant would 
have a forum for resolution of his/her claim (by which one understands the guarantee of a forum 
in a Contracting State); (iii) that the forum would have an interest in the dispute. The court’s 
assessment fails to note the overarching goal of ensuring certainty and predictability and makes 
no mention of the emphasis on the interests of the carrier. Its third goal is dubious in the extreme 
for the following reasons. In the first place, there is no evidence supporting the court’s view that 
the forums were so chosen. As detailed above, the specific forums were chosen, above all to 
ensure certainty and predictability, and secondarily with the interests of the parties in mind. They 
were not chosen for the purpose of ensuring that the forum itself had an interest in the dispute. 
Had the drafters had such a purpose in mind then they would surely have adopted the place of 
the accident as a possible forum. What the court’s approach amounted to was a reading of Article 
28 from a US common law perspective by importing considerations of the relative appropriateness 
of the available forums. Such an approach is utterly inconsistent with the text of the Convention 
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which imposes no hierarchy on the forums and explicitly grants the claimant a free choice. Should 
the claimant’s choice result in the dispute being heard by a forum with a lesser interest, then this 
would merely be a natural consequence of the scheme. The court was wrong to conclude that the 
drafters (predominantly made up of civilian lawyers and without any US delegates) intended the 
forum should have an interest in the dispute. 
Once the fact of US adherence is dismissed and the dubious account of the purposes of Article 
28 exposed, the decision of the Fifth Circuit in Air Crash Disaster near New Orleans effectively 
boils down to little more than a bare literal interpretation of the text of Article 28. Although 
ultimately resting its decision of the same grounds, the Southern District of New York in Air Crash 
off Long Island did engage in a somewhat broader interpretative analysis. The litigation in that 
case had been initiated by the relatives of forty-five French passengers who had died in the 1996 
crash of TWA Flight 800. The defendants’ FNC motion was ultimately denied but not before the 
question was raised regarding the availability of FNC. The court summarized the claimants’ 
contention as follows: ‘that the language of Article 28(1), considered in the context of the 
Convention as a whole and of its drafting history, prohibits a court from declining to exercise its 
jurisdiction in a case properly brought under Article 28(1).’103  
The claimants presented a number of arguments to support their contention, one of which was 
the precedent of United States v National City Lines Inc,104 a case in which the US Supreme Court 
considered the special jurisdiction provisions of a federal act which prohibited a court from 
interfering with the claimant’s choice of forum through the application of FNC.105 The claimants 
sought to draw an analogy to the Warsaw Convention and argued that it too established special 
jurisdiction rules which could not be displaced by FNC. The court distinguished National City Lines 
because in that case the legislature had expressed a clear legislative intent to preclude 
interference with the claimant’s choice of forum.106 It held that the mere fact that the Warsaw 
Convention contains a special jurisdiction provision is not enough to conclude that dismissal on 
grounds of FNC is precluded.107 Something more was required. 
The missing element of the claimants’ argument was the manifest intention that the claimant’s 
choice of forum be inviolable under the Convention. They sought to supply this by reference to 
the drafting history. In particular, the plaintiffs relied on the non-insistence of the British Delegate 
to the UK’s proposal for a judicial discretion to decline jurisdiction.108 For them, this was proof that 
the delegates had intended the choice of forum under Article 28(1) to be final. The court, however, 
found the drafting history to be inconclusive. The court opined that UK’s non-insistence on the 
proposal may simply have been because they did not wish to impose the procedural device on 
other signatories and on the understanding that the UK and other States, within whose procedural 
law an FNC-like doctrine was a feature, could continue to apply it on the strength of Article 28(2). 
Likewise, the civil law jurists may have adopted Article 28(2) precisely because they recognized 
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that were procedural rules in other systems with which they were unfamiliar and did not wish to 
interfere.109 It did not, ‘necessarily signify an intention by the drafters to prohibit signatory nations 
for which the [FNC] doctrine was part of their procedural law from employing the doctrine in a 
Convention case.’110  
The court’s reading of the drafting history led it to conclude that, ‘[n]othing in the discussion 
indicates a desire to restrict the defendant carriers to the forums listed in Article 28(1).’111 By which 
it meant that there was no suggestion that once a forum was chosen that such choice was 
inviolable. In any case, the court’s observations on the drafting history were purely obiter because 
it based its finding on the literal interpretation of Article 28. The literal language of Article 28(2) 
was clear, the court determined that ‘[FNC] is a procedural tool available to US courts and thus 
squarely falls within the literal language of Article 28(2).’112 Like in Air Crash Disaster near New 
Orleans, the court argued that Article 28(1) had to be read in conjunction with Article 28(2) and 
that the plaintiff’s choice of forum was subject to the forum’s rules of procedure, which in the US 
included FNC.  
The approach to treaty interpretation adopted by the two courts might have been justified on 
a restrictive reading of the Supreme Court’s judgment in Chan v Korean Air Lines Ltd,113 but it 
does not pass muster under the Vienna Convention. Article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention on 
the Law of Treaties provides that ‘[a] treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with 
the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its 
object and purpose.’114 The context considered by the two courts in reaching their determinations 
did not go beyond Article 28. Even in Air Crash off Long Island, where the plaintiffs had asked the 
court to consider the jurisdictional scheme in the context of the Convention as a whole and in light 
of its object and purpose, the court had not done so and contained itself to the immediate context 
of Article 28. In so doing, the courts failed to consider its meaning in light of the Convention’s 
dual-purposes.115 Had the courts asked themselves how compatible FNC is with the Convention’s 
cardinal purpose of uniformity and with a supplementary purpose which involves the balancing of 
interests between carriers, users and claimants, then its ability to adopt the stance that the 
meaning of Article 28 was clear and unambiguous would surely have been upset. Even the limited 
context of Article 28 should have given the courts pause for thought, but even there the courts 
still failed to identify the primary purpose of the jurisdictional scheme, i.e. certainty and 
predictability.  
In Air Crash Disaster near New Orleans and Air Crash off Long Island the courts did little more 
than adopt a literal interpretation of the text of Article 28. Taken at this level the conclusion of the 
courts is logical, but their approach was too superficial. Under the general rule of interpretation 
provided by Article 31 of the Vienna Convention, the courts interpretative approach was 
inadequate for failing to properly consider the extrinsic evidence provided by the context of the 
Warsaw Convention as a whole and its object and purpose. Had the courts followed the correct 
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approach, then it is submitted that they would have to concede that the text was ambiguous and 
that recourse to supplementary means of interpretation was required.  
 
4.4.2  The Comprehensive Approach 
Given their overly narrow approach to interpretation, the two courts in the decisions considered 
above rested their decisions on a literal interpretation of Article 28. As such, they felt satisfied that 
because the ordinary meaning of the terms was clear, recourse to supplementary means of 
interpretation, such as the drafting history and background circumstances, was not required. In 
the context of the Vienna Convention, it could be said that the courts did not see any requirement 
to go beyond the general rule of interpretation of Article 31. On the face of it, this seems plausible. 
Under Article 32 of the Vienna Convention, a court may have recourse to supplementary means 
of interpretation in two defined circumstances; firstly, to confirm the meaning resulting from the 
application of the general rule, and second, to determine the meaning where the application of 
the general rule fails to produce an acceptable meaning. The ICJ stated, in an advisory opinion 
in Admission of a State to the United Nations, that, ‘there is no occasion to resort to preparatory 
work if the text of a convention is sufficiently clear in itself.’116 These might have given to the courts 
in Air Crash near New Orleans and Air Crash off Long Island a sense of vindication for their 
inattentiveness to supplementary means of interpretation.  
Clearly the courts thought the ordinary meaning of the Article 28 was clear and unambiguous. 
Even so, they would have been permitted to have recourse to supplementary means of 
interpretation for the purpose of “confirming” the meaning arrived at from the operation of Article 
31. They elected not to do so and given that such recourse is couched in permissive, rather than 
mandatory terms, their decision to do so is defensible. However, in the second set of 
circumstances, where the application of the general rule leaves the meaning ‘ambiguous or 
obscure’,117 or, where it ‘leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable’118 
supplementary means of interpretation may be used to determine the meaning. This second 
scenario is a strictly limited exception to the general rule of interpretation whereby the 
supplementary means plays a more significant role than that of mere confirmation, they may be 
used to determine the meaning.119 As argued above, if properly applied the general rule of 
interpretation would result in the conclusion that the meaning of Article 28 is ambiguous, therefore, 
recourse to supplementary means of interpretation was both valid and necessary. Such means 
include the travaux préparatoires and Article 32 provides one other example, i.e. the 
circumstances of the treaty’s conclusion. It is not clear what is meant by the latter means, but the 
ILC Special Rapporteur understood it to mean, ‘both the contemporary circumstances and the 
historical context in which the treaty was concluded.’120   
How then would a more complete application of the general rule of interpretation and recourse 
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to supplementary means of interpretation resolve the critical question of the consistency of FNC 
with the Warsaw Convention? The English Court of Appeal wrestled with this same question in 
Milor.121 Philips LJ gave the opinion with which Gibson and Legatt LJJ both agreed. The claimant 
sought to resist a stay on grounds of FNC, arguing that, Article 28 gave him ‘the right to select 
within which of the competent jurisdictions their claim will be tried, and that accordingly there is 
no scope for the application of the doctrine of forum non conveniens.’122 
Much of the argument turned on the meaning to be given to the word “bring” in the context of 
Article 28. Did it mean merely the right to initiate proceedings in the forum, or, did the meaning 
cover initiation and resolution of proceedings? Philips LJ considered the French text of Article 28, 
(the only authentic language version of the Warsaw Convention). In Article 28 the word used is 
portée and the court contrasted this with the use of the word intentée in Article 29; both translated 
into English with the verb “to bring”. For Philips LJ this was significant. In his view, intentée carried 
the restrictive meaning of merely initiating proceedings whereas portée carried the meaning of 
commencing and pursuing. Philips LJ favoured the latter:  
[To] give a plaintiff the option to choose in which of a number of competent 
jurisdictions to commence his suit is to give him nothing. … If the option granted by 
Article 28 is to have value, it must be an option to the plaintiff to decide in which 
forum his claim is to be resolved.123  
The operation of FNC would be inconsistent with this right. There is much to commend in this line 
of argument but it is also an element hyperbole to suggesting that a claimant is given nothing 
because his choice may be subject to a rule of procedure. It is unlikely that Philips LJ intended 
his statement to be taken too literally. In most cases, the claimant’s choice will stand and only in 
limited circumstances, where the defendant can overcome the burden of proof, will the claimant’s 
choice not be final. Nonetheless, there is undoubtedly something absurd about offering a claimant 
the choice between a limited number of forums in to which sue and then disregarding that choice 
in preference of that of the defendant. A claimant on the receiving end of such treatment is 
certainly going to wonder if the choice first granted him had any real value. The crux of the matter 
is whether the drafters intended to bestow a substantive right to absolutely determine the forum 
for resolution of his claim under the Convention. 
For Philips LJ, the natural meaning was not so unambiguous that reference to extrinsic 
considerations need not be made. So, he looked beyond the natural meaning in its context and 
examined the object of the Convention, its drafting history and historical background. Philips LJ 
expressed his agreement with the trial judge’s opinion that the object of the Convention, as far as 
jurisdiction was concerned, was to harmonize national views on jurisdiction, i.e. to establish 
uniformity. Support for this position was found in Rothmans of Pall Mall124 where Roskill LJ had 
described Article 28 as creating a ‘self-contained code within the limits of which a plaintiff must 
found his jurisdiction.’125 Philips LJ understood this to mean that the object of the Convention’s 
jurisdictional provisions was to establish a uniform regime which would be self-reliant and 
independent of the substantive law of the individual national legal systems. In his view, if the 
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parties had intended FNC to apply within this ‘self-contained code’ then they would surely have 
made express provision for it. That they did not do so, not only reflected the desire for uniformity 
but also the fact that FNC was not an established doctrine in all common law countries in 1929 
and would have been unknown to many civilian jurists. In light of its purpose and in the context of 
its historical background, Philips LJ reached the following conclusions: 
I think it would be surprising if the high contracting parties has preserved to that small 
minority of countries which applied the doctrine of forum non conveniens a power to 
affect the choice of the forum in which a dispute should be tried by a process 
unknown to the majority of the parties. It seems to me that the jurisdictional code that 
was agreed in the form of article 28 aimed at providing the plaintiff with a limited 
choice of competent jurisdictions each of which to a greater or lesser degree was 
likely to be appropriate for the bringing of a claim. It was implicit that the court of the 
chosen forum would remain seised of the matter, trying it in accordance with its own 
rules of procedure, and there was no scope for an individual court to impose a venue 
that conflicted with the plaintiff’s choice.126 
Philips LJ very briefly considered the US authorities supporting the availability of the doctrine, 
including Air Crash Disaster near New Orleans, but did not find their reasoning compelling. The 
conclusion thus reached by the Court of Appeal was that FNC is not available under the Warsaw 
Convention, a plaintiff’s choice of forum under Article 28 is absolute. Philips LJ stated that he 
considered ‘that article 28 of the Warsaw Convention leaves no scope for a challenge to the 
jurisdiction on the grounds of forum non conveniens’.127 
Philips LJ’s concept of a “self-contained code” on jurisdiction appears to be at variance with 
the text of Article 28(2) which provides that matters of procedure will be determined by the 
procedural law of the chosen forum. As far as procedural law is concerned, the code is not at all 
self-contained. Philips LJ was clearly aware of this. This apparent inconsistency is reconcilable 
once it is understood that his essential point was that the drafters had intended to bestow upon 
the claimant a substantive right to choose his forum and have the dispute resolved there. Yes, 
Article 28(2) provides for the application of the forum’s rules of procedure, but in light of the 
Convention’s cardinal purpose of achieving uniformity, it would be inconsistent to allow such a 
rule of procedure to undermine that substantive right. The validity of the decision in Milor rests 
entirely on the nature of the substantive right intended under Article 28(1). Was that right limited 
to the choice of forum or did it also include the right to have the dispute resolved in that forum? If 
the latter, then the reference to national rules of procedure in Article 28(2) must be interpreted as 
precluding FNC otherwise it would conflict the substantive provisions of the Convention. The 
same reasoning would be applied by a US court in Hosaka,128 a case in which the court took 
particular note of Philips LJ’s decision in Milor. 
Decided in 2002, the Hosaka case concerned claims made by 46 Japanese tourists for injuries 
(as well as one fatality) suffered during severe turbulence encountered whilst travelling with 
United Airlines from Tokyo to Hawaii.  At first instance the case was dismissed on the grounds on 
FNC in favour of the courts of Japan. The question to be resolved by the appellate court was 
whether or not FNC could be invoked by a court to decline jurisdiction where such jurisdiction is 
established under Article 28 of the Warsaw Convention. 
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Starting with the text of Article 28, J Fisher (whose opinion was unanimously adopted by the 
court) looked to the preceding decisions of the courts on the matter. These demonstrated that two 
plausible interpretations were considered possible. The first was that adopted by the English 
Court of Appeal in Milor,129 which meant that FNC was unavailable under Article 28(2) because it 
would be inconsistent with the absolute right of choice of forum granted under Article 28(1). The 
textual interpretation adopted by Air Crash Disaster near New Orleans, had looked to the plain 
meaning of Article 28(2), concluding that the claimant’s choice of forum is subject to the 
procedural rules of the forum, which in the US includes FNC. That two plausible interpretations 
could be reached was justification enough for Fisher J to conclude that the text of Article 28 was 
ambiguous. 
Fisher J declined to adopt the Milor textual analysis of the authentic French version and the 
distinction between the terms portée and intentée; he doubted the meaning attributed to portée 
as requiring ‘that the action must be litigated to conclusion in the forum selected by the plaintiff.’130 
The text alone was not sufficient to provide an answer, all it showed was that the text of Article 
28 was ambiguous. This being so, the court followed Supreme Court precedent of Chan,131 
Tseng132 and Saks,133 to guide its interpretation of the Warsaw Convention by looking to other 
sources to elucidate the meaning of Article 28. This involved looking to the purposes of the 
Convention, its drafting history and the post-ratification understanding of the parties, whilst 
throughout, attempting ‘to give the specific words of the treaty a meaning consistent with the 
shared expectations of the contracting parties.’134 
Following precedent, the court identified the two purposes of the Warsaw Convention as being: 
(1) uniformity of the rules governing claims arising from international air transport;135 (2) to achieve 
a balance between the interests of air carriers and those of passengers.136 This sought after 
uniformity extended to matters of jurisdiction, the court opining that, ‘[b]y including an article 
addressing jurisdiction, the signatories manifested their intent to create not just uniform rules of 
liability, but also uniform rules of jurisdiction.’137  Quoting approvingly from Milor, Fisher J identified 
the purpose of the jurisdictional rules contained in Article 28(1) as being aimed at creating a ‘self-
contained code on jurisdiction’138 that sought to harmonize the rules of jurisdiction. FNC would 
undermine this harmony and uniformity because claimants could find their right to choose their 
forum denied before the courts of one Contracting State yet recognized in another. Additionally, 
the doctrine of FNC is itself ‘vague and discretionary’139 and therefore unlikely to produce uniform 
results.  
In light of the dual purpose of the Convention, the court took the view that in limiting the number 
of forums available to a claimant and balancing that against the claimant’s right to choose, the 
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drafters were conferring a benefit on the passenger (echoing the view of Philips LJ in Milor). This 
benefit being part of the balance struck between passenger and carrier. The court reached the 
view that, ‘[p]ermitting defendants to utilize forum non conveniens to cancel out the plaintiff's 
choice would undermine this balance just as it would undermine uniformity’,140 concluding that, 
‘[t]he doctrine of forum non conveniens is inconsistent with the Convention's dual purposes of 
uniformity and balance.’141  
Moving then to the drafting history, the court considered the UK proposal to include wording 
relating to discretion to decline jurisdiction.142 Like the court in Air Crash off Long Island, it 
considered the possible reasons for the non-inclusion of the UK proposal in the final draft of the 
Convention but determined that nothing conclusive could be established. However, the court 
stopped short of dismissing the UK proposal as irrelevant. Instead, it determined that the proposal 
suggested that the delegates at the Warsaw Conference were aware of FNC and that they did 
not see Article 28(2) as silently incorporating nor acquiescing to it.143 When further considered 
against the historical context of the Convention’s drafting, the implicit incorporation of FNC under 
Article 28(2) was even more difficult to accept for the court, because, with the exception of the 
UK, the drafters hailed from predominantly civilian legal systems where FNC was unknown. Fisher 
J thought it would be unreasonable and unlikely to assume that the majority of drafters would 
have acquiesced to the application of FNC under Article 28(2).144 He thought that if they intended 
such a doctrine to apply then they would surely have made express provision for it. Faced with a 
choice between an interpretation which would permit or prohibit FNC in circumstances where the 
majority of the drafters hailed from jurisdictions where such a doctrine was all but unknown, Fisher 
J was not prepared to adopt a construction of Article 28(2) that ‘would be controversial for most 
signatory countries.’145 
The next port of call for the consideration of extrinsic means of interpretation was the post-
ratification understanding of the parties and any decisions of other courts. The court was not 
persuaded by the Fifth Circuit’s reasoning in Air Crash Disaster near New Orleans because the 
court had not had the benefit of the Milor decision, nor had it considered the purpose, drafting 
history and post-ratification understanding of the parties.146 Having completed the consideration 
of extrinsic guides to interpretation, the court came to the same conclusion as Milor, i.e. FNC is 
not available under the Warsaw Convention. 147 The Supreme Court declined to review Hosaka 
on appeal.148  
 
4.5  Conclusion on the Availability of FNC  
Should the claimants choice of forum be conditioned on the application of local rules of 
procedure? Or, should those local rules of procedure be constrained by the jurisdictional scheme 
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providing the claimant his choice of forum? To put this another way, must Article 28(2) be read 
as constrained by the jurisdictional scheme provided by Article 28(1)? These were the questions 
we left hanging above (see 4.3.3 supra) but which we are now, having considered the case law, 
in a position to provide some answers to.  
Although, the general rule of interpretation under the Vienna Convention requires a court to 
start with the text, it is not permitted to limit itself solely to the terms of the provision in question. 
It must consider context and purpose. If one took Article 28(2) in isolation then it could be logically 
concluded that FNC is available where it forms part of the procedural law of the forum seised of 
an action under the Warsaw Convention. However, even the most immediate context of Article 
28(2), i.e. that provided by Article 28(1), must raise a doubt as to the extent to which rules of 
procedure may be relied upon to disturb the claimant’s choice of forum.  
These doubts are only intensified by consideration of the object and purpose, not only of the 
jurisdictional provisions themselves, but also of the Convention as a whole. As defined earlier, 
the cardinal purpose of the Warsaw Convention is the avoidance of conflict of laws through 
unification of certain rules relating to carriage documentation and air carrier liability; let us refer to 
this as the uniformity goal. This is confirmed by the historical context which shows that the legal 
status of the air carrier within the existing regimes of le droit commun was uncertain and the 
introduction of statutory solutions by various States had produced substantial non-uniformity. The 
supplementary purpose of the Convention was the furtherance of the public interest in the 
development of air transport whilst striking an equitable balance of interests between carriers, 
users and claimants; let us refer to this as the balance of interests goal. Together these can be 
understood as providing the general purposes of the Warsaw Convention. The jurisdictional 
scheme of the Convention also serves specific purposes. Primarily, the harmonization of 
jurisdictional rules. Supplementary to which, the drafters, in defining the jurisdictional scheme, 
gave primacy to legal certainty and predictability but balanced this with regard to the interests of 
the parties to litigation. With the former, the drafters followed the Convention’s cardinal purpose. 
With the latter, the jurisdictional scheme explicitly followed the supplementary purpose of the 
Convention by ensuring an equitable balance of interests.  
The application of a discretionary doctrine which operates to displace the claimant’s choice of 
forum in preference for the defendant’s choice of forum, on the face of it, offends both the 
uniformity goal and the balance of interests goal, as well as the specific purposes of the 
jurisdictional scheme. However, it is important not to overestimate the reach of uniformity in the 
context of the Warsaw Convention. How exactly does FNC offend uniformity? In one obvious way, 
FNC means the treatment of jurisdiction in a Warsaw Convention case will be different depending 
on whether the court seised applies FNC or not. In this sense, the claimant’s choice of forum is 
worth less and therefore does not carry a uniform value amongst the courts of Contracting States. 
But that can be said for any rule of substance or procedure which differs from one jurisdiction to 
the next. For example, the Warsaw Convention do not define damages, for the most part, it is left 
to le droit commun to determine the recoverable heads of damage. As a consequence, a plaintiff 
who sues under Swedish law will not be able to recover the same range of heads of damage 
available under US law. But we do not impugn this lack of uniformity as a breach of the 
Convention’s goals and purpose. This is because one must show that the uniformity which is 
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being undermined by le droit commun is one which the Convention intended to establish. 
Uniformity in the context of the Warsaw Convention was pursued to ensure legal certainty and 
predictability. Undoubtedly, FNC disturbs legal certainty and predictability. But the extent of this 
disturbance is greatly mitigated in the case of the Warsaw Convention’s jurisdictional regime with 
its limited number of possible forums. While the claimant is deprived of the certainty of knowing 
that their own choice of forum is final, they are assured that their case will be heard in one of the 
other forums available under the Warsaw Convention. This is because even where FNC dismissal 
is granted the alternative forum must be one of those identified by Article 28. 
From the other point of view, the strongest argument against the inconsistency of FNC within 
the Warsaw Convention is the literal interpretation of Article 28(2). Another argument is that the 
goal of uniformity pursued by the Warsaw Convention is only partial. Clearly, the Warsaw 
Convention did not seek to secure absolute uniformity of rules, the drafters sought only to unify 
“certain rules”. They maintained throughout that only matters essential to a treaty on private 
aeronautical law should be within its scope and that they did not wish to encroach on matters of 
general private international law or questions of procedure. Read in this light, Article 28(2) 
appears an affirmation of that intention. However, by including a bespoke jurisdictional scheme, 
the drafters undoubtedly intended to regulate this area of law within the context of international 
carriage by air. Thus, the question still remains as to what extent they intended to regulate it.  
The drafters were conscious that the adoption of a fault-based theory of liability with a low 
limitation of liability was fundamentally pro-carrier. However, contrary to what is often assumed, 
this was not done in order to directly protect the interests of carriers but rather in furtherance of 
the public interest in the development of air transport. The purpose of the Convention was not to 
protect the carrier per se, but only to the extent necessary to promote the public interest in air 
transport. The drafters were keenly aware that the basic regime favoured carriers at the expense 
of claimants and made a number of concessions to the latter in order to provide for an equitable 
balancing of interests. The jurisdictional scheme of the Convention must be examined in light of 
this context. Having established the basic liability regime, the drafters were of a mind-set to make 
concessions to the claimant. The jurisdictional scheme is reflective of this mind-set and it is 
submitted that the drafters would have looked dimly on granting further benefits to the carrier at 
the expense of the claimant where not justified by the public interest.  
The drafters of the Warsaw Convention hailed, almost entirely, from civilian law jurisdictions 
for whom the competence of a court was mandatory and thus, where the concept of a judicial 
discretion to decline jurisdiction did not exist. In addition, as demonstrated in Chapter 3, FNC is 
anathema to the civilian lawyer. Bearing this historical context in mind, it is eminently more likely 
that the drafters would have intended that the right to choose the forum in which to bring an action 
against a carrier would amount to a substantive right for the claimant to determine the forum in 
which his claim would be settled. The possible forums ensured a significant business connection 
to the carrier in whichever forum he was sued, whereas the convenience of the claimant was 
principally served by his having the initiative in choosing the forum. FNC would upset that balance 
of interests in favour of the defendant carrier. The desire to secure legal certainty and predictability 
for the parties outweighed considerations of convenience and no effort was made by the drafters 
to inject considerations of relative convenience into their jurisdictional scheme. The idea that the 
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choice of forum provided under Article 28(1) could be disturbed by a discretionary rule for 
declining jurisdiction, whose sine qua non is relative convenience, would not have been within the 
contemplation of the drafters.  
The issue ultimately boils down to a simple question: Would the drafters have considered FNC, 
as invoked per Article 28(2), to be inconsistent with the right granted under Article 28(1)? It is 
submitted that the answer to this question is yes. The drafters intended to grant the claimant a 
substantive right to choose the forum in which their action would be resolved and that this right 
should be inviolable. The employment of a rule of procedure by which the chosen forum exercises 
its discretion to decline the jurisdiction granted it under the Convention is inconsistent with that 
right.  
As codified by Article 26 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, customary 
international law provides that a Contracting Party to a Convention is under a duty to perform its 
obligations thereunder in good faith and, as codified by Article 27 of the Vienna Convention, it 
may not invoke provisions of its internal law as justification for its failure to perform.149 The rule of 
Article 26 is also referred to as that of pacta sunt sevanda. In the simplest of terms, this means 
that the parties to a treaty are obliged not to defeat the object and purpose of a treaty.150 In the 
context of the Warsaw Convention, a Contracting State would, as a matter of good faith, be 
precluded from applying a doctrinal principle such as FNC in a manner inconsistent with its 
obligations under the Convention. Given that Article 28(1) must be interpreted as giving the 
plaintiff the absolute right to choose the forum for the resolution of his claim, Article 28(2) must 
be read as precluding the application of FNC. 
Indeed, this has been the position reached by the stronger judicial authorities, i.e. Milor and 
Hosaka. Hosaka spelled the death knell for FNC under Warsaw Convention within the Ninth 
Circuit, and seriously undermined its continued availability for Warsaw claims in other US circuits. 
The great irony of the Hosaka decision was that it came just two years after the US delegates at 
the Montreal Conference in 1999 had been allaying the fears of other States (regarding the fifth 
jurisdiction) that the application of the doctrine of FNC by US courts would restrict forum shopping. 
The irony being that while the US delegates were holding up FNC as the saving grace for what 
was the most hotly debated issue at the Montreal Conference, one of its own courts was in 
process of whipping it away. Even before MC99 came into effect the Hosaka decision had 
effectively undermined one of the key components that had paved the way for its agreement. The 
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Chapter 5: Montreal 
 
5.1  Introduction 
Having examined the history of the Warsaw Convention and the place of FNC therein—or not as 
the case turned out—the obvious next step is conduct a similar examination in respect of MC99. 
One distinguishing feature this time will be that MC99 did not emerge from a vacuum of private 
international air law but within the context of an existing regime, i.e. WCS. The relationship that 
exists between WCS and MC99 is a critical factor in understanding the latter’s provisions and 
interpreting them correctly. This chapter begins with some basic background history to MC99 
which will account for its emergence and provide some valuable indicators as to its object and 
purpose. A significant portion of this chapter is dedicated to detailing the fifth jurisdiction. Aside 
from completing the picture of the current jurisdiction scheme that exists under MC99, attention 
to the fifth jurisdiction is necessary and desirable for a number of reasons. First, it proved to be 
the most controversial issue at the Montreal Conference and it involved prolonged consideration 
of FNC. Secondly, the debate over the fifth jurisdiction gave the delegates of the various States 
a chance to express views and voice criticisms relevant to general matters of jurisdiction. This 
provides an invaluable source of policy which is both specific to the field of international carriage 
by air and relatively recent. Appreciating the policy positions of the delegates will prove 
exceptionally useful in weighing-up options for reform in the concluding part of this work. Thirdly, 
the fifth jurisdiction controversy at the Montreal Conference was predominantly played out 
between the US and France who, once again, found themselves on opposing sides. This mirrors 
the core conflict at issue in the case of West Caribbean Airways which provided the catalyst for 
this work. The final sections of this chapter will focus on answering the ultimate question of the 
availability of the FNC within MC99.  
 
5.2  General History 
Time had inevitably pulled at the loose threads of WCS and expressions of dissatisfaction with 
the regime became more frequent and vociferous, especially from within the US. As air transport 
blossomed, the underlying public justifications for protecting the industry ebbed away and the 
balance of interests agreed in 1929 became harder and harder to justify. This was exacerbated 
by the low limits of liability. Limits which were being gradually eaten away by inflation. Discontent 
led to various attempts to remedy the situation and which saw the Warsaw Convention evolve 
into WCS. However, the result was a system which was fragmented, dis-unified and the subject 
of conflicting jurisprudence.1 With the emergence of private inter-carrier agreements and other 
regional initiatives, this dis-unification was on the verge of causing the disintegration of WCS. The 
time had come for international community to take collective and decisive action and it was 
decided that this should be done through ICAO with the aim of producing a new instrument aimed 
at ensuring world-wide uniformity. 
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The drafting history of MC99 followed a rather convoluted and unorthodox course.2 On 15 
November 1995 the ICAO Council decided to amend the General Work Programme of the Legal 
Committee to provide for the modernization of the WCS and to allow for a Secretariat Study Group 
(SSG) to be established to assist the Legal Bureau in developing a mechanism by which such 
modernization could be accelerated.3 The SSG met in February of 1996, and submitted a report 
to the Council which recommended the development of a new instrument to consolidate and 
modernize WCS.4 The Warsaw Convention was to be taken as the starting point and useful 
elements of the various subsequent instruments of WCS were to be incorporated. The hoped for 
end result would be a consolidation and modernization of WCS.  
In early 1996, the ICAO Council considered the recommendations of the SSG and referred 
them to the Legal Committee who were to have the Legal Bureau (with the assistance of the SSG) 
develop a draft. The Council referred the draft to the Legal Committee who appointed a rapporteur 
to review and revise it. The Rapporteur’s Report detailed the need for a new deal to replace the 
one struck in Warsaw in 1929.5 It was generally accepted that the need to protect an infant 
industry was no longer a legitimate justification and that the applicable limits were indefensibly 
low for many jurisdictions. However, some key issues were still hotly contested within the Legal 
Committee and this dissuaded the Council from calling a Diplomatic Conference. Instead, it 
circulated the latest draft to States and international organizations for comment. Preferring to have 
outstanding matters resolved prior to convening a Conference, the ICAO Secretariat 
recommended, not only further sessions of the SSG, but also the establishment of an expert 
panel. This panel was created by the Council and named the Special Group on the Modernization 
of the Warsaw System (SGMW). 
The SGMW convened between 14 and 18 April 1998. The hope was that by having the 
flexibility to consider ‘the political, economic and legal aspects of the problems at hand’,6 the 
SGMW would be able to resolve the outstanding issues. The conclusions or recommendations of 
the SGMW would not be final but would be presented to the Council for a final decision. The 
SGMW refined the text on several points.7 A report8 and an approved text of the Convention9 
were sent to the ICAO Council which then took the decision to convene the Conference in 
Montreal in May 1999. 
It was clear from early on in the Conference that States were not prepared to commit 
themselves to anything until the key matters of the liability regime and the fifth jurisdiction had 
been resolved.10 In order to achieve that, it was acknowledged that a smaller dedicated group 
should be created to deal with the matters that could not be resolved by the Commission of the 
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Whole. This group, the Friends of the Chairman Group (FCG), was to conduct a careful and 
thorough analysis of the issues with a view to finding common ground on key liability issues upon 
which a consensus could be built. The FCG produced a consensus package11 which was 
subsequently adopted by the Conference and forms the heart of MC99.  
Regarding the liability regime for passenger death and bodily injury, MC99 consists of a two-
tier system: strict liability of the carrier up to SDR 113,10012  and presumed fault liability for claims 
in excess of that amount. In respect of both tiers, the carrier can invoke the defence of contributory 
negligence.13 For the second tier liability the carrier can exonerate itself by proving the absence 
of fault, rather than the previous all necessary measures defence. An additional ground for 
exoneration was introduced which released the carrier from liability under the second tier where 
it could prove that the damage was solely due to the negligence or other wrongful act or omission 
of a third party.14  
Other important elements of MC99 worth mentioning include the express provision codifying 
jurisprudence to the effect that ‘punitive, exemplary or non-compensatory damages shall not be 
recoverable.’15 Recovery for mental injury was a hot topic at the Conference.16 The FCG stopped 
short of declaring mental injury non-compensable, instead it quixotically recognized that 
jurisprudence in the area was still developing and that it did not intend to interfere with this 
development, thus leaving the door open to future recovery.17 
The new regime is very beneficial for the passenger/claimant because the only initial barrier 
to full recovery is the obligation to prove damages resulting from an accident. Once having done 
this, barriers to full recovery, where in excess of the first tier limit, will only come into question 
where the carrier elects to and successfully raises one of the available defences. Given that the 
great majority of aviation disasters will involve some element of carrier negligence, the likelihood 
of the carrier even deciding to raise a defence, let alone prove it, are rare.18  
MC99 is not without its critics.19 However, in terms of ratification, MC99 has been an 
overwhelming success.20 It was hoped that it would result in a reduction in the amount of litigation 
and the speedier resolution of claims. Again, the consensus amongst carrier and claimant lawyers 
is that MC99 has been successful in this regard. As noted in Chapter 1, an MC99 claim is regarded 
as a “slam-dunk” by claimant lawyers. In fact, they are more likely to complain at the loss of work 
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they have incurred from MC99 than they are to complain of its substantive provisions. 
Nevertheless, we have seen that its success is conditional on it offering the claimant their desired 
choice of forum. Therefore, it is to the evolution of MC99’s jurisdictional provisions from those 
provided under WCS that much of this chapter is dedicated. First, however, a few words are 
necessary on the general purpose of MC99. 
 
5.3  Purpose 
Unlike the Warsaw Convention of 1929, MC99 did not spring into existence from within a vacuum 
of international private air law. By 1999, the Warsaw Convention was itself seventy years old and 
had developed into a system comprising of amending Protocols, a supplementary Convention 
and several inter-carrier agreements. Surrounding this was a huge body of jurisprudence and 
commentary. The juristic landscape of private international air law was infinitely richer and more 
developed in 1999 than it had been in 1929. The industry itself had evolved further than even the 
most prescient observer could have predicted and as the ICAO President, Assad Koitaite, 
explained in this opening address to the Montreal Conference, ‘the present-day aviation industry 
bears little resemblance to its precursor.’21 MC99 is a modernization and a consolidation of WCS. 
This requires us to appreciate two key factors in assessing the purpose of MC99: (i) the continuing 
relevance of the Warsaw Convention and WCS; (ii) the contrasting purpose of MC99 in light of 
WCS. In other words, to what extent does MC99’s purpose derive from WCS and to what extent 
does it diverge? 
 
5.3.1  Enduring Relevance of WCS 
As between Contracting States, MC99 completely replaces the previous liability system of the 
Warsaw Convention. MC99 is a new convention, neither supplemental to nor an amendment of 
the Warsaw Convention.22 However, this does not render WCS an irrelevancy. It continues to 
retain relevance. Firstly, because it continues to govern certain international air transportation 
involving Contracting States of that system who have not yet ratified the MC99. The second way 
is because it lives on through its jurisprudence.  
Much of the wording for the provisions of MC99 was directly transferred from WCS. It is 
abundantly clear that the drafters of MC99 did not intend to throw out the baby with the bathwater 
but wished instead to hold onto the valuable jurisprudence which had built up through applying 
and interpreting WCS.23 This is borne out by the Preamble to MC99 which begins by ‘[r]ecognizing 
the significant contribution’ made by the Warsaw Convention and other related instruments and 
further on, recognizes the need to ‘consolidate’ them. The Minutes of the Montreal Conference 
further underline this sentiment.24 The courts have since relied on the jurisprudence of WCS to 
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assist in interpreting MC99 where the provisions in question are substantively the same.25  
 
5.3.2  Warsaw and Montreal: At Cross Purposes? 
When it comes to defining the purpose of MC99, new considerations arise that were not at play 
in 1929 with the Warsaw Convention. Likewise, other considerations have fallen away as they 
lost import with the passage of time and the progress of air transport. The recognition by the 
preamble of the need to modernize and consolidate the Warsaw Convention is the first clear 
indication of one of MC99’s purposes. For example, the US Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit described MC99 as having been passed to ‘harmonize the hodgepodge of supplementary 
amendments and intercarrier agreements” of which the Warsaw Convention system consists.’26 
On the one hand, this certainly identifies something of the impetus behind the conclusion of the 
new treaty and describes the state of affairs as they existed at the time of negotiation. However, 
as a description of the object and purpose of the Convention itself, it does little more than refer 
consideration to the purposes of WCS and invite reflection on how these have been affected by 
MC99. This was the intimation of the Supreme Court of Canada in Thibodeau v Air Canada, 
where, citing the preamble’s stated object as modernization and consolidation, opined that, ‘[t]o 
understand the purposes of the Montreal Convention, we therefore must go back to its 
predecessor, the Warsaw Convention’.27  
Another consequence of the nature of MC99 as a modernising and consolidating instrument 
is that much of the work had already been achieved. In fact, the greater part of MC99 is taken 
verbatim from WCS. Consequentially, most of the debate contained in the travaux préparatoires 
of MC99 pertained to the relatively few matters that stood in need of modernization. The pitfall to 
be avoided herein is to identify the purpose of MC99 only with the changes rather than view the 
treaty in its full context. If one were to make this mistake, then one might conclude that the 
purposes of MC99 differed significantly from those of the Warsaw Convention. However, the 
courts have generally supported the view that there exists great commonality of purpose between 
the Warsaw Convention and MC99.28 However, equating the purpose of MC99 with that of the 
Warsaw Convention requires qualification in order to accommodate the effects and changes of 
the process of modernization and consolidation. The point to be borne in mind is that MC99 was 
not drafted on the basis of tearing up the preceding instruments and starting from a clean slate.  
For the reasons described above, the denomination of the objects and purposes of MC99 must 
begin with the objects and purposes of the Warsaw Convention and its subsequent instruments. 
In the previous chapter (see 4.2.5), the object and purpose of the Warsaw Convention was 
defined in twofold form. The first part of which was the cardinal purpose of  avoiding conflict of 
laws through the unification of certain rules, this has been reaffirmed by MC99 which incorporates 
the unifying rules of the Warsaw System, simplifying and modernizing some of which. The mere 
                                                       
25 Hunter v Deutsche Lufthansa AG 863 F Supp 2d 190, 205 (EDNY 2012); Stott v Thomas Cook Tour 
Operators [2014] AC 1347, 1359 (SC); Thibodeau v Air Canada [2014] SCC 67, [31].  
26 Ehrlich v American Airlines Inc 360 F 3d 366, 371 n 4 (2d Cir 2004).  
27 Thibodeau (n 25) [31]. 
28 See the view expressed by the UK Supreme Court in Stott (n 25) 1359.  See also, Matz v North Eastern 
Airlines No 07-CV-13447, 2008 WL 2064800 *2 (ED Mich 13 May 2008). 
 104 
act of modernization and consolidation is itself a poignant and powerful reaffirmation (by the 
drafters of MC99) of the cardinal purpose of WCS as the unification of certain rules of private air 
law. This first object remains the same with MC99 and has been broadly regarded so by the 
courts.29 
The previous chapter also identified a supplementary objective to the Warsaw Convention, the 
desire to further the public interest in the development of air transport while striking an equitable 
balance of interests. While the development of air transport remains a fundamental objective 
under MC99 there has been a substantial shift in the balance of interests which requires revising 
our understanding of this supplementary purpose. What was new about the approach taken in 
Montreal was the weight given to protecting the interests of consumers, i.e. the interests of natural 
persons who contract for international carriage by air. 
At least three inter-connected factors have helped shift the balance from that of the industry 
toward that of the consumer. First, the technological maturation of the air transport industry meant 
it was now much safer than it had been in its infancy and thus the financial risk to the industry of 
accident was less. Second, the economic maturation of the industry meant that the impetus for 
its development in service of the public’s need for air transport was no longer anywhere near as 
pressing, in fact, it could be said to have been overtaken by the public interest in the third factor, 
i.e. the global trend toward greater levels of consumer protection. Thus the preamble of MC99 
specifically recognizes the importance of ensuring protection for consumers. Both the courts30 
and commentators31 have echoed the centrality of this objective.  
At the same time, the preamble also noted the need for an equitable balance of interests. Just 
as it would be unjust to claim that the Warsaw Convention was a drafted with only the carriers’ 
interests in mind, so too it would be unjust to claim that MC99 had only the consumers’ interests 
in mind. The interests of the carrier, in particular those of the small to medium airlines (especially 
from developing nations) were strongly advocated at the Conference with several States raising 
concerns about the negative impact of being too pro-consumer.32 Under both Conventions it was 
a question of achieving an equitable balance between the interest of all parties. As Mercer states 
of MC99: ‘”Equity” and “balance” were cardinal guiding considerations in the crafting of the new 
Convention.’33 Without doubt there was a shift in the balance of interests, the Warsaw Convention 
had favoured the interests of the air transport industry (comprising both the carrier and the 
travelling public) with the claimant passenger drawing the short straw. When it came to MC99, a 
new deal was in order. There was to be better protection of the interests of consumers and 
equitable compensation secured for victims and their families. The carriers and the travelling 
public were expected to carry more of the burden of the fewer risks inherent in air transportation.  
                                                       
29 See e.g., Allianz Global Corporate & Specialty v EMO Trans California Inc No 09-CV-4893, 2010 WL 
2594360 *4 (ND Cal 22 June 2010); Thibodeau v Air Canada (n 25) [47]. 
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5.3.3  Statement of the Purpose of MC99 
In light of the above, the purposes of MC99 can be defined as follows. The cardinal purpose 
remains unchanged from the Warsaw Convention. However, the second supplementary purpose 
has undergone significant recalibration in light of the changing circumstances of the industry and 
socio-economic conditions. This is underlined by the forceful declarations made by the 
Contracting Parties in the preamble and as reflected in the substance of the provisions contained 
within the Convention itself. 
Thus, while retaining its twofold structure, the object and purpose of MC99 can be defined as 
consisting of the following: 
1. Avoidance of conflict of laws through unification of certain rules relating to travel 
documentation and air carrier liability. 
2. Assurance of an equitable balance between the interests of consumers in international 
carriage by air, the need for equitable compensation based on the principle of restitution 
and the orderly development of international air transport. 
 
5.4  The Long Path to the Fifth Jurisdiction 
The plaintiffs in Osborne v British Airways PLC Corp34 were two American missionaries working 
in Nairobi, Kenya.  Wishing to travel to the United States for Christmas, they had purchased a 
return ticket in Kenya for carriage by air between Nairobi and Orlando (via London) with British 
Airways. On the final leg of the journey, i.e. the London-Nairobi leg, a deranged passenger broke 
into the cockpit and attempted to commandeer control of the aircraft. During the fracas, the aircraft 
plunged downwards around 10,000 feet, allegedly leading the plaintiffs to sustain physical and 
psychological injuries. The plaintiffs brought proceedings against British Airways in the District 
Court for the Southern District of Texas. In another case, Hornsby v Lufthansa German Airlines,35 
the plaintiff was an American citizen living and working in Kaiserslautern, Germany. She had 
purchased a return ticket in Germany for carriage by air between Frankfurt and Los Angeles. She 
allegedly suffered physical injury caused by severe turbulence encountered during the Frankfurt-
Los Angeles leg of the journey and subsequently brought an action against Lufthansa before the 
District Court for the Central District of California. 
In Osborne, the court declared itself to be without jurisdiction and dismissed the plaintiff’s 
claim, whereas in Hornsby, the court assumed jurisdiction. What differentiated the two cases? In 
neither case was the domicile, or principal place of business of the carrier, or the place of 
destination located within the US, and in both cases the ticket in question had been purchased 
outside the US. Thus, under Article 28(1) of the Warsaw Convention, grounds did not exist under 
the four possible jurisdictions available. Indeed, this had been the very reason for the district court 
dismissal in the case of Osborne. The difference in the case of Hornsby was that her claim had 
not been brought under the Warsaw Convention, but under MC99. The specific advantage of 
which was the addition of a fifth jurisdiction which offered an additional choice of forum to a 
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claimant, i.e. the fifth jurisdiction. This grants the claimant the option to bring an action against 
the carrier before the courts of claimant’s home forum, provided the carrier has a sufficient 
business connection there. Although first made effective through MC99, the fifth jurisdiction had 
a longer history. 
 
5.4.1  Guatemala City and the Impetus for the Fifth Jurisdiction 
The impetus for a fifth jurisdiction came from US dissatisfaction with WCS. The low limits of liability 
were its chief complaint but the US was also concerned with the absence of a choice of law 
provision for establishing and quantifying damages. Whilst the Warsaw Convention makes 
provision for the application of the lex fori in specific circumstances, e.g. on tolling for the purposes 
of time limitations, it leaves other areas, not exclusively covered by the Convention, to le droit 
commun. Therefore, when it comes to the calculation of damages, there is the risk that the forum 
hearing the claim of a foreign claimant may apply rules which result in the plaintiff receiving a 
level or scope of compensation that is inadequate in comparison to that which he might have 
received in his home forum. Aside from choice of law issues, the perception in US quarters was 
that foreign courts would prove less favourable to American claimants and this would prejudice 
the interests of the US expat community working or travelling throughout the world.  
The solution preferred by the US to the problems described above was to guarantee to the 
claimant jurisdiction in their home forum. This would give the claimant the security of knowing that 
they had access to a forum which would assure them of an equitable level of recovery. In addition, 
access to one’s home forum also ensured the availability of  benefits which that jurisdiction had 
elected to endow upon its citizens and residents. The home forum would be the most convenient 
one to hear the case since the court would apply the law with which the claimant is most familiar 
and would be best placed to calculate the level of compensation.  
The possible amendment of the Warsaw Convention to make provision—in response to US 
insistence—for a fifth jurisdiction was raised at the 17th Session of the ICAO Legal Committee in 
1970 and a draft proposal agreed.36 This proposal was considered at the Diplomatic Conference 
at Guatemala City in 1971 where there was considerable support for it.37 The only opposition to 
the fifth jurisdiction came from behind the Iron Curtain, from Czechoslovakia,38 the Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics (USSR)39 and Poland.40 The main substantive issue that caused problems 
was the meaning to be ascribed to the term “establishment”, as it was to be a requirement of the 
fifth jurisdiction that the carrier have an establishment in the forum State.41 Particularly noteworthy 
was the minimal concern expressed with respect to the risk of forum shopping posed by the 
addition of the fifth jurisdiction; the situation would be totally different in Montreal in 1999. 
Ultimately, the text approved at Guatemala City would have granted a fifth jurisdiction but GCP 
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never came into effect having failed to achieve the necessary number of ratifications. The 
attempts by the US to secure the fifth jurisdiction were thus ultimately unsuccessful but as 
momentum built for the conclusion of a new convention to replace WCS the opportunity remerged 
in the late 1990s. 
 
5.4.2  Second Chance at a Fifth Jurisdiction 
The fifth jurisdiction was a feature of the discussions from the very start of MC99’s drafting history 
and featured prominently throughout that lengthy process. From early on there was a strong 
divergence of opinion on the matter. The US was ever the champion of the fifth jurisdiction and 
saw its inclusion in the new convention as essential. However, many other States were keenly 
opposed to it.42 Nevertheless, a draft article for a fifth jurisdiction was produced and provisionally 
approved by the ICAO Legal Committee at its 30th Session in 1997.43 The fifth jurisdiction 
remained deeply unpopular amongst most of the participating States.44 It became apparent to all 
that the US ratification without its inclusion would be ‘highly unlikely’.45 The mind-set thus 
appeared to turn toward finding an acceptable formulation and several alternatives were 
proposed.46 Eventually, at the Fourth Meeting of the SSG in late January 1999, a recommended 
wording was adopted and submitted to the SGMW for further consideration.47  
During the meeting of the SGMW, opposition to the fifth jurisdiction was still in the majority.48 
However, an implicit ultimatum was issued when the US reiterated that its ratification of a 
convention was dependant on its inclusion.49 A compromise proposal was agreed which it was 
hoped would be universally acceptable and promote uniformity.50 Satisfied that it had completed 
its task, the SGMW forwarded its approved draft convention51 to the ICAO Council who 
subsequently took the decision to convene a diplomatic conference.  
 
5.4.3  Controversy at the Montreal Conference 
The following account of the minutes of the Montreal Conference is vital for two reasons. First, as 
noted in the introduction to this chapter, the debate surrounding the fifth jurisdiction was both 
revealing as to State policy with respect to general issues of jurisdiction. Second, the fifth 
jurisdiction provided the context for lengthy discussions about FNC within MC99. 
 
5.4.3.1  Expressions of Policy 
As champion of the fifth jurisdiction, the US had submitted a comprehensive paper to the 
Conference reiterating why its inclusion represented an essential element of any revision to 
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WCS.52 The US position remained fundamentally premised on the same policy considerations. 
First and foremost, that justice and fairness required that passengers and their heirs should be 
able to bring a claim to the courts of their home State provided the carrier conducted business 
there. Secondly, that a claimant’s home forum was generally the most appropriate forum (at least 
for the claimant). Thirdly, that developments in the industry since 1929 which has seen it become 
a complex global network also made the inclusion of a fifth jurisdiction desirable. Support came 
from Japan, Colombia and Panama, who regarded it as desirable (“vital” in the case of Japan) for 
the promotion of consumer interests.53 Norway was also in support.54 As were the Latin American 
Civil Aviation Commission (LACAC).55 
Opposition to the fifth jurisdiction was led by France who presented a paper containing three 
arguments.56 These echoed the substance of the objections which had been voiced earlier in the 
process and were shared by many of the other States in attendance at the Montreal Conference. 
The French view was endorsed by India, Korea and China, as well as the 53 African Contracting 
States57 and the members of the Arab Civil Aviation Commission (ACAC).58  
The first argument was that the fifth jurisdiction simply was not necessary. Indeed, this point 
had been made by a number of States at different points during the drafting process.59 France 
specifically argued that the fifth jurisdiction was not necessary to ensure the protection of 
passengers because the existing four bases would provide satisfactory resolution of the vast 
majority of cases.60  
France’s second argument fell within a category of objections which were economic in nature. 
States were concerned about the financial impact of the fifth jurisdiction, particularly on insurance 
premiums. Suggestions had been made during the early drafting history to limit the financial 
impact of the fifth jurisdiction, e.g. by imposing a monetary limitation specific to claims based upon 
it.61 France argued in its paper that the operation of the fifth jurisdiction would have unfortunate 
consequences for the development of international air transport on account of the increase in 
insurance premiums and the resultant effect on fares.62 This would be particularly worrisome for 
small to medium carriers, especially from developing nations. This was a view voiced by many 
States, e.g. India.63 The fear being that exposure to claims in high award States could place an 
unbearable burden on such carriers and thus threaten their continued participation in the provision 
of international air transport. Another aspect of the economic argument against the fifth jurisdiction 
was that it would be largely detrimental to the interests of passengers. This was allegedly on 
account of the fact that the States advocating its inclusion were mostly very high damage awards 
jurisdictions. The resulting increase in insurance premiums would be paid for by the passenger in 
the form of higher fares which would fall disproportionally on consumers from developing 
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countries. In essence, it was argued that high awards by certain States would effectively be 
subsidized by passengers from developing countries.64 This is unquestionably a valid concern but 
it was totally overblown by France in the context of the fifth jurisdiction. The reason being that it 
was based on two erroneous assumptions. First, that the fifth jurisdiction was to be one based on 
nationality alone (addressed below). Second, leading on from the first, that the fifth jurisdiction 
would be frequently invoked. Both were wrong. Litigators on both sides recognize that in practice 
the fifth jurisdiction is very seldom invoked65 and has only a very modest impact on the global 
recoveries for aviation accidents, a fact accepted by aviation insurers. 
The third argument was that the fifth jurisdiction would create a regrettable precedent which 
would be inconsistent with the development of contemporary law. France maintained that this 
would run counter to recent instruments of international law which had expressly distanced 
themselves from jurisdictional competence based on nationality alone, e.g. the Brussels 
Convention 1968, the Lugano Convention 1996 and The Hague Convention 1971.  In France’s 
view, the fifth jurisdiction would expose carriers to litigation in a forum to which they had no real 
connection. This line of argument was based on the deliberate misperception—made purely for 
rhetorical effect—that the fifth jurisdiction was nothing more than what France called a ‘true 
jurisdiction of nationality’.66  
This challenge to the legality of the fifth jurisdiction was disingenuous. As argued by the US, 
a fifth jurisdiction was a feature of GCP67 and is one of the Athens Convention.68 Even more 
damning of the French argument is the simple fact that the fifth jurisdiction is not (and never was) 
based solely on nationality. This misconception had dogged the fifth jurisdiction from the start of 
MC99 drafting process. Despite the text of the proposal itself69 and the clarifications given 
thereon,70 which showed that the carrier would have to have a substantial commercial presence 
in the fifth jurisdiction State, the irrational suspicion and fear remained that the fifth jurisdiction 
was a blatant attempt to bestow a jurisdictional privilege on ‘the wandering American’.71 The text 
of the jurisdiction clause before the Conference and the comments submitted by the US with 
regard to the fifth jurisdiction clearly evidence that the proposal for a fifth jurisdiction actually on 
the table was not one based solely on nationality, it accepted that limiting connecting factors (for 
both claimant and carrier) to the fifth jurisdiction would be required.  
The valid underlying objection was not so much a matter of legality as of legitimacy. The real 
concern was to ensure that there were sufficient connecting factors between the defendant carrier 
and the fifth jurisdiction to justify exposing the carrier to litigation of claims in that forum. Indeed, 
a constant issue throughout the drafting history was how to define the necessary connecting factor 
                                                       
64 ibid 196. 
65 For discussion of a small number cases in which jurisdiction was established on the basis of the fifth 
jurisdiction, see McClean (n 18) div VII ch 28 [441.1]. 
66 MC99 Documents (n 11) 197. 
67 ibid 106.  
68 See Article 17(1)(d) of Athens Convention relating to the Carriage of Passengers and Luggage by Sea, 
1974 (opened for signature 13 December 1974, entered into force 28 April 1987) 1463 UNTS 19 (Athens 
Convention). 
69 MC99 Preparatory Materials (n 3) 42.  
70 See e.g., ibid 4.19. 
71 Mendelsohn, AI ‘The Warsaw Convention and Where We Are Today’ (1997) 62 J Air L & Com 1071, 
1077. 
 110 
in sufficiently robust terms.72 Therefore, the third category of objections pertained to legitimacy of 
the fifth jurisdiction as a forum for resolution of claims against carriers.  
The presentation of opening positions and the discussion thereof took place over the first week 
of the Conference and then gave way to more intense deliberations on the core package of 
provisions within the Friends of the Chairman Group (FCG). Initial French opposition to the 
inclusion of the fifth jurisdiction ended up being a damp squib. By the time the FCG came to 
discuss the fifth jurisdiction, France had acquiesced to its inclusion and preferred instead to draw 
battle lines over the applicable conditions to be satisfied before it could be relied upon.73 At its 
third meeting, the Chairman of the FCG indicated that the concerns expressed by those opposed 
to the fifth jurisdiction had their origin in the belief that there would be a tendency to resort to the 
fifth jurisdiction with the consequence that there would be excessive claims.74 The question of 
including a fifth jurisdiction in the Convention was no longer at issue, the pressing concern to be 
addressed was how to accommodate it in such a way that would allay the fears expressed by a 
number of States, some of which the Chairman described as being ‘purely imaginary’.75   
It is often said that it was the fear of forum shopping that was at the heart of opposition to the 
fifth jurisdiction. It is submitted that this was not the case and that it is vital to appreciate the 
nuance involved. The theme of forum shopping arose at numerous points in the discussions of 
the fifth jurisdiction within the FCG, as well as within the Conference in general. It is curious how 
the question of forum shopping only emerged with respect to the fifth jurisdiction. In fact, at no 
point did anyone raise a concern about forum shopping under the existing four jurisdictions. This 
suggests that it was not forum shopping per se that worried the delegates but rather some aspect 
of the fifth jurisdiction. This factor, it is argued, was the purported lack of a sufficient nexus 
between the carrier and the fifth jurisdiction.  
The existing four jurisdictions did not trouble the opponents of the fifth jurisdiction because, as 
the Chairman noted in his introductory remarks at the third meeting of the FCG, these were 
accepted by all to be appropriate forums.76 This dovetails with the typical civilian position with 
respect to jurisdiction (as discussed in Chapter 3) where, it should be noted, a claimant is not 
regarded as a forum shopper where he chooses a forum which the law has predetermined to 
have sufficient links to the defendant. It was the possibility that the fifth jurisdiction might operate 
to expose a carrier to litigation in a forum to which it had insufficient connection that scared some 
delegates. The anxiety surrounding the fifth jurisdiction was based on concerns regarding the 
basis for its application and the potential negative consequences of which, foremost amongst 
which was the exposure to high damages awards but also the practical inconvenience for a carrier 
of being sued in a forum to which it had little (or no) connection. Much of this was rooted in the 
misperception of the fifth jurisdiction as one of mere nationality of the claimant, or, as one in which 
there was lacking a sufficient nexus to the carrier to render litigation in that forum justifiable. Could 
a sufficient nexus be defined, then the concerns relating to forum shopping would have dissipated 
(as indeed they did). It is submitted that it was this uncertainty surrounding the application of fifth 
                                                       
72 See e.g., discussion reported in MC99 Preparatory Materials (n 3) 244. 
73 See Mercer (n 10) 465. 




jurisdiction that was the paramount concern and not forum shopping per se. Unfortunately, rather 
than focusing on defining this nexus, the FCG meetings got side-tracked by the notion of forum 
shopping and how to control it. A collateral benefit of this detour was that it provided the 
opportunity for FNC to emerge, deus ex machina, with a vital role.  
 
5.4.3.2  FNC: Deus ex Machina 
In the paper it submitted to the Montreal Conference, the US raised a number of arguments that 
it expected would allay the fears expressed by States with respect to forum shopping.77 The US 
argued that the control of forum shopping would be facilitated by the inclusion of the fifth 
jurisdiction because where a claimant sues in the US, but has access to a home forum under the 
fifth jurisdiction, then there is a greater likelihood of FNC dismissal.78 The US also submitted a 
paper during the conference which provided synopses of two cases which illustrated how FNC 
was applied by US courts.79 Even prior to the Conference, the US had given assurances that the 
doctrine of FNC would ‘provide discipline against unwarranted forum shopping.’80 What is more, 
the French expressly recognized the application of FNC by US courts in convention litigation in 
their paper opposing the fifth jurisdiction.81 
In an attempt to reconcile the desire to include the fifth jurisdiction with the fear that it might 
render the carrier subject to litigation in an inappropriate forum, the Chairman of the FCG 
proposed codifying the doctrine of FNC (or something similar) within the Convention.82 In 
response, Australia put forward a proposal which captured the spirit of FNC (based on the 
Australian doctrine).83 A misunderstanding emerged at this point. Whilst the Australian proposal 
had been intended to apply to all bases of jurisdiction,84 the Chairman, described it as only being 
applicable to the fifth jurisdiction.85 The US was vehemently opposed to such an idea. The US 
Delegate stated, in defiant terms, that ‘the doctrine of forum non conveniens would be applied to 
all five jurisdictions in his country whether the Group prescribed that or not’.86 Indeed, the US 
‘described the doctrine of forum non conveniens as it was currently applied in the Courts of the 
United States to the existing four jurisdictions and as it would be applied to a fifth, sixth, seventh 
or eighth jurisdiction, if such jurisdictions were created.’87 There can have been no doubt as to 
what the US was saying, it was applying and would continue to apply FNC to cases where 
jurisdiction is established on the basis of the convention. 
The US also had other concerns about codifying a rule for FNC. It worried about the ratifiability 
of the new Convention if it sought to impose the doctrine on States for whom FNC was a foreign 
concept and who had no desire to adopt it. Additionally, the US Delegate complained that 
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codification of FNC by the Group might result in altering the already existing jurisprudence in the 
US. For these reasons, the US proposed amending the wording of the final paragraph of the 
jurisdiction paragraph to read: ‘Questions of procedure shall be governed by the law of the Court 
seised of the case, including the doctrine of forum non conveniens or other similar doctrines.’88 
This additional wording was proposed in the name of giving comfort to some States who feared 
their carriers would be exposed to high US jury awards. What is crucial to note is that the context 
for the proposal was not to empower courts to apply FNC (or similar doctrines) but just to act as 
a form of comforting recognition of the doctrine’s existing applicability. 
The Delegate of Chile made the point that it and several other Latin American States would 
have difficulty with accommodating FNC within their legal (i.e. civilian) systems.89 The Delegate 
of Sweden also noted the ratification problems that would arise for it and a large number of 
European States.90 Both delegates noted the vagueness of the proposed wording and stated the 
need for further clarification before it could be decided.  
Playing the role of pantomime villain, the Observer from the IUAI entered the stage at this 
point and gave the hornet’s nest a kick. He referred to an English case (presumably Milor) which 
had rendered FNC a dead letter in England for Warsaw Convention cases.91 He also noted that 
there were no reported cases of a carrier being able to secure dismissal of a case from a US court 
by way of FNC. The relevance of these observations requires closer inspection and clarification.  
First, the Observer did not say that there were no cases in which FNC had been applied to a 
Convention action. It appears that the Chairman made this mistake. He is reported as having 
said, in his summary of the Observer’s point, that ‘[i]f, as indicated by the Observer from the IUAI, 
there were no cases in the United States in which the principle of forum non conveniens had been 
applied to Convention cases …’. 92  What the Observer said was that there were no reported 
cases in which a carrier had been able to secure dismissal, i.e. had been successful in an FNC 
motion. This is a different proposition entirely because where a motion is denied the doctrine is 
nevertheless applied. Indeed, at the time, there were several reported cases in which FNC was 
applied but no dismissal granted.93 Furthermore, the Observer was actually wrong. There was at 
least one reported case in which FNC dismissal was granted in a Warsaw Convention case;94 
there were also two unreported cases.95  
Second, the Observer enigmatically suggested that the English High Court case might throw 
light on the reason why FNC dismissals were non-existent in the US. His implication being that 
US courts did not dismiss Warsaw actions because they, like the English court in Milor, thought 
it had no place under the Convention. If this is what he thought, then unless he could predict the 
                                                       
88 ibid. 
89 ibid 160.  
90 ibid 161. 
91 ibid. The case name is not cited but is more than likely that of Milor v British Airways plc [1996] QB 
702 (CA).  
92 MC99 Minutes (n 16) 162 (emphasis added). 
93 See e.g., In re Air Crash Disaster near New Orleans, Louisiana on July 9, 1982, 821 F 2d 1147 (5th 
Cir 1987); In re Air Crash off Long Island New York, on July 17, 1996, 65 F Supp 2d 207 (SDNY 1999); 
Recumar v KLM Royal Dutch Airlines 608 F Supp 795 (SDNY 1985); McLoughlin v Comm Airways (Pty) Ltd 
(Comair) 602 F Supp 29 (EDNY 1985).  
94 In re Disaster at Riyadh Airport, Saudi Arabia on August 19, 1980, 540 F Supp 1141 (DC Cir 1982).  
95 Feng Zhen Lu v Air China Int’l Corp No 92-CV-1254, 1992 WL 453646 (EDNY 16 Dec 1992); Byrne v 
Japan Airlines Inc No 83-CV-9162, 1984 WL 1343 (SDNY 18 Dec 1984). 
 113 
future he was wrong. Although the US courts did eventually come to that position in 2002 with 
Hosaka v United Airlines Inc,96 at the time of the Montreal conference the one US court decision 
that had specifically made a finding on the issue had actually held that FNC was available.97  
The Chairman took the comments of the IUAI on board and commented that: ‘It would seem 
that if forum non conveniens was to play a role, that would have to be clearly indicated, having 
regard to the jurisprudence which might or might not exist in some countries.’98 This comment 
has been read as proof that FNC cannot apply unless specifically provided for in the Convention.99 
Whilst this is suggested by the immediate context provided by the Observer’s comments, the full 
context shows that the better and clearly intended meaning was otherwise. Let us recall that the 
Australian proposal was vaguely formed and it had been noted by some States that they would 
have difficulty implementing it into their legal systems. In other words, that the courts of civil law 
States would be unable to give effect to it since they did not have a doctrine of FNC or something 
akin to it. What the Chairman was recognising, was that if they were going to use FNC then, for 
those States, it would have to be explicitly provided for, i.e. courts would need to be empowered 
directly by the convention rule of FNC. In other words, this was not a matter to leave to national 
law to decide since that would not ensure its application, as evidenced by the UK and the 
purported practice of the US courts.  
It is not clear that the significance of Milor was appreciated by the Chairman or anyone else. 
Unfortunately, the Delegate of the UK did not bring clarity to the issue. He noted, in reference to 
the comments made by the Observer, that FNC was unavailable in relation to the four Warsaw 
Convention jurisdictions ‘as a result of implementing the Warsaw Convention into the national 
legislation of the [UK].’100 He then went on to say that the Group would not really be ‘modernizing 
and consolidating the Warsaw Convention’ if it required the claimant to fight for his choice of forum 
by leaving it open for the Court to dismiss on FNC.101 In his view, this could introduce litigation at 
a point where it did not currently exist—except presumably in those jurisdictions (e.g. the US) 
which applied FNC under the Warsaw Convention—and, furthermore, ‘could lead to the possible 
elimination of the plaintiff’s rights.’102 In so doing, the Delegate of the UK was confirming the gist 
of the Milor decision and he hinted at its ratio by mentioning the possible elimination of the 
plaintiff’s rights. Had the ratio of Milor been raised, i.e. the incompatibility of FNC with the 
substantive right of the claimant to choose his forum, it is unthinkable that it would not have 
provoked comment and debate at the Conference. It would have offered the civil law States, for 
whom the doctrine is anathema, a gilt-edged opportunity to banish it from this new convention 
entirely. The absence of any such debate is strong proof that the consistency of FNC with the 
convention was never questioned. 
The Chairman admitted to being in a state of confusion at this point in the discussion.103 To 
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the Chairman’s way of thinking, the positions discussed were irreconcilable. In the UK, the 
claimant’s choice was treated as final and FNC was not applied, but, on the other hand, it was 
being argued that the fifth jurisdiction’s application should be somehow circumscribed. The 
Chairman summarized the two available options; either, (a) single out the fifth jurisdiction and 
circumscribe its application in such a way as to address those issues, or; (b) recognize that all 
the jurisdictions would be subject to an FNC rule.104 
The Chairman thought the latter option, ‘would modify even the existing Convention rules.’105 
It could be argued that this comment, taken in isolation, might be read as suggesting that to make 
FNC available under the Convention would require modifying the existing rules of the Warsaw 
Convention. In other words, that FNC was prohibited by the Convention. However, the Chairman’s 
words ought to be read in context. Firstly, the discussion centred on the inclusion of express 
wording on the mandatory application of FNC which would naturally involve modification of the 
existing rules. As it stood, FNC was not mandated but it would be if codified. Second, making 
FNC applicable to all jurisdictions—rather than just the fifth—would amount to a modification of 
the Convention’s rules for certain States, e.g. the UK, whose position had just been described. 
Third, aside from the reference to the Milor case, at no other point had any doubt been raised 
about the consistency of FNC with the Convention. The US had made several references, without 
any opposition, to its availability and discussions had always preceded on that basis. Fifth, in the 
same excerpt, the Chairman spoke of ‘the rules being changed or clarified’, a turn of phrase that 
demonstrates the Chairman was not speaking authoritatively but speculatively.106 That he spoke 
of clarification proves that for those States which did apply FNC, the application of the doctrine 
by its court would be clarified by the Convention, there would not be a change of rule. The issue 
came down to whether the convention was going to mandate the application of FNC (and if so, 
whether for fifth jurisdiction only, or for all) or, whether it would leave the matter of applying FNC 
to national law. At no point was there a proposal to prohibit FNC. 
The FCG moved ahead with drafting the Consensus Package which was then discussed at its 
fifth and sixth meetings. Yet again, the fifth jurisdiction dominated the discussion. The draft 
Consensus Package incorporated into the jurisdiction clause an FNC-like test based on the 
Australian proposal.107 It applied only to the fifth jurisdiction and expressly authorized the court to 
decline jurisdiction (in favour of an alternative available forum) in certain specified circumstances. 
The Chairman explained that a convention rule had been necessary to ensure uniformity and 
because the doctrine did not exist in the legal systems of some States.108 He did not say that it 
was necessary because the Convention would otherwise proscribe the application of FNC by 
those States which had the doctrine. The FNC-like rule was not mandatory, it was to be a 
permissive rule.109 Although permissive, the Chairman did explain that the Court would be obliged 
“to address its mind” to the issues stated under the rule in coming to its conclusion, i.e. it was to 
be a quasi-permissive rule.110 
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The rule perplexed the US who remained opposed to anything which would make reliance on 
the fifth jurisdiction more onerous than the other four.111 Instead, the US proposed scrapping the 
rule and reverting to its former proposal which would have maintained the text of Article 28(2) of 
the Warsaw Convention (i.e. “questions of procedure shall be governed by the law of the court 
seised of the case”) and adding the following clarification: ‘that nothing here was intended to limit 
the ability of courts, in their discretion, applying the law of the court seised of the case to dismiss 
cases that more properly belonged in one of the other jurisdictions.’112 This would maintain the 
status quo, which the US understood as meaning that FNC would apply to all five jurisdictions for 
those States which had the doctrine whilst leaving it open for other States to follow suit if they so 
chose.113 The Delegate of Sweden voiced support for this proposal (echoed by the Observer from 
the European Community) and voiced concerns that the convention FNC rule could block 
ratification by many States of the civil law tradition. Of the US proposal, he observed:  ‘States who 
at the moment applied the principle of forum non conveniens could continue to do so’.114 
The Delegate of Switzerland, who saw a number of problems with the convention FNC rule,115 
posed a highly salient point. In his view, the problem of FNC was not ‘a matter of substance, but 
of procedure.’116 The Swiss Delegate proposed that the Convention should limit itself to questions 
of substance only and ‘should not try to unify one special element of procedure by adding an 
unclear rule in the Convention.’117 Instead, the Swiss Delegate proposed maintaining the wording 
from Article 28(2) of the Warsaw Convention and deleting the remainder of the proposed text. 
This is how it would turn out. The final draft of the Consensus Package118 was presented to the 
Commission of the Whole on 25 May 1999 to grand applause. Notable by its absence was any 
provision attempting to codify or affirming the application of FNC.  
The Chairman’s summation of the sixth meeting of the FCG suggests that the fate of the 
attempted codification of FNC into the Convention had been defeated by concerns relating to 
imposing the doctrine on the legal systems of States for whom it was foreign along with 
consequential issues of ratification.119 It is also submitted, as already considered above, that the 
real issue had been ensuring that a sufficient nexus existed between the carrier and the fifth 
jurisdiction. This had been achieved by requiring certain links to exist between the fifth jurisdiction 
and both the carrier and the passenger. As a result, the French bogeyman of a fifth jurisdiction 
based on the sole criterion of nationality had been exorcized. That said, there was no longer the 
need—from the civil law State perspective—to codify a rule of FNC since the fifth jurisdiction had 
been sufficiently circumscribed that it was regarded as an appropriate forum. 
It can be argued that the fact that Article 33 MC99 contains neither the codified version of FNC 
or the US proposal affirming the doctrine demonstrates that the drafters did not intend for FNC to 
play a role in MC99 at all. Insofar as this argument is limited to FNC playing an explicit role then 
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it is plainly correct and unobjectionable. However, if one wishes to argue that it shows the drafters 
thereby sought to proscribe the application of FNC under le droit commun (i.e. where available) 
then it is clearly wrong. The drafting history reveals the availability of FNC under le droit commun 
was frequently affirmed by the drafters from start to the finish. Although the Milor case was 
mentioned, its full significance was only hinted at but not appreciated. At no point was the 
proposition explicitly raised that FNC was not available under the Warsaw Convention on the 
grounds that it was inconsistent with its substantive provisions. Yet, this was what the plaintiffs in 
West Caribbean Airways sought to persuade the court of with respect to MC99.  
 
5.5  The Availability of FNC under MC99 
In this section, a thorough critical evaluation will be undertaken of the decision in West Caribbean 
Airways regarding the applicability of FNC under MC99. In addition, the appellate review of the 
decision by the Eleventh Circuit, as well as some other relevant court decisions, will be briefly 
considered. Having identified strong lines of argument for and against, as well as uncovering 
some of the shortcomings of those decisions, this chapter will conclude with the presentation of 
a new theory on the availability of FNC under MC99.  
 
5.5.1  Back to West Caribbean Airways 
The cornerstone of the plaintiffs’ argument in West Caribbean Airways rested on the precedential 
value of Hosaka. Their hope was that the court would find FNC unavailable under MC99 just as 
Hosaka had done for the Warsaw Convention. However, as explained in Chapter 1, Ungaro J 
determined that the Hosaka decision was of ‘limited precedential value’.120 Consequently, Ungaro 
J treated the question of the availability of FNC under MC99 on its own merits.121  
The approach to treaty interpretation employed in West Caribbean Airways was that laid down 
by the US Supreme Court in Floyd v Eastern Airlines Inc122 and Tseng v El Al Israel Airlines Ltd,123 
as incorporating a number of points from Saks v Air France124 and Zicherman v Korean Air Lines 
Co Ltd.125 This approach was thus closely aligned to customary international law as codified by 
the Vienna Convention.126 
 
5.5.1.1  The Text of the Treaty 
Commencing with the text of Article 33, Ungaro J found it to be ‘unambiguous and dispositive’ in 
providing that questions of procedure shall be governed by the law of the forum.127 Although FNC 
was not explicitly mentioned, the court held that since FNC was so firmly established as a rule of 
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procedure in the US at the time of the drafting of MC99 that the text, ‘by implication’,128 clearly 
covered it. Unlike other courts which had addressed the same issue, the court in West Caribbean 
Airways based its textual interpretation on the whole text of Article 33 and not simply on Article 
33(1) or 33(4). 
It is glaringly obvious that the court’s conclusion that ‘the text unambiguously permits 
application of the [FNC] doctrine in Montreal Convention cases’,129 conflicts the conclusion 
reached in Hosaka and Milor. In both of those cases, the courts had regarded the text of Article 
28 of the Warsaw Convention to be ambiguous. Naturally, this was something the plaintiffs in 
West Caribbean Airways were eager to point out given that the relevant text of Article 33 of MC99 
and Article 28 of the Warsaw Convention are substantially the same. The key distinguishing 
feature is that in Hosaka and Milor the courts had not based their determination of ambiguity 
based solely on a literal interpretation of the text but had reached that view having interpreted the 
text in its context within the treaty and in light of its purpose. However, Ungaro J’s approach had 
begun with a purely literal interpretation. Thankfully, she did not stop there. Despite declaring the 
text be ‘dispositive’,130 she accepted that the interpretative task did not end with the text and 
acknowledged that the Court had the ‘responsibility to interpret Article 33 consistently with the 
shared expectations of the contracting parties’131 and that this obliged recourse be had to the 
other means of interpretation.  
 
5.5.1.2  Historical Context 
Whilst there exists textual identity between the two conventions in relation to rules of procedure 
being governed by the law of the forum, Ungaro J was quick to identify the difference in historical 
context. The decisions in Milor and Hosaka could be distinguished from West Caribbean Airways 
because in the former cases the courts had been concerned with the interpretation of a convention 
concluded in 1929, ‘at a time when the [FNC] doctrine was rarely utilized, its contours were 
underdeveloped and its “procedural” character was unsettled.’132 However, by 1999 FNC was 
firmly established and frequently utilized so any confusion relating to its doctrinal status as a rule 
of procedure, rather than one of substance, had been resolved by the US courts. Ungaro J even 
noted that in 1999 the Hosaka decision had not been made and the only US precedent at that 
time which had directly addressed the issue had found FNC to be available.133 However, Ungaro 
J made no mention of Milor in this context. While not a US precedent, Milor was a judgment of a 
sister common law court—pre-dating MC99—which had rejected the availability of FNC under the 
Warsaw Convention.  
What the consideration of the historical context above can be reduced down to is the question 
of interpretation of the words “questions of procedure” in Article 28(2) and Article 33(4) in the 
Warsaw Convention and MC99 respectively. The question is, did the meaning of those words 
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encompass the doctrine of FNC? For Ungaro J, the varying historical context between the 
Warsaw Convention (as addressed Hosaka) and that of MC99 did not compel the Court to reach 
the same conclusion. Simply put, Ungaro J’s view was the in 1929 the meaning of the term 
“questions of procedure” could not be interpreted as including FNC, whereas it could in 1999. 
This line of argument is open to three criticisms. First, its historical accuracy is questionable. 
Secondly, it is fundamentally wrong. Thirdly, it misunderstands the rationes decidendi of Milor and 
Hosaka.  
From the history of FNC134 it is clear that in 1929 the doctrine was far from firmly established 
in the US or in England, in fact it was still regarded as an oddity of Scots law. At the same time, 
there was sufficient doctrinal basis within English and US law to confirm the general discretionary 
power of a court to decline otherwise valid jurisdiction. The relevance of the US law perspective 
is weak given that the US did not actively participate in the drafting of the Warsaw Convention. 
More relevant, as was already noted, the British Delegate at Warsaw had made a proposal to 
include wording to the provide for a discretionary power to decline jurisdiction but he had not 
insisted upon it for reasons unknown. Thus, while the drafters of the Warsaw Convention may not 
have known of FNC by name, they certainly knew that something similar was a feature of the 
common law landscape at the time of the Warsaw Convention’s drafting. The situation was not 
as clear-cut as Ungaro J appears to have assumed. 
The veracity of the line of argumentation may be challenged on the grounds that it is irrelevant 
whether the delegates were aware of FNC or whether they did, or would have, regarded it as 
covered by the term “questions of procedure” in Article 28(2). Such a broad term was deliberately 
used in order for the precise purpose of avoiding the need to catalogue or make express provision 
for each and every rule of procedure. The cardinal purpose of the Warsaw Convention was to 
achieve uniformity of certain rules and inherent to this was the drafter’s understanding that 
compromise was necessary given the diverse and distinct legal systems involved. Rather than 
seek the impossible (i.e. exhaustive unification) the scope of unification was limited only to 
essential matters. They intended to leave much to the lex fori, questions of procedure being one 
such example. All of which is to say, by way of a hypothetical, if Contracting Party to the Warsaw 
Convention had decided to create an entirely new rule of procedure in 1939, the compatibility of 
such a rule with the Convention could not be challenged solely on the basis that it was not 
specifically within the contemplation of the drafters in 1929.  
The question that can legitimately be posed in the context of the distinctive historical 
background to the Warsaw Convention and MC99 is not so much a matter of the comparative 
meaning of Article 28(2) and Article 33(4), but one of Article 28(1) and 33(1). Did the drafters of 
Article 28(1) intend to create a substantive right making a plaintiff’s choice of forum absolute and 
exclusive such that the meaning of Article 28(2) had to read as excluding FNC? Hosaka and Milor 
had both concluded that this was indeed the case in Warsaw in 1929. This was the ratio decidendi 
in both cases. Ungaro J did not appreciate this, she asked the wrong question. It is not a question 
of whether FNC was contemplated by the drafters as one of the rules of procedure under Article 
28(2). The real question was whether Article 28(2) had to be read as qualified by Article 28(1), 
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i.e. as only including rules of procedure to the extent that they do not conflict with the substantive 
provisions of Article 28(1). Had she addressed herself to this question then she would have to 
ask whether the answer given in Milor and Hosaka held true for the case of Article 33(4) of MC99. 
This is the biggest failing in West Caribbean Airways and we shall return to it below in the final 
section of this chapter. 
 
5.5.1.3  The Purpose of the Treaty 
Plaintiffs in West Caribbean Airways had also sought to rely on Hosaka to argue that FNC was 
contrary to the general purposes of MC99. However, Ungaro J noted that the reasoning of the 
court in Hosaka (agreeing with that of Milor) was based on the accepted purposes of the Warsaw 
Convention and she correctly noted that it could not be assumed that the purposes of MC99 are 
identical.135 Nonetheless, Ungaro J did not disregard the relevance of the Warsaw Convention to 
the interpretation of the purposes of MC99. Instead, her analysis mostly reveals an appreciation 
of their interrelationship and the continued relevance of the Warsaw Convention. However, her 
analysis of the purpose of MC99 raises a number of issues. 
As a preliminary observation, the court was not unequivocal in defining the purposes of MC99. 
To begin with, in the authoritative statement as to the purposes of MC99, they are defined as 
being: (1) to modernise and consolidate WCS; (2) to ensure the protection of interests of 
consumers in international carriage by air and the need for equitable compensation based on 
principle of restitution.136 Ungaro J based this on a mere reading the Preamble to MC99 and 
thereby failed to appreciate that the cardinal goal of MC99 remains, like that of the Warsaw 
Convention, the pursuit of uniformity of certain rules. However, a couple of paragraphs after this 
statement, Ungaro conceded that uniformity and predictability were amongst the objectives of the 
drafters of MC99, but referred to them as mere aspirations.137 This is simply wrong and 
substantially downplays the cardinal importance of uniformity within MC99. Ironically, later in the 
section of the purpose of MC99, she referred to ‘the predominant objectives’ of MC99 as being 
‘the creation of a new uniform system of liability governing the international transportation of 
passengers and cargo, and the balancing of the interests of the air carriers and passengers.’138 
This latter description is actually more accurate but it was not presented as the authoritative 
statement that the first definition was. These two “definitions” are not fully consistent yet the court 
never attempted to assimilate or reconcile them, nor was one or other stated in the conclusion to 
the judgment.139 The resulting difficulty is that we cannot be sure what the court’s understanding 
of the purposes of MC99 was and thus how it informed its final decision. In addition to this, Ungaro 
J did not specifically address the question of the object and purpose of the MC99’s jurisdictional 
scheme.  
Moving to the specifics of the court’s argument regarding FNC and the purpose of MC99. As 
modernization of the Warsaw Convention was one of the goals of MC99, Ungaro J surmised that 
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this supported the availability of FNC as it would accord with modern practice at the time of the 
drafting of the Convention.140 At that point in time, in the only US case to address the question 
under the Warsaw Convention the court had found the doctrine to be applicable.141 There were 
many US cases which had applied the doctrine in the context of the Warsaw Convention and at 
least one foreign court decision could be cited in support.142 Curiously, Ungaro J made no mention 
of Milor in relation to this point, despite it representing countervailing authority for the modern 
practice of the English courts. In any case, aside from the fact that it exposes a common law bias 
since it assumes the drafters intended to modernize the convention in the image of common law 
practice, Ungaro J’s point is unpersuasive for another more fundamental reason. That is, it 
assumes that the object of modernization was intended to apply extensively. This was clearly not 
the case and is demonstrated by the twin object of consolidation. The drafters intended to 
consolidate the Warsaw system, indeed it might arguably be claimed that this was preeminent in 
their considerations because they took the text of the Warsaw Convention as their starting point. 
Having done so, they made adjustments in the name of modernization, e.g. the addition of the 
fifth jurisdiction. Other than that, the specific jurisdictional provisions in question remained largely 
unchanged. If anything, this suggests consolidation rather than modernization.  
Within the context of the second articulation of the purposes of MC99, Ungaro J appeared to 
concede that FNC would, at first glance, appear to be inconsistent with uniformity. However, since 
MC99 (like the Warsaw Convention) only sought unification of certain rules, i.e. not all rules, 
Ungaro J was not prepared to presume that the goal of uniformity necessarily meant that FNC 
was inherently incompatible with MC99’s jurisdictional scheme. That much is true, but at the same 
time it does not answer the question of the inconsistency between FNC and the goal of uniformity. 
To do this, Ungaro J referred to the travaux préparatoires of MC99. The delegates were clearly 
aware that FNC was routinely applied by US courts and no proposal was ever made to explicitly 
exclude the doctrine. While proposals of various types were made with respect to codifying FNC, 
the delegates had ultimately been unable to reach a consensus on the issue for fear that 
codification would result in mandatory application of the doctrine, even for those States whose 
legal system did not currently have such a doctrine. Instead, it was decided to retain the existing 
wording for Article 33(4). For Ungaro J, this suggested that the delegates had intended to maintain 
the status quo.143 This point will be addressed further below, but for now it suffices to point out 
that the status quo was not so straightforward, one need only refer to Milor for proof of this.  
Next, the court recognized that one of the predominant objectives of the Convention was to 
achieve a balance between the interests of the air carrier and the passenger.144 The reasoning 
adopted by the courts in Hosaka and Milor had been to the effect that FNC would interfere with 
this balance by subverting the substantive right granted the claimant to choose from the available 
forums the one which in which he wishes to bring his claim. In Milor and Hosaka, the courts had 
placed great significance on the consistency of their interpretation of Article 28(2) with the creation 
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of what they viewed as a substantive right of the claimant to choose his forum under Article 28(1). 
So much so, that their interpretation that the application of FNC was precluded under the Warsaw 
Convention had fundamentally rested on that understanding of the Warsaw Convention’s 
jurisdictional scheme. This was a critical nuance to the reasoning of those two decisions which 
was not adequately considered in West Caribbean Airways. Ungaro J simply failed to appreciate 
the rationes decidendi of Milor and Hosaka in respect of the substantive right under Article 28(1). 
In the end, she dismissed it by stating: ‘The record does not reflect that drafters of MC99, 
assuming they understood [FNC] to be a jurisdictional question, accorded the objective of 
formulating a “self-contained jurisdictional code” the primacy ascribed in the Hosaka and Milor 
opinions to the drafters of the Warsaw Convention.’145 This is very weak judicial reasoning.  
In any case, from a practical perspective the court could not see how the doctrine would 
undermine the two purposes of MC99, i.e. uniformity and the balance of interests. Ungaro J 
focused on the latter, explaining that the jurisdictional scheme of MC99 ensures that the forum 
selected by the plaintiff has a significant connection to the carrier. She did not see FNC as being 
inconsistent with this because FNC is not capable of dismissing a case in favour of the courts of 
a State which does not have jurisdiction under the Convention. In one sense, the worst that FNC 
can do is require that a plaintiff bring proceedings in one of the other specified forums.146 In any 
case, the eventual forum will be one of those envisaged by the drafters. The effect of the operation 
of FNC is thus not prejudicial to the balance of interests struck between passengers and carriers. 
The obvious weakness in this argument is that it depends on ignoring the substantive right 
argument. If the jurisdictional scheme of MC99 intended to grant the claimant a substantive right 
to choose his forum from amongst those available under the scheme, then FNC undoubtedly 
interferes with that right and therefore with the balance of interests. In simple terms, FNC takes 
the initiative away from the plaintiff.  
 
5.5.1.4  Drafting History 
The drafting history of MC99 provides the strongest support for the conclusion that FNC is 
available as a procedural tool under Article 33(4) so it is unsurprising a large portion of the 
judgment in West Caribbean Airways is taken up with recounting it. As it has been presented 
above, it will suffice for present purpose to deal with the conclusions reached by the court. The 
drafting history showed that the delegates were keenly aware of FNC and that it had occupied a 
good deal of their discussions over the fifth jurisdiction. No proposal was made which would have 
expressly excluded the application of FNC. On the contrary, various proposals were made with a 
view to either clarifying its applicability or for codifying a version of it for MC99. Ungaro J noted 
that the US ‘actively and persistently opposed the inclusion of any forum non conveniens 
language except to clarify its general applicability, all while making it abundantly clear that United 
States courts would continue to employ the doctrine in Montreal Convention and other 
international cases.’147 These proposals were ultimately not adopted, not because of a desire to 
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exclude FNC but rather to avoid the difficulty of mandating its application by States for whom the 
doctrine (or something similar) was not already a feature of their legal system. Ungaro J 
concluded that the drafting history showed that ‘the delegates determined to maintain the status 
quo’.148 States that employed the doctrine would continue to do so. 
 
5.5.1.5  Post-Ratification Understanding and the Position of the United 
States 
With such a new treaty, there was little to go on in regard to post-ratification understanding. 
Although the parties had little to work with, the court had the benefit of amicus curiae brief outlining 
the position of the US Government.149 It was the opinion of the Government that Article 33(4) 
meant that MC99, ‘defers to the forum’s laws on all question of procedure and manifests an intent 
by the drafters not to alter the judicial system of any country on questions of procedure.’150 Such 
a position was seen as being compliant with US interests, especially in utilizing FNC as a means 
of controlling forum shopping and managing docket congestion.151 In support of this viewpoint, 
the US Government’s Statement of Interest cited Breard v Greene, thereby invoking the principle 
that absent express provision to the contrary, the procedural rules of the State shall apply.152 In 
other words, if MC99 does not expressly prohibit FNC, then as a well-established rule of 
procedure it is applicable in MC99 cases.153 
The US Government’s Statement of Interest emphasized that at the time of its drafting and 
negotiation, the Hosaka decision had not been issued and US courts were uniformly applying 
FNC under the Warsaw Convention and that the delegates at the Conference were aware of this 
fact and had been encouraged by the US delegation to expect this to remain the case. If one 
overlooks the fly in the ointment that is Milor, it is exceedingly difficult to challenge this factual 
conclusion. Although Ungaro J only summarized the views of the US Government and did not 
state the degree of weight or deference actually afforded them, it is clear that the arguments put 
forth were received sympathetically by the court. Given the binding authority of Sumitomo Shoji 
America Inc v Avagliano, in which the Supreme Court stated, ‘[a]lthough not conclusive, the 
meaning attributed to treaty provisions by the Government agencies charged with their 
negotiation and enforcement is entitled to great weight’,154 we can safely assume that she gave 
“great weight” to the views of the US Government in interpreting MC99. 
 
5.5.2  Subsequent Authorities 
Judge Ungaro’s decision in West Caribbean Airways was reviewed by the court of appeals under 
the name of Pierre-Louis v Newvac Corp.155 It raised nothing of striking significance with respect 
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to the availability of FNC under MC99, instead it briefly reviewed and affirmed the district court’s 
reasoning. Whilst Ungaro J’s opinion had been lengthy and comprehensive in its approach to 
treaty interpretation, the Eleventh Circuit’s was patchy. It picked out only a handful of points from 
the district court judgment. It claimed to have considered the drafting history156 but this is simply 
not in evidence. Although obliged to consider the object and purpose of the treaty when 
interpreting its terms, the court gave only sparse consideration to this means of interpretation.157 
The light touch adopted by the Eleventh Circuit is no doubt credit to the quality of Ungaro J’s 
judgment to which the appellate court showed great deference. However, in the few areas in 
which it did venture to do more than merely affirm, it committed new errors. 
Although Ungaro J had begun with a literal interpretation which she had described as 
dispositive, she had nonetheless taken the process of treaty interpretation much further than this. 
The Eleventh Circuit focused on the constrained literal approach. It found ‘no ambiguity or 
limitation in the express language of Article 33(4)’158 and endorsed the conclusion that this 
covered all rules of procedure of the forum State, including FNC.159 It is a requirement of 
customary international law that a treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the 
ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in light of its object and 
purpose.160 The Eleventh Circuit did not do this. Unlike the district court, it took only the literal text 
of Article 33(4) and interpreted it without considering its meaning in the context of Article 33(1). 
This is clear from the court’s statement: ‘We therefore find no ambiguity or limitation in the express 
language of Article 33(4), which states in no uncertain terms that questions of procedure—which 
can only reasonably be read to include all questions of procedure—are governed by the rules of 
the forum state.’161 To find the text of Article 33(4) unambiguous is only tenable by neglecting to 
consider it in its proper context.  
Like the district court, the court of appeals undervalued the precedential value of Milor and 
Hosaka by excluding them on the grounds that those cases involved interpretation of the Warsaw 
Convention rather than MC99 and that the status of FNC had changed between 1929 and 1999. 
The court made reference, on the one hand, to the uncertain status of FNC in 1929,162 and, on 
the other hand, to the shared expectations of the parties to MC99 that FNC would continue to be 
applied by those States which recognize the doctrine.163 These are valid observations which ought 
to be taken into account but, with respect to Milor and Hosaka, the courts’ decisions in those 
cases did not hinge on the status of FNC in 1929 (although it was a factor). The truth seems to 
be that the Eleventh Circuit did not understand what the rationes decidendi in Milor or Hosaka 
actually were. Milor and Hosaka had held that FNC was not available under the Warsaw 
Convention because it was inconsistent with the substantive right of the claimant to choose his 
forum under Article 28(1). It is disappointing that the Eleventh Circuit did not consider this.  
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This failure to appreciate the ratio decidendi of Hosaka was also evidenced in Re Air Crash 
Over the Mid-Atlantic on June 1, 2009,164 one of the few other cases to consider the availability 
of FNC under MC99. The case related to the crash of Air France Flight 447 on 01 June 2009 and 
was heard by the District Court for the Northern District of California. Again, the plaintiffs sought 
to rely on Hosaka to avoid FNC dismissal of their MC99 claim. The district court distinguished 
Hosaka, explaining that it did not compel the conclusion that FNC is not available under MC99 
for two ‘primary reasons’.165 
The courts first “primary reason” boiled down to distinguishing Hosaka on the basis of the 
change in status of FNC between 1929 and 1999, i.e. the same argument put forth in Pierre-
Louis. However, the district court’s summary of Hosaka was inaccurate. It suggested, that at the 
time of the drafting of the Warsaw Convention, the doctrine of FNC was relatively new, therefore, 
it would have required some express provision in the treaty to authorize its application.166 Since 
the Warsaw Convention was silent on the availability of FNC, it was not available.167 However, 
the court found this logic did not apply to MC99 because, when it was drafted, the status of FNC 
was substantially different. Against this “changed backdrop”, the court deduced that express 
provision was no longer required to authorise its application, ergo, it is available under MC99.168 
This was not the reasoning of Hosaka. The court in Air Crash over the Mid-Atlantic either failed 
to realize this or chose to ignore it.  
That the court entirely missed the point of Hosaka is also clear from its dismissal of the 
plaintiff’s second line of argument. Plaintiffs had also argued that FNC was inconsistent with the 
purpose of the fifth jurisdiction, which they claimed was to provide passengers with a forum in 
their home State. The court understood this as essentially arguing that FNC would render a 
plaintiff’s right to choose the fifth jurisdiction meaningless. Taken at such a blunt level, the court 
was right to regard such a bald proposition as objectionable. However, just as Philips LJ in Milor 
had not intended his statement that to give a plaintiff a choice is to give him nothing, so too the 
plaintiffs in Air Crash over the Mid-Atlantic had not intended to be taken so literally. It seems 
abundantly clear that they were invoking the line of argument first raised by Philips LJ in Milor and 
then endorsed by Fisher J in Hosaka, that FNC was inconsistent with the purpose of MC99 to 
achieve an equitable balance of interests. This is the argument the court dodged. 
The Eastern District of New York, in Khan v Delta Airlines Inc,169 came close to exploring the 
true ratio of Hosaka in the context of MC99. The court initially determined that the literal text of 
Article 33(4) MC99 ‘clearly, and without limitation’, provides that questions of procedure are 
governed by the court seised of the case170 and this unambiguously includes FNC.171 It based 
this finding solely on the text of Article 33(4) but the plaintiff was able to persuade the court that 
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the Hosaka decision had not been limited to the text of Article 28(2) of the Warsaw Convention, 
it had interpreted it in light of Article 28(1). Since the text of Article 28 of the Warsaw Convention 
and Article 33 of MC99 were largely the same, the plaintiff in Khan convinced the court to consider 
the meaning of Article 33(4) in light of the other provisions of Article 33.172 This allowed the court 
to acknowledge the core reasoning of Hosaka, i.e. that reading Article 28(2) as including FNC 
would conflict with the substantive right to choose one’s forum under Article 28(1). Nevertheless, 
the court distinguished Hosaka on the basis that it decided the issue for the Warsaw Convention 
but held that the changed status of FNC between 1929 and 1999 did not mandate the same 
conclusion for MC99.173 The laziness of the court’s distinction is unfortunate because there is 
substance there which will be fleshed out below.  
There are three other decisions that touch on the question of the availability of FNC under 
MC99. An Indiana district court in Dordieski v Austrian Airlines AG, and an Illinois district court in 
Garcia v Aerovias de Mexico SA de DV (Inc), both cited West Caribbean Airways approvingly in 
finding FNC to be available under MC99.174 However, in Delgado v Delta Air Lines Inc,175 the 
District Court for the Southern District of Florida (the same court as Ungaro J) stated that although 
bound to find FNC available on account of the Eleventh Circuit’s decision to affirm West 
Caribbean Airways, the decision of the French Cour de Cassation had caused a doubt.176 It would 
seem that West Caribbean Airways is open to future challenge; but should it be? 
 
5.5.3  The French Connection 
It will be recalled from Chapter 1 that directly after Ungaro J’s FNC order was granted in January 
of 2009, the claimants had commenced proceedings in Martinique petitioning the court to declare 
itself without jurisdiction on the grounds that their choice of a US forum was absolute under MC99. 
The trial court had found against the claimants and this was upheld on appeal. However, on 7 
December 2011, the Cour de Cassation found in favour of the claimants.177 The Cour de 
Cassation’s holding with respect to Article 33(1) and 46 of MC99 was as follows: 
Whereas the choice of jurisdiction raised by the appellant through the 
abovementioned text is contrary to a dispute being decided by an equally competent 
jurisdiction other than the one that it has chosen; whereas, in fact, this choice, which 
has been accompanied by a restrictive list of competent forums in order to reconcile 
the different interests present, implies, in order to satisfy the objective of 
foreseeability, security and standardization sought by the Convention of Montreal; 
whereas the plaintiff, and he alone, has the choice of deciding before which 
jurisdiction the dispute will in fact be decided, without an internal rule of procedure 
leading to contradicting his imperative choice being able to be enforced on him.178 
This official English translation (submitted by the defendants to Ungaro J in 2012) is less than 
satisfactory. The translation of prévisibilité, sécurité et uniformisation as ‘foreseeability, security 
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and standardization’ seems particular inapt. The better translation, it is suggested, would be 
“predictability, certainty and uniformity”. Nevertheless, the thrust of the judgment of the Cour de 
Cassation was that the scheme of Article 33(1) and 46 provides a limited list of forums from which 
the plaintiff has the right to choose in which to have the dispute decided and that it would be 
inconsistent with this choice, once made, if another court were to hear the dispute. This scheme 
was adopted in order to satisfy the purposes of predictability, certainty and uniformity. By plaintiffs’ 
choice of forum in the US, the Martinique forum became unavailable. Interestingly, the Cour de 
Cassation did not hold that the Martinique court lacked jurisdiction but rather that it was ‘currently 
unavailable’ given the plaintiffs’ choice.179 By assuming jurisdiction in the circumstances, the court 
of Martinique had violated the terms of MC99.  
The Cour de Cassation judgment was made with express reference to Articles 33(1) and 46 
of MC99; while Article 33(4) was cited as part of the plaintiffs’ grounds for appeal, it is not clear if 
it featured in the Court’s reasoning. It is nowhere referenced directly. If one were to be charitable, 
it could be suggested that consideration of Article 33(4) was implicit in the Court’s reference to an 
“internal rule of procedure”.180 However, in the circumstances, the decision of the Court must be 
taken at face value as having been based solely on Article 33(1). In so doing, the Court failed to 
interpret Article 33(1) in the context of Article 33(4) and this is contrary to the general rule of treaty 
interpretation laid down by the Vienna Convention.  
A further problem with the Cour de Cassation’s decision is that it was given without any 
consideration of the drafting history (travaux préparatoires) of MC99; not surprising, given the 
brevity of the Court’s judgment.181 While not mandatory under customary international law—
unless the general rule of interpretation does not resolve the ambiguity—the travaux may still be 
referred to in order to confirm the meaning arrived at from application of the general rule.182 Even 
where convinced of its interpretation, one would have hoped that in such contentious and perilous 
circumstances the Court would exercise its common sense and at least refer to the travaux for 
confirmation. Its refusal to do so, along with its error in failing to consider Article 33(4) leave the 
decision open to legal challenge. 
 
5.5.4  The Better Interpretation 
It was noted above that Ungaro J had asked the wrong question in West Caribbean Airways. 
Instead of asking whether the reference in Article 33(4) MC99 to “questions of procedure” was 
intended by the drafters to include the doctrine of FNC, the question should have been whether 
Articles 33(1) and 33(2) MC99 were intended to create a substantive right granting the plaintiff 
the absolute and exclusive option to choose their forum from those available under MC99. If the 
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answer to this question is in the affirmative, then Article 33(4) must be read in a manner consistent 
with that substantive right, i.e. as only including rules of procedure to the extent that they do not 
conflict with the substantive provisions of Articles 33(1) and 33(2). With regard to the Warsaw 
Convention, the courts in Milor and Hosaka had correctly determined that this was the correct 
understanding of the relationship of between Article 28(1) and 28(2). The question now is whether 
it remains the correct understanding in the case of MC99. 
Starting with the text of Article 33 MC99 we have to conclude that the text is ambiguous since 
it is capable of yielding two plausible interpretations. The option given the plaintiff to choose in 
which of the forums provided in Articles 33(1) and 33(2) to bring an action for damages is either 
to be regarded as an absolute right of choice, such that the Article 33(4) must be read as 
precluding the application of a rule of procedure (such as FNC). Or, the option given is not an 
absolute right of choice but is subject to the application of rules of procedure of the chosen forum 
even where they interfere with that right of choice (e.g. FNC). Whilst a purely literal reading of 
Article 33(4) would indicate the latter interpretation, this would not be a legitimate interpretative 
approach under customary international law (as codified by the Vienna Convention).  
Article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention provides that ‘[a] treaty shall be interpreted in good faith 
in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and 
in the light of its object and purpose.’183 In terms of purpose, it was established above that there 
is great commonality between MC99 and the Warsaw Convention. MC99 maintains the twofold 
structure of the Warsaw Convention. Its cardinal purpose remains that of avoiding conflict of laws 
through the unification of certain rules relating to travel documentation and air carrier liability. We 
have emphasized throughout that the purpose of uniformity is not all-encompassing but limited to 
certain (not all) rules. These include the matter of jurisdiction but do not extend, as shown by the 
language of Article 33(4), to questions of procedure; these are left to the lex fori. Yet, in pursuing 
a line of argument based on the purpose of uniformity, all we do is rehash the same points that 
were raised with respect to the Warsaw Convention and which were exhaustively analysed in 
Chapter 4. In the end it just leads to the same question: Would the drafters have considered FNC 
as inconsistent with the right granted under Article 28(1)? If a different answer is going to be found 
then it will have to be found where MC99 differs from the Warsaw Convention.  
Whilst the cardinal purpose of MC99 may be the same, we concluded that the supplementary 
purpose has evolved substantially from that of the Warsaw Convention. We defined the purpose 
of the Warsaw Convention as being: ‘Furtherance of the public interest in the development of air 
transport whilst striking an equitable balance of interests between carriers, users and 
claimants.’184 The balance of interests was fundamentally altered by MC99, most dramatically by 
its recalibration in light of the interests of claimants qua consumers. Now, under MC99, we have 
defined this complementary purpose as: ‘Assurance of an equitable balance between the 
interests of consumers in international carriage by air, the need for equitable compensation based 
on the principle of restitution and the orderly development of international air transport.’185 This 
change is most strongly reflected in the alterations made to the core liability regime with MC99. 
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Although it did not result in the same overhaul of the jurisdictional regime, it did have an impact.  
Like the Warsaw Convention, the key features of MC99’s jurisdictional regime reflect two core 
policy considerations: (1) the need to ensure legal certainty and predictability; (2) the desire to 
accommodate the interests and convenience of the parties.186 Again, like the Warsaw Convention, 
MC99’s cardinal purpose is served by the former and its supplementary purpose by the latter. 
Both policies were in evidence with respect to the addition of the fifth jurisdiction. Whilst certainly 
a concession to the interests of the claimant passengers, it was the need to balance that against 
the interests of carriers and consumers in general which received most attention throughout the 
drafting history. The fifth jurisdiction was fenced-in so as to ensure that it would be a predictable 
forum for carriers and to minimise the risk of forum shopping which was regarded as synonymous 
with increased cost to the industry and ultimately to the consumer. It would be wrong to suppose 
that MC99’s jurisdictional regime was recast with the interests of the consumer qua claimant as 
king. Although FNC is undoubtedly inimical to the interests of claimants, it can be seen as 
promoting the orderly development of air transport and the interests of consumers generally (i.e. 
as distinguished from consumers qua claimants). For a time, a codified version of FNC was the 
favoured solution. Thus, like the Warsaw Convention, both generally and specifically with regard 
to jurisdiction, MC99 is a balanced regime, but, with a new balance of interests, adjusted to reflect 
the changes in the industry and in the wider socio-economic landscape. The truth is that the FNC 
falls on both sides of the scales and trying to divine the relative weight the drafters would have 
assigned to its dual manifestations is likely an impossible task. Thankfully, such a task is 
unnecessary given another significant change between the Warsaw Convention and MC99, i.e. 
that MC99 has its own drafting history. 
As detailed above, in adding the fifth jurisdiction the drafters specifically turned their minds to 
the jurisdictional regime of MC99. They engaged in lengthy and in-depth discussion during which 
the reality of FNC was repeatedly acknowledged and accepted. There was repeated insistence 
from the US—the most significant State in terms of aviation litigation—that it applied FNC to WCS 
cases and would continue to do so under MC99. This was even recognized by other States 
(including civil law States). When we consider what understanding the drafters would have had 
of the substantive right granted the claimant to choose their forum under Articles 33(1) and 33(2) 
MC99, then an inescapable conclusion imposes itself. Not only was the exercise of the doctrine 
of FNC not inconsistent with that right, it was plainly and openly contemplated by the drafters. 
This is the key distinction between MC99 and the Warsaw Convention. With MC99, FNC was 
clearly within the contemplation of the drafters, therefore the substantive right granted the 
claimant under Article 33 was not regarded as absolute in the sense that it would have been by 
the drafters of the Warsaw Convention. Whatever the precise balance struck between competing 
interests, it was one struck on the shared understanding of the drafters that FNC may be applied.  
By reframing of the core interpretational question concerning the applicability of FNC under 
MC99 onto the nature and extent of the substantive right granted the claimant to choose their 
forum, rather than on whether the term “questions of procedure” referred to in Article 33(4) was 
intended to include FNC, we reach the following conclusion. The substantive right under Articles 
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33(1) and 33(2) MC99 grants the claimant the choice of forum (from those identified as available) 
in which to bring an action for damages. In the case of MC99, the claimant’s right to choose their 
forum is not inviolable and absolute. Such right is, as per Article 33(4), subject to the procedural 
rules of the court seised of the case, including, where available, a rule of procedure which permits 
the court to reasonably exercise discretion to decline jurisdiction in favour of one of the alternative 





Conclusion to Part Three 
The analysis conducted in Chapters 4 and 5 has led to the conclusion that whilst FNC is not 
available under WCS it is under MC99. Although the reasoning upon which that conclusion is 
reached is different to that put forth in West Caribbean Airways, it is essentially in agreement with 
respect to the outcome. When it comes to the decision reached by the Cour de Cassation in 
Antoine X,1 its failure to consider Article 33(1) in its context, specifically Article 33(4), is reason 
enough to discount it. Furthermore, it would beggar belief if the Cour de Cassation could maintain 
its position in the light of full consideration of the drafting history. The Cour de Cassation is quite 
simply wrong.  
Contracting States to MC99 undertook the obligation to make their courts available to claims 
brought before them in accordance with the jurisdictional regime of Article 33. We have 
established that FNC is not prima facie inconsistent with that regime. That being so, it is submitted 
that where a court declines to exercise jurisdiction on grounds of FNC and that action is then 
brought to one of the other forums permitted under MC99, then that other forum cannot invoke 
the exercise of FNC by the original court as justification for refusal to hear the case itself. To do 
so, it is suggested, would amount to a breach by that State of its duty of good faith under 
customary international law; unless of course that State could justify such action on some other 
basis. For instance, it could be argued that the application of the particular doctrine of FNC was 
in violation of MC99 or some other binding norm of international law. Indeed, there is room to 
argue that certain versions of the doctrine in the US discriminate between foreign and domestic 
claimants in a manner inconsistent with MC99. Another alternative justification for a court to refuse 
to accept jurisdiction over a case dismissed from another court on grounds of FNC might be on 
the basis of a rule of its own procedural law, provided such rule is not itself inconsistent with the 
substantive right granted the claimant under MC99. Although this was not the approach of the 
Cour de Cassation, we saw in Chapter 3 that devices such as the Latin American FNC blocking 
statutes could be employed to such effect.  All of which is simply to say that concluding that FNC 
is available under MC99 is not the end of the issue.  
Even if—as has been proved—FNC is not the interloper to MC99 that it is accused of being, 
there is still much wrong with it and we still stand in need of a better solution. In Part Two of this 
work it was shown that FNC is characterized by a lack of doctrinal uniformity. That it drives 
divisiveness between common law and civil law systems due to the essential differences between 
those systems with respect to jurisdiction. And we also observed that there has been a trend by 
which the doctrine has become liberalized with the consequence that litigation over where to sue 
has become more prevalent with resulting social and economic costs. These do not portend a 
happy future. It is unlikely that civilian States and their courts will find the resolution of the doctrinal 
conundrum regarding the availability of FNC within MC99 to be a sufficient reason to acquiesce 
to the employment of FNC by common law States.  
FNC and MC99, quo vaditis? Before we begin to attempt to answer this question, we should 
first reflect further about where it is we think we are. FNC is a problem but it is not the problem. 
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In truth, FNC is itself an attempted cure to an underlying crisis. It is in essence a doctrine directed 
toward the question of resolving a dispute between the parties to litigation over choice of forum. 
The various competing interests of claimant passenger and defendant carrier that feed into the 
dispute over forum within WCS and MC99 have been described throughout the first five chapters. 
However, when we subject these interests to closer examination then a bigger picture is revealed. 
If we hope to find a solution to choice of forum within the context of MC99 then it is essential that 
we understand the interests of the parties within this bigger picture. A solution might be easier 
found if MC99 were a hermetically sealed system insulated and protected from outside influence, 
but the truth is that is it not. MC99 is just a part of a larger aviation accident passenger 
compensation system. Indeed, it is the very failure of MC99 to adapt itself to the reality of its place 
within this larger system that is a prime contributor to the discontent felt with respect to choice of 
forum. 
In Part Four of this work, the extent of this bigger picture will be revealed and the thesis proved 
that MC99 is built upon an anachronistic understanding of itself as a discrete system grounded 
on a two-party paradigm of claimant passenger versus defendant carrier. It will be shown that this 
was a justifiable basis for the Warsaw Convention but that it no longer accords with the reality of 
international aviation litigation. Such litigation now takes place within a larger aviation accident 
passenger compensation system. To evaluate the options for reforming MC99’s jurisdictional 
regime with respect to choice of forum, we must first understand how this larger system arose, 
how it is organized, how it operates and what it all means for choice of forum. This is the goal of 
Part Four.  
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PART FOUR 
THE BIGGER PICTURE 
 
Chapter 6: Alternative Remedies and Defendants 
 
6.1  Introduction  
So far, we have looked at the question of choice of forum within the context of the Warsaw 
Convention and MC99. We have seen that this system is predicated on the paradigm of the two-
party liability relationship between carrier and passenger but it has become apparent that a bigger 
picture exists. The system created under the Warsaw Convention (to which MC99 is the 
successor) was more discrete and simpler because the passenger-carrier relationship could be 
largely insulated from third-party interests and influences. However, this is no longer the case 
under MC99 and it is the purpose of Part Four of this work to demonstrate that a bigger picture 
exists and to elaborate upon its nature and dynamics.  
We begin Part Four by looking at the emergence of alternative remedies to those provided 
under WCS. It will be shown in this chapter, and in the one that follows, how these alternative 
remedies have resulted in a paradigm shift. This work argues that unlike the system envisioned 
by the drafters of the Warsaw Convention, we are now faced with a multi-faceted system in which 
the influence of third parties impacts greatly on matters of choice of forum. Aside from evidencing 
the existence of these alternatives and the identity of the relevant stakeholders, this chapter will 
lay the groundwork for the next chapter in which the role and impact of third-party actions will be 
examined. 
 
6.1.1 The Kegworth Air Disaster 
The Kegworth air disaster refers to the crash of British Midland Flight 92 on 8 January 1989 that 
took the lives of 47 people and seriously injured many of the 79 survivors.1 The aircraft (a Boeing 
737-400) was climbing to cruising altitude when a fan blade detached from its left (number 1) 
engine, a CFM 56 which had been manufactured and sold by CFM International. The detached 
blade caused secondary damage to the engine and as a result the airframe began to vibrate 
severely and fumes and smoke were ingested into the cabin of the aircraft through the air 
conditioning system. Believing, erroneously, that the air conditioning system was fed from the 
right (number 2) engine, the crew identified it as defective and decided to throttle it back and then 
shut it down. In response, the shuddering lessened and the smoke/fumes reduced. This induced 
the crew to believe that the problem had been mitigated and it was decided to divert to East 
Midlands Airport. On approach, thrust to the damaged left engine was increased which caused it 
fail and catch fire. There was a resulting abrupt loss of power. Without sufficient time to restart 
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the other engine, the aircraft crashed short of the runway, colliding with the embankment of the 
M1 motorway.  
The UK’s Air Accident Investigation Branch (AAIB) would ultimately identify the cause of the 
accident as the shutting down of the wrong engine by the flight crew.2 Whilst this had been the 
theory from early on, it was challenged by some who argued that the true cause was down to the 
cross-wiring of an engine warning system by the manufacturer.3 At the time at which the litigation 
in Nolan v Boeing Co4 began, the AAIB report had not yet been published.5 The plaintiffs in Nolan 
were 45 surviving relatives of passengers killed in the disaster, 76 survivors, 2 bystanders and 
various other people claiming loss of consortium from injuries to survivors.6 As a crash occurring 
in the UK during a domestic flight between London and Belfast, operated by a British carrier, one 
might have expected that any resulting litigation would have taken place in the UK. Instead claims 
were brought before the courts of the United States against the defendants, Boeing Co, CFM 
International Inc and General Electric Co (GE). The engines had been marketed by CFM, a joint 
enterprise created by the American company, GE, and the French company, SNECMA,7 who had 
each designed and manufactured components of the engines. 
The case had been brought to the US because plaintiffs’ English legal representation believed 
that they would fare better in the US on account of the availability of strict products liability and 
the likelihood of greater damages. Another likely reason was to avoid the limitation of liability 
imposed by the application of the WCS to any claim brought against the carrier. Given the strong 
connections to the UK, keeping the litigation in the US would require overcoming some serious 
obstacles, foremost amongst which was the prospect of FNC dismissal. The appointed US law 
firm’s strategy was to avoid federal court and sue instead in the state courts of Louisiana which, 
at that point in time, did not recognize the doctrine of FNC.  
The next hurdle to vault was the issue of diversity jurisdiction. Under the US Constitution 
(Section 2, Clause I of Article III) and as modified by the general diversity statute (codified under 
28 USC § 1332), federal courts are granted subject matter jurisdiction in civil cases involving 
diversity of citizenship where the matter in controversy exceeds a certain amount (currently 
$75,000). Diversity of citizenship arises where the litigants are citizens of different states (e.g. a 
Florida plaintiff suing a Colorado defendant) or where one is a citizen of a state and the other is 
a citizen of a foreign State (e.g. a Florida plaintiff suing a French defendant, or vice versa). The 
generally accepted explanation for why the First Congress chose to bestow such jurisdiction on 
the federal courts is that they wished to avoid the possibility of prejudice by state courts against 
out-of-state parties by ensuring a neutral forum.8 For the purposes of diversity jurisdiction, a 
corporation is considered to be a citizen of both the state of incorporation and its principal place 
of business.9  
                                                       
2 ibid 2. 
3 The AAIB report found no evidence to support this theory. ibid 145. 
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In the Nolan case, none of the victims of the crash were US citizens whereas the defendants 
were. It thus appeared that diversity jurisdiction existed and the defendants would be entitled to 
have the case removed to federal court. The plaintiffs knew that once in federal court FNC 
dismissal would be a virtual certainty so they attempted to employ an untested theory to resist 
removal. They narrowed in on a requirement of diversity jurisdiction that the diversity of citizenship 
must be complete. Simply put, if a party on the plaintiff side and a party on the defendant side 
both hail from the same state, then there is not complete diversity.10 The theory being that in such 
cases there is no risk of prejudice where citizens of the same state are represented on both sides 
of the dispute. This is straightforward in simple two-party disputes but can be complicated in the 
case of multi-party disputes such as Nolan. Plaintiffs sought to exploit the requirement of complete 
diversity to avoid removal to federal court. Instead of filing actions under the names of the real 
plaintiffs in interest, the plaintiff lawyers filed actions under the names of the appointed legal 
representatives who shared citizenship with the defendants.11 The case was initially removed to 
federal court where the plaintiffs appealed. Although the defendants sought to impugn the strategy 
as fraudulent, the district court had no choice (as the law then stood) but to accept the citizenship 
of the appointed representatives and to remand the case back to state court. 
With removal successfully resisted, the case appeared to be stuck in state court. Since that 
court did not have the doctrine of FNC, the plaintiff lawyers thought they were home-free. 
However, Boeing and GE had an ace up their sleeve and sought to pull the rug out from under 
the plaintiffs by joining SNECMA as a third-party defendant. Although it was not alleged that 
SNECMA owed any liability to the claimants, it was under a contractual obligation to GE as part 
of their joint venture in CFM International and under which they shared profits and liabilities. This 
allowed GE to file cross claims for indemnification and contribution against SNECMA, thereby 
joining it to the litigation. At that time, SNECMA was owned by the French State and was thus 
entitled to have the case removed to federal court under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act 
(FSIA).12  
Once back in the federal court, Boeing (with the support of the other defendants) moved for 
FNC dismissal arguing that England represented an adequate alternative forum for resolution of 
the dispute. Plaintiffs challenged dismissal on the grounds that the change in law would be so 
detrimental to their interests that it rendered England an inadequate forum. The court noted that 
the damages likely to be awarded in England would be much lower, that punitive damages would 
not be available, and it also averred to the possible unavailability of strict products liability in that 
jurisdiction. Nevertheless, it concluded that, ‘the plaintiffs’ remedy in the UK is not so clearly 
inadequate or unsatisfactory that it is no remedy at all, the unfavourable change in law ought not 
to be given substantial weight.’13 On the other hand, the court was able to stress the absence of 
any connection to the local forum in contrast to the overwhelming links to the UK.14 The private 
and public interest factors all pointed toward dismissal and indeed the district court granted a 
conditional dismissal which was subsequently affirmed by the Fifth Circuit. The ultimate fate of 
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the plaintiffs’ claims is not publically known. The likelihood is that they settled for sums 
substantially lower than what they would have been awarded had the litigation continued to a 
conclusion in the US. 
Aside from demonstrating the lengths both plaintiff and defendant lawyers will go to secure a 
jurisdictional advantage, Nolan also illustrates a number of salient points of immediate relevance 
to this work.  
First, it is a prime example of a group of claimants electing to forego a WCS claim in a local 
forum in preference for an alternative remedy (e.g. product liability) in a foreign forum. Whilst 
Nolan was litigated against a sub-context of WCS, a system with obvious drawbacks (e.g. the low 
limit of liability), we continue to see the same foregoing of a remedy under MC99, a purportedly 
superior system to WCS. Why? The simple answer is choice of forum. The attractiveness of MC99 
is ultimately conditional upon its jurisdictional scheme providing the particular claimant with a 
choice of the most desirable forum. 
Secondly, it provides an example of the reality that most aviation accidents can be attributed 
to several possible causes which may implicate a range of potential defendants. In other words, 
aviation litigation is usually multi-party in nature. This is all the more so at the preliminary stage 
when jurisdiction is litigated, precisely because the pool of potential defendants will be larger on 
account of there not yet having been any findings on the substance of the various claims.  
Thirdly, the existence of multiple defendants (whether as co-defendants or third-party 
defendants) raises additional issues which influence jurisdiction, in the first instance, the 
claimant’s choice of defendant and, subsequently, the choices made by the defendant(s). 
Although British Midland was the prime suspect from the outset, and thus the “proper” defendant 
for the plaintiffs’ actions, the availability of US defendants and the plaintiffs’ desire to secure a US 
forum resulted in the litigation being brought in Louisiana, even though British Midland were not 
susceptible to the jurisdiction of those courts. From a defendant perspective, Nolan illustrates how 
they too will exploit the multi-party nature of aviation accident litigation to secure a jurisdictional 
advantage by excluding, impleading or joining other parties (this will be taken up in Chapter 7).  
The common denominator to these three points is choice of forum. Plaintiff lawyers will go to 
great lengths to secure the most advantageous forum while the defendants will bend over 
backwards to frustrate that goal. At the top of the list of desirable forums is the US. A good plaintiff 
lawyer will look at his jurisdictional options under MC99, if one of those is the US, and FNC 
dismissal can be avoided, then he is home free and can expect the airline—in reality its insurer—
to settle post haste. Where MC99 does not offer a US forum then plaintiff lawyers will turn their 
attention to other potential defendants and theories of liability, anything that will get their foot in 
the door of a US court. A highly eligible alternative defendant in an aviation litigation context is 
the manufacturer, especially since an enormous share of the airframe and aircraft component 
market is owned by US manufacturing corporations. The manufacturer is all the more attractive 
where an action lies in strict products liability.  
This all begs a rather obvious question. If the aviation manufacturer is such an obvious and 
attractive target for passenger claims, then why did the drafters of the Warsaw Convention not 
address it? Why did the drafters exclusively focus on the two-party relationship of the carrier-
passenger and not take into account the existence of third-party defendants? It will be shown that 
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this oversight has had repercussions that undermine the effectiveness and fairness of MC99 (as 
successor to WCS) as an aviation accident passenger compensation system. The existence of 
alternative remedies against third-party defendants alters the dynamics of that system by giving 
the claimant additional choice of forum and by providing one avenue through which third-party 
interests can influence proceedings. In other words, they are an aspect of the bigger picture. We 
will build on this in Chapter 7 when we explore one of the consequences of the existence of 
alternative remedies against third-party defendants, i.e. third-party actions.  
 
6.2 Legal Landscape at the Time of the Warsaw Convention’s Drafting 
We know that nowadays a claimant passenger is faced with a variety of options beyond suing the 
carrier via WCS or MC99. There is a range of defendants and remedies which widen his choice 
of forum. We have begun to see how this reality can translate into third-party influence in the 
claimant-passenger liability relationship, a point to which we will return in Chapter 7. For now, the 
immediate concern is to understand why the Warsaw Convention did not take this reality into 
account. Why did the Convention establish itself as a discrete system grounded on the two-party 
paradigm of claimant passenger versus defendant carrier? This section will seek to prove that 
this was a consequence of the legal landscape within which the Convention came into being. This 
will be done by looking to the drafting history of the Convention and the prevailing situation under 
the English common law and French civil law. It will be seen that alternative remedies for 
passengers against third parties, e.g. a manufacturer, did not generally exist at the time of the 
Convention’s drafting. As a consequence of the subsequent emergence of alternative remedies, 
the foundation of WCS in the two-party paradigm of claimant passenger versus defendant carrier 
has become anachronistic. It is a core argument of this work that MC99, as successor to the 
WCS, is predicated on this same anachronistic understanding and it does not correspond to the 
reality of modern passenger litigation. 
 
6.2.1  The Warsaw Convention Travaux Préparatoires 
Given that the Warsaw Convention concerns the liability of the carrier for international carriage 
by air, it should not come as too much of a surprise that the aircraft manufacturer is very seldom 
mentioned in the travaux of the Warsaw Convention. However, a small amount of attention was 
given to the manufacturer in respect of the carrier’s liability for inherent defects in the aircraft.15 
At the second session of the Warsaw Conference, Rapporteur de Vos provided a commentary on 
the substantive provisions of the Final CITEJA Draft.16 Moving from article to article, de Vos 
outlined the reasoning and objectives behind the adoption of specific principles and explained 
various alternations made to the text since the Conference of 1925. In treating the topic of the 
possible exoneration of the carrier on proof that the carrier had taken all reasonable measures, it 
was noted that the draft no longer permitted for such exoneration in the case of inherent defect 
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16 ibid 18–23. 
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of the aircraft. Rather, the carrier was to be held strictly liable.17 Paragraph 1 of Article 22 of the 
draft provided: 
The carrier shall not be liable if he proves that he and his servants have taken the 
reasonable measures to avoid the damage or that it was impossible for them to take 
them, unless the damages arises out of an inherent defect in the aircraft.18 
This solution had been adopted for the benefit of the passenger, who, it was stated, could not 
‘turn against the manufacturer’.19 Instead, the carrier was to bear the burden of liability with any 
unfairness being mitigated by the fact that the carrier, unlike the passenger, would have ‘recourse 
against the manufacturer.’20 As explained by Pittard (the Swiss Delegate and Rapporteur of the 
1925 Conference), excluding exoneration of the carrier in the case of inherent defect ensured that 
the victim would have access to a remedy against someone (i.e. the carrier) rather than no one. 
The written submissions made by the UK,21 France22 and Sweden23 on the Final CITEJA Draft 
had expressed misgivings about the inherent defect provision. During the Conference itself, 
proposals were made for its removal. Sympathetic though the delegates were to the humanitarian 
interests involved,24 it was nevertheless regarded as inequitable to impose liability on the carrier 
in the absence of its fault and in circumstances where the defect could not reasonably have been 
detected by its exercise of due diligence. The then unperfected state of aeronautical science was 
also highlighted as further reason not to adopt this instance of strict liability. Manufacturing defects 
were regarded as unavoidable, even where the greatest care and expertise was employed. 
Therefore, even assuming recourse was available, one could not rely on the carrier recovering 
against the manufacturer. Indeed, the delegates acknowledged that manufacturers were not 
generally disposed to offer carriers warranties. Therefore, in practice, the carrier would often have 
no right of recourse against the manufacturer.25 In the end, the drafters elected to remove the 
inherent defect proviso of Article 22 altogether,26 granting the carrier the possibility of exoneration 
in all cases where it could prove that it and its servants had taken all necessary measures to avoid 
the damage or that it was impossible to take such measures.27  
What this brief dalliance with the prospect of holding the carrier liable in the absence of fault 
for damage caused by the presumptively wrongful conduct of the manufacturer shows is twofold. 
First, it demonstrates that the delegates did not understand the passenger as generally having a 
cause of action against the manufacturer under le droit commun, nor was there any attempt to 
provide any such cause of action under the Convention. Secondly, the delegates contemplated, 
even endorsed, the existence of recourse actions by carriers against manufacturers (albeit 
subject to limitations in practice). There was no intention to insulate the manufacturer from liability, 
in fact, one of the benefits of making the carrier strictly liable for inherent defects in the aircraft 
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was that it would create an indirect means of making the true culprit (against whom the passenger 
had no action) liable via a recourse action. That this proposal was not adopted was not as a result 
of any desire to protect manufacturers (although this was a practical effect) but for the immediate 
goal of protecting the carrier, even though it would clearly leave the claimant passenger without 
a means of recovery. This favouring of the carrier’s interests over those of the claimant passenger 
was justified by the nascent state of aeronautics and the perilous financial position of carriers.  
 
6.2.2  Historical Inadequacy of the Common Law 
Circa 1929, a claimant passenger’s options for commencing proceedings for damages suffered 
in an aviation accident were extremely limited under the common law. The fact that there was a 
need for the Warsaw Convention is itself recognition of this fact. The practice of carriers at the 
time was to exempt themselves from liability under the contract of carriage with the passenger. 
With no contractual remedy, the injured passenger would also find himself unable to succeed in 
tort. This was as a consequence of the rule in the 1842 case of Winterbottom v Wright which 
precluded the possibility of an action in negligence without privity of contract between the injured 
party and the tortfeasor.28 Lord Abinger had baulked at endorsing a principle that would allow 
sufferers of an accident to reach back through the series of contracts to grasp the manufacturer 
since he feared it risked opening the doors to ‘an infinity of actions’.29 Even though Winterbottom 
v Wright was decided on contractual grounds, the decision was misapprehended as deciding a 
much broader question and accepted as standing for the proposition that no cause of action, 
whether in contract or tort, lay against a manufacturer in the absence of privity of contract.30  
The rule in Winterbottom v Wright represented, in the absence of privity, a de facto immunity 
for manufacturers for their defective products.31 The rule was subject to only a small number of 
exceptions, e.g. in the case of inherently dangerous articles.32 In these limited cases, the absence 
of privity of contract could be remedied by the existence of a legal duty owed by the manufacturer 
to the public at large. This was not a contractual right of action but one in tort.33 This helped to 
ameliorate the harshness of the rule in Winterbottom v Wright but so limited were these 
exceptions that they offered little help in the vast majority of cases.  
As it stood at that time, there was no accepted general principle of tortious liability for 
negligence. In Heaven v Pender,34 Brett MR (later Lord Esher) attempted to articulate such a 
principle from the accepted instances in which a manufacturer or supplier of goods could be held 
liable without privity of contract. He stated: 
[W]henever one person is by circumstances placed in such a position with regard to 
another that every one of ordinary sense who did think would at once recognize that 
if he did not use ordinary care and skill in his own conduct with regard to those 
circumstances he would cause danger of injury to the person or property of the other, 
                                                       
28 (1842) 10 M & W 109; 152 ER 402, 405.  
29 ibid 403. 
30 CW Gillam ‘Products Liability in a Nutshell’ (1957) 37 Or L Rev 119, 133.  
31 FH Bohlen ‘Liability of Manufacturers to Persons Other than Their Immediate Vendees’ (1929) 45 LQR 
343, 343. 
32 ibid 344.  
33 Thomas v Winchester 6 NY 397, 397 (1852).  
34 (1883) 11 QBD 503 (CA).  
 140 
a duty arises to use ordinary care and skill to avoid such danger.35 
Even though the case was decided by the majority on narrower grounds, Brett MR’s principle was 
a precise and potent articulation of what would become—with some adjustment—the accepted 
principle for the duty of care in Donoghue v Stevenson in 1932. However, prior to this seminal 
case, Brett MR’s principle found favour in the US where it was referred to in a 1916 case that 
would lay the foundation for products liability in the US, i.e. MacPherson v Buick Motor Co.36 In 
that case, Cardozo J, of the New York Court of Appeals, stated that ‘[i]f the nature of a thing is 
such that it is reasonably certain to place life and limb in peril when negligently made, it is then a 
thing of danger.’37 In finding for the plaintiff, the court concluded that where there is an element 
of danger and knowledge that the thing will be used by third parties, then, ‘irrespective of contract, 
the manufacturer of this thing of danger is under a duty to make it carefully.’38 Cardozo J thus laid 
down a general rule of manufacturers’ liability for negligence. 
In 1932 the English courts reached a similar view in Donoghue v Stevenson with Lord Atkin’s 
famous neighbour principle, by which was meant ‘[t]he rule that you are to love your neighbour 
becomes in law, you must not injure your neighbour’,39 that one ‘must take reasonable care to 
avoid acts or omissions which you can reasonably foresee would be likely to injure your 
neighbour.’40 Lord Atkin found inspiration in the principle articulated by Brett MR but, 
acknowledging that it was framed too wide,41 he constrained it with his concept of “neighbourship”, 
more elegantly expressed as “proximity”.42 Expressed in a manufacturing context, the general 
principle was: 
[A] manufacturer of products, which he sells in such a form as to show that he intends 
them to reach the ultimate consumer in the form in which they left him with no 
reasonable possibility of intermediate examination, and with the knowledge that the 
absence of reasonable care in the preparation or putting up of the products will result 
in an injury to the consumer’s life or property, owes a duty to the consumer to take 
the reasonable care.43 
Of course, Donoghue v Stevenson came after the deliberations in Warsaw in 1929. Even then, 
the initial tendency of English courts was to reject liability if there was any substantial possibility 
of intermediate inspection. With the development of a general principle of liability for negligence, 
an avenue for recovery was opened for injured parties against parties with whom there was no 
privity of contract. Looking at this from an aviation perspective, it became possible for a passenger 
to bring a direct claim against a third party, most notably the manufacturer or service provider 
(e.g. the airport or ATC) and, sovereign immunity permitting, against the State’s aviation 
authorities. The claimant passenger was no longer constrained by privity of contract to suing only 
the carrier with whom the contract of carriage had been formed. Now, the claimant passenger 
could hope to establish liability against other parties. In other words, there was now the possibility 
of an alternative remedy.  
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However, the alternative remedy provided under the general principle of negligence was not 
to prove particularly useful to the claimant in the context of an aviation accident claim. In these 
types of cases, the circumstances were frequently such as not to allow a claimant an easy road 
to recovery, certainly not in comparison to the regime of presumed liability established under the 
Warsaw Convention. Then, as now, a claim on the general theory of negligence was not usually 
an attractive option to a claimant passenger because of the need to prove the fault of the 
manufacturer. This was (and still is) an onerous burden to overcome, especially in the field of 
aviation products liability given the technical sophistication of the industry.44 Even today it can be 
extremely difficult for a claimant to prove negligence where the aircraft has been destroyed in the 
accident or lost altogether, not to mention that that potential witnesses have been killed? 45 Even 
where it is possible to establish proof of negligence, the actual expense involved in doing so in 
the case of an aviation accident may be prohibitively expensive and beyond the means of the 
claimant.  
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur would seem particularly well suited to aiding plaintiffs in 
aviation cases.46 For the doctrine to apply, the real cause of the damage must be unknown and 
the instrument or circumstances causing the damage must have been within the exclusive control 
of the defendant.47 This latter requirement excludes its application in manufacturer cases or other 
third-party cases because they are seldom in exclusive control (the carrier is). It was initially 
argued that the doctrine was inapplicable to aviation due to the inherent perils of the air which 
meant that the defendant was never truly in exclusive control of the circumstances.48 Some 
support was found for this viewpoint in the early days of aviation.49 Although accepted as 
applicable in modern times due to technological advancements and resulting improvements in 
safety and performance,50 the authors of Shawcross & Beaumont state that the courts have 
nevertheless been reluctant to apply the doctrine in cases of aircraft crashes or disappearances.51  
 
6.2.3  The Situation under French Civil Law 
The inadequacy of private law for those injured in aviation accidents against third parties was not 
much better under the French civil law at the time of the Warsaw Convention’s drafting. The 
obvious starting point is with Articles 1382 and 1383 of the Civil Code which are grounded on the 
concept of faute délictuelle. Under these, a claimant has to prove harm (dommage)52 causally 
linked (lien de causalité)53 to the fault (faute)54 of the defendant. On the face of it, delictual liability 
under Articles 1382 and 1383 is extremely broad and we might thus expect that it would have 
provided a good source of redress against the manufacturer and other third parties. However, this 
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was not the case. Firstly, for much the same reasons as the common law, proving such fault in 
defective product cases was very difficult. Second, at the time of the Warsaw Convention’s 
drafting, it was not generally accepted that placing a defective product into the market constituted 
an example of faute délictuelle upon which an action could succeed under Articles 1382 and 1383. 
Indeed, this was not recognized as a faute délictuelle until the 1970s.55 For these reasons, actions 
based on contract or on the strict liability provision of Article 1384 were preferred.  
The problem of privity was also at issue for the aviation claimant seeking a remedy in contract 
under French civil law. However, the French civil law was less constrained by privity than the 
common law.56 Particularly relevant to the field of defective products claims is the concept of the 
action directe en garantie.57 This permits a buyer to pursue sellers further up the chain of 
commerce. Therefore, the claimant sub-buyer who has a contract of sale with his immediate 
seller, but not with the manufacturer, is permitted to reach back through the chain of contracts to 
sue the manufacturer directly for latent defects. In effect, the sub-buyer becomes the successor 
in interest to the original-buyer’s rights against the manufacturer. The action directe en garantie, 
which is contractual, was introduced precisely because the sub-buyer did not have a cause of 
action in contract or delict against the manufacturer.58 This form of recourse was available at the 
time of the Warsaw Convention’s drafting; in fact, well prior to it.59 However, this remedy was 
limited to sub-buyers and thus would not have availed the aviation passenger claimant who 
purchases services, not goods.60  
The final option for the claimant was Article 1384(1) of the French Civil Code. Similar to res 
ipsa loquitur, Article 1384(1) provides for strict liability of the gardien61 of a thing which causes 
damage.62 Initially it only countenanced responsibility for damage caused by animals or buildings 
but was subsequently interpreted as providing a much broader principle of liability of the gardien 
for any thing which causes damage.63 Since 1930, it has been established that Article 1384(1) of 
the Civil Code establishes a presumption of strict liability for damage caused by things (le fait 
d’une chose).64 This presumption arises regardless of whether or not the thing is defective or 
dangerous and is not based upon any notion of fault of the gardien. The only defences available 
are contributory negligence and force majeure (albeit a simpler definition of which as 
unforeseeable and unpreventable harm).65 It proved an ample means of recourse for victims of 
motor vehicles, who could then secure recovery against the gardien without needing to show fault. 
Whittaker observes that ‘[i]n this way, French courts imposed a strict liability for physical things 
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some 65 years before implementation of the EC Product Liability Directive imposed strict liability 
for defective products.’66 
This might appear an ideal theory upon which to pursue a manufacturer but it is entirely 
dependent on the definition of gardien, and that was not generally held as being applicable to 
manufacturers. The definition attributed to la garde centres on the possession, use, direction and 
control of the thing.67 For instance, the legal owner of a car is presumed to be its gardien but may 
rebut this presumption by showing that control (i.e. la garde) has been transferred to another 
party. In the context of aircraft, such control at the operative moment when harm is caused to the 
passenger is not vested in the manufacturer but more likely in the operator (or potentially the legal 
owner). It has since become accepted that there can be two gardiens at the same time, one in 
respect of its behaviour (gardien du comportement), the other in respect of its structure (gardien 
de la structure).68 In the context of an aircraft, the carrier would be the gardien of its behaviour, 
while the manufacturer could be regarded as the gardien of the thing’s construction and thus 
potentially liable under Article 1384(1). However, this does not appear to have been the law at 
the time of the Warsaw Convention’s drafting.69 Thus, Article 1384(1), useful though it might be 
against the carrier, would not have aided the claimant passenger against third parties circa 1929.  
 
6.2.4  Vindication of the Two-Party Paradigm  
What this legal history shows, is that during the period of the Warsaw Convention’s gestation and 
at its adoption in 1929, a third party to the passenger-carrier relationship (e.g. aircraft 
manufacturer) was practically immune from direct liability toward an injured passenger. Privity of 
contract was the great stumbling block. Such liability could only be established in very limited and 
defined circumstances. There was not yet the general principle of negligence. It is true that a New 
York court enunciated a principle of general products liability in 1916 and that this decision, i.e. 
MacPherson,70 ‘found immediate acceptance’.71 However, such acceptance was, pre-Warsaw, 
limited to US jurisdictions. As noted earlier in this work, the US did not actively participate in the 
drafting of the Warsaw Convention and it does not appear from the record that the actual drafters 
were aware of the emergence of products liability in the US. The French civil law was similarly 
beneficial to the manufacturer and other third parties. Aside from the difficulty of establishing fault, 
delictual liability was not recognized against manufacturers under Articles 1382 and 1383 of the 
Civil Code. The strict liability of Article 1384(1) did not avail the aviation claimant against a third 
party since he was not regarded as the gardien of the thing. Likewise, contractual remedies were 
of no avail to the aviation claimant due to the problem of privity.  
The drafters of the Warsaw Convention would not have needed to take into consideration the 
potential impact of the existence of alternative remedies against third parties. It was reasonable, 
at the time, to rely on the liability relationship involved in the international carriage of passengers 
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by air as being essentially two-party in nature, i.e. passenger and carrier. Since the passenger 
could not sue a manufacturer, there was no risk of that manufacturer seeking recourse against 
the carrier; that aspect of recourse did not arise at all. 
On the other hand, the manufacturer had little to fear from the carrier in terms of recourse. The 
Minutes show that the delegates were aware of the possibility of recourse actions by carriers 
against third parties, they even endorsed them, but they acknowledged that they were unlikely to 
arise in practice.72 They were right. The aircraft purchase agreement between manufacturer and 
carrier would invariably contain express warranties against defects in material and workmanship, 
as well as a remedy limitation section in the event of defect, and various disclaimers of liability. 
As one legal counsel for a manufacturer later put it, ‘any manufacturer having reasonably 
competent legal counsel can exempt itself from virtually all liability from manufacturer caused 
damages to aircraft that the manufacturer has sold to the air carrier.’73 In addition, recourse 
actions taken against manufacturers resulting from the carrier’s liability to the passenger under 
the Convention were generally blocked by the rule against contribution amongst tortfeasors (a 
topic covered Chapter 7). Therefore, the other aspect of recourse actions, i.e. the carrier seeking 
recourse against third parties for its liability to the passenger, was not a concern to the delegates 
and further reinforced their two-party understanding of the aviation liability system they adopted.  
The drafters were quite content to leave the manufacturer and other third parties out of the 
system. They had no desire to protect them as they were already amply protected by the law and 
by their own business practices. The drafters did not foresee that the law would evolve to provide 
the claimant passenger with a choice of defendants and a selection of remedies through which 
the scope for the involvement and influence of third parties in the carrier-passenger relationship 
would be greatly expanded. This is precisely what happened with the development of the general 
doctrine of negligence, strict products liability and other new remedies. Indeed, strict products 
liability is particularly relevant to aviation litigation, not only because of the technological 
quintessence of the industry, but also because it is, in practice, one of the principal alternative 
remedies pursued by claimants. 
 
6.3  Concluding Remarks 
We began exploration of the bigger picture in this chapter by tracking the emergence of alternative 
remedies for claimant passengers in international aviation litigation. The Warsaw Convention was 
premised on the paradigm of such litigation as being two-party in nature, i.e. claimant passenger 
versus defendant carrier. The emergence of alternative remedies and defendants means that 
third parties (i.e. third parties to the contract of carriage) are now directly implicated in the litigation 
of passenger claims. Whereas at the time of the Warsaw Convention the drafters could rely on 
the law insulating third parties from passenger claims, the development of the general theory of 
negligence and especially the birth of strict products liability has expanded the claimant 
passenger’s options. The present reality is that MC99 is just one of several potential remedies 
                                                       
72 Horner and Legrez (n 15) 21. See 6.2.1 supra. 
73 H Hughes ‘Aircraft Manufacturer Warranties - Protection for the Manufacturer or the Purchaser?’ 
(1977) 2 Air Law 71, 71. 
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available and this impacts upon the efficacy of MC99 and upon the wider issue of choice of forum. 
The attractiveness of MC99’s jurisdictional scheme is ultimately conditional upon it granting the 
claimant passenger with a choice of the most desirable forum. Where an alternative remedy exists 
that offers a preferable forum, then claimants will forego an MC99 action, even if that alternative 
remedy is otherwise a less attractive option. This was not something contemplated by the drafters 
of the Warsaw Convention but which must now be taken into account when evaluating choice of 
forum under MC99.  
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Chapter 7: Third-Party Actions 
 
7.1  Introduction 
The previous chapter showed that the drafters of the Warsaw Convention, worked on the basis 
that the liability relationship involved was essentially two-party in nature, i.e. claimant passenger 
versus defendant carrier. As a result, the drafters did not realize the potential impact that 
alternative remedies against third parties would have on their regime. The evolution of the legal 
landscape of international aviation litigation has now retroactively proved this to be an oversight. 
The emergence of alternative remedies has led to another development which also impacts 
significantly on the bigger picture. This is the reality of third-party actions for contribution or 
indemnification, the impact of which is twofold. Firstly, they provide a route through which 
alternative remedies become directly implicated into the carrier-passenger liability relationship. 
Second, they can undermine the goals and objectives of the WCS and MC99 by facilitating the 
circumvention those regimes.  
Third-party actions can also have a direct bearing on choice of forum. Whether the defendant 
to the main action is the carrier (or some other party) the existence, or even just the prospect, of 
the defendant bringing a third-party action against another party alters the jurisdictional power-
play. As will be shown, third-party actions are a strategic tool used by defendants in aviation 
litigation to win a jurisdictional advantage over the claimant. This raises new questions: Is this fair 
to the claimant passenger? Is it consistent with the goals of MC99?  
This chapter begins by summarizing the basis upon which non-contractual third-party actions 
are founded, i.e. the liability of joint and concurrent tortfeasors and the doctrines of contribution 
and indemnification. The relevance of third-party actions to aviation litigation and particularly 
choice of forum will be revealed by elaborating on how they permit third-party influence and 
introduce the risk of circumvention of the special liability regimes of WCS and MC99. In so doing, 
a central and highly controversial question will arise regarding the applicability of those regimes 
to third-party actions. The potential impact of third-party actions is hugely dependent on whether 
they fall within or outside of WCS/MC99. The later sections of this chapter will critically assess 
this matter and reach a conclusion which will further develop our understanding of the bigger 
picture.  
 
7.2 Third-Party Actions 
What is a third-party action? This question is best answered by way of an example. Where a 
claimant passenger brings an action for damages against a carrier, that carrier may in turn allege 
that another party, e.g. the manufacturer of the aircraft, is also to blame and that this other party 
should reimburse the carrier for some (or all) of the liability that the carrier ends up owing to the 
claimant passenger. In the West Caribbean Airways case, the court noted the likelihood that the 
defendant carrier would seek recourse (via third-party actions) against the airframe manufacturer 
(Boeing Co), the engine manufacturer (Pratt & Whitney), and the manufacturer of the weather 
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radar system (Honeywell).1 Various other configurations can arise, instead of the carrier the 
claimant passenger might sue an agent of the carrier (e.g. in negligence) or a component 
manufacturer (e.g. in products liability) and that defendant may wish to seek recourse against the 
carrier for some share (or all) of the liability.2  
The most common examples of a third-party action are claims for indemnification or 
contribution. A distinction must be made between a third-party action for 
contribution/indemnification arising as a matter of law from one arising as a matter of contract. 
While indemnity might arise by way of contract and/or by operation of law, the right to contribution 
arises only by operation of law.3 A right to indemnification arising under contract will be treated in 
the next chapter which focuses on the influence of third parties via contractual indemnities and 
contracts of insurance. This chapter is concerned with the influence exerted by third parties via 
their right to contribution or indemnification as it arises by operation of law. This occurs in the 
case of joint or concurrent tortfeasors; a common occurrence in aviation litigation which is often 
multi-party in nature (as demonstrated in Chapter 6). 
A third-party action is distinct from, but conditional upon, the main action between a claimant 
and a defendant. Where contribution/indemnification is sought by a third-party claimant against a 
third-party defendant based on common tort liability (as distinct from a contractual basis) then a 
condition of recovery is that both parties (to the third-party action) bear common liability to the 
claimant in the main action. Obviously, if the defendant is not himself liable to the claimant then 
no judgment will be given for the third-party claimant against a third-party defendant. Likewise, 
for a defendant to the main action to succeed on a third-party action he must not only be liable to 
the claimant himself but must also prove that the third-party defendant would be liable to the 
claimant. This commonality may be expressed either in the tortious act (and consequently in the 
damage) or solely in the damage. Where the commonality is in the tortious act and damage then 
the parties are defined as joint tortfeasors. Where the commonality is only in the damage then 
they are defined as concurrent tortfeasors. What both species of tortfeasors (generally referred 
to solidary tortfeasors in the civilian law tradition) share is the fact that their torts must ‘run 
together’ to produce the same damage.4 
 
7.2.1  Contribution 
In the simplest of terms, contribution allows one tortfeasor, who has paid for the total liability to 
the plaintiff, to seek a portion of the total liability from another non-paying tortfeasor(s). The right 
of contribution is essentially a concession to fairness and rests upon the recognition of the need 
for equity between those with a common obligation, even where the obligation in question has not 
arisen from a consensual transaction between the parties.5 Each legal system has its own 
doctrine of contribution, or indeed may have a rule against it. However, it must be noted that the 
                                                       
1 Order Granting Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (Doc 184) at 4, 10 n 18, In re West Caribbean Airways 
SA 616 F Supp 2d 1299 (SD Fla 2007) (No 06-CV-22748). 
2 See cases discussed below in 7.3.3. 
3 FJ Gorman ‘Indemnity and Contribution under Maritime Law’ (1981) 55 Tul L Rev 1165, 1167. 
4 GL Williams Joint Torts and Contributory Negligence (Stevens & Son 1951) 1. 
5 See RA Leflar ‘Contribution and Indemnity between Tortfeasors’ (1932) 81 U Pa L Rev 130.  
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right of contribution at common law is generally denied an intentional tortfeasor,6 a similar 
exclusion applies in the civil law.7  
Although contribution between tortfeasors is now commonplace, it was not always so. Under 
the rule in Merryweather v Nixan (1799) there was no contribution between joint tortfeasors at 
common law.8 A related rule, i.e. the exclusionary rule of contributory negligence.9 The policy 
justification for these rules was expressed in the legal maxims, in pari delicto (potior est conditio 
defendantis) and ex turpi causa non oritur actio.10 In simple terms, the courts would not come to 
the aid of a wrongdoer and elected to let the losses lie where they fell. These could be harsh rules 
which worked an injustice on parties who bore only a small proportion of the fault. In addition, it 
undermined the deterrent effect of tort liability. Nevertheless, the common law did not—strictly 
speaking, it still does not—permit a right to contribution. However, under English law a statutory 
right was provided by s 6 of the Law Reform (Married Women and Tortfeasors) Act 1935.11 This 
Act was subsequently repealed and replaced by the Civil Liability (Contribution) Act 1978.12 Under 
which, any party liable for damage suffered by another person may recover contribution from any 
other person liable for the same damage (whether jointly or otherwise).13 Therefore, beyond the 
Act and outside of admiralty,14 there is no common law right to contribution in England.15   
Although the common law in the US varies from state to state, it can be broadly said that it 
firmly adhered to rule against contribution, as well as the contributory fault exclusionary rule. This 
led various state legislatures to introduce exceptions by way of statute. In 1955, the great majority 
of states maintained the contributory fault exclusionary rule but in the 1960s and 1970s there was 
strong movement toward comparative negligence.  
When it comes to the civil law tradition, Szalma states that whilst Roman law recognized 
delictual solidary obligations, therefore permitting the injured party to recover all losses from one 
of a number of tortfeasors, the law did not permit contribution claims between tortfeasors.16 
Although Szalma claims that the majority of European civil law systems followed the Roman law 
he describes provisions under Austrian, German, Swiss, and French Codes, which allowed for 
contribution between solidary tortfeasors.17 Indeed, this appears to be the current general position 
of the European civilian law tradition.18  
Therefore, unlike the common law, the civil law tradition has long provided for contribution 
                                                       
6 ibid 139.  
7 H Drion Limitation of Liabilities in International Air Law (Springer 1954) 103.  
8 (1799) 8 Term Rep 186; 101 ER 1337. 
9 See FH Bohlen ‘Contributory Negligence’ (1908) 21 Harv L Rev 233; EE Davis ‘Indemnity Between 
Negligent Tortfeasors: A Proposed Rationale’ (1952) 37 Iowa L Rev 517, 557–558. For an aviation example, 
see Bowen v US 570 F 2d 1311 (7th Cir 1978). 
10 Leflar (n 5) 132.  
11 Law Reform (Married Women and Tortfeasors) Act 1935 (UK) s 6. 
12 Civil Liability (Contribution) Act 1978 (UK). 
13 ibid s 1.  
14 An exception did arise, but only in admiralty in England and the US. See The Woodrop-Sims (1815) 2 
Dods 83; 165 ER 1422, 1423; The Schooner Catharine 58 US 170 (1854).  
15 M Jones, A Dugdale and M Simpson (eds) Clerk & Lindsell on Torts (22nd edn, Sweet & Maxwell 
2017) [4.13]. 
16 J Szalma ‘Solidary and Divided Liability of Joint Tortfeasors - with Special Regards to the Provisions 
of the New Hungarian Civil Code’ (2017) 8 J Euro Hist L 66, 66–67. 
17 ibid 69. 
18 See European Group on Tort Law ‘Principles of European Tort Law’ (www.egtl.org) 
<http://civil.udg.edu/php/biblioteca/items/283/PETL.pdf> accessed 26 June 2018. 
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between solidary tortfeasors. However, as demonstrated in Chapter 6,19 this was still problematic 
because it required establishing the liability of the parties in the first instance, this was very hard 
to do against third parties to the contract of carriage so the availability of contribution was more 
theoretical than real. In other words, the need for contribution seldom arose in the context of 
carriage because the underlying requirement for liability of a third-party to the claimant did not 
arise. 
 
7.2.2  Indemnification 
In essence, “indemnity” means the duty to make good the liability incurred by another. The right 
of indemnity can arise either by contract or by operation of law. It is with the latter that we are 
currently concerned, the former is addressed in Chapter 8. The origin of the non-contractual 
indemnity is to be found in equity where it was founded upon the doctrines of restitution and unjust 
enrichment.20 A party can bear a legal responsibility to compensate another individual without 
necessarily bearing any fault. The imputation of liability by operation of law may arise on account 
of a special relationship between the wrongdoer and the liable party, e.g. respondeat superior, or 
from rules of strict or absolute liability. In these cases, the courts have recognized an equitable 
right for a tortfeasor to recoup his loss from the other tortfeasor who was truly at fault. As one 
commentator described it, ‘[i]ndemnity is given to the person morally innocent but legally liable, 
as against the actual wrongdoer whose misconduct has brought the liability upon him.’21 Indemnity 
results in the ‘shifting of the entire loss from one tortfeasor to another’.22  
The rule against contribution/indemnification could be harsh on a joint/concurrent tortfeasor, 
especially in circumstances where the paying tortfeasor’s liability was vicarious in nature (i.e. 
where he was personally faultless) or their share of fault was minor. Therefore, it is not surprising 
that some jurisdictions developed exceptions to the rule. However, unfortunately, it is not possible 
to discern a common doctrinal foundation to these various exceptions.23 At most it could be said, 
as Judge Learned Hand stated in Slattery v Marra Bros Inc, that indemnity ought to arise where 
‘faults differ greatly in gravity’24 between the tortfeasors. Thus, the lower one’s degree of fault, the 
likelier it is that the court will grant a right of indemnity against the other tortfeasor. However, the 
right to equitable indemnification was only available in those circumstances where the paying 
tortfeasor was de jure liable but de facto “fault-less”. Where the paying tortfeasor bears a more 
than de minimis level of fault, then the right of indemnification is not available and he must instead 
rely on the availability of a right to contribution.  
The need to rely on equitable indemnification has been substantially reduced by the 
introduction of statutory regimes for contribution which generally permit contribution on a 
proportional basis all the way up to, and including, full indemnification.25 In the context of aviation 
                                                       
19 See Chapter 6.2.3. 
20 MR Yeates, PB Dye Jr and R Garcia ‘Contribution and Indemnity in Maritime Litigation’ (1990) 30 S 
Tex L Rev 215, 223. 
21 Bohlen (n 9) 243. 
22 Ingham v Eastern Air Lines Inc 373 F 2d 227, 240 n 12 (2d Cir 1967). 
23 Davis (n 9) 536; Bohlen (n 9) 242; GM Hodges ‘Contribution and Indemnity Among Tortfeasors’ (1947) 
26 Tex L Rev 150, 153–157. 
24 186 F 2d 134, 138 (2d Cir 1951). 
25 See e.g., Contribution Act 1978 (n 12) s 2(2). 
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accident litigation, indemnification is much more likely to actually arise through an insurance 
agreement or contractual indemnities, which will be the subject-matter of Chapter 8. 
 
7.2.3  Relevance to Aviation Litigation 
The availability of a right to non-contractual contribution or indemnification was not a feature of 
the common law at the time of the Warsaw Convention and its availability within the civilian legal 
system was largely theoretical. On the international law plane, there was some precedent for 
recourse. The Collision Convention of 191026 provided for apportionment of liability between joint 
tortfeasors according to their relative degree of fault. The international regime governing the 
carriage of goods by railway had contained provisions on recourse since the Berne Convention 
in 189027 and continued in 1924 with the CIM28 and the CIV.29 However, the recourse provisions 
contained in the rail conventions dealt only with recourse between carriers who were party to the 
contract of carriage.30 However, neither the CIM nor the CIV made any provision in relation 
recourse actions by, or against, third-parties. The Hague Rules 1924 made no provision for 
recourse between carriers or third-parties in the carriage of goods by sea.  
What all of this suggests, is that recourse actions were not a common feature of the legal 
landscape at the time of the drafting of the Warsaw Convention and this is reflected in the fact 
that the Convention does not address them. This is in stark contrast to the state of affairs that 
exists at the present moment when third-party actions for contribution and indemnification are a 
regular feature of civil litigation around the world. This fact alone has fundamentally changed the 
legal landscape of international aviation litigation and has exploded the myth of the two-party 
paradigm upon which WCS (and thus MC99) was established. The bigger picture is one in which 
the emergence of third-party actions had resulted in third party influence. 
 
7.2.3.1  The Influence of Third Parties 
The development of doctrines of indemnification and contribution drove the expansion of 
procedural rules of joinder. Traditionally, the ability to join a defendant to proceedings was limited 
to cases of joint tortfeasors, so where a claimant wished to recover against concurrent tortfeasors 
he was forced to pursue each in a separate action. Once contribution and indemnification became 
available, it made more sense to provide for separate proceedings to be joined together. This 
certainly countered many of the inequities of the traditional regime but it has also led to a greater 
incidence of multi-party litigation. This has, it is submitted, generated new inequities for the 
claimant because it empowers defendants to employ various strategies to challenge the 
jurisdictional choice of the claimant. This is precisely what occurred in Nolan v Boeing Co (with 
                                                       
26 Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules of Law with respect to Collisions between Vessels, 
(adopted 23 September 1910) (Collision Convention) Article 4.  
27 Convention Internationale concernant le Transport des Marchandises par Chemins de Fer (signed 14 
October 1890) (CIM 1890).  
28 Convention concernant le transport des marchandises par chemins de fer (signed 12 October 1924, 
entered into force 1 October 1928) 77 LNTS 367 (CIM 1924). 
29 Convention concernant le transport des voyageurs et des bagages par chemins de fer (signed 23 
October 1924, entered into force 1 October 1928) 78 LNTS 17 (CIV 1924).  
30 ibid Articles 48 & 49. 
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which Chapter 6 began).31  
In Nolan, a factor militating in favour of FNC dismissal was the inability of the defendants to 
join the carrier (British Midland) as a third-party defendant to the US proceedings. It was argued 
that unfortunate consequences would arise if FNC dismissal were not granted, because the 
defendants, if found liable, would be forced to seek indemnification or contribution from British 
Midland through a separate action in England. Ironically, the defendants in Nolan had complained 
of their inability to join British Midland as a third-party defendant due to the court’s lack of 
jurisdiction over the carrier. However, it is highly unlikely that Boeing did not have a contractual 
indemnity in place with British Midland upon which jurisdiction could have been secured. Indeed, 
jurisdiction over SNECMA had been established on a similar basis. To the cynical observer it 
might seem that the defendants (including potential third-party defendants) were coordinating 
their efforts to ensure a jurisdictional advantage that served their common interest. Strategically, 
it made sense for the defendants to keep British Midland out of the litigation altogether. They had 
done likewise with SNECMA, only bringing them into the litigation as a last resort so as to secure 
removal to federal court. 
Cases such as Nolan bring to light the impact that third-party actions can have on the litigation 
of international aviation accident cases. In particular, the issue of choice of forum. Through a 
third-party action, a defendant can bring about the joinder of another party to the litigation between 
it and the claimant to the main action. This invariably alters the dynamics and is frequently 
exploited by the defence to secure a jurisdictional advantage; most often by manufacturing an 
FNC dismissal.  
 
7.2.3.2  Circumvention of the Convention 
Having departed from Yerevan, Armenia, on 03 May 2006, Armavia Flight 967 crashed into the 
Black Sea close to its destination of Sochi, Russia, killing all 113 people on board. The aircraft 
involved was an Airbus A320 and was operated by the Armenian airline, Armavia Airline Co Ltd. 
The published accident report noted several shortcomings with the crew’s performance as well 
as with the airline’s management.32 On the matter of the airline’s liability toward its passengers, 
the applicable regime was that of the unamended Warsaw Convention. However, a number of 
claimants opted instead to bring a product liability action against Airbus in the courts of Toulouse, 
France. From the claimants’ perspective, an action against Airbus was clearly preferable because 
it provided the possibility of recovering under broad heads of damage without the limitations and 
conditions imposed by the Warsaw Convention. Airbus sought to join Armavia to the litigation in 
Toulouse by bringing third-party actions against the airline for indemnification and contribution. It 
was this move that created the mischief of circumvention of the Warsaw Convention.  
Armavia challenged the jurisdiction of the French court, essentially arguing that it could not be 
made party to litigation of passengers’ claims before the courts of a jurisdiction not specified by 
Article 28 of the Warsaw Convention. The airline’s argument was that if the court allowed Armavia 
                                                       
31 Nolan v Boeing Co 762 F Supp 680 (ED La 1989) aff’d 919 F 2d 1058 (5th Cir 1990).  
32 See Interstate Aviation Committee ‘Final Report on the Investigation into the Accident Involving the 
Armavia A320 near Sochi Airport on 3 May 2006 (English Translation)’ (2006) 52–53 
<https://www.bea.aero/docspa/2006/ek-9060502/pdf/ek-9060502.pdf> accessed 26 March 2019.  
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to be joined as a third-party defendant to the claimant passenger’s product liability action against 
the aircraft manufacturer then the claimants would effectively circumvent the application of the 
Warsaw Convention. Armavia maintained that the Court ought not to allow Airbus to separate the 
third-party claim from the underlying passenger tort claim against the carrier, essentially arguing 
that they were not distinct causes of action. Airbus maintained the view that the Warsaw 
Convention applied only to claims between the carrier and passengers and not to its own claim 
against the carrier. As such, Airbus argued that the French courts had jurisdiction under national 
law (specifically Article 333, Code de Procédure Civile).  
Armavia was successful at first instance and also on appeal.33 However, Airbus appealed the 
matter to the Cour de Cassation which found that Airbus’ claim against Armavia did not come 
within the scope of the Warsaw Convention and, therefore, the jurisdictional provisions of Article 
28 did not apply to it.34 In consequence, Armavia could not contest the jurisdiction of the French 
courts to hear Airbus’ third-party claim against it, even though the claimant passenger could not 
have sued the carrier directly in France. 
This issue is not just limited to the Warsaw Convention. It arose also in the context of litigation 
brought under MC99 in Re Air Crash Over the Mid-Atlantic on June 1, 2009.35 The majority of the 
plaintiffs were non-US domiciliaries for whom jurisdiction against the airline could not be 
established in the US. Instead, these plaintiffs brought separate tort actions against US 
component manufacturers in a number of US courts. These actions were eventually consolidated 
before a California district court where the defendant manufacturers brought third-party actions 
against Air France for indemnification or contribution.  
In considering a motion for FNC dismissal, the court noted the potential tension which would 
arise if it held that the third-party actions against the carrier were not covered by MC99. The cause 
of this potential tension was twofold: firstly, the airline would not be presumptively liable to the 
plaintiffs as contemplated by MC99; and secondly, it would undermine the jurisdictional provisions 
of MC99 by forcing Air France to indirectly answer the passengers’ actions for damages in a forum 
not specified by the Convention.36 On the other hand, if MC99 did apply, the defendants would 
be unable to seek contribution/indemnification in the same proceedings. Instead, they would be 
forced to bring their claims against the carrier in France. Unfortunately, rather than make a 
determination on the question, the court decided that the “tension” could be avoided by a granting 
the FNC dismissal.37 Indeed, it is more than likely the main reason that the defendants brought 
the third-party action was to secure FNC dismissal. It was in the combined interest of Air France 
and the manufacturing defendants to be sued in France where their final liability would be less.  
 Cases like these demonstrate the risk of circumvention posed by third-party actions. It is not 
just limited to the issue of jurisdiction. It can apply, as shall be shown below, to the time bar under 
WCS and MC99. It is theoretically possible that in appropriate circumstances it might even allow 
for circumvention of the limits of liability. All depends upon the doctrine of contribution or 
                                                       
33 The text of the lower court’s judgment is reproduced in the Cour de Cassation judgment: Cass Civ 
(1ère) Arrêt n 327 du 4 mars 2015, Airbus c Armavia, n 13-17392 [2015] RFDAS 92. 
34 ibid.  
35 760 F Supp 2d 832 (ND Cal 2010). 
36 ibid 846–847. 
37 ibid 846  
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indemnification to be applied under le droit commun. However, the better view is that 
circumvention of conditions and limits of liability under WCS or MC99 is not going to be at issue 
where non-contractual indemnification or contribution is at issue. As described above, these 
doctrines are built on the premise of common liability between tortfeasors. As such, the duty of 
the third-party defendant to provide indemnification or contribution to the third-party claimant is 
conditional upon the third-party defendant bearing liability to the injured party (i.e. the claimant in 
the main action). This liability must be proved according to the applicable law which will be 
determined by the forum’s choice of law rules. In the majority of cases, this will result in the 
applicable law being that of WCS or MC99 so its theory of liability and available defences will 
apply. In most cases, the doctrine of contribution/indemnification will respect the extent of liability, 
such that any applicable limitations and reductions will apply. For example, under s 2(3) of the 
UK’s Civil Liability (Contribution) Act 1978, the extent of a person’s duty to provide contribution 
cannot exceed the amount to which he would have been liable to the injured party.38 It must be 
admitted that the risk exists that some jurisdictions will not permit the third-party defendant to limit 
the extent of their liability and may apply a different theory of apportionment of damages, e.g. a 
pro-rata basis.  
More problematic, however, is the existence of contractual indemnities. These will be explored 
in Chapter 8, but for now, it suffices to note that where a claimant passenger sues a third party 
for damages, if that third party has agreed a contractual indemnity with the carrier then it could 
bring a third-party action against the carrier. The basis of that third-party action would be the 
contractual indemnity, rather than the common liability. This would mean that unless the contract 
incorporated the terms of WCS or MC99, then the carrier would be unable to invoke its conditions 
or limits of liability. It would be faced with providing contribution/indemnification in accordance 
with its contractual obligation without the benefit of defences or limitations under a WCS or MC99 
action taken directly by the passenger.  
This is one reason why it is important to distinguish between contractual and non-contractual 
rights to contribution or indemnification. A non-contractual right of contribution or indemnification 
will thus not, in practice, result in the same risk (in terms of extent) of circumvention as a 
contractual right. The conditions and limits of liability under WCS or MC99 will usually apply. This 
is not the case with a contractual indemnity. A carrier is entitled to agree to exceed the limits of 
liability or to agree terms which do not conflict with the Convention.39 Thus, a contractual 
indemnity clause is perfectly legitimate and should be enforced blind to the Convention’s 
provisions.40 
However, one area in which the risk of circumvention is equally at issue in contractual and 
non-contractual indemnities/contribution is with respect to the jurisdictional provisions of WCS 
and MC99. The magnitude of the risk of circumvention of jurisdiction is more pronounced with 
MC99, precisely because the limitation of liability is much less likely to apply. In other words, 
under MC99 (unlike the Warsaw Convention) the carrier is seldom going to be able to limit itself 
to tier-one liability but will usually face unlimited (i.e. tier-two) liability. Circumventing jurisdiction 
                                                       
38 Civil Liability (Contribution) Act 1978, s 2(3). 
39 Article 22(1) and Article 33 of the Warsaw Convention and Articles 25 and 27 of MC99. 
40 See Drion (n 7) 104. 
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can be highly beneficial in such circumstances. This is best illustrated in practical terms. If a 
claimant passenger successfully sues a manufacturer in a US state court—where the carrier 
would not be subject to an MC99 action by the claimant passenger in the US—then where that 
manufacturer brings a third-party against the carrier, the carrier will be liable for a quantum of 
damages established by a US jury which will almost always be more than it would otherwise have 
been.  
Cases like that of Armavia and Aircrash over the Mid-Atlantic demonstrate the controversy 
involved with third-party actions. There is a real risk of circumvention of WCS and MC99, not just 
its substantive and jurisdictional provisions but also its underlying purposes. Indeed, the decision 
in Armavia not to apply the Warsaw Convention to third-party actions has been condemned by 
some commentators as undermining the very uniformity that the Convention sought to achieve.41 
Some have argued that the Conventions ought to apply to third-party actions brought against 
carriers.42 It has even been argued in some cases (most notably in Reed v Wiser43 which is 
analysed below) that the Conventions ought to apply to actions brought by claimant passengers 
against specific categories of third parties for damages arising out events occurring during 
international carriage by air. The goal behind both lines of argument is to insulate the Conventions 
from circumvention. It remains a hotly contested issue. To resolve this, it is necessary to examine 
the applicability of WCS and MC99 to third-party actions, which in turn will inform us as to their 
place in the bigger picture.  
 
7.3  The Applicability of WCS and MC99 to Third-Party Actions 
Placing third-party actions within the bigger picture of international aviation litigation requires 
determining the applicability of WCS and MC99 to such actions in the first place. This requires 
looking at what place (if any) actions against third parties have within those regimes before turning 
attention to the specifics of third-party actions. The distinction involved is key. We shall start by 
looking at the question of the applicability of WCS to actions brought against agents, servants, 
employees, préposés, etc., of the carrier. These are third parties vis-à-vis the contract of carriage 
between the claimant passenger and defendant carrier. Where the passenger sues the agent of 
the carrier, then they are suing a third party, although it is not a third-party action. However, a 
third-party action may well arise during such litigation, i.e. where the third party decides to seek 
contribution or indemnification from the carrier. Revealing how the courts and the international 
community have dealt with the problem of actions taken by claimant passengers against third 
parties will lead us directly to the issue of the risk of circumvention via resulting third-party actions.  
 
                                                       
41 PMJ Mendes de Leon ‘Jurisdiction under the Exclusivity of Private International Law Agreements on 
Air Carrier Liability: The Case of Airbus versus Armavia Airlines (2013)’, From Lowlands to High Skies: A 
Multilevel Jurisdictional Approach Towards Air Law (Essays in Honour of John Balfour) (Martinus Nijhoff 
2013) 273; L Chassot ‘Le Domaine de La Responsabilité Du Transporteur Aérien International à La Lumière 
de Deux Dédisions Rédentes’ [2016] RFDAS 5, 23. 
42 See e.g., Drion (n 7) 104. 
43 555 F 2d 1079 (2d Cir 1977). 
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7.3.1  The Préposé Problem 
Both common law and civil law systems provide for vicarious liability of the master for his 
“auxiliary”.44 But, there is one important distinction between the two systems which has created 
some controversy within the context of WCS. The authentic French text of the Warsaw 
Convention employs the term “préposé” which is translated as “agent” in the US and UK 
translations and as “servant and agent” in the Hague Protocol. However, neither of the English 
translations are adequate to describe the full meaning of term préposé. The general position in 
civilian legal systems is that a préposé may be an independent contractor,45 whereas ‘vicarious 
liability in English law does not generally extend to the acts of independent contractors.’46 Préposé 
is thus a broader concept than the common law one of servant or agent.47 In light of this 
divergence, and as the French is the only authentic language version of the Warsaw Convention, 
the term “préposé” shall be used hereinafter. 
The question arose whether the provisions of the Convention applied in an action brought by 
a passenger/shipper against a carrier’s préposé. Aside from being of academic concern, this 
lacuna was exploited by claimant lawyers as a possible means of avoiding the Convention’s 
provisions. lf not covered by the Convention, then an action against a préposé could be brought 
under le droit commun. The advantage of which is it may allow a forum not specified under Article 
28, a more generous period of limitation and, most importantly, yield unlimited liability without 
having to prove wilful misconduct. Aside from the obvious inequity involved in a préposé facing 
unlimited liability while his employer could limit its liability, the more pernicious effect of this 
strategy was that in reality it was the carrier who would end up paying the bill for his préposé’s 
liability. This would arise either due to indemnities given by the carrier to the préposé in the 
employment contract or by means of a claim for contribution or indemnification by the préposé 
against the carrier. This meant that the Convention was being effectively circumvented and its 
objectives undermined.  
The risk of circumvention posed by contribution/indemnification actions raised two critical 
questions. Does the Convention apply to actions brought by claimants against préposés? If not, 
does the Convention apply to claims brought by préposés against the carrier?  
The Warsaw Convention embodies a basic rule by which the carrier is prima facie liable for 
the acts and omissions of its préposés. At no point does the unamended Warsaw Convention 
address the personal liability of the préposé. This is confirmed by the drafting history and 
background to the Warsaw Convention which demonstrate that the drafters exclusive focus was 
on the liability of the carrier to passengers/shippers, they were not at all concerned with the 
personal liability of préposés or any third party.48 In fact, the only liability angle with respect to 
préposés contained in the Convention is the liability of the carrier for the acts of its préposés, i.e. 
                                                       
44 The term “auxiliary” is used for descriptive purposes only as a means of collectively referring to agents, 
employees, servants, contractors, préposés, etc., it is not intended to convey a specific juridical meaning. 
45 RH Mankiewicz The Liability Regime of the International Air Carrier (Kluwer Law 1981) 45. 
46 JW Salmond Jurisprudence (GL Williams ed, 10th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 1947) 414 n k. 
47 RH Mankiewicz ‘Judicial Diversification of Uniform Private Law Conventions’ (1972) 21 Int’l & Comp 
LQ 718, 740.  
48 See RC Horner and D Legrez (trs) Second International Conference on Private Aeronautical Law, 
October 4-12, 1929 Warsaw: Minutes (Fred B Rothman 1975) 246.  
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vicarious liability. On the face of it, this means that actions brought by passengers/shippers 
against préposés fall outside the Convention and are governed by le droit commun, thereby 
creating the loophole by which the carrier, via the préposé, could be exposed to liability outside 
the terms of the Convention.  
Faced with this dilemma, two alternative responses were taken. The first was to accept that 
this loophole existed and to close it by amending the Warsaw Convention. The second response 
was to interpret the unamended Warsaw Convention in such a way that the loophole would not 
arise in the first place.  
 
7.3.1.1  The Hague Protocol 
The first response was adopted by the international community at the Hague Conference in 1955. 
The reality was acknowledged that the indemnification of préposés by the carrier meant that an 
action taken directly against a préposé could result in circumvention of the Convention and its 
limits of liability.49 The solution was the adoption of the Hague Protocol. It amends the Warsaw 
Convention so as to include a new provision (i.e. Article 25A) extending the limits of liability to 
préposés.50 It must be noted that only the monetary limitation of liability is extended to préposés, 
in all other respects, e.g. jurisdiction, the Convention remains inapplicable to the action against 
the préposé. This has changed with MC99, under Article 30(1) of which, the servant or agent may 
rely on the conditions and limits of liability under the Convention. 
One might imagine, that the mere fact that the international community took the step of 
amending the Warsaw Convention in this way is proof positive of the recognition of a gap in the 
Warsaw Convention, i.e. acknowledgement that it did not extend to préposés. In fact, only 
Professor Ambrosini (a member of the Italian delegation) voiced any view to the contrary and 
even this was made in the context of acquiescence to the inclusion of Article 25A rather than in 
defence of the interpretation of the Warsaw Convention. He is reported as having said that he 
always thought: 
[T]hat the Warsaw Convention regulated not only the liability of the carrier, but, at 
the same time, that of his servants or agents, and especially for the simple reason 
that, in his opinion, the carrier and his servants or agents were, from the legal point 
of view, the same person.51 
Professor Ambrosini’s comments do carry authority since he was one of the drafters of the 
Warsaw Convention. However, by far the stronger position is that Article 25A was not a mere 
clarification but actually a substantive addition. So, while it cannot be stated with utter 
conclusiveness, the minutes of the Hague Conference and the adoption of Article 25A provide 
very strong support for the view that the Warsaw Convention does not govern the personal liability 
of préposés. After the adoption of the Hague Protocol, the issue was settled (at least insofar as 
                                                       
49 See comments of delegate from Mexico. International Conference on Private Air Law (The Hague 
September 1955) Doc 7686-LC/140 (Volume 1: Minutes) (ICAO 1956) 216. See also comments of the Greek 
and Belgian delegates. ibid 218.  
50 Protocol to amend the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Carriage 
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1 August 1963) 478 UNTS 373 (Hague Protocol) Article XIV.  
51 International Conference on Private Air Law (The Hague September 1955) Doc 7686-LC/140 (Volume 
1: Minutes) (n 49) 220.  
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préposés and the limit of liability was concerned) for those States who chose to adhere to it. The 
fly in the ointment would be that the US would not ratify the Hague Protocol until 2003. 
  
7.3.1.2  The Lamentable Authority of Reed v Wiser 
Having not ratified the Hague Protocol, the US opted—through its courts—for an alternative 
response to the unforeseen problem of préposés. Reed v Wiser52 concerned claims brought by 
the relatives of decedent passengers against the senior management of the carrier (Trans World 
Airlines) for their alleged negligence in not preventing a bomb being planted aboard the aircraft. 
Seeking to rely on the Convention’s limitation of liability, the defendants argued that for the 
purpose of the Convention the term “carrier” was not limited to the corporate entity but also 
included employees and agents acting on its behalf.  
The trial court had agreed with the plaintiffs. Although it accepted that there were strong policy 
reasons supporting the defendant’s position, the court determined that the correct interpretation 
of the Convention was that it did not apply to an action against préposés.53 The trial court was 
right, the drafting history confirms that the delegates regarded the carrier and préposé as being 
distinct legal entities, in line with general principles of law.54  
It was a different story on appeal. The Second Circuit was in no doubt as to the adverse effects 
of not permitting employees to rely on the protections of the Convention, it stated: 
Should employees not be covered by the provisions of the Convention, the entire 
character of international air disaster litigation involving planes owned and operated 
by American airlines, would be radically changed. The liability limitations of the 
Convention could then be circumvented by the simple device of a suit against the 
pilot and/or other employees, which would force the American employer, if it had not 
already done so, to provide indemnity for higher recoveries as the price for service 
by employees who are essential to the continued operation of its airline. The 
increased cost would, of course, be passed on to passengers.55 
This excerpt is suggestive of a court preparing the way for a purely policy driven conclusion. 
Indeed, this is precisely what transpired. What reference there was to legal principle in the court’s 
holding served only to lend the thinnest doctrinal gloss to a blatant example of judicial legislating. 
The court never clearly established a ratio decidendi. Instead, the court hedged its bets by 
providing two half-baked attempts at a ratio but failed to follow through on either.  
On one hand, the court asked itself if the term “carrier” was intended to cover just the corporate 
entity or whether it ‘was intended to embrace the group or community of persons actually 
performing the corporate entity’s function.’56 Whilst the answer under the common law would be 
in the negative, the US court showed itself uncharacteristically open to considering what the views 
of other jurisdictions might be.57 Without any authoritative basis,58 it determined that in some civil 
law systems, the employer and employee were treated as one and that this could have been the 
                                                       
52 414 F Supp 863, 866 (SDNY 1976) rev’d 555 F 2d 1079 (2d Cir 1977). 
53 ibid.  
54 See Horner and Legrez (n 48) 64–66.  
55 Reed v Wiser (n 43) 1082. 
56 ibid 1083.  
57 G Miller Liability in International Air Transport (Kluwer Law 1977) 281. 
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intention of the drafters of the Warsaw Convention. As shown above (see 4.2.2.2), this is simply 
not the case. Rather than follow through on this line of argument, the court just left the matter 
hanging with the declaration that it could not deem a common law reading as controlling.59  
On the other hand, the court looked to Article 24, indulging itself in an expansive reading of 
that article. Article 24(1) provides: ‘In the cases covered by Articles 18 and 19 any action for 
damages, however founded, can only be brought subject to the conditions and limits set out in 
this Convention.’60 The court read this as meaning that any action for damages arising out of the 
events anticipated by Articles 17, 18 and 19, is governed by the provisions of the Warsaw 
Convention. On application to the facts of the case, the court explained that since the action was 
one for damages and because it arose out of the death of a passenger during international 
carriage by air, that it was therefore covered by the Convention and subject to its monetary 
limitation.61 The implicit reasoning of the Second Circuit was that the scope application of the 
Warsaw Convention was effectively determined by Article 24, i.e. that the claimant’s action be 
one for damages arising out of an event covered by the Convention. Yet again, the court failed to 
follow through on its reasoning and elected, once again, to leave its ratio half-baked.  
What is missing from its equation are the identities of the parties to the litigation. If one follows 
through on the logic, the Warsaw Convention would apply to all actions for damages arising during 
international carriage from an event described in Articles 17, 18 or 19, regardless of the identity 
of the defendant (or indeed the plaintiff). An action by a passenger against a manufacturer would 
be covered, as would the third-party action taken by that manufacturer against the carrier. Of 
course, not even the Second Circuit thought an action against a manufacturer was covered. It 
took it for granted that the defendant must be a carrier but this would not explain why the préposé 
should be covered. Why should one third party (i.e. the manufacturer) be outside the Convention 
but another (i.e. the préposé) be within it? This line of argument just reverts back to the original 
question of whether the definition of the carrier was intended to include its préposés.  
The doctrinal basis for the court’s ultimate decision was decidedly patchy and left deliberately 
vague. On the one hand its interpretation of the term “carrier” was dubious given the court’s poor 
appreciation of civilian law. On the other hand, its unjustly expansive interpretation of Article 24 
and the purported scope of the Convention was misleading. It is submitted that it was not the 
intention of the court to resolve the matter through doctrinal reasoning. Instead, the court was 
satisfied to fumble around in the text of the Convention until it could rustle up some ambiguity to 
act as the shakiest of pegs on which to hang its purely policy driven decision. While the doctrinal 
basis was feeble, the court could, in contrast, rely on several powerful policy considerations which 
justified extending the protections of the Convention to préposés. Foremost amongst which was 
that it would ensure the protection provided by the Convention to the carrier was not circumvented 
by plaintiffs bringing actions against its préposés, thus safeguarding the objects of the 
Convention.62 The action of the Second Circuit in Reed v Wiser, though well-intentioned, was 
nonetheless a dimly-veiled example of judicial amendment of an international treaty. Simply put, 
                                                       
59 ibid 1084. 
60 Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Carriage by Air (signed 12 
October 1929, entered into force 13 February 1933) 137 LNTS 11 (Warsaw Convention) Article 24. 
61 Reed v Wiser (n 43) 1084.  
62 ibid 1089. 
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the US did not want to adhere to the Hague Protocol so instead it attempted to cherry pick what 
it liked about the Hague Protocol, i.e. extension of the limits of liability to préposés. At its base, 
Reed v Wiser is judicial ratification of part of the Hague Protocol and is a poor decision which 
should be erased altogether. Fortunately, its influence has been curtailed by US adherence to the 
Hague Protocol in 2003 and by MC99.  
Reed v Wiser committed two major errors which have been hugely troublesome for the 
question of third-party actions under both to the WCS and MC99. 
First, although the court had limited its judgment to the specific issue before it, i.e. the 
applicability of the monetary limitation, once it accepted that the monetary limitation applied, it 
was inevitable that subsequent decisions (discussed below) were going to be made which 
extended the coverage of the remainder of the Convention (e.g. time limits) to actions against 
préposés—not even the Hague Protocol had done that. 
Secondly, it fostered the notion that the identity of the claimant is not of critical importance to 
determining the application of the Convention. This was not mischievous on the facts of Reed v 
Wiser because the plaintiffs were the representatives of decedent passengers and thus their 
standing was unquestioned. However, subsequent cases would take Reed v Wiser to mean that 
the identity of the plaintiff is irrelevant so long as the action is against a carrier for loss covered 
by the Convention.63 This meant the Convention might apply to a third-party taken against a 
carrier, which is the question that directly concerns us. 
 
7.3.1.3  MC99 and Préposés 
It would be remiss not to briefly mention the state-of-play under MC99 with respect to préposés 
and actual carriers. Thankfully, the provisions introduced by the Hague Protocol and the 
Guadalajara Convention64 have been replicated almost verbatim in MC99. Articles 30 and 4365 of 
MC99 were modelled on Article 25A of the Warsaw Convention (as amended by the Hague 
Protocol)66 and Article V of the Guadalajara Convention respectively. Thus, under MC99, a Reed 
v Wiser type scenario involving an action against a préposé will be covered. In the context of 
MC99, the reality is that insofar as the limits of liability are concerned, there is almost no incentive 
for a claimant to pursue a préposé since unlimited recovery against an insured carrier on the basis 
of strict liability is guaranteed in most cases. It would be rare indeed if the basis for liability against 
a préposé offered an easier route to recovery than a cause of action under the Convention. 
However, as we shall see in the following sections, an action against a servant or agent might 
prove preferable where it guarantees a forum in a generous jurisdiction which is not available 
under MC99. 
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7.3.2  Third-Party Actions and WCS 
As noted above, Reed v Wiser left the door open for courts to reach the conclusion that the 
Warsaw Convention applied to third-party actions taken against carriers. Unsurprisingly, some 
courts would take this opportunity whereas others would not. Which is the correct position?  
 
7.3.2.1  The Orthodox Position 
The Warsaw Convention makes no mention of recourse actions (which include third-party actions 
for contribution/indemnification). The topic did emerge during the Diplomatic Conference of 1961, 
at which was adopted the Guadalajara Convention. This Convention neither creates nor 
presumes the existence of a right of recourse between actual carriers and contracting carriers. In 
fact, it limits itself to merely facilitating recourse actions where they exist under le droit commun 
by ensuring a right of joinder for each carrier against the other.67 The first explicit reference within 
WCS to a right of recourse came in 1971 with the Guatemala City Protocol (GCP).68 However, 
this reference was only made, ‘in order to remove any doubts’.69 Such rights were already 
enforced in the context of WCS, not in the sense that it was recognized that a right of recourse 
existed under the Convention, but that such rights, however founded, were not incompatible with 
the Convention. GCP never entered into force, but the right of recourse provision contained 
therein was included in Montreal Additional Protocol No. 4 (MAP4) of 1975,70 which entered into 
force in 1998. What this shows is that the understanding was that WCS (with the exception of the 
right of joinder under the Guadalajara Convention) does not regulate recourse actions.  
This is reflected in the orthodox position adopted by some courts, for example, in a Canadian 
case from 1978, Connaught Laboratories Ltd v Air Canada.71 In this case, involving successive 
carriage, one carrier had been found liable to the shipper and brought a third-party action against 
the other carrier for contribution or indemnification. The other carrier sought to rely on the time 
limitation contained in the Warsaw Convention (i.e. Article 29) to defeat the third-party action. The 
Ontario Supreme Court addressed the issue by asking itself whether the Convention applied to 
claims between carriers, reaching the view that: 
In short, while the Convention deals with the claims of passengers, consignors and 
consignees, and the liability of carriers therefor, it does not deal with the claims of 
carriers inter se. Consequently, it is my view, that Article 29 does not apply to the 
action of Air Canada against Andes Airlines and does not constitute the statutory bar 
it is said to represent.72  
The manifest common sense of the ruling in Connaught Laboratories seems unassailable. In 
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stands for the position that the Warsaw Convention governs actions between passengers (or 
shippers) against the carrier. The claimant’s cause of action arises from the carrier’s liability to 
the claimant under the Convention. The identity of the parties to the cause of action is thus crucial 
to determining the question of its applicability. If the action is not one between the proper parties 
then it is, by definition, not covered by the Convention. Therefore, an action taken by one carrier 
against another, or by a carrier’s servant or agent against a carrier, or by a passenger against 
manufacturer, and so on, is not governed by the Convention, but either by some other 
international treaty or by le droit commun.  
 
7.3.2.2  The Alternative Position 
The alternative position is grounded in the same reasoning as applied in Reed v Wiser which 
broadens the meaning of a Convention action, firstly, to include actions taken against préposés 
(since these are to be identified with the term “carrier”) and secondly, to apply to any action for 
damages against a carrier (including préposés) covered by the Convention.  
In the 1985 case of LB Smith Inc v Circle Air Freight Corp,73 the Supreme Court of Onondaga 
County, New York applied the Warsaw Convention’s two-year limitation to a third-party action 
brought by the contracting carrier against the actual carrier, Iberia.74 This was supported, in the 
court’s view, by the wording of Article 24(1) which it construed liberally to mean that ‘an action 
“however founded” would include an action for contribution.’75 Whilst Reed v Wiser was not cited 
as authority for this point, the reasoning is based on the same misreading of Article 24. Likewise, 
in a series of cases in the late 1980s (including Split End Ltd v Dimerco Express (Phils) Inc), the 
District Court for the Southern District of New York approved the proposition in LB Smith that the 
Convention applies to third-party actions taken against carriers (including préposés).76 
Disappointingly, the courts did not outline the doctrinal basis for their holdings, instead they merely 
followed precedent.77 The only reasonable conclusion is that the courts in these cases applied 
the Convention because they understood Reed v Wiser as holding that the Convention governs 
any action for damages against a carrier (or its préposé) arising out of an event covered by the 
Convention irrespective of who the claimant is. In addition, they also reached the inevitable 
construction—implicit in Reed v Wiser—that the Convention’s provisions applied generally to 
third-party actions, not just its monetary limitations.78 Similar decisions were reached in a number 
of subsequent cases.79 
A couple of US cases involving third-party actions taken against carriers for damage arising 
out of events covered by the Convention deserve special attention because the courts in those 
                                                       
73 488 NYS 2d 547 (1985).  
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cases did not apply the Convention to third-party actions against carriers. These two cases are 
Re Air Crash at Agana, Guam80 and Re Air Crash Near Nantucket, Massachusetts on October 
31, 1999.81 In both Guam and Nantucket, the defendants to the main action (the US State and 
ATC providers in Guam, Boeing and Parker Hannifin in Nantucket) had brought third-party actions 
for indemnification or contribution against the carrier (Korean Air Lines in Guam, EgyptAir in 
Nantucket). Both airlines argued that the third-party claim was governed by the Warsaw 
Convention and that the US court had no jurisdiction because the US was not one of forums 
available under Article 28. In Guam, the California district court held that the text of the Warsaw 
Convention applied exclusively to actions by passengers or shippers. Therefore, an action taken 
by a manufacturer against a carrier was not subject to the Convention’s provisions.82 In Nantucket, 
the New York district court referred to Guam approvingly, stating that, ‘[t]he identity of the parties 
is central to the Convention.’83 The court continued by stating that ‘[t]he express purpose of the 
Convention was to regulate litigation between passengers and carriers’,84 noting that  the 
Convention is silent as to contribution and indemnification claims between manufacturers and 
carriers.85 The Nantucket court concluded that ‘to apply the Convention to contribution and 
indemnity claims of manufacturers would expand the reach of the Convention beyond its intended 
scope.’86 The result of which meant that the third-party plaintiffs’ actions could be brought in the 
US since they were not pre-empted by the Convention’s jurisdictional provisions. 
The position reached by the courts in Guam and Nantucket is at odds with the one adopted 
by the US courts in the decisions discussed earlier (such as Split-End). Although it is submitted 
that Guam and Nantucket, were correctly decided, both failed to distinguish themselves from the 
precedents established under the reasoning first laid down in Reed v Wiser. It is would seem the 
courts are reluctant to overrule Reed v Wiser and its progeny, while at the same time, the need 
to staunchly support its lamentable authority has been greatly reduced by US adherence to MAP4 
in 1998 and MC99; the result being that fewer—yet still some—actions will be taken under the 
unamended Warsaw Convention. Indeed, the fact that decisions in Guam and Nantucket date 
from 1998 from 2004 respectively, would suggest as much.  
The result is that in the US there is conflicting decisions on the question of the applicability of 
the Warsaw Convention to third-party actions. With no satisfactory conclusion, the issue has 
carried over into the litigation of third-party actions under MC99. 
 
                                                       
80 The details provided herein are taken from commentary on the case provided by AH Collier and SN 




mnity-Collier-Brie.pdf> accessed 28 February 2019; B Rodriguez ‘Recent Developments in Aviation Liability 
Law’ (2000) 66 J Air L & Com 21; SA Sundvall and MC Andolina ‘The Status of Pending Air Carrier Litigation’ 
(2000) 66 J Air L & Com 167; BF Benson and J Dahlman Rosa ‘The Status of Pending Air Carrier Litigation’ 
(2001) 66 J Air L & Com 1367; AM Huarte ‘Korean Air Flight 801: Warsaw and the FTCA’ <http://www.mcmc-
law.com/korean-air-flight-801-warsaw-and-the-ftca/> accessed 14 April 2019. 
81 340 F Supp 2d 240 (EDNY 2004). 
82 Collier and Brie (n 80) 20. 
83 Air Crash near Nantucket (n 81) 243.  
84 ibid.  
85 See ibid 243–244.  
86 ibid 244. 
 164 
7.3.3 Third-Party Actions and MC99 
MC99 contains two articles relating to third-party recourse actions: one regarding any right of 
recourse against third-parties (Article 37) and the other regarding any right of recourse between 
contracting and actual carriers (Article 48). In this regard, MC99 is merely a consolidation of the 
provisions on recourse from the Guadalajara Convention and MAP4. Therefore, one would expect 
that the courts would reach the same conclusions regarding the applicability of MC99 to third-
party actions as they did in respect of WCS.  
The first cases to address the applicability of MC99 to third-party claims for 
contribution/indemnification emerged in the US and were the subject of two district court cases in 
2008 and a third in 2010.  The first was Chubb Insurance Co of Europe SA v Menlo Worldwide 
Forwarding Inc  (Chubb I)87 before the District Court for the Central District of California, the 
second was American Home Assurance Co v Kuehne & Nage (AG & Co) KG,88 before the District 
Court for the Southern District of New York. In Chubb I, the court applied the time-limitation of the 
Convention to a third-party claim brought by a contracting carrier against the actual carrier, 
referring to authorities for the same proposition under the Warsaw Convention.89 Strictly speaking, 
the court in Kuehne & Nagel did not have to decide the question of the applicability of MC99 to a 
claim between a contracting carrier and an actual carrier because the parties had not contested 
it. However, in the course of its opinion, the court did express its agreement with Split End that 
the time limitation would apply in an action between a contracting and actual carrier.90 In a third 
case, this time in 2010, Chubb I was followed by the District Court for the Northern District of 
California in Allianz Global Corporate & Speciality v EMO Trans California Inc.91 In each case the 
courts had adopted the same perspective on the issue as had been applied to WCS, in other 
words that MC99 applied to third-party claims. However, the proverbial cat would be set amongst 
the pigeons in 2011 when Chubb I reached the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. 
 
7.3.3.1  A New Line of Argument 
In the Nantucket case, a new line of argument was raised to the effect that the third-party action 
brought by the manufacturer defendants was coextensive with the underlying passenger claim 
and ought, therefore, to be governed by the same law, i.e. the Warsaw Convention.92 The court 
was outright in its rejection of this proposition, stating that the manufacturing defendants’ 
contribution and contractual claims were based on legal and equitable relationships with the 
carrier which were distinct from any passenger claim.93 The court took the view that the 
contribution/indemnification claims were grounded in a separate and distinct source.94 This line 
                                                       
87 [2008] Av L Rep 10988806 (CCH), 2008 WL 10988806 (CD Cal 14 Jan 2008) rev’d 634 F 3d 1023 
(9th Cir 2011). 
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of argumentation was taken up by the Court of Appeal for the Ninth Circuit in Chubb II,95 this time 
in the context of MC99.  
As noted above, the Californian district court’s dismissal of the third-party complaint in Chubb 
I on the grounds that the claim was time-barred by Article 35 of MC99 was appealed to the Ninth 
Circuit. In Chubb II,  O’Scannlain J neatly summarized the issue by stating: ‘We must decide 
whether the Montreal Convention's two-year statute of limitations on "the right to damages" in 
connection with international air cargo shipments applies to suits seeking indemnification and 
contribution.’96 His analysis began with the text of Article 35 MC99 with the court asking itself 
whether UPS’s claims against Qantas fell within the single right recognized by it, i.e. a right to 
damages.97 The substantive elements of that right are provided in Articles 17 to 19 of MC99 i.e. 
that ‘by which a passenger or consignor may hold a carrier liable for damage sustained to 
passengers, baggage, or cargo.’98 The right to damages referred to in Article 35 was thus 
identified with the cause of action under MC99.  
Turning to the facts, a right to damages was present in the main action between the shipper 
and the contracting carrier but not in the third-party action—which was the one at issue—between 
the contracting carrier and the actual carrier. The third-party action was not based upon the 
Convention’s right to damages but upon a right of recourse; the court drawing a strong distinction 
between the two.99 The Ninth Circuit stated that a cause of action for contribution/indemnification 
is not created by the Convention, but neither is it pre-empted where available under le droit 
commun.100 In conclusion, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s decision and held that 
MC99 did not apply to the third-party action.101  
In 2012, the Court of Appeal for New South Wales, Australia, issued a judgment in the case 
of United Airlines Inc v Sercel Australia Pty Ltd102 in which it articulated the distinction between 
the right to damages and the right of recourse in similar terms to Ninth Circuit in Chubb II. 
However, the case was not one under MC99 but was taken pursuant to the Australian Civil 
Aviation (Carrier’s Liability) Act 1959103 which gives force of law to the Warsaw Convention (as 
amended by the Hague Protocol and MAP4). Like Chubb II, the Australian court distinguished 
between the causes of action. The cause of action granted the passenger arises under the 
Convention and consists of a claim made by a passenger against a carrier seeking to hold it liable 
to compensate the claimant for damages arising from personal injury. In contrast, a third-party 
action is not one for damages for the injury of a passenger but is one which seeks to hold the 
carrier liable to provide contribution or indemnification, the cause of action for which is sourced, 
not in the Convention, nor in the Act, but by other provisions of le droit commun.104  On that basis, 
the court held that the Convention’s time-bar did not apply to the cause of action for 
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contribution/indemnification.105 In Allsop P’s view, ‘[c]laims by persons other than passengers 
their estates or heirs were not picked up by the words of the Convention.’106 
This may seem a rather formalistic perspective to adopt since the liability of the carrier to 
provide contribution/indemnification is conditional on its primary liability toward the passenger. 
However, if one looks at the matter from the perspective of the right being vindicated by each 
cause of action, it becomes clear that they do represent independent and separate causes of 
action. A right to damages seeks to compensate the passenger for the injury suffered during 
carriage by air. A right to contribution/indemnification seeks to reimburse a paying tortfeasor or 
indemnifier who has paid more than its actual fault demands, the purpose is not to compensate 
the passenger for his loss but to redistribute the liability between the responsible parties.  
Whilst the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Chubb II is to be regarded as the correct one, its authority 
is open to some doubt. First, the court did not expressly address the case law on WCS which had 
determined that the regime did apply to third-party actions. The court merely noted that it had 
considered the cases but found them unpersuasive. Perhaps the court was reluctant to step too 
heavily on the toes of Reed v Wiser. A more thorough examination and critique would have been 
welcome, as it stands this omission diminishes the persuasive value of Chubb II in other circuits. 
More unfortunate is the fact that the ratio decidendi limited itself to stating that Article 35 of MC99 
did not apply to third-party claims and stopped short of holding that MC99 does not apply to third-
party actions at all. It was not helped in this by the manner in which the case was initially pleaded. 
The parties had not contested the application of MC99 to the third-party claim but had differed 
only as to the extent of its application. Had the court being free to do so, then it seems likely a 
broader holding might have been made since in the concluding paragraphs it expressed its 
agreement with Connaught on the point that the Warsaw Convention was only intended to deal 
with claims between passengers/shippers/consignees and carriers, and not claims of carriers 
inter se.107 Sercel was braver on this front, but being a decision in respect of WCS its rationale 
may not be immune from challenge in the context of MC99. 
 
7.3.3.2  An English Authority? 
The UK courts have yet to issue an opinion on the issue, possibly because it is generally accepted 
that the MC99 is not applicable to recourse actions.108 However, in 2015, the Court of Appeal did 
deliver a judgment on the matter of a third-party action for contribution in the context of the Athens 
Convention109 in Feest v South West Strategic Health Authority.110  Although not an MC99 case, 
nor even an aviation case, it is submitted that Tomlinson LJ’s judgment should be recognized as 
bearing strong persuasive value because the Athens Convention was modelled on the Warsaw 
Convention and the provisions at issue are substantially the same in both instruments. The Athens 
Convention, in the simplest of terms, does for carriage of passengers by sea what WCS and 
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MC99 do for carriage of passengers by air. The carrier sought to invoke the two-year time 
limitation provided by the Athens Convention, arguing that the Convention applied to the claim for 
contribution.111  
Before the Court of Appeal, Tomlinson LJ had to answer the question of whether the Athens 
Convention governs a third-party claim for contribution made against a carrier.112 He rejected the 
trial judge’s suggestion that a claim to damages and a claim to contribution were the same 
creature, holding instead that there existed a distinction between them, such that a claim to 
contribution could not be regarded as an action for damages for personal injury to a passenger.113 
This holding was supported by noting that the Athens Convention only purports to unify certain 
rules and not to provide ‘a complete code governing all liability of sea carriers to whomsoever 
owed’.114 In addition to distinguishing a Convention claim from contribution on the basis of the 
identity of the parties, the court also found support in the distinct sources of each cause of action. 
Recognizing of course that ‘the liability of the carrier to contribute is critically dependent on its 
own liability to the passenger’,115 the court emphasized that the cause of action for contribution is 
provided under le droit commun, being an autonomous cause of action,116 distinct in source from 
the Convention’s action for damages. Tomlinson LJ stated, therefore, that ‘[i]t is unsurprising that 
the claim in itself is unaffected by the provisions of the Athens Convention.’117 In so doing, 
Tomlinson LJ opined that the Warsaw Convention likewise does not apply to claims for 
contribution,118 citing Chubb II and Sercel approvingly.119  
   
7.4  Concluding Remarks 
The two key takeaways from this Chapter are the facts that third-party actions provide an 
additional avenue for third-party influence in international aviation litigation (including WCS and 
MC99) and, that third-party actions give rise to the risk of circumvention of WCS and MC99. These 
are two critical components of the bigger picture.  
The two-party paradigm upon international aviation litigation was originally conceived was 
valid at the time of the Warsaw Convention. The then existing legal landscape under the common 
law and civil law systems meant that such litigation was seldom multi-party in nature. However, 
with the emergence of alternative remedies and the consequent introduction of third-party actions 
for contribution/indemnification, the two-party paradigm was exploded. These actions provided a 
new avenue by which third parties became involved in international aviation litigation and could 
exert their influence, specifically, for our purposes, on the matter of choice of forum. Carriers and 
third parties routinely cooperate to ensure their preferred choice of forum succeeds against that 
of the claimant passenger. This is a reality that has not been taken into account when regulating 
choice of forum within the jurisdictional regime of WCS or MC99. 
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Although still the subject of debate, the balance of opinion has come down on the side of 
holding that third-party actions are not governed by WCS or MC99. It is submitted that this is the 
correct view. Therefore, the decision reached by the Cour de Cassation in Armavia was the right 
one.  Furthermore, this view is supported by the authorities of Chubb II, Sercel, and Feest. The 
argument put forth that a third-party claim is derivative of the passenger’s Convention cause of 
action can thus be rejected. Insofar as passenger related claims are concerned, WCS and MC99 
are exclusively concerned with actions for damages taken by passengers against a carrier. A brief 
note must be made with respect to death actions which are, strictly speaking, actions taken by 
third parties. These are governed, to a limited extent, by the WCS and MC99.120 However, these 
are distinguishable from third-party actions for contribution/indemnification. First, WCS/MC99 
apply to such actions only because those instruments specifically provide as much; no such 
provision is made for third-party actions for indemnification/contribution. In other words, the 
application of WCS/MC99 to wrongful death is the exception that proves the general exclusionary 
rule. Second, a wrongful death action is distinguishable in nature from a third-party action for 
contribution/indemnification insofar as the former is an action for damages whilst the latter is not.  
Unfortunately, the non-application of the Conventions to third-party actions has the 
consequence of opening up the possibility of circumvention of WCS or MC99. However, we must 
be careful when employing the term “circumvention”. Although it is often used in a pejorative 
sense, the circumvention involved here is not illegal or dishonest. The claimant is entitled to 
pursue a third party under an alternative cause of action rather than pursue the carrier via WCS 
or MC99. However, where that third party then brings a third-party action against the carrier, the 
result can be that the carrier indirectly answers a passenger claim in a forum which he would not 
have been subject to in an action brought by the passenger directly. This is the reality of 
international aviation litigation and policymakers and legislators are entitled—if not obligated—to 
take this into account when assessing the efficacy of MC99 within the bigger picture that this work 
is describing.  
Is it desirable that the carrier should face higher net liability as a result of an accident on 
account of third-party actions than it would have had the claimant passenger sued it directly under 
MC99 (and WCS to a lesser extent)? Although many doctrines of contribution/indemnification will 
abide by the theory and extent of liability provided by WCS or MC99 in assessing the liability of 
the carrier qua third-party defendant, there is the risk that in some jurisdictions the carrier may 
face liability in excess of the limits provided by the conventions or for heads of damages not 
covered by them, e.g. punitive damages. Is this not a possibility that should be guarded against? 
These and other questions will be returned to in the concluding chapter to this work. 
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Chapter 8: Risk Management Devices 
 
8.1  Introduction 
Given its history, the extent of potential liability involved, and the sophistication of parties within 
the aviation industry, it should come as no surprise that complex networks of arrangements are 
established to channel and allocate risk associated with carriage by air between the various 
stakeholders. These can be broadly split into two groups: (1) Contractual indemnities; (2) 
Insurance. But why should this work take an interest in contractual indemnities and insurance? 
First, they play a critical role as devices for the management of risk in aviation. As such, they may 
either promote or frustrate the objectives of MC99 which itself plays a role in risk management. 
Both seek to control and allocate the risks related to liability for damages suffered by passengers 
during international carriage by air. Second, insurance for passenger liability in international 
carriage by air is so ubiquitous nowadays as to be almost universal.1 Whilst neither WCS nor 
MC99 make carrier insurance compulsory, Article 50 of MC99 does provide that the Contracting 
States shall require their carriers to maintain “adequate” insurance covering their liability under 
the Convention. The quasi-universality of insurance coverage is not limited to air carriers, all 
commercial aviation entities—whether by law or mere prudence—insure themselves against risk. 
This means that in aviation litigation it is the insurer, rather than the liable party, who is settling 
the bill with the victim of an accident. This fact invariably influences the litigation of claims. Third, 
the concluding chapter of this work will require some evaluation of MC99 as a system of 
compensation and it is submitted that this can only be done where the actual exposure of the 
carrier is known and, even more importantly, the full extent of the insurer’s role is brought to light. 
Beyond these specifics, the purpose of this chapter, along with the previous chapters covering 
product liability and recourse actions, is to present the bigger picture within which passenger 
claims under WCS and MC99 are only a small part. Contractual indemnities provide an avenue 
through which third parties can become part of and influence litigation between the claimant 
passenger and the defendant carrier. Behind all of which stands the insurer(s), who is not some 
benign presence whose only role is to sign the cheques for its insured. Instead, it occupies—
through subrogation—a staggeringly important place in the process of defending and settling 
claims. Yet, the insurer’s role is seldom noted and even less often analysed. Collectively, this 
matrix of contractual indemnities and insurance agreements bind those parties together in 
opposition to the interests of the claimant passenger. This is felt in particular with regards to FNC. 
As demonstrated throughout Part III of this work, potential defendants facing claims after an 
aviation accident will frequently cooperate to ensure a jurisdictional disadvantage for the claimant.  
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8.2  Contractual Indemnities 
This section is concerned with indemnities arising from contract as opposed to those which arise 
by law or equity.2 In the simplest of terms we are concerned here with a particular type of clause 
frequently included in contracts between commercial aviation entities. For example, an aircraft 
lease or purchase agreement will nearly always contain a clause by which the operator of the 
aircraft agrees to indemnify the lessor or manufacturer against any losses arising from the 
operator’s use of the aircraft. Therefore, if the manufacturer is sued by a passenger injured during 
carriage by air, the manufacturer will turn to the operator in the expectation that it will hold the 
manufacturer harmless against such liability. This form of indemnification must be distinguished 
from that which takes place in the case of insurance. Whilst a non-life insurance contract is a 
contract of indemnity, it is distinguishable from a non-insurance contract of indemnity. For 
instance, indemnities in insurance contracts are subject to legal doctrines which are not applicable 
in a non-insurance context, such as the duty of utmost good faith and the principle of fortuity.3 
Insurance will be considered in the following section; for now, our concern is solely with the 
contractual indemnities in non-insurance contracts. 
The labyrinthine complexity of contractual indemnities within the aviation industry is well 
illustrated by the facts Re Air Crash near Peggy’s Cove, Nova Scotia on September 2, 1998.4 A 
Swissair operated McDonnell Douglas MD-11 crashed into the Atlantic Ocean during a flight from 
New York to Geneva resulting in the deaths of all 215 passengers on board. The crash was the 
result of an inflight fire started due to faulty wiring in the inflight entertainment system which had 
ignited flammable insulating blankets. The plaintiffs sued not only Swissair, Boeing (as successor 
in interest, having acquired McDonnell Douglas) and Interactive Flight Technologies (the 
designers of the inflight entertainment system), they also sued the manufacturers of the thermal 
blankets, the sub-contractor who installed the system, and two other sub-contractors who 
provided certification of the installation. The spaghetti-like criss-crossing of third-party actions 
between these seven defendants was mitigated by Swissair and Boeing settling with the plaintiffs 
and reaching agreements with all but one of the other defendants. However, even still, Interactive 
Flight Technologies’ refusal to settle resulted in it seeking contractual indemnification from four of 
the six other defendants, including Swissair. Multi-party litigation such as this is a common 
occurrence in the field of aviation litigation. Even if only one defendant appears on the docket, the 
truth is that the contractual indemnities between the various parties feed into the nexus and 
demand that attention be expanded beyond the illusory paradigm of a simple two-party dispute. 
 
8.2.1  Key Features in an Aviation Context 
In the context of contractual indemnities, Courtney defines a promise of indemnification as ‘a 
promise of exact protection against loss.’5 This concept of exact protection consists of three 
elements, the first of which concerns the efficacy of protection, the second, the exactness of 
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3 See W Courtney Contractual Indemnities (Hart 2015) 9. 
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protection and the third, the loss itself.6 The desired effect of an indemnity is to protect a party 
(the indemnified) from loss. The party undertaking to protect the indemnified is obliged to either 
prevent such loss arising in the first place or to compensate for loss already incurred.7 The 
element of exactness can be summarized as being that ‘[t]he indemnified party should not be 
under-protected nor over-protected in respect of a given loss.’8 The protection required is thus 
dependent on the nature of the loss covered by the indemnity, i.e. the loss(es) within the scope 
of the indemnity. Being a creature of contract, the scope of a contractual indemnity and the 
manner in which it may be performed is ultimately a matter of construction and thus subject to the 
relevant legal principles.  
Once a loss is within the scope of the indemnity, the indemnified is entitled to full 
indemnification and there is no rule providing for apportionment of liability between the indemnifier 
and indemnified based on any comparative fault.9 Subject to limitations imposed by statute or 
public policy, a party may undertake to indemnify another party against any conceivable loss. Of 
relevance to this work is indemnification relating to liability to passengers for personal injury or 
death sustained during international carriage by air. As has been noted on several occasions, the 
claimant passenger has a range of possible defendants to sue in the event of an accident. In 
addition to the carrier, he may opt to pursue the airframe or component manufacturer, the lessor 
of the aircraft, a maintenance or service provider of the carrier, an airport or ATM service provider, 
and so on. Therefore, to the extent that these possible defendants have pre-existing contractual 
relations, they have an interest in securing contractual indemnities from each other. Of course, 
the buck has to stop with at least one of them, with the question of who shall carry the risk being 
a matter for commercial negotiations between the parties.   
Contractual indemnity clauses in non-insurance agreements vary significantly from one 
agreement to the next but some common features are easily discerned. To take the example of 
a general indemnity clause taken from a lease agreement10 between a leasing subsidiary of a 
major aircraft manufacturer and an international air carrier, it contains an indemnity clause which 
provides under its first sub-section: 
The [lessee] agrees to indemnify and hold harmless the [Indemnitee] against any 
and all Losses which the Indemnitee may at any time suffer or incur, whether directly 
or indirectly as a result of (i) ownership, registration, import, export, storage, 
modification, leasing, ... use, operation whether in the air or on the ground, delivery 
or re-delivery of the Aircraft or any part thereof, and which relate to the Aircraft, 
during the lease period, and (ii) any act or omission which invalidates or which 
renders voidable any of the Insurances.11 
What is immediately notable is that the scope of the general indemnity is incredibly broad, 
covering every conceivable act involving the aircraft resulting in any and all loss to the 
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indemnified. It applies whether the loss be direct or indirect, the latter covering claims by third-
parties such as passengers. There is no requirement of fault on the part of the lessor, it is 
expected to assume the obligation to indemnify the lessee for any and all risks. Indeed, the next 
sub-clause specifies that the indemnities apply even where the loss is attributable to an act or 
omission of the lessor, or to a defect in the aircraft or to strict liability.12 
Subsequent sub-clauses of the lease agreement do provide exceptions in which the lessee is 
not required to indemnify the lessor.13 Most significant of which, for our purposes, is the exclusion 
of indemnity where the loss is caused by the indemnified’s fraud, wilful misconduct or gross 
negligence (this exclusion applying only to deliberate wrongdoing and not to mere negligence). 
However, these exceptions to the general indemnity only apply to the extent that the loss for which 
the indemnity is made is attributable to the particular exception. For example, where the lessor is 
guilty of wilful misconduct, he may still claim indemnification from the lessee for the extent of the 
loss not caused by such wilful misconduct. 
Generally speaking, aircraft manufacturers tend to have far-reaching indemnity clauses in their 
aircraft sales agreements which allocate the risk of liability to the carrier. The scope of these 
indemnities can be surprisingly broad. This is well illustrated by the case of Pakistan International 
Airlines (PIA) v Boeing Co.14 Although the facts of the case involved first party damage to the 
carrier’s aircraft, the indemnity clause at issue in the case extended to include third-party liability 
for injury to or death of any person(s). The carrier’s aircraft had been damaged in a hard landing 
at Ankara, Turkey. Boeing had sent a survey team to inspect the damage and submitted a repair 
proposal to PIA. After completing the repairs, Boeing agents were towing the aircraft when a 
component of the main landing gear broke resulting in the $500,000 in damage to the aircraft. 
Naturally, PIA sought recompense from Boeing, arguing that the damage had been the result of 
its negligence in failing to detect the problem. Unfortunately for PIA, its attempts were frustrated 
by an indemnity clause in the aircraft sales agreement which provided: 
Buyer will indemnify and hold harmless Boeing and each employee of Boeing 
assigned pursuant to paragraphs (a), (d) and (e) above from and against all liabilities, 
costs and expenses incident thereto, which may be suffered by, accrue against, be 
charged to or recoverable from Boeing or any such employee, or both, by reason of 
injury to or death of any person or persons … or by reason of loss of or damage to 
property, including the Aircraft, arising out of or in any way connected with the 
performance by said employee of services in connection with any of the aircraft after 
delivery thereof to Buyer.15  
The expansive effect of this clause was to effectively immunize Boeing against any conceivable 
liability, not only arising from PIA’s operation of the aircraft, but also arising in any way connected 
to the aircraft. Such indemnities are commonplace in aircraft purchase agreements with aircraft 
manufacturers. 
An easily accessible example of a contractual indemnity which is almost universally employed 
by air carriers engaged international carriage by air is to be found in the Standard Ground 
Handling Agreement (SGHA) of the International Air Transport Association (IATA). This SGHA is 
a model agreement of standard clauses which carriers (members and non-members of IATA 
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14 575 F 2d 1268 (9th Cir 1978). 
15 Reproduced in ibid 1269.  
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alike) use as the basis for the contracts with ground handling agents. Ground handling agents 
provide the vast majority of ground operations for carriers at their outstations, e.g. baggage and 
cargo handling/loading, de-icing, aircraft marshalling, load control, fuelling, surface transport and 
so on. Article 8 of the 2018 edition of the IATA SGHA includes several clauses pertaining to 
liability and indemnity. Article 8(1) provides, inter alia, that the carrier indemnifies the ground 
handling against liability for claims for liability for passenger death or personal injury arising from 
the act or omission (including negligence) falling short of wilful misconduct.16 A similar indemnity 
is provided by Article 8(2) which includes death or personal injury to third parties, i.e. non-
passengers.17 
 
8.2.2  Enforceability 
That contracts between the various commercial entities involved in international carriage by air 
contain such far-reaching indemnity clauses is one thing, whether such clauses will be enforced 
by the courts is another. The purported influence achieved through contractual indemnities in the 
litigation of passenger claims is conditional on their enforceability. A contractual indemnity is 
undoubtedly capable of being construed as an exemption clause18 and this is one area in which 
they may run into trouble. The English courts introduced strict controls for exemptions clauses, 
i.e. the general rules19 and the special, stricter, Canada Steamship rules for negligence liability.20 
There is no question that these principles apply as much to indemnities as they do to exemption 
clauses.21 However, it is submitted, that in the context with which this work is concerned, i.e. 
indemnities between commercial parties with respect to third-party liability, not only will such 
indemnities usually not be classified as exemption clauses, even where they are so defined the 
chance of such a clause falling afoul of the restrictions is slim to none.  
There are three qualifications which must be noted in respect of the enforceability of 
contractual indemnities in the aviation context. Firstly, there has been a major shift in judicial 
attitude in recent times which has seen the courts adopt a much more flexible approach to the 
construction of exemption clauses in a commercial context.22 In these cases, these principles 
(such as the Canada Steamship rules) may still be applied but with much less vigour, the courts 
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Ltd [1974] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 443, 445 (QB).  
22 See Lord Hoffman’s comments, Investors Compensation Scheme Ltd v West Bromwich Building 
Society (No 1) [1998] 1 WLR 896, 912 (HL). See also Caledonia North Sea Ltd v British Telecommunications 
PLC [2002] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 553 (HL).  
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referring to them more in the nature of guidelines.23 
The second critical qualification is that a distinction must be made between an indemnity 
clause as it pertains to the liability between the parties to the contract (i.e. between the indemnitee 
and indemnifier) and an indemnity clause pertaining to the liability owed by one of the parties to 
the contract (i.e. the indemnitee) to a third party.24 In the latter case, it is the third party who has 
suffered loss for which the indemnitee is liable on some basis (e.g. negligence). Here, the 
indemnitee turns to the indemnifier and seeks to enforce the contractual indemnity whereby the 
indemnifier will assume the liability to hold harmless the indemnitee for the economic loss it has 
incurred from compensating the third party. This is sometimes referred to as a risk-allocation 
clause.25 The key point is that such a clause is not regarded as an exemption clause because it 
does not involve the exemption of a legal duty or obligation which one party would other bear the 
other. Therefore, the common law principles applicable to exemption clauses would not apply. 
This is exactly the scenario with which we are concerned in this work. To give an example, a 
carrier gives a contractual indemnity to a manufacturer in an aircraft purchase agreement by 
which it agrees to indemnify the manufacturer for any liability that the manufacturer incurs for 
death or personal injury of a passenger arising from the use of the aircraft by the carrier. There 
are two liabilities involved, the one owed by the manufacturer to the claimant passenger (i.e. 
liability in tort) and the one owed by the carrier to the manufacturer (i.e. liability to indemnify). The 
indemnity clause does not affect the liability owed by the manufacturer to the claimant passenger, 
all it does is determine who should pay the final bill for that liability.26 
The third critical qualification to be noted is the introduction of specific legislation aimed at 
controlling exemption and indemnity clauses. The first point to note is that such legislation is often 
specific to consumer contracts and thus not applicable to commercial contracts. Secondly, even 
where legislation is directed at commercial contracts, such as the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 
(UCTA), the scope of application to aviation contracts is narrow and the regime non-hostile. 
Although UCTA is directed at terms seeking to avoid what it calls “business liability”27 it is not 
concerned with all exemption clauses. Like the common law, it does not apply to risk allocation 
clauses.28 In addition, the application of the Act is specifically excluded from certain types of 
contract, most relevant for our purposes, is the non-application of UCTA to insurance contracts29 
or to international supply contracts, e.g. aircraft lease or sales agreements.30 Also, and of great 
relevance to aviation is the non-application of UCTA to certain contracts with a foreign element; 
which of course covers many commercial aviation contracts. The scope of application of UCTA 
to the type of indemnity clause employed between commercial aviation parties is thus very 
narrow. Even where an indemnity clause would be subject to UCTA’s provisions, it would only be 
                                                       
23 See e.g., Photo Production v Securicor Transport Ltd [1980] AC 827, 851 (HL); Mir Steel UK Ltd v 
Morris [2013] 2 All ER 54, [35] (CA); Wood v Capita Insurance Services Ltd [2017] UKSC 24, [2017] AC 
1173. 
24 This distinction is illustrated by contrasting two cases, i.e. Phillips Products Ltd v Hyland (n 18) and 
Thompson v T Lohan (Plant Hire) Ltd [1987] 1 WLR 649 (CA).  
25 Courtney (n 3) 92–94. 
26 R Christou Drafting Commercial Agreements (6th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2016) pt 1.7. 
27 Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 (UK) s 1(3). 
28 Thompson (n 24) 657.  
29 For other exemptions, see UCTA 1977 (n 27) Schedule 1.  
30 ibid s 26. 
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subject to the test of reasonableness required under s 2(2).31 Given the commercial context and 
the sophistication of the parties involved, the courts in today’s judicial climate are unlikely to find 
such clauses unreasonable.  
For all these reasons, contractual indemnities between commercial entities in the aviation 
industry can, for the most part, be regarded as iron clad. In an aviation context, these contractual 
indemnities make carriers the repositories of the risk of third-party liability to passengers. Even 
where a passenger claim is brought against an aircraft or component manufacturer, or whichever 
other aviation business entity one cares to mention, the reality is, with few exceptions, that the 
complex web of contractual indemnities will lead back to the carrier. The carrier will have little 
option but fulfil its assumed contractual duties to indemnify other parties and pick up the bill. But, 
there is one further aspect to be explored, that is, the fact that carriers arrange for this risk to be 
shifted to an insurer. It is to the role of insurance that this work now turns. 
 
8.3 Insurance 
The contractual indemnities agreed by carriers with third parties such as manufacturers allocate 
the risk of liability to passengers (and much more besides) to the carrier. This is not done for 
charitable, ethical or legal reasons but for purely commercially motivated reasons and is 
predicated on the fact of insurance. The carrier prefers to accept the allocation of risk because it 
knows it will transfer that risk to the insurance market and because it believes that the ultimate 
cost of doing so will be cheaper where it sources the insurance coverage itself. Were the carrier 
to refuse to accept the allocation of risk then the manufacturer (or other third party) would be 
required to purchase the extra coverage necessary and this would be factored into the purchase 
price of the aircraft. In simple terms, carriers prefer to buy cheaper aircraft and assume the risk 
and cost of insuring against liability. Through contractual indemnities and similar risk allocation 
devices, the parties agree between themselves who is going to carry the risk of liability, but, more 
realistically speaking, it is a matter of deciding who is going to assume the primary obligation to 
insure against that risk.  
This section begins by providing some background on aviation insurance agreements. The 
greater share of this section will be focused on the doctrine of subrogation, the device by which 
the insurer is able to assume claims control and acquires the right to bring third-party actions. 
This shall be presented from an English law perspective, this being justified by the size, 
importance and influence of the UK aviation insurance market globally. As one distinguished 
commentator on aviation insurance notes, ‘[w]ith the London market being recognized as the 
international centre for aviation insurance ... common law principles have a strong influence in 
the formulation and interpretation of aviation insurance policies.’32  
 
8.3.1  Aviation Insurance Policies 
Aviation insurance comprises policies issued to aircraft operators (e.g. carriers), aircraft 
                                                       
31 ibid s 2(2).  
32 W Müller-Rostin ‘Insurance’ in S Hobe, N von Ruckteschell and D Heffernan (eds), Cologne 
Compendium on Air Law in Europe (Carl Heymanns Verlag 2013) 1095. 
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manufacturers, component manufacturers, airports, aviation maintenance and repair providers, 
aviation service providers and so on.33 As is to be expected, there are substantial differences 
between various aviation insurance policies. Nevertheless, there is also a great deal of 
standardization to be found in the documentation employed by the aviation insurance market. 
This is in large part thanks to the efforts of various groups within the market who have produced 
voluminous libraries of standard clauses which are combined and utilized by the market to tailor 
individual policies to meet specific requirements. In 1949, the Lloyd’s Aviation Underwriting 
Association (LAUA) drafted a standard aircraft policy referred to as AVN 1. This standard has 
been amended over the years, most recently by the Aviation Insurance Clauses Group (AICG) 
who produced AVN 1D in 2014. However, it is its predecessor, AVN 1C, which is still more 
commonly used.34 For commercial airlines, it is more common for the broker to prepare a policy 
specific to the airline but generally utilizing various standard clauses from AVN 1C and 
augmenting it with others produced by the AICG and other groups. These standard clauses will 
be relied upon in this work because actual airline policies are not publically available. 
Within the field of aviation insurance, coverage for several categories of risk can be purchased. 
In some respects, an aviation insurance policy can be regarded as amalgamation of separate 
policies under a single document. As a result, a policy may contain a schedule of insurance which 
consists of multiple sections each addressed to a particular risk. Aviation insurance falls into 
several categories of cover which are listed in the policy as separate sections, such as loss or 
damage to the aircraft (i.e. hull), liability to passengers, liability to third-parties,35 and war and 
allied perils. Each of these sections will usually provide specifics as to coverage, exclusions, 
conditions and possibly extensions of cover. The limits, deductibles and premiums are generally 
itemized for each type of insurance provided under the policy. When it comes to liability for death 
or injury to passengers and third-parties, aviation policies do not usually have deductibles but an 
overall limitation will be specified, generally between $1.5 and $2 billion per occurrence.36 
We are concerned with the category of risk referred to as aviation legal liability. This is a type 
of “liability insurance” defined by Clarke as covering ‘the monetary impact of legal claims against 
policyholders and, crucially, sometimes the cost of defending claims’.37 The aviation insurance 
market categorizes aviation legal liability into several categories and a fundamental distinction 
applies between liability to passengers and liability to third-parties. From the airline perspective, 
our attention is on passenger liability insurance as this is the category into which WCS and MC99 
claims fall.  
Subject to applicable limitations and deductibles, aviation legal liability insurance for 
passengers grants the insured airline an indemnity from the insurer against all sums which the 
insured shall become legally liable to pay as damages for bodily injury to passengers or property 
damage to baggage or personal articles caused by an occurrence arising out of, or in connection 
                                                       
33 See Margo (n 1) 12.  
34 ibid [10.01] n 3.  
35 Here, the term “third party” is used to refer to non-passengers, i.e. third parties to the contract of 
carriage, rather than third parties to the contract of insurance. 
36 Margo (n 1) [12.05] n 1. Viccars also cites a limit of liability as high as $1.5 to $2 billion (USD). PJC 
Viccars Aviation Insurance: A PlaneMan’s Guide (2nd edn, Witherby Insurance & Legal 2012) 20. 
37 MA Clarke ‘Insurance’ in A Burrows (ed), English Private Law (OUP 2013) 785. 
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with, the insured’s operation of aircraft.38 This cover includes liability of the airline for losses 
caused by the negligence of its employees, i.e. vicarious liability. It will usually cover the insured 
carrier’s defence costs too.39 
It goes without saying that insurance coverage is not absolute, in addition to monetary 
limitations there are also limitations on coverage. The description of cover contained in the 
schedule of insurance in a policy provides, in and of itself, a form of exclusion insofar as it defines 
the circumstances in which the duty to indemnify will arise. Prima facie, if the loss suffered does 
not fall within the description of cover then the insurer is not on risk and no duty to indemnify can 
arise. Supplemental to the basic coverage provided by a policy are exclusions; usually laid down 
in an exclusions section. The significance of an exclusion, whether it be general or specific, is that 
where the loss suffered by the insured comes within the scope of the exclusion the insurer is 
entitled to refuse to indemnify the insured against the loss.40 An example of an exclusion clause 
is one to the effect that the policy will not apply where the aircraft is operated outside the 
geographical limits specified in the policy schedule. 
The general exclusions portion of the policy will usually also include detailed exclusions which 
are attached from standard clauses produced by the aviation insurance market. The most relevant 
attached exclusion clause is the “War, Hi-Jacking and Other Perils Exclusion Clause” (AVN 48B). 
This particular exclusion clause operates to exclude claims arising from a range of perils. Aside 
from the obvious cases of war and hijacking, AVN 48B excludes claims arising from, inter alia, 
‘strikes, riots, civil commotions or labour disturbances’, and ‘[a]ny malicious act or act of 
sabotage.’41 It is very common for these general exclusions to be written back into the policy by 
way of an endorsement.  
Broadly speaking, an endorsement is a document (standard or non-standard) attached to an 
insurance policy which modifies the policy in some way. An endorsement may provide additional 
coverage to the basic policy, for instance, by increasing the limits of liability or by extending cover 
to a type of risk not covered by the basic policy. In simple terms, endorsements are add-ons to 
the basic policy which allow the parties to customize the coverage to their needs. Another 
common usage for an endorsement is for “writing back” something excluded in the basic policy. 
Since war and related perils are always excluded by the policy, some cover may be reinstated for 
this via an endorsement. AVN 52E is the standard clause currently in use for this purpose. To 
illustrate this, let us take the tragic case of the Germanwings Flight 9525. Here, the co-pilot—in 
an apparent act of suicide—deliberately crashed the aircraft into the French Alps killing himself 
and all others on board. Such an event would certainly be construed as a malicious act which is 
excluded by an aviation insurer under AVN 48B. Therefore, but for that clause the insurer would 
be liable to indemnify the insured. However, in all likelihood an insurer would likely be liable to 
indemnify a carrier in such circumstances but only because coverage for war risks (including 
malicious acts) would have been written-back into the policy by way of an endorsement, albeit 
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LexisNexis 2019) div IX [38].  
39 Margo (n 1) [23.39].  
40 ibid [10.49] See also De Maurier (Jewels) Ltd v Bastion Insurance Co Ltd [1967] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 550 
(Com Ct). 
41 See “War, Hi-Jacking and Other Perils Exclusion Clause (Aviation)” (AVN 48B).  
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under differing terms.42 A standard endorsement exists within the aviation insurance market for 
this purpose, i.e. AVN 52E. Alternatively, the carrier may separately arrange cover from a 
specialized war risks insurer. In either case, the norm is that carriers will be amply covered. 
This brief overview of aviation insurance contracts intends only to demonstrate the fact and 
ubiquity of aviation insurance, specifically of carriers, and the extent of the coverage involved. As 
explained in the introduction to this Chapter, insurance coverage for carrier liability to passengers 
is mandated by law, so much so that it is all but universal. The sophisticated contracts of insurance 
employed within the aviation industry provide the insureds with very comprehensive protection 
against loss, damage or liability arising from accidents. Not only can the insured shift the risk of 
liability to the insurer under these policies, it can also immunize itself against its own legal costs 
and those awarded to the claimant passenger incurred in the process of defending claims brought 
against it. Naturally, to enjoy these benefits the carrier must pay a premium, but the cost of these 
premiums is negligible in comparison to the potentially disastrous consequences of a major 
disaster. Indeed, one distinguished commentator has stated that ‘[w]hilst insurance is an 
indispensable prerequisite for an air carrier’s operation, its actual cost is relatively small, usually 
averaging less than two percent of the total operating cost of the flight.’43  
The facts are, the carrier (as well as other commercial aviation parties) is comprehensively 
insured against passenger liability, in most cases not having to pay a penny itself to the victim of 
an aviation accident, neither in compensation nor as costs. In addition, deductibles are not 
generally a feature of aviation insuring agreements for passenger liability and the overall limits 
provided under policies are massive (ranging from $1.5 to $2 billion per occurrence).44 The near 
universal existence of such insurance almost guarantees that in the event of an aviation 
catastrophe the resources are in place to provide the victims and their families with the 
compensation that they are entitled to under the terms of the applicable conventions, even where 
the carrier has long since become insolvent or has been wound-up. However, insurance has its 
limitations and there remain circumstances—however rare—in which the carrier remains 
vulnerable to the risk of liability and where the passenger is left at the mercy of the carrier’s 
solvency. This is a factor which must not be overlooked and to which this work shall return in the 
concluding chapter.  
 
8.4 Subrogation 
The doctrine of subrogation has its origins in Mason v Sainsbury, a case concerning the 
destruction of a house during riots in 1780. The owner of the house had been indemnified for 
losses under an insurance policy. The insurers then sought to recover against the hundred (i.e. 
the local district) by bringing an action against it in the name of the insured under the Riot Act 
1714. The defendant argued that the owner had had a choice between suing under the Riot Act 
or recovering under his insurance contract; having elected the latter, the owner’s loss had been 
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satisfied and therefore, the action could not be maintained in his name. Nor, it was argued, did 
the insurer have any cause of action since it had suffered no loss by the defendant’s acts, its risk 
was covered by the premium it received from its insured. The question posed by the facts of this 
case was when should an insurer be able to recover from third-parties for sums paid to the insured 
by way of indemnification for a loss which the third-party is liable for? The doctrine of subrogation 
provides the answer and Lord Mansfield’s judgment in Mason v Sainsbury is frequently cited as 
authority of its application in non-marine insurance cases.45 
Under the common law, a contract of indemnification might permit an insured party to recover 
more than his actual loss because his right to indemnification from the insurer is not affected by 
his having a right of action against a third-party for the same loss.46 In other words, it is no defence 
to the insurer to argue that the insured has a claim against the wrongdoer. Likewise, where the 
insured sues the wrongdoing third-party for the loss, the fact that he has insurance does not affect 
his claim against the third-party.47 Therefore, the injured party could theoretically recover twice 
for his loss, once by way of a claim against the wrongdoer and the other by way of indemnification 
by his insurer. As stated in Arnould’s Law of Marine Insurance and Average (hereinafter Arnould), 
‘it is entirely foreign to the spirit of contracts of indemnity that a person damnified should recover 
his loss more than once.’48 For this reason, the common law recognizes that the indemnifying 
party has rights against the indemnified which are collectively referred to under the doctrine of 
subrogation. Subrogation is inherent to the contract of indemnification and is established upon 
the basic principle that a party shall not be over-indemnified. 
 
8.4.1  Two Aspects of Subrogation 
In its broad sense, subrogation is identified as giving rise to two entitlements. First, the right of 
the insurer to step into the insured’s shoes and exercise any causes of action vested in the insured 
against third-parties. Second, the right of the insurer to recover from the insured any sums 
received from third-parties in respect of the insured loss. Colinvaux’s Law of Insurance 
(hereinafter Colinvaux) argues that the first is the only true instance of subrogation.49 It is 
submitted that this view is to be preferred. While the term subrogation is used to refer to the 
second case, it is does not strictly amount to subrogation since it involves the exercise of a 
personal right of the insurer against the insured and not the subrogated exercise of the insured’s 
cause of action against a third-party.  
In the first, the doctrine of subrogation grants to the insurer the right to the benefit of any rights 
or remedies of the insured against third-parties which may relieve or lessen the loss for which 
indemnification has been paid. This aspect of subrogation was alluded to by Lord Mansfield in 
Mason v Sainsbury and probably accounts for why it is considered the first authority on 
subrogation in non-marine insurance, he said: ‘Every day the insurer is put in the place of the 
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insured. … The insurer uses the name of the insured.’50 In practical terms, the insurer’s right of 
subrogation gives to it the right to control proceedings against third-parties in the name of the 
insured, i.e. claims control.51  
The second aspect to which the term subrogation is applied typically entitles the insurer to 
receive from the insured any money received in damages from third-parties liable for the 
indemnified loss.52 As stated in Arnould, ‘[a]n insurer is therefore entitled both to the benefit of 
any recovery actually made by the assured in diminution of his loss, and to the benefit of any such 
recovery that the assured has the right to make (but has not yet made).’53 
It is the first aspect of subrogation that we are primarily concerned because it is this which 
gives the insurer the power of claims control. However, insurers will usually include a contractual 
clause to this effect in the policy rather than rely on common law subrogation. The major 
consequence is that it is the insurer—not the insured—who is really calling all the shots in 
proceedings brought against the insured as the party allegedly liable to the claimant. As Brett LJ 
said in 1882 in Wilson v Rafflalovich: 
The underwriters are, in the sense in which the phrase is always used, the real 
plaintiffs, that is, they are the persons instructing the solicitors, the persons paying 
for the action, the persons to benefit by the action, and the persons to lose by the 
action if it is lost; but in point of law they are not the plaintiffs, the plaintiffs on the 
record being the only persons who can be recognized as plaintiffs.54 
Whilst the right of subrogation is subject to some limitations at common law, e.g. it is only 
exercisable once the insured has been fully indemnified,55 these are either not of relevance to 
third-party liability policies of the type we are concerned with or can be mitigated by an express 
provision in the insurance contract. Rather than relying on the common law of subrogation to 
grant it claims control, the insurer can make use of the policy to grant it expressly by contract.56 
The doctrine of subrogation provides the insurer with an invaluable right of claims control which 
is subject to few limitations at common law. The first such limitation can be resolved by means of 
making the right of subrogation contractual by inclusion of a clause in the insurance contract. The 
second, i.e. that the doctrine does not arise in the case of non-indemnity insurance, is certainly 
of great relevance to life insurance but is largely inapplicable in the context of aviation insurance 
which is almost entirely of the indemnity type. The third limitation undoubtedly applies in the case 
of aviation insurance but its impact is dependent on the nature and extent of the liability relations 
between the insured and third parties, e.g. the contractual indemnities agreed between the 
various commercial aviation entities. The next step, is to look closer at the role played by 
subrogation in the field of aviation litigation. 
 
8.4.2  Aviation Litigation and Subrogation 
In conversation with aviation litigators it becomes abundantly clear that it is the insurer who is, so 
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to speak, “calling all the shots”. This is a state of affairs that is enthusiastically acknowledged by 
plaintiff lawyers, for whom it almost goes without saying. Whereas, on the defence side lawyers 
are eager to downplay the role of the insurer; they know not to bite the hand that feeds them. 
Depending on the parties involved, the air carrier may have some influence over how the litigation 
is pursued, not by matter of law or contract but down to commercial considerations. A large airline 
is a valuable customer to an aviation insurer and the market is highly competitive so the desire to 
keep the insured happy will influence the power-play. The insurer will generally stress this aspect 
of the arrangement and emphasize the importance of not only satisfying the insured but of 
protecting its interests. Clearly, each situation is unique and the relative bargaining strength of 
the parties will influence the de facto control of proceedings. For instance, a very large 
international air carrier opposed to the course of action pursued by its insurer (e.g. to concede 
liability in litigation) may be able to exert sufficient influence over its insurer to alter the course of 
litigation. The insurer’s interest is in minimizing its exposure and reaching a settlement with the 
manufacturer whereas the airline is primarily concerned with the negative impact that conceding 
liability would have for its business. It is therefore impossible to generalize but one thing is clear, 
it is the insurer who controls the purse strings and it is the insurer who is in the driver’s seat when 
it comes to making decisions.57 
AVN 1C contains a claims control clause which provides: ‘The Insurers shall be entitled (if they 
so elect) at any time and for so long as they desire to take absolute control of all negotiations and 
proceedings and in the name of the Insured to settle, defend or pursue any claim.’58 AVN 1D 
contains provisions to similar effect.59 AVN 1C and AVN 1D also provide for subrogation based 
on a payment being made under the policy which could be construed as sufficient to grant the 
insurer a contractual right to subrogation (including claims control) irrespective of the full 
indemnification of the insured’s loss. 
Even in the case that the insured retains the right of claims control—a rarity in aviation 
insurance—the insured nonetheless owes a duty of good faith to the insurer in respect of claims 
against third-parties. In many cases this will have been codified as a contractual obligation within 
the policy.60 As a result, even if the insurer cannot control the proceedings, its potential to seek 
damages against the insured for any prejudice caused by the insured’s own handling of the claim 
against the third-party gives to the insurer indirect control. It is a safe working assumption that the 
insurer of a commercial air carrier will have claims control and this sub-section shall continue on 
that basis.  
There are two aspects to claims control, firstly, it grants the insurer control of proceedings 
brought against the insured, and secondly, it also gives to the insurer the power to bring third-
party actions in the name of the insured. However, a word of caution must be mentioned here 
with respect to joint insurance in light of the decision of a majority of UK Supreme Court in Gard 
Marine & Energy Ltd v China National Chartering Company Ltd (The Ocean Victory).61 The 
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majority determined that subrogation will not operate for the insurer for an action between the co-
insureds. As joint insurance is not commonplace in the aviation insurance market this is unlikely 
to prove problematic and insurers can be expected to act to counter it. 
 
8.4.2.1  Claims Control 
In most jurisdictions, although the insurer has claims control, the litigation in question will be taken 
in the name of the claimant against the insured, e.g. the carrier. The insurer’s name will not appear 
anywhere on the court docket. Therefore, although the insurer may not be the de jure liable party, 
he is the real defendant in interest since the litigation is being primarily conducted in accordance 
with its instructions and in pursuance of its benefit. The reality is that a passenger bringing an 
action against a carrier under WCS or MC99 is not taking on the party with whom it concluded 
the contract of carriage or the carrier who actually performed the flight in question, instead he is 
facing off against a party with whom he has neither contracted, nor one that was ever within his 
contemplation. In some jurisdictions, e.g. New York, a direct action against an insurer is possible 
and an insurer may be obligated to take any subrogated actions in its own name.62 However, this 
is exceptional. In the vast majority of jurisdictions around the world, the insurer can pull the strings 
from behind the curtain without fear of revealing itself; which is especially beneficial where a jury 
is involved.  
Claims control by the insurer fundamentally alters the dynamics of aviation litigation. Not only 
is the imbalance in power between the claimant and defendant shifted even further in favour of 
the latter, the insurer’s interests may differ significantly from those of the carrier. Whilst a carrier 
may be eager to settle, the insurer may wish to challenge the quantum to be paid in damages. 
Claims control—indeed subrogation itself—undermines the theory of corrective justice. For many 
claimants, especially in cases involving the death of passengers, a primary objective for litigation 
is vindication of the rights of the decedent passenger against the party actually liable for their 
death. This is best served by ensuring that it is the carrier who must assume the duty of answering 
for their wrongdoing and compensate the passenger out of their own pocket. Claims control by 
the insurer removes the carrier one step from the litigation and defeats the element of corrective 
justice embodied in the carrier itself compensating the victim. Clearly, MC99 contemplated 
insurance and was not intended to solely embody principles of corrective justice, but the adequacy 
with which it has considered the role actually played by the insurer in litigation of claims taken 
under it and the extent to which the interests of the insurer drive the efficacy of MC99 as a 
compensatory system is a question to which the concluding chapter of this work shall attend. 
 
8.4.2.2  Right to Bring Third-Party Actions 
The right of the insurer to step into the shoes of its insured and take advantage of rights and 
benefits accruing to the insured in respect of the loss for which it has been indemnified by the 
insurer provides extraordinary potential for loss shifting. This aspect of subrogation is often put 
front-of-stage by supporters of the doctrine who argue that it ensures that the cost of 
                                                       
62 See e.g., Royal Insurance v Amerford Air Cargo 654 F Supp 679 (SDNY 1987). 
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compensating the victim is ultimately borne by the responsible party.63 In this sense, it can 
promote corrective justice. In a similar vein, it is argued that subrogation lowers the costs of 
premiums since it reduces the final sum paid by the insurer as indemnification. However, 
scepticism has been expressed by some courts as to whether or not the insurer actually includes 
subrogation recoveries into the calculation of premiums or whether it treats them as a windfall.64 
In any case, these arguments are, on other grounds, less persuasive in the context of the aviation 
insurance market for reasons detailed below. 
Subrogation cuts both ways in aviation litigation, where the carrier is sued by the passenger 
then the carrier’s insurer is entitled to take subrogated third-party actions against other liable 
parties, such as the aircraft manufacturer. Likewise, where the manufacturer is held liable in a 
product liability action taken by the passenger against it, subrogated actions by insurer of the 
manufacturer against the carrier or other parties is a distinct possibility. 
The value of a subrogated claim against a third-party will depend on a number of factors. 
Firstly, in many cases, the same insurer will be involved on both sides, being the insurance carrier 
for at least part of the risk of both the carrier and the manufacturer. Second, there will more than 
likely be a pre-existing contractual relationship between the insured and third-party so any 
contractual provisions which affect the insured’s right of action against the third-party will be 
binding on the insurer. For instance, if the insured carrier has given to the third-party manufacturer 
contractual indemnities of the type discussed earlier in this chapter, then the right of subrogation 
will most likely be worthless. In addition, the parties may have agreed a waiver of subrogation 
clause which the insured will be obliged to make provision for in its insurance policy. In the case 
of leasing agreements, the lessor will always require that the lessee carrier take out and maintain 
insurance and that the lessor shall be named as an additional insured.65 This will prevent the 
carrier’s insurer from bringing a subrogated claim against the lessor. As the grantor of contractual 
indemnities, waivers, etc., the carrier is thus placed in the position of having the risk contractually 
allocated to it, a risk it then shifts to the insurer who will be unable to rely on subrogation to shift 
it elsewhere.  
However, the insurer of the recipient of these contractual indemnities and related mechanisms 
will have the option to utilize subrogation to shift the loss off of its shoulders and onto those of the 
carrier. But, since the carrier is itself insured, the reality of subrogation in an aviation market where 
insurance is so ubiquitous is that the loss is merely shifted from one insurer to another. The net 
impact of which is not only that it necessitates the duplication of insurance but it also results in 
immense cost. Subrogation is a wasteful and extremely costly process which only adds to the 
overall cost of litigation.66 In turn, this results in higher insurance premiums which are ultimately 
paid for by the consumer for international carriage by air. In this scenario, the justifications of 
subrogation—as promoting corrective justice by ensuring that the responsible party pays and that 
it also reduces the premiums charged—are of doubtful value since it is the insurer of the 
                                                       
63 P Cane Atiyah’s Accidents, Compensation and the Law (8th edn, CUP 2013) 377. 
64 Derham quotes a dictum of Swann J from De Cespedes v Prudence Mutual Casualty Co of Chicago 
193 So 2d 224, 227-8 (1966) in which he stated: ‘“[Subrogation] has frequently become a source of windfall 
to insurers in that the anticipated recoveries under subrogation rights are generally not reflected in the 
computation of premium rates.”’ Derham (n 52) 153. 
65 See AVN 67 Airline Finance/Lease Contract Endorsement. 
66 See Cane (n 63) 378. 
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responsible party who pays and who will therefore figure the cost into the future premiums 
charged. 
The fact that the insurer can do all this in the insured’s name is of enormous value to an insurer 
who is desperate to keep its name out of the litigation. Its anonymity is chiefly motivated by the 
fear that ‘the knowledge of the existence of liability insurance is likely to affect the jury both in the 
allocation of responsibility and in the assessment of damages.’67 Naturally, where the dispute is 
to be decided by a judge this motivation is less pressing as the judge will be well aware of who is 
who. As Sir Richard Aikens (Lord Justice of Appeal) noted in the preface to Merkin & Steele’s 
Insurance and the Law of Obligations, [t]he fact that the claimant was actually a subrogated 
insurer and the defence was being maintained by the defendant’s liability insurer have traditionally 
been treated as the unacknowledged elephants in the court room.’68 Even still, the insurer is keen 
to maintain a low profile and subrogation facilitates this by obfuscating its presence as the true 
party in interest. The reality is that the nominal claimant or defendant has long since been 
indemnified by its insurer and plays only a supporting (if any) role in the proceedings.  
 
8.4.3  Concluding Remarks 
The prevalence of insurance coverage for international carriage of passengers by air is a boon 
for the travelling public. It all but ensures that the resources necessary to satisfy claims will be 
available in the event of an accident. In addition, insurance also means that in most cases the 
passenger’s right to compensation will not be defeated by the financial dire straits of fly-by-night 
operators such as West Caribbean Airways. The stark reality is that by way of subrogation— 
regardless of what the docket says—it is the insurer who is calling the shots in the vast majority 
of aviation litigation of passenger claims. The result of which is that there is a hidden cost of 
insurance for the claimant passenger, one that is not always readily apparent but which is 
nevertheless pernicious. 
By holding claims control, it is the insurer’s interest in choice of forum which becomes 
paramount. The carrier is effectively removed from the equation in all but name. This undoubtedly 
changes the dynamics involved in aviation litigation. Most notably, the question of the liability of 
the carrier is seldom the concern, except perhaps where the carrier has sufficient commercial 
power to sway the insurer. Instead, it is simply a matter of the quantum of damages that will have 
to be paid in settlement of the claim. Whether it settles a claim in the US or almost anywhere else 
is the key factor driving the insurer to challenge the claimant passenger’s choice of forum. 
“Anywhere but here” is the mantra of the aviation insurer when it comes to being sued in a US 
court. FNC is thus manna from heaven for the insurer and it is zealously employed, not as a 
device for ensuring fairness and convenience in forum selection, but as a means of mitigating the 
cost of the insurer’s duty to indemnify its insured.  
Subrogation further empowers the insurer in this battle over forum because its ability to bring 
third-party actions can be exploited to secure a jurisdictional advantage. Whilst claimants can add 
                                                       
67 Cane (n 98) 378. See also JT Ray Jr ‘The Loan Receipt and Insurers’ Subrogation - How to Become 
the Real Party in Interest Without Really Lying’ (1975) 50 Tul L Rev 115, 119–120. 
68 R Merkin and J Steele Insurance and the Law of Obligations (OUP 2013) Preface. 
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alternative defendants to proceedings to do likewise, they are not, unlike the defendants, able to 
count on the cooperation of those parties. In some cases, the claimant might be able to play the 
defendants off against each other, but, in most cases, it will be the defendants teaming-up against 
the claimant.  
There are of course cases in which subrogation is employed toward a genuine goal of shifting 
the loss from the insurer (who has indemnified its insured) to the actual party at fault. This is 
especially important in the case of a regime such as MC99 which provides for no-fault liability of 
the carrier. Where this strategy succeeds, then it is arguable that it keeps the costs of premiums 
down and by extension the passenger pays a lower fare but there is a social cost involved to the 
claimant whose road to receiving compensation is made so much longer and more arduous. In 
addition, the reality of aviation litigation is that the loss is not shifted to the party at fault but to its 
insurer. Thus, instead of reducing the overall loss to be spread across the market, the loss is just 
shifted—at great expense—from one loss-spreading insurer to another with the cost of doing so 






Conclusion to Part Four 
The goal of Part Four of this work was to prove that MC99, as the successor to WCS, is built upon 
an anachronistic understanding of itself as a discrete system for the resolution of passenger 
claims arising out of international carriage by air. This involved showing how that system is 
premised upon a two-party paradigm of claimant passenger versus defendant carrier that no 
longer accords with the reality of international aviation litigation. The legal environment that 
existed in 1929, i.e. at the time of the Warsaw Convention’s drafting, has evolved enormously due 
to various socio-political factors.  
We have focused on the emergence of alternative remedies for claimant passengers. This 
means that MC99 is really just a part of a larger aviation accident passenger compensation 
system. One major impact of this new reality is that through these alternative remedies against 
alternative defendants (i.e. other than the carrier) claimants’ choice of forum has been expanded. 
Claimants will take advantage of this when choosing in which forum to pursue an action for 
compensation, even if that means foregoing an action under MC99 and, thereby, risking the 
undermining of that Convention’s goals. 
Another effect of the changing legal environment is that international aviation litigation has 
become multi-party in nature. Partly as a result of the emergence of alternative remedies, courts 
and/or legislators have made provision for third-party actions for contribution and indemnification 
on the basis of common liability between the defendants and the injured party, i.e. the claimant 
passenger. Aside from also creating risks of undermining or circumventing the provisions and 
goals of MC99, third-party actions have created an avenue for third-party influence in what was 
previously a two-party relationship between the claimant passenger and defendant carrier. This 
third-party influence is felt most strongly on the defence side as it is exploited by the defendants 
to secure a jurisdictional advantage against the claimant passenger. In making their choice of 
forum, the claimant passenger must contend, not only with the competing interests of the carrier 
but also those of third parties.  
The final piece of the bigger picture to be revealed is the role played by risk management 
devices, specifically contractual indemnities and aviation insurance. In addition to the liability 
relations that arise by force of law between defendant stakeholders to international aviation 
litigation, as evidenced by third-party actions for contribution/indemnification, there are also 
underlying contractual relations whereby these parties allocate the risk of their liability to 
passengers. We have found that this risk is generally shifted to the carrier who, in turn, shifts that 
risk to the insurer who then spreads it across the aviation insurance market. The near-universal 
presence of insurance cover and the paramount role played by insurers is perhaps the most 
potent instrument for third-party influence. Through claims control and subrogation, it is the 
insurer’s interests which become controlling. The reality of contractual indemnities and insurance 
underlines the multi-party nature of international aviation litigation, augments our appreciation of 
third-party influence and fills out our conception of the bigger picture by showing how risk is 
actually allocated.  
With the bigger picture now exposed, how should we address the challenges facing MC99 







Chapter 9: The Way Forward is Back 
The catalyst for this work was the doctrinal conundrum posed by the West Caribbean Airways 
litigation. Should a claimant’s choice of forum under MC99 be absolute and inviolable, or, should 
it be subject to the discretion of the chosen forum to decline to exercise that jurisdiction? The US 
court aligned itself with the latter position by granting FNC dismissal but the French Cour de 
Cassation reached the opposite conclusion by declaring that a court could not invoke a doctrine 
such as FNC to disturb the claimant’s choice. It was in the hope of resolving this standoff over 
FNC and MC99 that this work first conceived. 
Having familiarized ourselves in Chapter 2 with the doctrine of FNC in its various doctrinal 
manifestations, we considered the perspective of the civilian legal system on declining jurisdiction 
in Chapter 3. Thus forearmed, Chapter 4 began with analysis of the jurisdictional regime of the 
Warsaw Convention and the place of FNC therein. Although the practice had been to apply the 
doctrine, the courts in the UK and US eventually reached the conclusion its application was 
inconsistent with a convention agreed in 1929 by predominantly civilian drafters. It was with some 
surprise that we came to the opposite conclusion with respect to MC99. Whilst sharing the same 
text, MC99’s new drafting history resolved any doubt as to the availability of FNC.  
If we had been able to conclude otherwise, i.e. that the doctrine of FNC was not available 
under MC99 then our journey may have been much easier. Claimant passengers could rely on 
their choice of forum being absolute and the impetus that exists for wasteful litigation over 
jurisdiction would be removed and greater legal certainty provided. In consequence, there would 
be a resulting diminution in the volume of MC99 litigation. This was not, however, where we found 
ourselves. But, if all this would be so, then would not the obvious reform be to amend MC99 to 
expressly make the claimant’s right to choose their forum absolute, thereby precluding the 
application of a discretion to decline jurisdiction? Sadly, no. By targeting a solution solely at FNC 
and MC99, one would be adopting a two-dimensional solution to a three-dimensional problem. 
The truth is that FNC is merely a symptom of a more fundamental ailment within the bigger picture 
of international aviation litigation, one centred on the wider issue of choice of forum and which 
goes beyond MC99. We must not confuse the attempted cure with the underlying illness.  
Simply put, FNC is a doctrinal mechanism for resolving a dispute between litigants regarding 
choice of forum driven by the parties’ conflicting interests over where to litigate. In our analysis of 
these interests in the context of WCS and MC99, a bigger picture emerged in which those regimes 
for passenger compensation were revealed as being just one part of a larger aviation accident 
passenger compensation system. The stakeholders to this multi-party system were identified and 
its organization and means of operation revealed in Chapters 6, 7 and 8. This permitted us to 
reach a vital conclusion, that MC99 (as successor to WCS) is based on an anachronistic 
understanding of international aviation litigation as two-party in nature. Such an understanding 
was justifiable in 1929 but not in 1999 and even less so in 2019. With the emergence of alternative 
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remedies, the realization of rights to contribution and indemnification, and the ubiquity of 
insurance and other risk management devices, the reality of modern aviation litigation of 
passenger claims is that it is predicated on a multi-party system of liability relations. The two-party 
paradigm of the claimant passenger versus defendant carrier has been exploded. In its place 
stands a far more complex multi-party system in which third-party interests play a dominant role.  
The jurisdictional regime established by MC99 does not accommodate this bigger picture and 
the presence of FNC therein means that that the manner in which it regulates choice of forum is 
inadequate, inequitable and outdated. It is fundamentally unfair to the claimant passenger and it 
frustrates—rather than furthers—the policy objectives of MC99. It goes without saying that the 
claimant passenger is prejudiced by the application of FNC. The idea that this prejudice was 
somehow balanced against the interests of defendant carriers has evaporated in light of the bigger 
picture. This reveals that the interests on the defendant carrier’s side receive generous and 
powerful support from its insurer and third-party defendants who are more than willing to 
cooperate to secure a common jurisdictional advantage where it will result in lower net liability.  
When it comes to choice of forum, the balance of interests is thus tipped firmly against the 
claimant passenger and this has prejudicial consequences on the extent and level of 
compensation they can hope to receive. Yet, was it not a stated goal of MC99 to provide a new 
deal which assured claimant passengers of swifter and more equitable compensation in the event 
of an accident? In so doing, it professed to readdress the balance of interests and make 
concessions to the claimant passenger who had hitherto been underserved by WCS. However, 
by failing to appreciate the existence of the bigger picture revealed in this work, the balance of 
interests upon which the jurisdictional regime of MC99 was established was woefully incomplete. 
Consequently, the results derived therefrom are necessarily defective and unsound. Furthermore, 
by leaving the claimant’s choice of forum open to challenge, MC99 incentivizes and generates 
unnecessary litigation over jurisdiction which not only lengthens the process of securing 
compensation in the event of an accident but also adds to its cost (which is then borne by the 
industry and the fare-paying public).  
With the US being the current centre for international aviation litigation, FNC serves an 
important function in controlling forum shopping and keeping the cost of settlements and damages 
awards down. This amounts to a counter-argument for maintaining the availability of FNC within 
MC99. However, it is based on the supposition that there is a need to control forum shopping in 
the context of MC99, a supposition that must be challenged. FNC makes sense within a common 
law system where the jurisdiction of courts is extremely broad and which freely entertains the 
claims of foreigners. Civil law systems manage without an equivalent to FNC precisely because 
the jurisdiction of their courts is more constrained and carefully prescribed. The jurisdictional 
regime of MC99—based as it is on the Warsaw Convention—has a civilian sensibility. It provides 
a limited number of pre-determined forums in which a claimant can sue. These are forums that 
have been selected because they are deemed prima facie appropriate to the parties. In the vast 
majority of cases, the practical reality is that a claimant passenger will most likely only have a 
choice between two or three forums in which to pursue an action for damages against the carrier. 
It is wholly inappropriate and downright disingenuous to accuse a claimant passenger of forum 
shopping when they have selected a forum from among a very limited choice presented to them. 
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As we saw in Chapter 5, the concerns expressed by States at the Montreal Conference regarding 
forum shopping under MC99 were only voiced with respect to the fifth jurisdiction and they 
dissipated once the necessary connecting factors between the carrier and the fifth jurisdiction 
were established. Furthermore, time has proven that the fifth jurisdiction did not—irrespective of 
FNC—open the floodgates to US litigation of foreign claims. Indeed, practitioners acknowledge 
that invocation of the fifth jurisdiction is slight and its economic impact has been extremely 
modest. Therefore, in the context of MC99, forum shopping poses little danger. 
In light of all these considerations it must be concluded that FNC has no place within the 
jurisdictional regime of MC99. The claimant’s choice of forum under MC99 should be absolute 
and inviolable. However, as concluded above, FNC is just a symptom of the wider problem of 
choice of forum in international aviation litigation. Therefore, merely excluding FNC from MC99 
will not be sufficient. Due to the evolution of the legal landscape since the time of the Warsaw 
Convention’s drafting, the claimant now has a multitude of litigation options. In 1929, the only real 
option for the claimant passenger was to sue the carrier because third parties were generally 
beyond reach. As such, the Warsaw Convention was the only show in town. This is no longer the 
case, MC99 is just one of several options.  
This new reality of international aviation litigation is a factor that MC99 has failed to adequately 
respond to. In practical terms, the legal landscape in 1929 meant the Warsaw Convention ring-
fenced passenger claims falling within its scope and it could operate as a discrete passenger 
compensation system, insulated from third parties. This is no longer true. The existence of 
alternative remedies and the reality of third-party actions and contractual indemnities means that 
exposure of the carrier and the industry in general to liability for passenger claims arising from 
international carriage by air is not kept contained within MC99. This undermines MC99 in a 
number of ways.  
Firstly, it generates litigation outside MC99. The knock-on effect of which is that instead of 
providing the fast and equitable compensation envisaged, passenger claims arising from 
accidents are submitted to non-uniform general regimes of liability under which the resulting costs 
will usually be far in excess of what would have been awarded under MC99’s bespoke regime. In 
addition, the liability imposed on the third-party will often be shifted to the carrier by way of third-
party actions and/or contractual indemnities. Where this loss-shifting is contested by the carrier—
in truth, its insurer—the resulting litigation is incredibly expensive. Although this will not trouble 
the claimant passenger, it should concern the industry and the fare-paying public who ultimately 
pick-up the cost.  
Second, is the risk of circumvention of MC99. Where MC99 does not offer the claimant 
passenger their desired choice of forum then we have seen that they will forego MC99 and pursue 
an alternative remedy which does offer them access to that forum. Albeit indirectly, the carrier is 
thereby exposed, via a third-party action taken by this alternative defendant, to litigation of the 
claimant passenger’s action in a forum not specified by MC99. In addition, the risk exists that the 
theory and extent of liability that the carrier will ultimately face may be inconsistent with that 
envisaged by MC99.  
Merely removing the possibility of FNC from MC99 litigation will not resolve these issues. The 
optimal solution is that MC99 should be amended, not only to exclude the application of FNC, but 
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also to explicitly provide that it provides the exclusive remedy for passenger claims falling within 
its substantive scope—not just against the carrier, but against any of a list of specified third parties 
(e.g. the airframe manufacturer, a component manufacturer, an aircraft lessor, an airport 
authority). The claimant passenger’s MC99 action against the carrier would pre-empt claims 
against these specified third parties. In effect, all passenger claims should be channelled through 
MC99 and alternative remedies proscribed. A savings clause should be provided to ensure that 
the carrier’s right of recourse against third parties is not prejudiced. When it comes to the sharing 
or shifting of liability between the carrier and the specified third parties, this should be left—as it 
is at present—to the contractual mechanisms agreed inter se.  
This proposed amendment to the regime would resolve the immediate problem of the 
availability of FNC. It would greatly reduce the volume of litigation of passenger claims as well as 
assure claimants of faster and more equitable compensation in the event of an accident. The risk 
of circumvention would be effectively eliminated by the non-availability of alternative remedies. In 
addition to providing greater certainty and predictability to all stakeholders, these immediate 
consequences would reduce the cost of aviation litigation to the industry.  
Several secondary benefits from flow from this proposal. One such benefit would be the 
avoidance of duplication of aviation insurance. At present, whilst the carrier is under the all-but 
universal legal obligation to insure against liability to passengers, manufacturers and other parties 
involved in international air transport also insure themselves against potential liability to 
passengers. This duplication of insurance is required because of the different bases for liability 
which exist (MC99, products liability, negligence, etc.). Under the proposed regime of exclusive 
carrier liability, the carrier would be the single repository of specified risks and thus the party 
responsible for insuring against them. As a result, other stakeholders would no longer require 
insurance coverage for the same risks. This would reduce the cost of insurance to the aviation 
market and ought to translate into lower fares.  
Such a proposal is not new to international law. A similar proposal was proposed by Cheng1 
and considered by the ILA at its Conference in 1980.2 A draft convention was produced which 
was debated at the 1982 ILA Conference but never came to fruition.3 This proposal was for an 
integrated system of aviation liability under which liability for personal injury or death was to be 
based on the principle of absolute, unlimited and secured liability.4 Crucially, liability was to be 
channelled through the carrier. However, as noted by the authors of Shawcross & Beaumont, the 
‘weakest link’ in the argument was that it proposed to include liability for damage to third parties 
on the surface.5 An additional weakness to the regime was that the proposed channelling was de 
facto rather than de jure.6 It did not propose to legally exclude alternative remedies against third 
parties (e.g. manufacturers) but expected that assured and unlimited recovery against a carrier 
would be a sufficient incentive to achieve that in effect, if not in law. As observed in this thesis, 
                                                       
1 See B Cheng ‘Fifty Years of the Warsaw Convention: Where Do We Go from Here?’ (1979) 28 ZLW 
373, 379–380.  
2 International Law Association ‘Air Law’ (1980) 59 Int’l L Ass’n Rep Conf 471, 479–482. 
3 ibid 553–593. 
4 ibid 583. 
5 D McClean (ed) Shawcross & Beaumont: Air Law (Issue 166, LexisNexis 2019) div VII [184]. 
6 See International Law Association (n 2) 583. An alternative draft had been proposed by Mankiewicz 
which would have made channelling obligatory but it was not preferred. ibid. 
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the availability of an alternative remedy, even where seemingly less attractive, will be exploited 
by claimants where it offers the preferred choice of forum. The advantage of the channelling 
proposal made in this thesis is that it does not extend to liability to third parties7 and it does provide 
for de jure exclusivity of the liability of the carrier.  
 There has been successful implementation of similar proposals in international law. Indeed, 
Cheng’s proposal was inspired by conventions on civil liability for nuclear damage agreed through 
the International Atomic Energy Agency.8 In addition, the International Convention on Civil Liability 
for Oil Pollution Damage 1969 (CLC 1969),9 makes the ship-owner strictly liable for oil pollution 
damage. As amended by in 1992 Protocol,10 it defines a range of persons against whom no 
remedy, either under the Convention or otherwise, can be taken. In addition to servants or agents 
of the ship-owner, the pilot, charterer, operator, any person taking preventative measures, etc., 
are now insulated from liability.11 Thus, CLC 1992 provides a quasi-exclusive remedy against the 
ship-owner. In other words, it channels liability through the ship-owner. At present, CLC 1992 has 
been ratified by 138 States (accounting for 97.75% of world tonnage) and it thus represents a 
compelling analogy which could be applied mutatis mutandis to international carriage by air. 
Channelling claims through the carrier also makes sense in the context of the near-universal 
requirement for carrier insurance that now exists. Insurance that is relatively inexpensive, offers 
very wide coverage and the capacity of which is well in excess of that required to satisfy claims 
in the vast majority of aviation accidents. The carrier’s own financial capacity to meet the cost of 
settlement will not be at issue. Limiting claimants to an MC99 action against the carrier (i.e. 
excluding alternative remedies) will not deprive them of their right to full damages since recovery 
is guaranteed by insurance. There would be no need to pursue alternative remedies where the 
MC99 remedy is capable of satisfying claims in full. There are, of course, exclusions and limits to 
insurance coverage and there will thus remain cases in which the carrier will bear the financial 
burden of meeting claims without the aid of insurance. In such case, the claimant passenger’s 
remedy is dependent on the solvency of the carrier. Where a carrier proves incapable of satisfying 
the full cost of compensating the claimant then the absence of an alternative remedy would be 
prejudicial. This is an issue that would benefit from future research, the conclusions from which 
may require adjustment to the proposals put forward by this work.  
A related issue would pertain to the existing grounds on which the carrier can be exonerated 
from tier-two (i.e. unlimited) liability under MC99. As it stands, the carrier is not liable where it can 
prove: (a) ‘such damage was not due to the negligence or other wrongful act or omission of the 
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signature 27 Nov 1992, entered into force 20 May 1996) 1956 UNTS 255 (CLC Protocol 1992). 
11 International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage (opened for signature 29 Nov 1966, 
entered into force 19 June 1975) 973 UNTS 3, as amended by Protocol to Amend the Convention on Civil 
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carrier or its servants or agents; or (b) such damage was solely due to the negligence or other 
wrongful act or omission of a third party.’12 It is submitted that such grounds for exoneration should 
be removed. However, in their place, the carrier should be entitled to exonerate itself from tier-
two unlimited liability where it can prove the damage arose solely due to the negligence or other 
wrongful act or omission of a third party other than the specified third parties.  
A further issue for future examination is how this proposal would interact with the controversial 
matter of the exclusivity of MC99. In this context, the exclusivity in question pertains to the scope 
of MC99 and of the available remedies found therein. As decided by Supreme Court of the UK 
(then the House of Lords) in Sidhu v British Airways plc13 and the Supreme Court of the US in 
Tseng v El Al Israel Airlines Ltd,14 where a claimant’s action against the carrier falls within the 
substantive scope of the Warsaw Convention (or MC99)15 but no liability is provided for under the 
provisions of the relevant convention, then no action lies against the carrier (either under the 
conventions or le droit commun). For example, a passenger injury that occurs during qualifying 
international carriage by air but is not the result of an “accident” and/or is not “bodily injury” would 
not be recoverable. This proposition is largely accepted but is not without challenge.16 As it stands, 
the consensus of jurisprudence would deny the claimant a remedy against the carrier but they 
would be entitled to pursue a third party (e.g. the manufacturer) under le droit commun. The 
question to be asked in the context of this research is whether the immunity granted to third parties 
by channelling claims through carriers should be maintained in the case where there is no liability 
of the carrier. In other words, should the exclusivity enjoyed by carriers under the conventions be 
extended to the nominated third parties? Resolution of this issue is dependent on the solution to 
the question of the exclusivity of the Convention, which, as noted above, is still contested. If the 
current consensus prevails, then the issue of third parties would arise and a policy would need to 
be adopted with respect to third parties. However, if non-exclusivity were to win out, then the issue 
would not arise, since both carriers and third parties could be sued under le droit commun. In 
either event, the proposal made in this thesis would be applicable, the only distinguishing issue 
would the extent of its application. Establishing a policy position on this would be a valuable area 
for future research. 
An advantage of the proposal put forward in this thesis is that it would replicate the 
arrangements already established by the industry itself. Through contractual indemnities, the 
principal stakeholders to international carriage by air allocate risk to the carrier, who in turn shifts 
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that risk onto the aviation insurance market. The cost to the insurer in assuming that risk is then 
spread across that market through the payment of premiums by carriers. It is submitted that this 
is the most efficient and appropriate mechanism as it focuses the cost on the party best placed 
to spread it across the widest possible consumer base for international carriage by air, i.e. the 
passengers. This results in a regime where it is the two contracting parties to international carriage 
by air who are prima facie bearing the costs of a risk which has been rationally and responsibly 
insured against.  
The way forward is back. Back to a regime where the claimant’s choice of forum was absolute 
and inviolable. Back to the two-party paradigm upon which the Warsaw Convention was created 
and under which the claimant passenger was effectively limited to a remedy against the carrier. 
If this is done then choice of forum will be regulated in a manner which takes account of the bigger 
picture, which is fair to all parties and which also promotes the policy objectives of MC99 and 
those of the industry generally.   
 
 
